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 Zimbabwe’s crisis was not just about values or votes, but about institutions: 
their performance, outcomes and about the distributional advantages that flowed from 
them.  During this period, institutional rules were fiercely contested, and the 
referendum result was an important expression of preferences for institutional 
alternatives that could generate different political outcomes.  The contestation was also 
about institutional alternatives and legacies, in other words, about institutional stability 
or change.  Institutions matter, for they are the 'rules of the game' (North 1990: p. 3), 
and they have important distributional consequences (Knight 1992).  This dissertation 
examines the strategic institutional reforms in the print media and commercial 
agriculture sectors, as well as the issue areas of freedom of expression, assembly and 
movement, political violence and impunity. 
The 2000-2008 period of Zimbabwe's history was unique, for ZANU-PF faced 
both unprecedented domestic opposition and the challenge of four national elections 
(parliamentary and presidential) (the 'hurdles') during this eight-year period (the 'hurdle 
race').  Together with ZANU-PF's own decisions to participate in the electoral 
processes, these realities created a very specific collective action problem for the senior 
members of ZANU-PF.  Known as the 'State's Dilemma', it is the challenge of retaining 
needed support for the status quo in the face of collective dissent, when the interests of 
the state's supporters may align otherwise (Lichbach 1995: pp. 256-258).   
   Using the theoretical framework of rational-choice institutionalism, this 
dissertation contributes to the Zimbabwean literature through its identification of, and 
explicit focus on, ZANU-PF's collective action problem.  It reveals the importance of 
strategic institutional reform in altering the dynamics of exit and voice, with their 
implications for stability or change (Hirschman 1970, 1978, 1986).  It thus contributes 
to the explanation of the outcomes of this period.  The dissertation's findings are of 
interest to the larger study of liberation movements.  
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Chapter One:  Introduction, Design and Methodology 
 This dissertation is about the collective action problem faced by ZANU-PF 
during 2000-2008.  The 'State's Dilemma' is the challenge of retaining support for the 
status quo in the face of collective dissent, when the interests of the state's supporters 
may align otherwise (Lichbach 1995: pp. 256-258 citing Olson 1990: p. 15).  The 
dissertation offers explanatory value through its identification of, and focus, on ZANU-
PF's collective action problem, through its attention to the role of strategic institutional 
reform and the dynamics of exit and voice in easing this problem.   
 In situations of declining satisfaction, those actors who are dissatisfied have 
three core action-choices: to exit, to stay loyal, or to give voice (Hirschman 1970, 1978 
and 1986).  The interactions between these three action-choices are known as the 
dynamics of exit and voice.  This dissertation, using a rational choice institutionalist 
framework, argues that strategic institutional reforms altered institutions and the 
dynamics of exit and voice in Zimbabwe during this period, and thus are important 
additional explanatory elements to the outcomes of this period.  The Zimbabwean 
literature has not previously explicitly focused on this collective action problem, the 
dynamics of exit and voice (Hirschman 1970, 1978, 1986), nor on the role of 
institutional reform in easing the same.   
 The period 2000-2008 was an extraordinary time in Zimbabwe's history.  The 
senior members of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), 
faced unprecedented opposition and mobilisation by Zimbabweans.  They also 
competed in four nation-wide elections (two parliamentary, two presidential) during 
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this eight-year period.  Each of the elections was a 'hurdle' in the eight-year long 'hurdle 
race'.  The first of these 'hurdles', the parliamentary elections of June 2000, were held 
only a few months after Zimbabwe's historic referendum – a national referendum in 
which ZANU-PF's draft constitutional reforms were rejected by many Zimbabweans.  
The results of the various elections are presented in Table 1.    
 The political opposition was led by the Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC), and supported by many other civic actors working to improve democratic 
governance and economic performance in Zimbabwe.  The MDC's political platform, 
anchored in the issues of democratisation, economic reform, respect for human rights, 
the rule of law and the fight against corruption (Saunders 2000: pp. 102-103) resonated 
widely with many Zimbabweans.  The MDC benefited, particularly in its first years, 
from its roots within the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), which had 
already engaged with the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) on issues of economic 
policy and demonstrated its mobilising capacity through national strikes.  Morgan 
Tsvangirai, the ZCTU's Secretary-General, would step down to become the MDC's first 
leader (Dansereau 2003: pp. 180-184; McCandless 2011: p. 49).  The ZCTU was also 
important in the 1997 formation of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), 
joining the Zimbabwe Council of Churches and other civic organisations to launch this 
Assembly (Raftopoulos 2009: p. 206; McCandless 2011: pp. 40-49). 
  By 1997-1998, Zimbabweans' demands for change were coalescing around the 
need for constitutional reforms that would constrain the powers of the Executive 
Presidency, introduce electoral reforms, increase media freedoms as well as address the 
land redistribution issue (Saunders 2000: pp. 92-95; McCandless 2011: pp. 40 citing 
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Raftopoulos 2000, Kagoro 2001).  While the NCA was leading civic processes, the 
ZANU-PF government set up its own Constitutional Commission that produced the 
draft constitution that was voted upon by Zimbabweans.  This is discussed further 
below in chapter five.     
  The February 2000 rejection of the draft constitution in the national referendum 
had multiple implications, but from an institutionalist perspective, the following are 
noteworthy.  First, the referendum results, and indeed the processes, were important 
expressions of preference, by many Zimbabweans, for institutional alternatives that 
could generate different political outcomes.  Both the NCA's consultation processes and 
the referendum campaign had demonstrated Zimbabweans' interest and engagement in 
questions, and the issues of institutional reform.  Importantly, the issues of institutional 
reform had been placed on the public agenda, by citizens.  Following the referendum 
victory, these were unlikely to be removed from the agenda, until change or progress 
was achieved – or blocked.   
 Second, the debates, the consultations and the referendum campaign, appear to 
have reminded the members of the ZANU-PF regime, and many Zimbabweans as well, 
of the agency that belonged to Zimbabweans' as citizens and electors.  The NCA's 
education and consultation efforts mobilised concern and awareness, amongst many 
Zimbabweans, about the democratic consequences of the institutional rules of 
Zimbabwe's Constitution.  These policy processes were important: for their awareness-
raising, their legitimating and mobilising effects, and for the agency that they created 
(Dorman 2003).  By creating opportunities and space for the expression of the action-
choice of voice the NCA and its allies and supporters had contributed to altering the 
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future expectations of many Zimbabweans, both within ZANU-PF, the civic and 
political opposition, and Zimbabwean society.   
 Third, these processes, the participatory approaches by the civics, and the 
representativeness of the trade unions, had been contrasted against ZANU-PF’s more 
closed structures of decision-making and its more authoritarian approach.  Through 
their outreach they educated and engaged, and influenced public opinion.  They 
contributed to a de-legitimisation of the regime (Compagnon 2011: p. 91), at a time 
when its support was already weakened due to economic pressures.  
 Fourth, the referendum result generated important uncertainty for the members 
of the ZANU-PF regime.  Uncertainty, and the strategic management of the same, is 
discussed further below, as it is important to collective action.  The members of the 
ZANU-PF regime faced two different types of uncertainty:  one related to the actor's 
future status within a group and another related to institutional alternatives and 
outcomes (Knight 1992: p. 45).  This latter uncertainty is directly related to the choices, 
outcomes and consequences of institutional reform.  At this point it is worth noting that 
the uncertainty faced by the members of the ZANU-PF regime, arose because of the 
inter-dependency within the 'State's Dilemma' as a collective action problem.  In this 
case, the members of ZANU-PF, were dependent on the choices of Zimbabwean voters, 
once the election was called.  This inter-dependency is discussed further below.  
 Zimbabweans were surveyed, in late 1999, about their views on democratic 
governance.  This public opinion data is particularly revealing, eighteen years later, 
given our knowledge of the events that followed.  The Zimbabweans surveyed 
indicated that "regular elections" (86 percent), "freedom of speech" (82 percent), 
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competing political parties (82 percent) were "absolutely essential" or "important" to 
their understanding of democracy, along with high ratings for progress on several 
socio-economic rights (Chikwanha-Dzenga et. al. 2001: p. 10 Table 2).  This, and other 
public opinion data analyzed for this dissertation, confirmed Zimbabweans' preferences 
for a democratic system of governance – preferences that highlighted the extent of the 
challenge facing ZANU-PF as they sought to solve the 'State's Dilemma'.   
 Against a backdrop of worsening economic conditions, a spreading HIV/AIDS 
pandemic, and declining democratic governance, this 1999 survey also revealed that 
"...nearly seven out of ten Zimbabweans felt that their President does not bother about 
their fate or care what they think" and nearly 60 percent felt the same about 
Parliamentarians (Chikwanha-Dzenga et. al. 2001: p. 24).  By 2002, the youthfulness 
of Zimbabwe's population was striking: fifty percent of the population had been born 
following independence in 1980 and only thirty-six percent of all Zimbabweans had 
lived under Rhodesian rule (IOM 2009: p. 28 Table 6 citing Central Statistics Office 
2004, author's calculations).  As discussed further below, this public opinion and 
demographic data suggested a very fragile base of loyalty to the members of the 
governing ZANU-PF regime.     
 Institutions matter, for they are the 'rules of the game' (North 1990: p. 3) that 
structure the relationships between actors.  Institutions may offer important 
coordination gains, but they also have important distributional consequences (Knight 
1992).  This phase of the contestation over institutional rules in Zimbabwe was 
significant, but earlier contestations had also occurred under Rhodesian rule, and 
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during the liberation struggle.  Indeed, contestation over the distributional 
consequences of institutional rules was a central feature of both of those periods.   
 Institutional rules also matter for their contribution to explaining outcomes 
(Shepsle 1989: p. 135).  Institutional rules emerge and are "...communicated through 
the claims and actions of rational actors... Rather than focusing on collective goals, 
self-interested actors want institutions that produce those social outcomes that are best 
for them as individual strategic actors" (Knight 1992: p. 38).  Knight’s argument re-
positioned rational choice institutionalism as a theoretical framework that was relevant 
to a broader range of collective action challenges, such as those that help define the 
distribution of power within a state.   
 Institutional rules may also magnify or ease the collective action problems 
faced by each actor.  This dissertation provides specific examples of how institutional 
reforms, strategically undertaken by the members of the ZANU-PF regime, eased their 
own challenge, and/or exacerbated the MDC's dilemma (the 'Rebel's Dilemma', defined 
below) and altered the dynamics of exit and voice.  The prospective nature of rules 
meant that their effect would continue to be felt at each future 'hurdle' or election.  This 
analysis adds explanatory value to our understanding of the outcomes during this 
unique period of Zimbabwean history.      
 Electoral success is a collective action problem.   A "change in an unpopular 
regime (or its fundamental reform)" is a public good because no one can be excluded 
once it is achieved (Pfaff 2006: p. 9).  But electoral success is a specific type of 
collective action problem, one that is a 'step-good', for it "...can be provided only in 
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discrete steps rather than over a continuous range of levels" (Hardin 1982: pp. 4, 
59-91).  As a collective action challenge, I would add that it also has aggregated (e.g. 
across constituencies) characteristics and a time-bound nature.  These both generate, or 
exacerbate, the coordination problems, raising the hurdle 'higher' for both the members 
of the governing regime and for members of the political and civic opposition.   
 A second, related collective action challenge is, the 'State's Dilemma'.  This is 
the specific collective action challenge faced by members of a governing regime and it 
is their challenge of sustaining their needed support in the face of collective dissent 
when the interests of the state's supporters may align otherwise (Lichbach 1995: pp. 
256-258 drawing on Olson 1990: p. 15).  In other words, it is the challenge of aligning 
the interests of Zimbabweans to the interests of the members of the ZANU-PF regime.   
In Zimbabwe, this Dilemma arose, because of ZANU-PF's own decision to participate 
in the elections, for the Dilemma is own of inter-dependency.  Their decision to 
participate in the elections, despite their authoritarian character, made them dependent 
on the electoral choices of Zimbabweans.  The ‘step-good’ cannot be achieved unless 
the ‘State’s Dilemma’ of aligning support in the facing of competing interests is solved.   
 The ‘State’s Dilemma’ as a collective action problem existed in every round of 
Zimbabwean elections, but it was not until the 2000 referendum and the subsequent 
elections that it truly became visible.  General satisfaction with ZANU/ZANU-PF’s 
performance in the initial years meant that there was no real significant challenge of 
aligning voters’ choices with ZANU-PF’s interests.  In 1987, the Zimbabwe African 
People's Union (ZAPU) had been integrated into ZANU, to form ZANU-PF (Clapham 
1996: p. 204) and the remaining opposition was weak and fragmented (Sithole 1999: 
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pp. 206-211).  In the 1990s, as voter turn-out dropped, and Zimbabweans became less 
engaged with their democracy, the collective active challenge started to emerge.  
However, by the late 1990s, as discussed below, it was a time of significant economic 
dissatisfaction and many Zimbabweans, desired change.  And a new, well-formed, 
political opposition emerged.  The Dilemma existed at each election, but it was the 
scale of support, and the strength of the political opposition, that combined to make this 
collective action dilemma visible during this Zimbabwean period.    
 The opposite ‘Dilemma’ was faced by the MDC, as the leading political 
opposition.  It is the 'Rebel's Dilemma' and it is the challenge of the mobilisation of 
dissent.  Actors face uncertain public benefits and certain private costs, which 
incentivises inaction rather than action and participation in protest or dissent (Lichbach 
1995: pp. 15-16).  In light of the risks, and the uncertain outcomes, it is striking the 
extent to which Zimbabweans mobilised for changes to their institutions and to the 
outcomes (political, economic, and social) that they produced.   
Collective action problems are central to outcomes during periods of 
contestation, for the "...[t]he relative capacity for solving and creating, diminishing and 
magnifying collective action problems decides the outcome of the game" (Lichbach 
1995: p. 258).  During this period of contestation in Zimbabwe, the members of the 
ZANU-PF regime faced their most significant collective action challenge in the post-
independence period, and they adopted multiple strategies, including institutional 
reform, to retain their political support for the status quo.  The strategic management of 
collective action problems is at the heart of the political contestation between regimes 
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and their opponents (ibid: pp. 22-28).  The focus of this dissertation is on the regime’s 
strategic use of institutional reform to help ease the ‘State’s Dilemma’.   
 This eight-year period was marked by political, social and economic turbulence.  
Despite this, strategic institutional reforms were undertaken, and their effects 
contributed to the outcomes of this period of contestation.  Like the collective action 
problem itself, these intentional reforms became more visible because of the use of 
theoretical lens of rational choice institutionalism, collective action theory, and the 
dynamics of exit and voice (Hirschman 1970, 1978, 1986) as analytical frameworks.  
These frameworks, and this analysis, contributes to the understanding this period of the 
Zimbabwean crisis and have added to the diversity of theoretical frameworks already 
present within the literature on Zimbabwe.    
 Rational-choice institutionalism is a theoretical framework that focuses 
analytically on decision-making, rules, collective action challenges, uncertainty, and 
how "...existing institutions structure individual and aggregate choice" (Levi, Cook et 
al. 1990: p. 15).  It goes beyond traditional rational-choice theory, to recognize that the 
strategic choices of actors (individually, in organisations or in groups), are influenced, 
and shaped by, the institutions themselves but maintains the assumption of rationality 
(i.e. reasoned action that is goal-focused).   
The “institutionalism” of rational-choice institutionalism is particularly 
important in the Zimbabwean context, for the contestation in Zimbabwe during this 
period was not just about values or votes, but about institutions: their performance or 
outputs (for example, access to health services), their outcomes (e.g. democratic 
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consolidation, or not) and about the distributional advantages that flowed from them 
(e.g. political power, private economic gain).  During this period, the contestation was 
also about institutional alternatives (e.g. a new constitution, a stronger, less presidential 
democracy), and about the institutional legacies of the colonialism, in other words, 
about institutional stability or change.  The strategic choices and decisions made by 
actors may influence the development of, or evolution in, institutions, through their 
impacts on institutional stability or change (Knight 1992).  It was for these reasons that 
this theoretical framework was chosen, rather than pure rational-choice theory, or other 
alternative frameworks.  
 Strategic institutional reforms also altered the dynamics of exit and voice, and 
thus contributed to the outcomes of this period.  In situations of rising dissatisfaction, 
there are three core action-choices available to individual or collective actors – to exit, 
to give voice or to remain loyal (Hirschman 1970, 1978, 1986).  This dissertation 
discusses each of these action-choices, as well as the two mechanisms of information 
and sanctions (i.e. penalties) that help actors to formulate their expectations of other 
actors (Knight 1992).  Mobilisation, inducements (i.e. incentives, rewards and 
penalties), and veto or other powers, are amongst the products of institutional reform, 
that may contribute to aligning expectations, and therefore choices and outcomes.  
These are discussed throughout the following chapters.  Lichbach argued that "[t]he 
state, recognising a dissident's exit/voice option, uses accommodative and repressive 
response strategies to control the dissident's choice" (Lichbach 1995: p. 24).    
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 The literature on Zimbabwe has given a great deal of attention to ZANU-PF's 
political narrative, and indeed argument and narrative are important political tools 
(Majone 1992; Stone 2002; 2012).  With the core themes of war and resistance, 
sovereignty, liberation and race, the narrative was a re-telling of Zimbabwe's history 
(Ranger 2004), and a sophisticated political framing, of ZANU-PF's liberation struggle.  
In this dissertation, I will call it the 'patriotic narrative'.  This term recognises its origins 
in Ranger's 'patriotic history', but, from a public policy perspective, acknowledges that 
it also served as a causal story, that is, a narrative that selects “...some aspects of 
perceived reality and make them more salient [important or visible]…in such a way as 
to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation…” (Stone 2012: pp. 252-53 citing Entman 1993: pp. 51-8).   
 Casual stories, are one approach, amongst many, to defining political problems 
and therefore also to framing issues.  Both narrative and issue-framing are important 
strategies, albeit non-institutionalist strategies, which may help to address collection 
action problems through their influence on choices.  For example, and as was the case 
in Zimbabwe, they can influence public opinion, may help to frame choices, and may 
also affect mobilisation.  In terms of the 'State's Dilemma', this patriotic narrative 
differs, in substantive content, source, role, and target, from the action-choice of voice.  
These differences are discussed further in Chapter three.  Chapter four discusses the 
challenge of retaining loyalty, i.e. "...[postponing exit] in spite of dissatisfaction and 
qualms" (Hirschman 1970: p. 104)  and the differences between the action-choice of 
loyalty and ZANU-PF's concept of loyalty which was also communicated through this 
patriotic narrative.   
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 But ZANU-PF's patriotic narrative was not deployed alone – it was 
accompanied by institutional reform.  The narrative's effects arose not only from its 
own normative power, but also its framing of issues, and choices.  It was supported by 
institutional reforms that amplified its message through the state-owned media that 
carried the public statements by senior members of the regime, and it was also 
supported by institutional reforms that suppressed the voices of dissent.  The regime's 
distributional advantage in the broadcast sector, including crucially rural radio, 
communicated this patriotic narrative widely and extensively.  However, the rise of 
private print media was not only reducing their distributional advantage, but also, the 
private media was increasing the availability of information, including about alternative 
choices and institutional outcomes, as discussed further in chapter three.       
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Institutional reforms also targeted the freedoms that underpin the action-choice 
of 'voice' and its aggregation.  The action-choice of voice is the expression of dissent, 
and therefore differs from the patriotic narrative introduced above.  It is defined as "…
any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape, from an objectionable state of 
affairs, whether through individual or collective petition [to internal leadership] .... or 
through various types of actions and protests, including those that are meant to mobilise 
public opinion" (Hirschman 1970: p. 30).  The analytical developments to this action-
choice are discussed further in chapter three.   
The freedoms of speech, association, assembly and of movement are 
institutional rules, all guaranteed in Zimbabwe's Constitution.  These freedoms, from 
the perspective of the ‘State’s Dilemma’ exacerbated ZANU-PF's collective action 
challenge, for they facilitated mobilisation and the aggregation of collective voice.  
Institutional reforms that narrowed permissions, increased penalties and noticeability, 
and selected actors, were adopted.  As discussed in chapter three, these institutional 
reforms reduced the effectiveness of the action-choice of voice – and intensified the 
MDC's mobilisation challenge.    
 Restrictions on the freedoms of movement and assembly were not only imposed 
through institutional reforms to formal rules, but also through the development of 
informal rules.  These new informal rules differed from the simple non-enforcement of 
the formal rules, and I identify the following specific differences: how they structure 
the relationships between actors, including via new roles; the new permissions, 
entitlements or prohibitions that they may create or impose; and, the different decision-
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making fora where these informal rules are decided and enforced.  These points will be 
discussed further in chapters three to five.   
 This introduction has identified the specific collective action challenge faced by 
ZANU-PF, and introduced the importance of institutional rules, in influencing choices, 
coordinating expectations and influencing outcomes.  Inducements, i.e. incentives, 
rewards and penalties, are strategies that contribute to aligning choices and outcomes 
with collective goals (Stone 2002: pp. 265-283).  This dissertation, particularly chapter 
four, examines how the institutional reforms introduced by the ZANU-PF regime 
altered the incentives, rewards and penalties facing Zimbabweans.  These alterations 
had consequences for the dynamics of exit, voice and loyalty.  To encourage, or reward, 
electoral loyalty incentives (e.g. food aid, impunity) were offered.   
 In situations of inter-dependency, such as the State's Dilemma, the risk of 
free-riding will arise, and with it the challenge of monitoring individuals or actors.  
Free-riding occurs when an actor benefits from the "...provision of a collective good 
without having participated in its production..." (Olson 1971: p. 91).  Free-riding poses 
risks to group success (Hardin 1982: p. 98), so if incentives or rewards are offered, 
monitoring will occur.  Demands for contributions and/or demonstrations of loyalty 
may also be made.  In Zimbabwe, the members of ZANU-PF both introduced reforms 
(e.g. in the media sector) that increased the noticeability of actions, and the penalties 
for non-compliance.  Demands for demonstrations of loyalty, for example, by members 
of the police or by rural voters were also made.  These are discussed further below, 
particularly in chapter four.   
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Chapter five will discuss one of the most controversial features of the 
Zimbabwean crisis during this period, i.e. the land occupations and the acquisition of 
Zimbabwe's commercial farms.  The occupation and acquisition of the private white-
owned commercial farms, and the associated political violence, were amongst the 
events that generated considerable international media and diplomatic attention to the 
crisis in Zimbabwe.  Beyond the headlines, they were a significant political and 
economic moment in Zimbabwean history.  The land occupations and seizures 
continued for several years, albeit with declining intensity.  They would have (and 
continue to have) profound impacts for Zimbabwe's future social, political and 
economic development as well as its governance and identity.  
 The land issue came to a head from the late 1990s, for several reasons, and was 
catalysed further by the referendum results of February 2000.  Facing significant 
electoral pressures, the ‘State’s Dilemma’, and in advance of the June 2000 elections, 
members of the ZANU-PF regime, needed to demonstrate a credible political 
commitment on this central issue.  After twenty years of independence, and despite 
some progress in land settlement, Zimbabweans were however, sceptical about the 
commitment of the ZANU-PF regime to this issue.  Supporting the land occupations, 
i.e. "...the forcible takeover of land (outside the law)" (Matondi 2012: p. xi) and, later, 
the 'fast-track' acquisition of the farms, demonstrated commitment to sceptical voters, 
mobilising support through visible action.  It has also become apparent that these 
occupations permitted a selective incentive (i.e. the material benefit of land) to be 
accessed, and/or allocated to, many current or future supporters in rural Zimbabwe –as 
well as to elite members of the regime.     
!  25
 While much has been written on these land occupations and seizures, this 
dissertation contributes to the literature through its argument that the reform of the 
institutional rules governing property rights altered the dynamics of exit from one of 
'voluntary' to 'forced' exit.  The institutional reforms were thus essential enablers for the 
land seizures.  Forcing exit reduced transaction costs, allowing for the acceleration of 
land acquisition, and helped to suppress and/or punish the voices of dissent within the 
commercial farming sector.   
Structure of the Dissertation:   
 The dissertation is divided into two parts: the first part (chapters one and two) 
introduces the core argument of the dissertation itself, its theoretical foundations and 
the design and methodology of this study.  The second part of the dissertation (chapters 
three through five plus a synthesis section) explores specific institutionalist elements 
that contributed to altered dynamics of exit and voice, and thus contributes to the 
explanation of the political outcomes of the period.  Chapter six brings together the 
findings from this research and offers concluding analysis.      
 In Chapter three, the action-choice of 'voice' is discussed.  As the expression of 
dissent, it is, therefore, a sub-set of the larger public debate that was occurring within 
Zimbabwe.  The chapter analyses the strategic institutional reforms that were 
introduced by the members of the governing regime to limit the private print media, 
and to restrict the four freedoms most important to 'voice' and therefore collective 
mobilisation: the freedoms of expression, of assembly, of association, and, of 
movement.  
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 The intentional reforms undertaken to restructure the relations within the print 
media sector resulted in narrowed permissions, an increased noticeability of action and 
stronger penalties for non-compliance.  Information flows matter, in situations of 
strategic interdependency, and to collective action.  Information that is unavailable or 
unreliable negatively affects decision-making, while new information may generate 
uncertainty.  Information problems exacerbate the challenge of coordinating both 
expectations and actions.  Restrictions on the flow, availability and reliability of 
information all help to resolve collective action problems by "...concentrat[ing] their 
attacks...on the dissident's supplies or input sources" (Lichbach 1995: p. 49 citing 
Leites and Wolf 1970: pp. 76-78).   
 Chapter four examines the strategic deployment of inducements by the 
members of the regime.  Selective incentives and rewards (e.g. food aid, impunity and 
protection from political violence) or penalties (e.g. targeted political violence) are all 
important means of aligning choices to achieve preferred outcomes.  Inducements were 
a critical part of ZANU-PF's response to their challenge of retaining electoral loyalty.  
They were needed in order to help resolve the 'State's Dilemma', with its focus on 
sustaining the status quo.  The chapter also discusses the concept of free-riding, and the 
measures taken, by members of the ZANU-PF regime, to reduce it.  Free-riding has 
important negative consequences on the prospects of collective success, and therefore 
needed to be addressed, particularly in 'step-good' collective action problems, and when 
collective action problems are time bound.  
 Chapter five discusses the ' forced exit' of farmers and farmworkers in the 
commercial agriculture sector, enabling the governing regime to acquire private lands 
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for re-distribution and resettlement.  The visible actions on the land issue, helped to 
demonstrate political commitment to rural Zimbabweans, mobilising support needed to 
ease ZANU-PF's collective action problem.   This discussion contributes to the 
literature by arguing that the reforms to the institutional rules governing property rights 
in the commercial agriculture sector, altered the dynamics of exit from one of 
'voluntary' to 'forced' exit.  These institutional reforms were thus essential enablers for 
the land seizures.  They reduced transaction costs as well as the cost of exit, allowing 
for the acceleration of land acquisition.  As the reforms shifted the commercial farmers’ 
choices from 'voluntary' to 'forced exit', the reforms served first as a source of 
‘voice’ (Hirschman 1970: p. 34), and then increasingly as a deterrent, as penalties were 
applied to punish the voices of dissent within the commercial farming sector.  Forced 
exit demonstrated commitment to sceptical rural voters through visible action 
(including through the regime's support for the land occupations).  It also permitted a 
selective incentive (i.e. the material benefit of land) to be acquired for re-settlement, or 
in some cases re-allocated as a reward, including to senior members of the regime.   
 Across chapters three through five of this dissertation, the analysis draws 
specific attention to the powers of actor selection, of initiative and compulsion and the 
permissions and prohibitions altered or created through intentional, institutional 
reforms.  The identification of these powers and their effects on the dynamics of exit 
and voice is an advance on both Hirschman and Lichbach, for neither author discussed 
explicitly these powers..  Lichbach identified multiple possible solutions to collective 
action problems, some of which are discussed in this dissertation but he did not identify 
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the potential of these powers to take away the choice of exit or voice from one actor by 
allocating them to another.   
 The synthesis section focuses on the elections of March 29th, 2008.  These 
elections saw significant electoral gains for the MDC and losses for ZANU-PF.  The 
synthesis examines this election through the lens of the dynamics of exit, voice and 
loyalty, drawing upon the discussion in preceding chapters regarding institutional 
reforms and their effects on incentives, penalties, free-riding and uncertainty.    
 This dissertation also discusses the strategic management of uncertainty, i.e. 
intentional reforms to reduce uncertainty pertaining to choices, decisions and/or 
outcomes.  Uncertainty is an important analytical factor emerging from rational choice 
institutionalism, given its effects on the evaluation of choices, decisions, and the 
expected actions of other actors.  This dissertation specifically discusses two types of 
uncertainty: the first, about an actor's future status within a group and, the second, the 
uncertainty about institutional alternatives and outcomes.  This dissertation argues that 
institutional reforms helped to reduce uncertainty for members of the ZANU-PF 
regime.  
  
Research Design   
 The previous sections of this introductory chapter have presented a short 
overview of the dissertation's main arguments, its theoretical foundations, and the 
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structure of the dissertation.  This section of the dissertation discusses the origins of this 
research project and its influence on the design of the research problem.  The following 
section then discusses the research methodology. 
 This research was prompted by an initial interest in the development of targeted 
or 'smart' sanctions, such as asset freezes or travel bans that are applied against specific 
actors (e.g. individuals, private entities) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Belarus or Zimbabwe or other states.  These sanctions are often deployed by a range of 
actors, including the European Union.  As the policy instrument of sanctions evolves 
away from comprehensive sanctions to targeted or 'smart' sanctions against specific 
actors (Cortright and Lopez 2002; Hufbauer et al. 2009: pp.131-141), this author 
believed that there was also a need for a shift in the unit of analysis away from the state 
and towards the responses of the individuals and groups within the sanctioned regime.  
This more micro-level of analysis, brings with it a focus on rules and decision-making, 
as well as the dynamics of groups and collective action.   
 This initial interest and thinking quickly made visible the domestic collective 
action challenges in countries under targeted sanctions, including the challenges to 
constrain other domestic actors with whom members of governing regimes interact.  
This turned this dissertation away from its origins towards the issues of domestic 
collective dissent, collective action, the role of institutions and the 'State's and Rebel's 
Dilemmas’ (Lichbach 1995).  
 The initial observation of a perceived gap relating to institutions in the sanctions 
literature influenced the research design for this dissertation in three ways – although, 
ultimately the scope of the dissertation does not address, at all, the issue of targeted 
!  30
sanctions.  First, this identification of a gap in the sanctions literature contributed to the 
selection of rational choice institutionalism as the theoretical framework, and thus to 
the development of the dissertation’s focus on collective action.   
 Rational choice institutionalism, as a theoretical framework, links individual 
decision-making to institutions, thus differing from pure rational choice theory.  In turn, 
the strategic choices decisions made by actors may influence the development or 
evolution of institutions, through their impacts on institutional stability or change 
(Knight 1992).   This theoretical framework is discussed in greater depth in the next 
chapter and is a clear part of the research value of this dissertation.  By selecting this 
theoretical framework, this dissertation contributes to the analytical diversity that 
already exists in the body of literature on Zimbabwe, including the literature which 
assesses this crisis period.   
 The selection of Zimbabwe as the case study also arose from this initial 
research interest on targeted sanctions.  It was selected following a winnowing of 
potential cases drawn from the set of the EU's sanctions episodes, as discussed further 
in the research methodology section below.  Third, the scope of research on Zimbabwe 
was initially defined by the 'five fields' of institutional reform demanded by the EU, i.e. 
the areas in which the EU expected to see strengthened compliance:  "...the end of 
politically motivated violence; free and fair elections; freedom of the media; 
independence of the judiciary, [and the] end of illegal [land] occupations" (Council 
2003: Annex).  These 'five fields' were identified through a documentary review and 
content analysis of the EU decisions sanctioning the senior members of the 
Zimbabwean regime.  This initial analysis foreshadowed the interactions within the 
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Zimbabwean crisis of the action-choices of exit, voice and loyalty (Hirschman 1970, 
1978, 1986).   
  Given the subject matter and the framework of rational-choice institutionalism, 
a qualitative, rather than quantitative approach was selected.  Qualitative research 
allows for the assessment of a wide range of documentation covering the political 
events that unfolded, including reports that documented specific actions taken to reform 
institutions and to alter the penalties and incentives faced by other actors.  Each 
theoretical lens provides “…a perspective that shapes the types of questions asked, 
informs how data are collected and analysed…” as well as the “implications made from 
the study” (Creswell 2009: p. 235), and specific lines of enquiry were developed using 
the core elements of rational choice institutionalism.  
Therefore, the lines of enquiry asked the following questions:    
• what were the collective action dilemmas faced by members of the regime, and 
by their opponents?  
• what were the sectoral rules that structured the interactions between members 
of the regime, between the regime and its supporters or its opponents?   
• how did the reforms to these rules affect the collective action dilemmas faced 
(e.g. were veto-players created, agenda-setting powers provided)?  
• did these reforms alter the incentives and penalties faced by actors?  If so, 
how?              
• did these reforms reduce uncertainty, if so for whom?  
• did these reforms alter transaction costs, if so for whom?                         
• what were the consequences of these reforms in terms of the dynamics of exit 
and voice?  
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These questions were incorporated into the research methodology, as discussed further 
below.    
 The research design of the dissertation, i.e. the "...implicit or explicit logic that 
provides the framework for the research and guides the research strategy" (Burnham et 
al. 2008: p. 38) faced two major challenges: first, to develop a structure for the research 
and the dissertation itself that was theory-driven; and, second, to identify the sources of 
data and existing research, recognizing that the events had already passed.  To meet 
these challenges, a multi-step and multi-method process was used, described in more 
detail in the research methodology section below. 
 The breadth of the literature review undertaken reflected the challenge of 
demonstrating explanatory value about this unique period in Zimbabwe's history 
through the frameworks of rational choice institutionalism and collective action theory.  
The literature review allowed both existing findings and elements of the research 
dialogue on the Zimbabwean crisis to be assessed.  This helped to advance this 
researcher's own understanding and analysis, and the results of this literature review are 
presented in the next chapter.  
  The literature review also made explicit the core theoretical elements of rational 
choice institutionalism – that institutions help to resolve collective action dilemmas, 
reduce transaction costs, influence and aggregate choices, and/or maintain or alter 
distributional advantage; the assumption of rationality (i.e. reasoned action that is goal-
focused), and the use of rules that communicate incentives, commitments and penalties 
(sanctions) to other actors.  Throughout the drafting of the dissertation efforts were 
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made to evaluate the data, findings and theory against each other, with a view to 
producing a robust analytical narrative. 
   These theoretical elements guided the assessment of the research data, based on 
the lines of enquiry above.  They also guided the development of the argument in 
support of this dissertation’s findings and its contributions to the literature.  With 
Knight's (1992) work on institutional emergence and change and Olson's work on 
collective action (1971) as initial theoretical foundations, the dissertation is grounded in 
the work of two important authors in the fields of institutionalism and collective action.  
The literature review was conducted in order to identify points of commonality, 
divergence and gaps in the literature.  Due attention was given to the issues of group 
dynamics, veto-players (Tsebelis 2002) and agenda-setting powers, as discussed further 
in the next chapter.  
 As the analysis for this dissertation deepened, three other authors took 
prominence in the institutionalist argument that has been developed.  These are:  Stone 
(2002) and her focus on policy processes and their paradoxes; Lichbach's 1995 study 
on the paradoxes of the 'Rebel's Dilemma' and the 'State's Dilemma', and his 
identification of 'solutions' to these specific collective action challenges; and, 
Hirschman's (1970, 1978, 1986) studies on the three action-choices of exit, voice and 
loyalty that are available to actors in situations of declining economic or policy 
satisfaction.   
 The latter two authors, Lichbach and Hirschman, were particularly influential 
because of their direct relevance to the Zimbabwean case.  Given the dissatisfaction of 
many Zimbabweans' with their political and economic governance, there was 
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unprecedented collective mobilisation, and therefore there was contestation over 
collective action solutions. Voice was being expressed, the maintenance of electoral 
loyalty was being sought, exit (both voluntary and forced) was occurring.  
 A final component of the literature review concerned Zimbabwe itself – its 
history, political dynamics and economic development, and other accounts of this crisis 
period.  This literature has been written from a variety of theoretical perspectives, 
including a more limited engagement with institutionalism (Compagnon 2011).  Given 
that rational choice institutionalism is a new theoretical perspective in the Zimbabwean 
literature, the dissertation understandably focuses on this approach and its findings.  
However, additional attention has been paid to identify the points of commonality and 
difference with other accounts. 
   
Research Methodology:   
 The above section on research design has been transparent in explaining the 
starting point for this research project (targeted sanctions) and how it helped to 
influence the design of the research.  It set out the specific lines of enquiry that guided 
the research, with these lines of research enquiry anchored in the core elements of 
rational choice institutionalism and collective action theory.  This section shall discuss 
the methods of data collection, analysis and interpretation utilized in this research 
project.  
 Qualitative research involves the collection, analysis and interpretation of data, 
as well as the linking of analysis and theory through an interactive process.  It seeks to 
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provide explanatory value, acknowledging that competing views and perspectives do 
exist.  This debate on explanation and theory is the basis for a professional, public 
dialogue amongst researchers.  Each researcher brings his or her own history, including 
relevant professional experience, as well as a worldview and biases that reflect both the 
researcher's intellectual development and socio-economic and cultural contexts.  These 
worldviews and biases are important to a research project, for example, in terms of 
generating the initial research interest, in the framing of the research problem, and to 
the understanding, and thus the explanation, of the research topic.  The realities of 
location, resources, time, networks and language skills may also further influence the 
design and methods of research projects.  
 Together these generate the challenge of reflexivity, i.e. reflecting “…how [a 
researcher's] biases, values and personal background, such as gender, history, culture 
and socio-economic status, shape their interpretations formed during a study” (Creswell 
2009: p. 233).  Conscious efforts in the analysis must be made to address this 
challenge.  Despite the challenge of reflexivity, the global research community 
continues to investigate questions of interest, taking necessary steps to acknowledge 
and/or to overcome actual or perceived bias.  This research continues to cross not only 
borders (real or perceived) but also the boundaries of research disciplines, ultimately 
contributing to a richer debate and to advancing understanding.  
 Reflexivity requires that the researcher be explicit as to the worldview the 
researcher is applying to the research question.  Creswell defines a worldview as "...a 
basic set of beliefs that guide action" (2009: p. 6 citing Guba 1990: p. 17).  This 
dissertation uses rational choice as its worldview, with rational choice defined as 
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"...individuals act[ing] in pursuit of various goals and interests and [they] choose their 
actions in order to satisfy those interests most efficiently" (Knight 1992: p. 16-17).  
This worldview does not ignore that research occurs within specific settings including 
social, cultural, historical and/or institutional, but argues that the choices and decisions 
made within these contexts will satisfy an actor's interests efficiently.  The next chapter, 
discusses the various ways institutions are defined, including those based on norms as 
well as those defined as rules.   
 Rational choice institutionalism is a theory of rational actors, making 
consequentialist choices, influenced by the expectations of other actors within an 
institutional context that helps to reduce uncertainty and/or maximise the gains from 
exchange or cooperation (Hall and Taylor 1996: p. 12).  Although Hindmoor criticizes 
rational choice theory, arguing that actors may be bounded in their rationality, i.e. 
actors may not consider the full range of choices, nor the "...full range of consequences 
of any one choice" (Hindmoor 2006: pg. 16 Box 1.4), in this worldview actors 
nevertheless are still acting in the pursuit of their goals and interests.   Collective action 
is outcome-focused, and intentional institutional reform is also undertaken to advance 
or achieve specific outcomes.  Rational-choice with its consequentialist view is an 
appropriate worldview for this specific dissertation.   
Case-study Selection:   
 A key step in this research process was selecting a country to be the basis of the 
case study that would allow for an in-depth exploration of events, within a defined 
timeframe and activities (Creswell 2009: p. 13 citing Stake 1995).  As discussed, this 
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research project began with an initial interest in targeted sanctions, particularly those of 
the European Union (EU).  Four criteria were applied sequentially to a list of countries 
and entities subject to targeted sanctions by the European Union  developed by this 1
researcher.  These four criteria are:  the selection of states rather than non-state actors; 
internal vs. cross-border conflict; the inclusion of restrictive measures imposed against 
individual actors; and, eligibility for ODA assistance.  
 The first criterion excluded non-state actors, such as Al-Qaeda, that were 
subject to EU sanctions, reflecting the limited institutional context of some of these 
non-state actors.  The second criterion concerning the internal versus cross-border 
nature of the conflict was then applied. Focusing on those countries where the 
dynamics of the conflict were internal (e.g. Zimbabwe, Haiti) rather than those conflicts 
that directly engaged actors from neighbouring countries (e.g. the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo), offered a good alignment with the theoretical framework, by allowing a 
research focus on the domestic dynamics of institutional reform.  A third criterion, to 
remove those countries that did not have restrictive measures, i.e. targeted sanctions 
against specific named actors, was then applied.  Finally, to incorporate EU sanctions 
decisions under the Cotonou Agreement, a fourth criterion, that the country must be a 
recipient of Official Development Assistance (ODA) was applied to the remaining list 
of countries.   
 Following the sequential application of these four criteria, from an initial list of 
twenty countries, seven remained.  Haiti was the country which had been under 
 A consolidated list of countries and entities subject to EU sanctions and restrictive measures 1
may be found at:  <http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/consol-list/index_en.htm> [Accessed 
17 September 2011]. 
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sanctions for the longest period, while Guinea and Moldova were the most recently 
sanctioned (less than two years since the initial sanctions at the time of the assessment).  
After a preliminary review, Guinea and Moldova were set aside due to the limited 
material available.  Somalia and Zimbabwe were a second small cluster within the set, 
as both were sanctioned by the EU during the same 2000-2002 period, while Ivory 
Coast and Belarus formed a third cluster, both being sanctioned in 2004.  The diverse 
socio-economic differences between Belarus and the Ivory Coast made this cluster less 
interesting than the Somalia and Zimbabwe cluster, as Somalia and Zimbabwe were 
both aid-dependent countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.   
 It was Zimbabwe that emerged as an interesting potential case study.  First, the 
Zimbabwean case attracted international attention, not only for the events in Zimbabwe 
itself, but also due to the early imposition of targeted sanctions by the EU.  For many, 
what was at stake was the compliance, by the members of the ZANU-PF regime, with 
both domestic and internationally-agreed institutional frameworks (e.g. the rule of law, 
freedom of expression), in support of democratic governance, while for others the 
institution of sovereignty and the right of a state's leaders to chart the country's future 
was under challenge by the international community. 
 To note, to avoid a real, or perceived, conflict of interest, between her 
professional duties and her research activities, Haiti was removed from the list of 
possible case studies as the author was, during the timeframe of this research project, 
professionally employed on files that involved Haiti.  The author, a mid-career 
professional, was also, over twenty years ago, temporarily resident in Zimbabwe and 
engaged in international development issues.  This experience, although it provided her 
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with an initial exposure to Zimbabwean affairs, it was this research project which 
deepened her analytical understanding of the country's political dynamics.  She did not, 
during the timeframe of this research project have any professional contact with 
Zimbabwe.   
Analytic Narrative  
 This dissertation is an analytical narrative.  This research method brings 
together the theoretical elements of rational choice institutionalism with the historical 
data and research on the crisis in Zimbabwe.  The dissertation is one that is both 
narrative, in that "...it pays close attention to stories, accounts and context," but also 
analytic for its "...explicit and formal lines of reasoning, which facilitate both 
exposition and explanation" (Bates et al. 1998: p. 10).  Each of chapters three through 
five, examines a specific element (or elements) of rational choice institutionalism and 
collective action and analytically assesses the impact of these elements on the dynamics 
of exit and voice.   
 In alignment with the analytical narrative method, a single case study is 
discussed, and the previous section explained the selection of Zimbabwe as the case 
study.  By examining a specific case, there is an opportunity to "...examine the choices 
of [actors] who are embedded in specific settings" recognizing that they "...possess 
preferences and expectations; they are not isolated, but rather are locked in patterns of 
strategic interdependence" (Bates et al. 1998: p. 9).  Drawing upon the results of the 
literature review, and the events in Zimbabwe, this dissertation identified the specific 
collective action challenge, with its inter-dependencies, that faced by the members of 
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the ZANU-PF regime (the 'State's Dilemma).  It also identified specific choices and 
decisions made to advance institutional reforms. The analysis within this dissertation 
also discussed the implications of these reforms for the dynamics of exit and voice.   
 Several criteria for evaluating analytic narratives have been identified, 
including: the alignment between facts and the assumptions, between the data and the 
implications of the findings, the logic of the conclusions vis-à-vis the premises and the 
value of the theory as compared to other explanations, and to its broader applicability 
(Bates et al. 1998: pp. 14-18).  These criteria were kept in mind throughout the writing 
of the dissertation.  The dissertation has been structured around the core theoretical 
elements of rational choice institutionalism, and the lines of enquiry and analysis also 
reflect the same.   
 The dissertation offers explanatory value through its identification of, and 
focus, on ZANU-PF's collective action problem, created by the realities of diverging 
interests between their supporters and the members of the ZANU-PF regime, and their 
decision to participate in the electoral processes.  These findings are more broadly 
applicable to the study of other liberation movements in the Southern African region, 
including to their challenges of both constitutionalism and institutional reform.   
 Analytical narratives often use game theoretical modelling to help study and 
explain collective action problems.  However, this dissertation does not include this 
modelling in its examination of the Zimbabwean crisis, due to several considerations.  
First, game theory is often used to test specific causal mechanisms and variables, 
through the application of statistical analysis and modelling.  However, this dissertation 
is, if you will, positioned further 'upstream', for it has first made a contribution to 
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discussion of the Zimbabwean crisis by explicitly identifying the reality of ZANU-PF's 
collective action problem, something which has not previously been discussed within 
the literature.   
 Secondly, this analysis has discussed the importance of strategic institutional 
reform, and the management of collective action dilemmas as influences on outcomes.  
Specific powers, i.e. of actor selection, and the power of initiative have been identified 
as critical to the dynamics of exit and voice.  The identification of these powers may 
usefully serve as hypotheses for future research, but other case studies are needed to 
fully confirm these powers as causal mechanisms with broader applicability.  Thirdly, 
game-theory is most often modelled under the definition of institutions as 'equilibria', a 
theoretical approach to defining institutions (discussed in the next chapter) which was 
not accepted for this dissertation.  
 Finally, game theoretical modelling requires the availability of accurate 
statistics and data, yet the availability of statistical data on the Zimbabwean crisis is 
very limited, often of poor quality and due to the hyper-inflation, accurate economic 
data and comparisons is very difficult (UNDP 2008: p. 6).  Within the scope of this 
dissertation, three types of relevant data regularly appear in the grey literature (see 
below): data on political violence, election results, as well as public opinion data.  The 
latter with its statistical validity within specified margins of error is particularly 
welcome and has been incorporated into the dissertation.   
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The Literature Review and Documentary Analysis:   
 With Zimbabwe selected as the case study, the literature review started by 
developing a list of keywords that could be used to identify relevant materials through 
the available databases.  These keywords covered several theoretical areas, (e.g. 
institutionalism, particularly its rational-choice variant; theories of policy reform; 
collective) as well as Zimbabwe-specific areas (e.g. history, actors) and key authors 
(e.g. Raftopoulos, Chan, Kriger).  Each of these areas were adjusted, and often 
expanded, as the literature review advanced.  Some areas of reading were added as the 
research project progressed and gaps were identified (e.g. the history of Zimbabwe's 
media sector, land reform efforts, patriotic history).  Approximately twice a year, 
throughout the research period, the database searches were revisited to identify new 
scholarship and to incorporate, as appropriate, this research into the literature review 
and the analysis within the dissertation.    
 An inductive approach to data analysis was used throughout the research 
process, allowing for the collection and organisation of data to enable researchers 
“...look for and explain patterns that they find in it” (Hindmoor 2006: pg. 2).  This 
approach is relevant for what is de facto now a historical case study, as the events of 
this unique period in Zimbabwe's history began more than fifteen years ago.  As Bates 
et al. (2000: p. 698) argue, without a specific defined ‘game’ to model a case study 
against, the inductive method is most appropriate in analytic narratives.   
 While keywords helped to form the initial basis for the literature review, the 
data gathered required the classification, analysis and interpretation of each of the 
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materials identified.  Various filing structures (e.g. issue area) and working documents 
(e.g. chronological charts and/or tables of key events or reforms) were developed to 
both track the information and the analysis.  More advanced tools were developed as 
the research progress, for example to cross-reference the materials to the core 
theoretical elements (e.g. uncertainty), or to link different data sources about a specific 
event (e.g. the adoption of the Public Order and Security Act (POSA)) together.  These 
tools helped to identify commonalities, gaps and/or points of divergence. These tools 
facilitated the interpretation and bought meaning to the information collected (Creswell 
2009: p. 186 citing Rossman and Rallis 1998: p. 171).   
 This inductive approach was also interpretative, in that the inquiry was 
conducted by a single researcher who “…draws meaning from the findings of data 
analysis” (Creswell 2009: p. 230).  The interpretation was influenced by the theoretical 
framework, for the research lines of enquiry were anchored in rational choice 
institutionalism but was also challenged by the views and approaches of other 
researchers.  Although induction has been criticized as a research method due to the 
researcher's engagement in selecting the data and in interpreting it (Blaikie 2004: p. 243 
citing Popper), it remains in use as a social science method.   
 Research records captured the keywords and definitions of the core terms used 
throughout this dissertation.  Decisions to halt specific research avenues (e.g. to no 
longer pursue the role of sanctions as a policy instrument) and to initiate new ones that 
proved more fruitful (i.e. the framework of exit, voice and loyalty) meant that new 
keywords and definitions were added throughout the process.  For example, 
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Hirschman's concept of voice resulted in new keywords (e.g. mobilisation, public 
opinion, narrative) being identified and integrated into the research process.  This 
iterative process helped to both advance the analysis and build coherence with the core 
elements of the theoretical framework.  
 Of note, this research project began at a time when the Zimbabwean crisis had 
already been unfolding for over a decade.  This timing is significant, for it allowed for 
the research period to be established based on known events.  The period of study 
begins in 2000, with its constitutional referendum and elections providing an obvious 
'start' date and the establishment of a new 'government of national unity' in 2008 (GPA 
2008) serving as the logical 'end date'.  This 2008 event has also been used by other 
authors (e.g. Raftopoulos and Mlambo 2009; Bratton 2014: pp. 73-93) as a defining 
'break point' in discussions of the Zimbabwean crisis.    
 The timing of the research project also affected the choice of research methods, 
for the events had already transpired.  The challenge for the research project was thus 
to contribute explanatory value to the patterns and dynamics that arose from the 
decisions already taken, the reforms that had already been made and the events that had 
already occurred.  Many, but certainly not all, decisions are reflected in the reforms to 
institutions that were made during this period.  
 Institutional reforms and actions are the outcomes of decisions taken.  The 
detailed analysis of secondary materials is often how strategic behaviour is revealed 
(Bates et. al: 2000: p. 698) and thus methods of historical research were thus 
appropriate for use in this analytical narrative that examines events of nearly 20 years 
ago.  The project benefited from a wealth of primary source material (e.g. legislation, 
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public opinion data, and newspaper accounts) as well secondary sources; both grey 
literature (e.g. human rights reports) and published research by both Zimbabweans and 
other externally-based researchers.   
   Concurrent with the formal literature review, and to help examine the patterns 
and dynamics within the crisis, this research project examined four other documentary 
sources:  local newspapers, civil society reports, public opinion polling data, and 
specific pieces of Zimbabwean legislation.  Each type of document provided a specific 
value in the research process, summarized here and discussed below.  The newspapers, 
through the method of chronological review, provided an overview of the crisis, as it 
was reported to Zimbabweans daily.  The civil society reports provided an important 
documentary record of the effects of specific events and/or decisions on specific actors, 
and at times, on specific institutions (e.g. rule of law, freedom of expression). 
 The public opinion polling data now serves as an important record of the views 
of Zimbabweans as expressed at the time.  Finally, the legislative Acts provide a formal 
record of the rules and of the reforms decided.  Collectively these materials, produced 
by a range of Zimbabwean and international actors, provide quantitative and qualitative 
sources of data that contribute to the quality of analysis and argument within this 
dissertation.  Specific pieces of evidence and quotations from these sources are 
embedded throughout the dissertation.  Each of the methods of review for these 
documentary sources is now discussed in more depth.   
  To obtain an understanding of the crisis, the core articles about the political 
crisis, in Zimbabwe's two leading newspapers, the Herald and the Daily News were 
reviewed – the Herald for the full eight-year period and the Daily News until it ceased 
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publishing at the end of 2003.  The weekly Financial Gazette, a second, leading private 
print newspaper, was also reviewed.  These records were available through the British 
Library as well as a purchased subscription to the archives of AllAfrica.com, which 
also provided access to several other Zimbabwean papers as needed.   
  The chronological review of these articles provided an opportunity to review 
the crisis as it unfolded – albeit as reported on by a polarised press (see chapter three).  
While there are weaknesses to using published accounts (e.g. specific elements of the 
context may be unavailable, errors may exist), these accounts do provide access to, and 
a record of “…the language and words of the [Zimbabwean] participants” (Creswell 
2009: p. 180 Table 9.2).  A key weakness however, was found only through the review 
process.  This weakness was that the articles carried virtually no analysis of the events 
reported, leaving it to the opinion writers to (sometimes) situate individual events into 
their larger, partisan frames.   
 A second source of documents analysed for this research project were reports by 
Zimbabwe's own civil society actors.  Given the collapse of Zimbabwe's own official 
statistics, and that a great deal of any available official data was also not being made 
available due to "national security concerns" (UNDP 2008: p. 6), these reports 
represent an important body of Zimbabwean data and voices on the scale and the 
effects (e.g. types of violence, arrests, perceived causes of attacks) of specific events 
that were unfolding at the time (e.g. reports from dispersed protestors, or of recent 
human rights violations).   
 By the late 1990s, Zimbabwe's civil society was sizeable, articulate and 
represented a wide range of interests.  Members possessed many skill sets (e.g. 
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advocacy, research, law, human rights defense) and subject-matter experts (e.g. gender 
equality, law, media freedoms) (Saunders 2000).  Both individually (e.g. the Media 
Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe) and collectively (e.g. the Zimbabwe Human Rights 
NGO Forum, a grouping of 17 Zimbabwean human rights organisations) these reports 
are a documentary record of the events, scale, effects and/or consequences on the rights 
of individuals and other actors.   
 These reports are particularly valuable in terms of the research enquiries 
regarding the issues of impunity, penalties and the allocation of selective benefits. They 
are a record of specific incidents, (including, for example, data regarding dates, 
locations, numbers, injuries and/or damage) as well as, often, comments from the 
victims, and at times, the perpetrators.  Their statistical validity cannot be judged 
however, as there is yet no official, Zimbabwean national account of the number cases 
of political violence.  Therefore trends were not extrapolated, nor judgements or 
assertions of completeness made, when using this data.  Even with these limitations, 
their use allows this research project to more fully reflect the evidence base of events in 
the Zimbabwean crisis.   
 Many of these reports applied the human rights framework, enshrined both in 
the Zimbabwean Constitution as well as in international law, to analyse and document 
the intentional restrictions, rights violations and the violence experienced by 
Zimbabweans.  These reports are an expression of the action-voice of voice, and 
documenting this history often demanded resilience and courage, for the organisations 
and their staff, were often targets of the governing regime.  Only the report The 
Anatomy of Terror (2011), which documented the specific sites, perpetrators, supporters 
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and violent incidents across fifteen of Zimbabwe's constituencies, in six of Zimbabwe's 
ten provinces, was published anonymously to protect the lives of the researchers, 
victims and interviewees who contributed to the report. 
  Zimbabwe's civic actors also drew upon international networks of similar 
organisations, enabling both the international engagement of these networks (e.g. the 
Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) or the International Bar Association 
(IBA)) and the mobilisation of international support to Zimbabwe's civic actors.  This 
mobilisation also added to the volume of data and research available about specific 
aspects of the Zimbabwean crisis.  Their normative frameworks also provided "...a 
common metric" against which Zimbabwean performance could be evaluated and 
communicated, both domestically and externally (Pfaff 2006: p. 90 citing Tarrow 1991: 
p. 16).  The MMPZ data is a record of the frequency of broadcast and print messaging 
by the ZANU-PF regime, and by the political opposition, and assesses these allocations 
against the Southern Africa Development Community's (SADC) own agreed-upon 
standards.  However, the mobilisation of these networks may, for members of the 
ZANU-PF regime, be examples of their political opponents mobilising to increase 
international pressure and/or interference by the international community in 
Zimbabwe's domestic affairs.   
 These civic reports are categorized as 'grey literature' i.e. documentation by 
organisations which is neither formally published by commercial publishers nor is peer-
reviewed research.  Grey literature is an important source of information and evidence 
in the field of public policy, enabling both understanding and participation. It is often 
valued for the timeliness of the information produced, as well its capture of information 
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about events and/or issues that otherwise would not be available (Lawrence et al. 2014: 
pp. 2-3).   
  The grey-literature reports cited in this dissertation are documentary examples 
of an “events-based” approach that records events of political violence and/or 
document events linked to specific standards (e.g. treaty commitments, human rights 
guarantees) (Davenport 2000: p. 14).  They have also documented specific issues such 
as media bias in reporting, and/or other specific actions by members of the regime and 
its allies (e.g. establishing or supporting bases of terror).  Many of the reports cited in 
this dissertation have been previously cited in other peer-reviewed research.   
 By their nature and their source, these reports de facto document instances and/
or patterns of non-compliance (e.g. with human rights provisions of the Zimbabwean 
Constitution) and/or of targeted enforcement (e.g. under specific pieces of legislation).  
To account for biases in these civil society reports and/or to minimize possible quality 
issues, specific efforts were made to cross-reference findings from one report with 
other sources, as demonstrated in the citations throughout the dissertation, particularly 
in chapters three through five.  Again, no judgements on their completeness, nor trends 
were extrapolated from these reports.   
Public opinion polling data and reports are a specific type of grey literature.  
Zimbabwean data has been published via the Afrobarometer network and/or by its 
Zimbabwean partner, the Mass Public Opinion Institute (MPOI).  The Afrobarometer 
data is also available via an on-line search tool, allowing this researcher to go beyond 
the published reports, to see more detailed breakdowns of the reporting findings (e.g. 
rural versus urban, by age).  Public opinion data and reports represent the expression of 
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a valid sample of Zimbabwean voices (within the margin of error defined by each 
survey), at a specific moment in time, and on a range of issues, including issues 
specifically linked to governance, land, voice and exit.   
 To further triangulate findings amongst these sources, and thus strengthen the 
dissertation's validity, specific efforts were made to identify and draw upon other 
research and studies that reviewed the original reports and contributed an assessment of 
their credibility.  For example, the surveys of public opinion in Zimbabwe, undertaken 
as part of the Afrobarometer initiative, were also cross-referenced to other materials, 
reports and findings.  Reeler's (2009) study on torture in Zimbabwe during the 
2000-2008 period included a meta-review of human rights reports from several 
different organisations, and assessed their quality and validity.  
 A final type of documents analysed was Zimbabwe's legislative Acts.  This was 
the smallest set of documents, and the text of the relevant legislation was obtained from 
many different sources, as referenced. Legislation is an output of intentional decisions 
and intentional decision-making processes.  Therefore, each piece of legislation was 
analysed based on four of the lines of enquiry identified above.   
• did the reforms of the rules affect the collective action dilemmas, for example by 
creating veto-players and/or agenda-setting powers?   
• did these reforms alter the incentives and penalties faced by actors, (e.g. by creating 
or altering permissions and prohibitions)?  
• did these reforms reduce uncertainty, if so for whom?   
• did these reforms alter the dynamics of exit and voice? If so, how?                     
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This institutionalist analysis of the legislation is a new contribution to the literature, and 
the findings are discussed throughout the dissertation.   
 The dissertation now continues with the second chapter, "Institutions, Collective 
Action and the Dynamics of Exit and Voice".       
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Chapter Two:  Institutions, Collective Action and the 
Dynamics of Exit and Voice  
  This dissertation discusses the Zimbabwean crisis from the perspective of 
rational choice institutionalism, a theoretical framework that focuses analytically on 
decision-making, rules, collective action challenges, and role of institutions in the 
aggregation and structuring of choices.  This dissertation's analytical argument is that 
the members of the ZANU-PF regime strategically reformed institutions in order to 
resolve their specific collective action challenge known as the 'State's Dilemma'.  This 
argument and its supporting evidence and analysis is a new contribution to the literature 
on the Zimbabwean crisis. 
 Zimbabwe’s history has included very significant contestation about both 
institutional reform and about the maintenance of institutional stability.  Colonial era 
institutions established rules that defined political and economic rights, and social 
relations, based on race, education and/or and property.  The liberation struggle, was 
not only about identity and history, but given its demands for majority rule and land 
rights, was also about the reform of institutions, while maintenance of these 
institutional rules was a critical concern in Rhodesia’s 1965 Universal Declaration of 
Independence (UDI).  Zimbabwe’s own debates about whether to create a one-party 
state, about constitutional development and reform, human rights, and the redistribution 
of property rights, are all important post-independence examples of the contestation 
among actors over institutional design, stability and reform.   
 This chapter begins with a discussion of institutions and rational choice 
institutionalism, including its relevance to this study.  Specific references are made to 
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the Zimbabwean crisis, but the key theoretical features of rational choice 
institutionalism, i.e. the interactions between rules, uncertainty, strategic 
interdependence, group dynamics, collective action, and the strategic choices of actors, 
are also discussed more broadly.  This approach allows for a clear articulation of the 
theoretical features before relating them to another key theoretical element: the 'State's 
Dilemma', a specific type of collective action challenge (Lichbach 1995: pp. 256-258).  
This dissertation also argues, following Hirschman (1970, 1978 and 1986) that in 
situations of rising dissatisfaction, the fundamental action-choices facing actors are to 
exit, to give voice or to remain loyal.  These action-choices are discussed along with 
their more recent analytical developments.  The relationship between the action-choice 
of exit and the action-choice of voice is of critical importance, as the prioritization of 
one action-choice over the other has implications for the prospects of reform or 
stability.   
 The demands of both Zimbabwe's political opposition, seeking to 
democratically defeat the ruling members of the ZANU-PF regime, as well as the civic 
opposition seeking better conditions, rights or services, are all examples of collective 
efforts mobilised to alter "government institutions, policies and/or 
personnel" (Lichbach 1995: p. 3).  In this case, and other similar ones, the term 
"contentious collective action" is applied, for the collective action is aimed at 
"...directly or indirectly transform[ing] existing patterns of political authority" (Ulfelder 
2005: p. 312).  It may give rise to situations that generate both the 'Rebel's Dilemma' 
and the 'State's Dilemma' (Lichbach 1995). 
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 The 'State's Dilemma' is a specific collective action challenge faced by members 
of a governing regime, when they wish to retain the status quo.  It is their challenge of 
sustaining needed support in the face of collective dissent (demands for reform), when 
the interests of the state's supporters may align otherwise (Lichbach 1995: pp. 
256-258).  In Zimbabwe, the State's Dilemma arose, de facto, when the members of the 
ZANU-PF regime decided to compete in elections at a time of significant opposition 
and weakening support.  Its opposite is the Rebel's Dilemma, for "[r]ebels have 
everything to gain and nothing to lose by staying home" given that the public benefits 
are uncertain and the private costs "...provide every incentive not to act" (Lichbach 
1995: p. 7).   
 In Zimbabwe, and in other similar governance crises, many actors may have 
declining economic and/or policy satisfaction.  In these situations, Hirschman (1970) 
identified three action-choices available to actors – to exit, to give voice or to remain 
loyal.  Each of these action-choices are discussed here, along with the two mechanisms 
of information and sanctions (i.e. penalties) identified by Knight (1992) that help actors 
to formulate their expectations of other actors.  The chapter concludes with a short 
summary and sets the stage for the second part of the dissertation which examines 
several specific institutional reforms undertaken by members of the ZANU-PF regime 
to help resolve their 'Dilemma'.      
 This dissertation identifies and analyses the institutional responses undertaken 
by members of the ZANU-PF governing regime to address their collective action 
challenge arising from the demands of many Zimbabweans for change, reform and 
democratisation.  This dissertation argues that the institutional responses were made 
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with a view to achieving or sustaining ZANU-PF's existing strategic distributional 
advantage, building on Knight's 1992 argument about institutional change and stability.  
By analysing and explaining these institutional reforms, the findings of this dissertation 
will be of broader interest to researchers studying the Zimbabwean crisis, as well as 
liberation movements more broadly.  
 Members of the ZANU-PF regime are actors in situations of strategic 
interdependence, with the rewards of each varying, and affected by, the choices and 
decisions of others (Knight 1992: p. 48 citing Elster 1986: p. 7, emphasis added).  This 
strategic interdependence is at the heart of the specific collective action challenge, the 
State's Dilemma that they faced.  Strategic interdependence has two implications for 
decision-making: first, there is a need to take into account the expected actions of 
others; and, second, there is a need to assess the effects of the actor's own decisions on 
the others with whom he interacts (Knight 1992: pp. 17, 48).  During the time-period of 
this case study, the ZANU-PF government called four national-level elections.  In so 
doing, their decision to compete electorally, in order to sustain their political status quo, 
made them dependent on the choices and decisions of Zimbabwean voters.  
 The ZANU-PF regime is made up of groups, and the participation in groups, as 
well as the dynamics of group membership (including decision-making rules), are 
important factors analysed and discussed throughout this dissertation.  These are 
brought to attention as a result of the use of rational choice institutionalism, with its 
concern for rules and their effects on the strategic choices of actors.  Mobilisation, 
inducements (i.e. rewards and penalties), and vetoes are amongst the strategies that may 
contribute to aligning choices and outcomes.  Discussions of collective action, 
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including solutions to the State's Dilemma, benefit therefore from an analysis of "... 
how collective processes influence the way individuals will apply and respond to 
[rewards and penalties]", for these rewards and penalties help to align individual 
choices and group goals (Stone 2002: pp. 267, 265-283).    
Defining Institutions  
 In setting out the argument of this public policy dissertation, it is important to 
clearly define institutions.  North's (1990: p. 3) definition is the most widely known: 
institutions are "...the rules of the game in a society, or more formally, are the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North 1990: p. 3).  This definition 
adds clarity to one of the key features of institutions, i.e. that they are human 
constructs.   As discussed further below, there are three main approaches to defining 
institutions, including as rules.  North defines institutions as rules, and by serving as the 
'rules of the game', or as Knight argues, by "...structur[ing] social interactions in 
particular ways" (Knight 1992: p. 2), they help to explain outcomes (Shepsle 1989: p. 
135).  Informal institutions also exist, and are defined by their “[s]ocially shared rules, 
usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside of officially 
sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: p. 727).  Interactions between 
formal and informal institutions are common, for example, informal institutions may 
encourage compliance with formal rules (Helmke and Levitsky (2004): p. 726).  They 
argue for both to be considered in institutional analysis.   
 In explaining institutional emergence, change and stability, a review of the 
literature reveals that it divides along two main lines.  Key authors such as Ostrom 
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(1990), argue that institutions emerge as a response to coordination problems, 
particularly those that exist around the provision of public goods.  Institutions also help 
to reduce transaction costs, including those associated with information, monitoring 
and enforcement (North 1990: pp. 27f, 46-47, 54ff).  
 Knight, a significant institutionalist thinker, set out, in his 1992 work, an 
important alternative theoretical view of the emergence and change of institutions 
(whether formal or informal) – that is, that they develop and stabilise as the “…product 
of efforts to constrain the actions of those with whom we interact” as actors compete 
for distributional gains (Knight 1992: pp. 19, 126, emphasis added).  In Zimbabwe, 
several characteristics of ZANU-PF make this theoretical development relevant.  As 
discussed, ZANU came to power following a lengthy liberation war against the 
Rhodesian government, and a long struggle against British rule.  Both of these conflicts 
had important institutional dimensions, as ZANU, ZAPU and black Zimbabwean civic 
society sought to re-write the racially-based rules that constrained their development.   
 Post-independence, ZANU-PF drew its strength from the accomplishment that 
was the transition to majority rule, but in its revolutionary tradition, also sought to 
weaken other challengers for power.  The mid-1980s violence in Matabeleland and the 
Gurkahundi massacres (CCPJZ and LRF 1997) was the most significant assault on 
Zimbabwe's other major political party, the Ndebele-based ZAPU.  But as others 
(Kriger 2006; Southall 2013: pp. 174-210) discuss there was a recurring pattern of 
violence, co-option and weakening of challengers in the both the political and civic 
domains.   
!  58
 While other analysts have examined these developments through the lenses of 
nationalism and authoritarianism, this dissertation anchored in Knight's analytical 
approach to institutional development and change, offers an institutionalist analysis 
during a unique period of Zimbabwean history, when there was significant contestation 
over institutional reform, legacies and alternatives.  Knight's theory of institutional 
emergence and stability is an important explanatory framework that helps to understand 
institutional outcomes during this period.  Further research may reveal whether this 
framework offers broader analytical value to Zimbabwe's post-independence period.   
 The analysis of the literature review also identified the three key conceptual 
approaches to defining institutions.  These are: defining institutions as equilibria, as 
norms or as rules.  Each of these three approaches have differences, as well as some 
overlaps,  particularly between those defining institutions as 'norms' and those defining 
institutions as 'rules' (Crawford and Ostrom 1995: pp. 582-583).  The crucial 
differences amongst these approaches are with respect to the issue of how to account 
for the emergence of institutions, and how to address the matter of non-compliance.   
 The latter difference is particularly important in this analysis of the 2000-2008 
period of the Zimbabwean crisis, for non-compliance with rules was a mobilising factor 
for many Zimbabweans.  For the ZANU-PF regime, and their allies, Britain's perceived 
non-compliance with the commitments on land acquisition made during the Lancaster 
House agreement mobilised many, while for those members of Zimbabwe's political 
and civic opposition, the regime's non-compliance with the Constitution and electoral 
and other laws, were a source of mobilisation.   
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In defining institutions as equilibria, it is the “stable patterns of behaviour” that 
"...arise from mutually understood actor preferences and optimizing behaviour... [that 
are treated] as institutions" (Crawford and Ostrom 1995: p. 582).  This approach to 
defining institutions is often linked to game-theory, suggesting that the equilibria arise 
from extensive-form games (Bates et al. 1998: p. 5).  In this approach, it is credible 
threats or promises that “play a significant role ...in generating institutionalized patterns 
of behaviour" (ibid: pp. 9-10).  Institutional stability may also be affected by 
institutional structures and procedures, including those that assign specific agenda-
setting powers (including vetoes) to specific actors (Shepsle 1989).   
Within these institutional structures and procedures, Shepsle (1989: p. 137) 
argued that stability will be sustained if there is no other alternative that is preferred by 
those actors with the relevant voting power or veto.  However, this definitional 
approach has been criticised for both failing to provide a theoretical rationale for the 
emergence of institutions, and for failing to explicitly address the consequences that 
arise in those situations where the equilibrium is not respected (Crawford and Ostrom 
1995: pp. 582-583, 588).   
When the equilibrium is not respected, Crawford and Ostrom define the 
consequences as the 'or else' variable, and they argue that this variable is only present in 
the conceptualisation of institutions as rules.  It exists only when the following criteria 
are in place: “…a known range of sanctions …a norm or rule that prescribes sanctions 
and, some provision for monitoring – all emanating from a rule-making 
arena” (Crawford and Ostrom 1995: p. 588).  Sanctions, i.e. penalties to address and 
reduce non-compliance, allow an actor to assess the costs of pursuing a particular 
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strategy and therefore (along with information), are one of two mechanisms 
fundamental to the formation of actors' expectations, and therefore choices (Knight 
1992: p. 49).  Penalties (i.e. sanctions) as a mechanism to reduce non-compliance are 
discussed further below.   
Considering institutions as 'structure-induced equilibrium', adds some 
explanatory value to the discussion of the Zimbabwean crisis.  It reveals the structural 
equilibrium behind the demands for constitutional reform made by many 
Zimbabweans, as well as collective actors such as the NCA and the MDC.   Multiple 
institutional reforms and constitutional amendments had, throughout the 1980s, 
centralised power within both ZANU-PF and the Zimbabwean executive (Meredith 
2002: pp. 79-80), and in so doing, eliminated a number of veto-players in both the 
constitutional and partisan spheres (Tsebelis 2002).  These reforms also reinforced the 
links between the ZANU-PF party and the Zimbabwean government, and marginalised 
Parliament (Southall 2013: p. 146).  In 1987, the roles of Head of State and Head of 
Government were combined – with Robert Mugabe becoming the new Executive 
President (Meredith 2002: p. 79).   
The democratic implications of this structural stability became a source of the 
NCA's advocacy and mobilisation for a citizen-driven constitutional reform process in 
the late 1990s (McCandless 2011: pp. 47-48).  The structural stability that resulted from 
these multiple constitutional amendments, also, in the aggregate, appeared to support 
the earlier ZANU-PF goal of a one-party state (Chikuhwa 2004: p. 72).  The NCA and 
its allies had unprecedented success in mobilising actors to resist and to challenge this 
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equilibrium, but, as discussed below, ZANU-PF's responses also limited their ability to 
overcome the structural barriers needed to alter the institutional equilibrium, including 
through their retention of power in Parliament for several years.  
In the second conceptual approach to defining institutions, that is as norms, it is 
the logic of appropriateness that prevails.  This logic is one of “...fulfilling the 
obligations of a rule in [that] situation, and so of trying to determine the imperatives, 
rather than preferences” and it governs behaviour as opposed to a logic of 
consequentiality (March and Olsen 1989: pp. 160-161).  Situational, rather than 
strategic, decision-making predominates and compliance with the norms is a primary 
motivator of behaviour.  In this approach, institutions are “…self-enforcing rules... [that 
are] non-consequentialist rules of appropriate behaviour” (Knight 1992: p. 16 note 1).  
It is the “[s]hared beliefs of a group about normative obligations that explain the 
regularised patterns of behaviour that become recognised as institutions” (Crawford 
and Ostrom 1995: p. 583).   
Informal institutions that have an important and significant normative element 
may be formally codified.  Codification goes beyond the realm of "...[s]hared beliefs of 
a group about normative obligations” to become “formal rules that guide both current 
and future action as well as behaviour in specific situations or contexts" (Stone 2002: 
p. 286, emphasis added).  Formalising rules allows specific events, actions and reforms 
to be both identified and assessed.  Non-compliance may be more easily detected and 
penalties applied (Hodgson 2004: p.14).  Codification also communicates information 
to other actors, helping them to assess costs, benefits, reduce uncertainty and/or make 
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strategic decisions.  Examples include information about permissions, expectations for 
compliance, entitlements, the mechanisms of enforcement and the sanctions (penalties) 
for non-compliance.  Codified rules may also communicate the formal decision-making 
and/or specific procedural actions required to alter (i.e. to amend, to suspend or to 
annul) the current rules – in other words, to change the status quo.    
Both norms and rational choice may motivate action in different contexts 
(Knight 1992: p. 14).  Norms may informally bind actors together through recognition 
and acceptance of appropriate behaviour and obligations (e.g. Comaroff and Roberts 
1981), including at both community, organisational and societal levels.  The shared, and 
therefore the collective nature of these norms, is what enables the community “...to pass 
judgement on [the] appropriateness” of the specific actions or behaviour (Risse and 
Sikkink 1999: p. 7).  Institutions, in turn, may facilitate the maintenance of these 
norms, including through the assignment of roles to specific actors (Knight 1992: p. 
15).   
This conceptualisation of institutions as norms is relevant, particularly in a 
developing country such as Zimbabwe, with its colonial and liberation history.  
Comaroff and Roberts (1981: p. 28, emphasis added) recognise the importance of 
culture by defining a norm as "a statement of rule that is indigenously regarded as 
relevant to the regulation of social conduct".  Colonial-era institutions were overlaid on 
societies, often without reference to local culture, traditions and existing norms of 
social, political and economic governance, with resulting contestation, both violent and 
non-violent.  Debates continue as to the appropriateness of some these institutional 
rules, and a key element of ZANU-PF's patriotic narrative was against Western 
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interference and values (e.g. human rights) in Zimbabwean politics, and for its 
conceptualisation of sovereignty, as discussed further in the next chapter.  
Further, norms and their institutionalisation were a key part of the contestation 
in Zimbabwe during this period.  The MDC and its civic allies, argued for the norms of 
constitutionalism, political rights and more participatory governance.  They drew upon 
their existing formal institutionalisation in Zimbabwe's Constitution, and Zimbabwe's 
own commitments, to supporting international treaties.  From an institutionalist 
perspective, the argument of the members of the ZANU-PF regime would be that the 
democratic norms stemming from the liberation struggle were already being 
institutionalised in Zimbabwe – through the achievement of majority rule and their 
continuing efforts to realise the goals of their struggle.   
There are two main criticisms of this approach of defining institutions around 
normative obligations and self-enforcing mechanisms.  First, the approach fails to 
explain behaviour that is inconsistent with the normative obligations and/or the role of 
the actor.  Abuse of authority, again an important issue during the Zimbabwean crisis, is 
an example of behaviour what could be inconsistent with the shared understanding of 
an actors normative obligations.  Second, this approach is also criticised for its failure 
to explain the problems that arise from situations where actors hold conflicting roles or 
have competing interests (Knight 1992: p. 15 citing Boudon 1981).  In addition to the 
contestation over norms in Zimbabwe during this period, both of these criticisms are 
particularly pertinent to analysing the Zimbabwean crisis.  There were conflicts 
between constitutional and partisan roles and abuses of authority that violated norms 
did occur.  Examples are discussed further in the following chapters.   
!  64
Norms may not be neutral in terms of the distribution of social and economic 
power.  Indeed, they often "...embody and reinforce the asymmetries characterising a 
society" (Knight 1992: p. 124).  These asymmetries may exist between individual 
actors, between actors within a group, or amongst different groupings.  They also exist 
between members of the governing regime and other actors, including groups of actors 
in the broader society.  Relevant asymmetries in Zimbabwe include those related to 
gender, class and race.  These asymmetries will be taken into account in the dynamics 
within, and/or between groups, but also in the choices and decision-making of 
individual strategic actors.   
From the perspective of institutional stability or change, these asymmetries may 
allow an individual or group to sustain a rule, based on their own interests and their 
own capacity to enforce compliance with the rule.  In other words, asymmetries of 
power may be used intentionally, by strategic decision-makers to institutionally 
consolidate their advantages, thus strengthening the current institutional stability and 
making reform more difficult.  Knight cites the apartheid regime in South Africa as a 
relevant example to this discussion (Knight 1992: p. 73).  This dissertation analyses the 
case of Zimbabwe (2000-2008) and highlights the rule-making powers held by the 
members of the regime that were deployed to help sustain their distributional advantage 
and to retain support for the political status quo.   
The third conceptual approach to defining institutions is to define institutions as 
rules.  This dissertation, contributes to the literature on the Zimbabwean crisis by its 
discussion of the intentional and strategic alteration of rules to help resolve the regime's 
collective action problem.  These alterations in some cases restricted specific freedoms, 
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and in other cases provided members of the regime and/or their agents and allies with 
more permissive powers.  In this conceptual approach to defining institutions, 
institutions are based on regularised patterns of behaviour that reflect "... a common 
understanding that actions inconsistent with those that are proscribed or required are 
likely to be sanctioned or rendered ineffective if actors with the authority to impose 
punishment  are informed about them" (Crawford and Ostrom 1995: p. 583).  This 
shared understanding is critical, for it shapes expectations. To understand the patterns 
of behaviour “...one needs to examine the actions and outcomes that rules allow, 
require, or forbid and the mechanisms that exist to enforce those rules” (ibid: p. 583).  
The research lines of enquiry reflect these points, and subsequent chapters of this 
dissertation will provide this examination with respect to specific freedoms, the media 
and commercial agriculture sectors as well as the realm of public safety.     
Rules assign permissions (Crawford and Ostrom 1995: pp. 584-585), that is, 
they provide actors with specific freedoms, roles and/or entitlements.  The resulting 
configuration of permissions helps to constrain some, or enable other actors.  
Modifying the rules may alter the assigned permissions, making specific freedoms or 
entitlements either more restrictive, expansive or, perhaps time-bound (e.g. term 
limits).  These permissions may also be indirect, for example, by not explicitly 
forbidding an action: “…assigning a 'may' to an action is the equivalent of 'constituting' 
that action”, with the authors citing 'may vote' as an example of a rule that creates an 
action that did not otherwise exist (Crawford and Ostrom 1995: p. 585 citing Searle 
1969).   
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Rules may also assign decision-making powers to specific actors, and in some 
cases may create a veto-player.  A veto-player is an “individual or collective [actor] 
whose agreement is necessary for a change in the status quo” (Tsebelis 2002: p. 19).  
These veto-players may be defined either in institutional (i.e. by the constitution and 
legal frameworks) or partisan terms, i.e. defined by the political system (ibid: p.2).  The 
rules governing specific positions (e.g. a party President, or a specific Minister) may 
also create veto-players, with the position's permissions defining the scope or breadth 
of a veto.  In this sense the veto is 'bounded', i.e. with limits.  Rules, may result in veto-
players in a specific domain (e.g. the power to veto judicial nominations may be held 
by the Minister of Justice), or the holder of specific agenda-setting powers (e.g. Chief 
of Defence Staff).  Examples of decision-making rules include: the delegation of 
authorities to Ministers, consultation or approval requirements (e.g. Cabinet, 
Parliament, and chiefs), specified fora for decisions (e.g. party or state).    
This argument on veto players is coherent with Shepsle’s view (1989: p. 137 
italics in the original) that, in terms of decision-making rules and processes, the 
"identity of individuals" matters.  Under institutional rules individual actors may be 
eligible or able to act in specific circumstances or domains.  This may allow them, 
therefore, to have influence over other actors.  This is the case whether institutions are 
formal or informal.  Of course, more generally, identity matters – for it provides, or 
allows for, networks of family, ethnic, social and/or professional groups, ties which are 
important in Zimbabwe as elsewhere, including for decision-making.  
The simultaneous possession of both partisan and constitutional vetoes 
significantly reinforced policy stability in Zimbabwe, particularly following the 
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creation of the Executive Presidency in 1987.  The location and number of veto-players 
matters for policy stability (Tsebelis 2002: pp. 17-18), for it speaks to the question of 
the actors, and the processes, required to bring about change.  They narrowed the "...set 
of outcomes that can replace the status quo” (Tsebelis 2002: p. 3).  The NCA's 
advocacy and mobilisation for constitutional reform reflected concerns about the net 
effect on the political status quo of the permissions contained in Zimbabwe's oft-
amended Constitution.  Over the years, these constitutional amendments, had removed 
specific actors, each with their own decision-making spheres and authorities (e.g. a 
Prime Minister), thus also removing existing institutional vetoes from the Zimbabwean 
structures of state decision-making.  Most notably, in 1987, several previously distinct 
roles, and vetoes, were consolidated into the new Executive Presidency.   
This dissertation argues that these rules and permissions matter, in responding 
to the collective action challenge posed by the 'State's Dilemma'.  Rules and 
permissions provide members of the governing regime with specific institutional 
decision-making authorities, mechanisms and/or resources that will influence choices 
in situations of strategic interdependency.  Rules and permissions may reinforce 
existing asymmetries of power, and as discussed in the following chapters, alter the 
dynamics of exit and voice, with implications for political outcomes.    
For this dissertation, the theoretical approach that defines institutions as rules, 
rather than as equilibria or as norms, has been selected, due to its unique conceptual 
focus on reducing non-compliance.  In the polarisation of this period, both ZANU-PF 
and MDC were concerned with questions of compliance, albeit each based on different 
institutional foundations.  This definitional approach emphasises rewards and sanctions 
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[penalties], as key constraints on actors.  As domestic collective dissent demands an 
intentional response on the part of the targeted actors (e.g. the authorities), this 
theoretical approach underlines the importance of procedures, compliance and 
enforcement in the decision-making processes, particularly those needed to address the 
collective action challenge that is the 'State's Dilemma'.     
Neither the option of defining institutions as equilibria nor the option of 
defining institutions as norms were selected for this dissertation.  Despite its value in 
highlighting the structural equilibrium that many Zimbabweans and the political 
opposition sought to change, during the period of this study, the Zimbabwean crisis was 
characterized by profound contestation about the equilibria itself, and about 
institutional reforms.  The role of norms in encouraging compliance, and in mobilising 
support was important, and some argumentation on the role played by norms is 
incorporated into the discussion below.  While this author explicitly recognises the 
value of the conceptual approach to defining institutions as norms, there was also, 
during this period, contestation over different norms and their institutionalisation. 
Finally, the concept's logic of appropriateness does not align with the consequentialist 
logic of rational choice institutionalism, and therefore this definitional approach was 
not selected for the dissertation.   
Institutions also enable actors to address future actions and situations, as a rule 
"...automatically covers new cases... [c]onfronted with a case he has never seen before, 
the agent knows what to do" (Knight 1992: pp. 68-69 citing Searle 1969: p. 42).  In this 
way, institutions help to shape expectations through the information the rules 
communicate to actors, which may in turn be factored into strategic decision-making.  
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Both the prospective and the permissive nature of rules are important for actors 
calculating the costs of future action – including actions that may lead to the imposition 
of new or additional penalties or sanctions.  The prospective and permissive nature of 
rules, and the 'or else' variable of penalty (sanction), when combined, may become a 
deterrent, especially if an actor becomes persuaded that the costs of specific actions or 
strategies may outweigh the benefits (Freedman 1998:  p. 23 citing George and Smoke 
1974: p.11).    
This section of the chapter has discussed several points – different ways by 
which institutions may be defined, and the selection of the definition of institutions as 
'rules' for use in this dissertation.  The importance of decision-making rules and the 
minimisation of non-compliance; the role of rules in defining the powers of many 
positions and actors; the importance of an 'or else' consequence in shaping expectations 
and strengthening compliance; and, the prospective nature of rules are all important 
elements of this approach.  Their relevance to the dynamics in Zimbabwe, has also 
contributed to the justification of the selection of the definition of institutions as rules.  
Together, these points have also contributed to the selection of rational choice 
institutionalism as the theoretical framework for this dissertation.   
Rational choice is one of institutionalism's three main variants, the other two 
being historical and sociological institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996).  Although the 
study of institutions is long-standing (Barkanov 2007: p. 449), a 'new' institutionalism 
arose in the mid-20th century in response to political science's earlier focus on 
behaviouralism (Lowndes 1996: p. 183).  Its development was enabled by advances in 
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both the organisational sciences (Barkanov 2007: p. 451) and also in economics 
(Burnham et al. 2008: pp. 24-25).   
  The rational choice approach to institutions is "...concerned with how human 
actions combine to create institutions and how existing institutions structure individual 
and aggregate choice" (Levi, Cook et al. 1990: p. 15).  It goes beyond pure rational 
choice theory, to link individual decision-making to institutions, whereby the strategic 
choices of individuals are influenced and shaped by institutions themselves.  It is 
underpinned by a consequentialist logic of decision-making, as is rational choice 
theory.   
Many authors argue that the motivation for institutional development and 
maintenance is based on the provision of collective benefits, including reduced 
transaction costs (e.g. North 1990, Hardin 1982).  However, Knight argues differently 
and asserts that:  
"The primary motivation for social institutions cannot be the 
achievement of collective goals.  Such goals are inconsistent with the 
narrow rationality underlying these institutions. Rather, institutional 
rules are created by and communicated through the claims and 
actions of rational actors....Rather than focusing on collective goals, 
self-interested actors want institutions that produce those social 
outcomes that are best for them as individual strategic 
actors" (Knight 1992: p. 38).   
It is the search therefore for distributional advantage, rather than collective benefit, that 
leads to institutional emergence, change or stability (Knight 1992).   
This attention to distributional advantage, rather than collective benefit, 
positioned rational choice institutionalism as a theoretical framework that was relevant 
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to a broader range of collective action challenges.  By looking beyond collective 
benefit, to consider distributional advantage, Knight's approach enables rational choice 
institutionalism to explain collective action problems such as those that define the 
distribution of power within a state and are contested via the claims and actions of 
rational political actors.  In particular, Knight’s argument has been praised for 
integrating power asymmetries between actors into a theory of institutional emergence 
and change dynamics (Kanazawa 1994: p. 1090) as well as for explaining, at a "micro-
institutional" level why one rule is chosen over another (Ostrom 1995: p. 175).  For 
these reasons (and others) his work continues to be cited twenty-five years following its 
publication and this author selected his work as a core element of this dissertation.     
As a theory that examines decision-making and choices, it is important to 
recognize that actors, whether individual or collective, commonly interact with each 
other in situations of strategic interdependence.  Situations of strategic interdependence 
are an important sub-set of collective action problems, and may include circumstances 
where actors coordinate as a group.  Strategic interdependence has two implications for 
decision-making: first, there is a need to take into account the expected actions of 
others; and, second, there is a need to assess the effects of the actor's own decisions on 
the others with whom he interacts (Knight 1992: pp. 17, 48).  
The ‘State’s Dilemma’ is, by definition, a situation of strategic interdependence.  
Elster identified three different forms of strategic interdependence: "...the rewards of 
each depend on the rewards of all; the rewards of each depend on the choice of all; and, 
the choices of each depend on the choices of all" (Knight 1992: p. 48 citing Elster 
1986: p. 7).  For this author, following Elster's typology above, the 'State's Dilemma' is 
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a situation whereby the rewards of each depend on the choice of all.  Strategic 
interdependence contributes explanatory value by revealing how the survival by the 
members of the governing regime depended not only on coordination amongst 
themselves, but also their dependency on ensuring the continued support from their 
supporters, despite the rational interests of many of their supporters likely being 
otherwise.   
Strategic interdependence requires the integration the dynamics among 
members of a group into the analysis, a factor enabled by the choice of rational choice 
institutionalism as the theoretical framework.  The discussion within this dissertation of 
the strategic interdependence at the heart of the State’s Dilemma, and the analysis of 
distributional advantage as the basis for institutional reform or stability, are 
contributions to the analysis of, and literature on, the Zimbabwean crisis.   
Crucial to examining the strategic linkages between decision-making and 
institutions are the identifying the mechanisms used to formulate their expectations 
about the behaviour of others. Knight argues that these mechanisms are information 
and sanctions [i.e. penalties]: 
"[t]hrough [the] mechanisms [of information and sanctions] social 
actors learn the information necessary to formulate expectations 
about the actions of those with whom they interact.  With these 
expectations they choose the strategies that they think will maximise 
their individual benefits.  In this way institutions affect strategic 
choice…." (Knight 1992: p. 49).  
These mechanisms, and the implications of strategic interdependence for collective 
action, will be discussed in more depth below and in the subsequent chapters, but first, 
the issue of actors as members of groups and/or organisations will be discussed.   
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Groups and Decision-Making:  
Strategic interdependence highlights the issue of actors as members of groups 
and/or organisations.  This chapter section discusses group membership and the effects 
of institutions on the choices and decisions of members.  This discussion is enabled by 
the selection of rational-choice institutionalism as the theoretical framework.  
Collective action may occur for the "....the provision of virtually any good, no matter 
how 'private' or 'public' the good" (Hardin 1982: p. 4).  Organisations may produce 
some collective benefits to their members (Olson 1965: p. 15) and these benefits may 
be a public good, but as Olson states, they do not have to be in the public interest 
(Olson 1965: p. 15 note 22).  Knight concurs, noting that "...there is nothing about 
strategic rationality that guarantees social efficiency in the substantive content of social 
institutions" (Knight 1992: p. 39).   
Rational choice theory focuses on the strategic choices and decisions of 
individual actors. However, in rational choice institutionalism, with its concern for how 
"...existing institutions structure individual and aggregate choice" (Levi, Cook et al. 
1990: p. 15), the dynamics within a group, and rules, are far more prominent than in 
traditional rational choice theory.  This is important, for in the political sphere, 
collective entities abound, and membership in a group or organization will "...alter the 
way individuals respond" (Stone 2002: p. 267).  Both groups and organisations enable 
collective action for, for without coordination with others it may be difficult for actors 
to achieve either institutional change or to sustain institutional stability (Knight 1992: 
p. 177).   
!  74
Uncertainty is also an important analytical factor emerging from rational choice 
and rational choice institutionalism, given its effects on the assessing of, and deciding 
on, choices and also its effects on the expected actions of other actors.  This section, 
and the dissertation as a whole, discusses two types of uncertainty, the first, about an 
actor's future status within a group and, the second, the uncertainty about institutional 
alternatives and outcomes.  Free-riding that is, "...benefiting from the provision of a 
collective good without having participated in its production..." (Olson 1971: p. 91), is 
also a factor within group dynamics, which can generate its own uncertainty about 
whether the collective good will be provided. This challenge to effective collective 
action is introduced here, and specific examples from the Zimbabwean crisis are 
discussed in greater depth in chapter four. 
The internal structure of an organisation, established by rules or norms, and 
often the two together, as formal rules are complemented by normative conventions.  
Rules may, for example, define the boundaries of membership, spheres of action, as 
well as specific roles and responsibilities (Hodgson 2004: p. 425).  By influencing how 
actors interact with each other these institutional rules, within the organisation, also 
contribute to the structure and aggregation of actors' choices.  Organisations are often 
themselves constrained by other institutions (e.g. an NGO is constrained by its own 
internal governance as well as the formal rules that govern all non-governmental 
organisations in the country), and therefore a 'nesting' of organisations and institutions 
becomes evident.  This 'nesting' blurs the sharp analytical distinction between the two 
made by North in his analysis of institutions and economic performance (1990: p. 4).  
However, the concept of 'nesting' also allows organisations to be "...treated as actors 
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within broader institutional frameworks" (Hodgson 2004: p. 428), an important 
advance when the unit of analysis is broad, for example, in this dissertation, the media 
sector and the commercial agriculture sector.   
Collective actors (e.g. trade unions, political parties) are frequently engaged in 
collective action.  Each are governed by their rules of membership, spheres of action 
and roles and responsibilities (including chains of command or hierarchy), Knight 
(1992) calls these the 'arrangements' of the group or organisation.  These arrangements 
are important elements to be examined in assessing the response (e.g. by Cabinet, the 
governing political party or a government department) to collective dissent.  
Institutional rules may require engagement by specific actors (e.g. mandatory 
consultation requirements, criteria for specific representatives to be present in a 
Commission), or others may voluntarily engage, in order to achieve, for example, 
advocacy or mobilisation objectives.  These formal rules may also be not enforced, or 
be replaced (in whole or in part) by informal rules, as discussed with reference to the 
impunity which arose within Zimbabwe's public security sector.  
The rules that structure these groups, and/or structure the environment within 
which they must act, may also define, for example, the frequency or duration of their 
interactions.  In so doing, they define the extent of the constraint and/or the form of 
interdependency amongst actors.  These rules thus help to formulate expectations of the 
others with whom an actor will interact, and, to constrain their strategic interaction with 
others (Knight 1992).  Some penalties, for example of the 'three strikes and you're out' 
variety, may restructure relationships to limit future interactions, affecting future group 
membership by forcing exit from the group itself.    
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Group size is an important variable in analysing collective action, for it has 
effects on rules, interactions, enforcement and information mechanisms as well as 
decision-making.  Organisations and groups vary in membership, both size and/or 
composition (e.g. sex, age, geographic distribution), and this may vary over time.  
Variance may also occur due to changes in normative affinities and/or changes to rules 
that make the group more inclusive or exclusive. The efforts, through ZANU-PF’s 
patriotic narrative, to define a group of ‘patriots’ are an example.  Changes in the 
external environment in which the members of the group operate (e.g. the imposition of 
targeted sanctions, economic decline) may interact with group size, potentially 
affecting the benefits (e.g. rents, status, resources) and choices accruing to actors.   
Group size impacts on collective action and factors into strategic decision-
making both directly and indirectly.  Groups may include the presence of sub-groups 
(e.g. regional sections) or may sub-divide into smaller informal groups (e.g. the 
factions within ZANU-PF) or split into separate formal groups (e.g. the split within the 
MDC in 2005).  Group size has an impact on collective action, and Hardin argues that 
the relevant criteria for assessing the size of the sub-group must be the ability to 
provide the "whole group's good" (Hardin 1982: p. 12).  This author concurs with 
Hardin's argument, for it strengthens the analytical focus on the collective action 
outcome sought, in this case, one that is a 'step-good' type of collective action problem 
that can only be wholly provided.   
Group size may also affect the prospects for successful collective action, for 
example, larger groups may also for burden-sharing, but only if this successfully 
coordinated.  Smaller groups allow actors to more easily assess the credibility of those 
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with whom they interact (Knight 1992: p. 80), while increasing group size may reduce 
the frequency of contact between individual group members, potentially altering the 
incentives for non-compliance.  The effects of increasing group size on the incentives 
for non-compliance is particularly important in situations where informal rules that are 
self-enforced amongst actors within the group (ibid).     
Non-compliance becomes less observable in a larger group, and as a result 
larger groups often face the challenge of free-riding that is, "...benefitting from the 
provision of a collective good without having participated in its production..." (Olson 
1971: p. 91).  Free-riding affects the prospects for the group's success (Hardin 1982: p. 
98), particularly in the absence of penalties.  Increased non-compliance with a specific 
rule may contribute to its instability, although the rule’s stability will also be influenced 
by the consequences of non-compliance on those currently favoured by the status quo 
(Knight 1992: p. 180).  As was the case during the Zimbabwe crisis, those who benefit 
from the political status quo will find it rational to enforce those rules that help to 
sustain their advantage.   
Group size also directly affects the cost, for each actor, of either the current 
rules or proposed reforms to the rules.  In turn, costs affect the net benefits to be 
realised and, therefore, the choices and decisions of strategic actors (Olson 1965: p. 46; 
Knight 1992: p. 180).  Costs include transaction costs (including the cost of organising 
the group), information, free-riding, the costs of penalties and their associated 
enforcement mechanisms.   
Altering group size may be one solution to adjusting the cost/benefit trade-off.  
Membership may be expanded for greater burden-sharing, or be reduced (e.g. via 
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forced or voluntary exit) for greater per capita benefits for remaining members.  
Forcing exit may threaten the viability of the group as a whole, as it may not be able to 
sustain itself, while voluntary exit may generate competing groups (e.g. when a break-
away group is formed) that affects costs and benefits.  With small groups, the collective 
benefit may be sufficient for the group to remain self-enforcing (Olson 1965: pp. 29, 
34), avoiding the transaction costs associated with the need for external enforcement 
mechanisms. 
Group size also influences strategic decision-making through the knowledge 
actors acquire about each other through their interactions and, by affecting the 
reliability of information within the group.  Institutional rules transmit two types of 
information, first, information pertaining to "...the probable future actions of others" 
and second, information concerning "...the nature of sanctions for non-
compliance" (Knight 1992: p. 17).  The former includes information about both present 
intentionality and about past patterns of behaviour (Knight 1992: p. 82) which is 
critical to strategic decision-making.   
Changes in the external environment may also provide a strategic advantage to 
actors who are able to identify and to act on them (Knight 1992: p. 76).  This strategic 
advantage may be material or informational, if there is privileged information that can 
be generated or captured through a specific institution or from a specific position.  
Examples of informational advantages that can be used for strategic decision-making 
abound.  A central bank governor will have informational advantages regarding 
economic performance that can be integrated into strategic decision-making, including 
for personal advantage.  The commander of the security services could use the rules of 
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his position to mandate the compilation of additional information about opponents.  
The Minister of Communications may use the rules of her ministry to close or restrict 
independent media, thus potentially constraining the availability of inputs and/or 
evidence for decision-making, choice selection and preference formation amongst 
media consumers.  Acting on these strategic advantages (e.g. restrictions on media 
freedoms) may negatively affect the reliability of information about external events 
available to other actors with whom they interact. 
To encourage membership and participation in groups, or to assist in the 
retention of members, membership benefits (a form of selective incentives) may be 
used to encourage mobilisation and to overcome the challenges of collective action 
(Olson 1971).  The arrangements of the group itself, for example, those governing 
distributional share, also affect the benefits arising from membership, as the strategic 
interactions among members are guided by both by the rules which comprise the 
arrangements and the degree of transparency therein.  Actors may not only assess the 
magnitude and frequency of the benefits themselves, but also the direct or indirect 
benefits arising from the policies of that organisation (Hirschman 1970: pp. 4 and 87).  
A change in the quality of those benefits is defined as the "...equivalent to increasing 
disagreement with the organisation's policies" (Hirschman 1970: pp. 4, 87).   
This strategy of providing inducements to group members and/or supporters is 
discussed throughout the dissertation, particularly with respect to the benefits of 
impunity and access to food-aid and employment.  The discussion is directly linked to 
institutional reforms, for it was the reform of institutional rules that enabled the 
provision of many of these inducements.  As discussed below, ZANU-PF's patriotic 
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narrative also sought to de-legitimize specific groups of Zimbabweans, with 
implications for their access to resources (e.g. food aid, land) but also implications for 
party membership.       
The members of the ZANU-PF regime certainly received selective benefits for 
their membership in the regime.  These may be normative or reputational (e.g. as a 
leader advancing their convictions, improving welfare) and in many cases they were 
also financial (e.g. preferential access to foreign exchange, to land).  They are, 
however, also in a situation of strategic inter-dependency, and many of their personal 
benefits largely depend on the group as a whole continuing to benefit, i.e. the rewards 
of each depend on the choices of all (Knight 1992: p. 48 citing Elster 1986: p. 7).  
Given this inter-dependency within the group, the group's arrangements may 
create, intensify (or resolve) a specific uncertainty with respect to an actor's own future 
status in the group or community (Knight 1992: p. 45 citing Rawls 1971). Uncertainty 
regarding their future status in a group (e.g. the governing ZANU-PF regime) will 
depend on both the details of the group's arrangements, and the position of the actor(s) 
within the group.  Institutional rules (e.g. seniority), for example, may, in some cases, 
help hedge against this uncertainty, while the presence of veto-players within the group 
may increase this uncertainty.   
For example, if those vetoes pertain to eligibility or other membership matters 
(e.g. term limits) or if alterations to the other rules make the exercise of this veto easier 
(e.g. a shift from a qualified majority vote to a simple majority), uncertainty for 
individual actors about their future status in the group, will be increased.  An actor's 
uncertainty about their future status in the governing regime may make the State's 
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Dilemma more difficult to solve, e.g. by weakening loyalty, and/or making the 
mobilisation of supporters more difficult (e.g. fewer volunteers, increased free-riding).   
Members of a governing regime (including Zimbabwe's) hold the powers that 
can influence the uncertainty of other actors, individual or collective.  These powers, 
discussed below, featured in the regime's response to the uncertainties generated in both 
the print media and commercial agriculture sectors. They held not only the powers of 
appointment etc., but also the powers to alter these rules, in either generic or specific 
cases (e.g. to ban a political party or to ban its leader and/or its officials).  When these 
powers to define or to alter the rules are deployed strategically, they may create or 
reinforce the uncertainty about future status for other actors or groups.  Changes to 
labour laws in order to ban trade unions, the declaration of a human rights activist as a 
persona non grata or the revocation of citizenship are all examples of institutional rules 
that create uncertainty about an actor's future status.  For individual or collective actors 
engaged in collective dissent, uncertainty about an actor's future status within the 
group, or about the status of the group itself matter.  This uncertainty will reinforce the 
Rebel's Dilemma by exacerbating coordination problems and/or adding to the private 
costs of participation.   
This period of contestation in Zimbabwe also featured other types of 
uncertainty specifically those related to institutional alternatives and outcomes.  In 
other words, actors faced uncertainty that is related to the choices, outcomes and 
consequences of institutional reform.  This uncertainty was particularly acute following 
the referendum result on the draft constitution.  Knight identifies five different types of 
uncertainty as: "...1) the present institutional alternatives available to them, 2) the 
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present consequences of their institutional choices, 3) the future consequences of their 
present institutional choices, 4) the future institutional alternatives that will be available 
to them, and 5) their future preferences regarding future alternatives and 
outcomes" (Knight 1992: p. 45). 
This dissertation has argued that the contestation in Zimbabwe, during this 
period, was over institutions, their reform (or not) and their consequences.  Rational 
choice institutionalism pays particular analytical attention to the issue of uncertainty 
given its impacts on strategic decision-making.  This typology of uncertainties 
regarding future institutional alternatives, choices and their consequences is particularly 
relevant to this discussion, for it helps to explain actions that helped to propel 
mobilisation and/or suppress voices of dissent.  For example, the collective dissent by 
the war veterans following the referendum defeat may be seen as mobilisation to secure 
land reform commitments prior to the June 2000 parliamentary elections, reducing 
uncertainty about the present and future consequences of the referendum decision 
(discussed further in chapter five).  As the commercial farmers struggled with the land 
occupations, and support from the regime for the same, they also faced uncertainties 
about the future institutional alternatives that would be available. This dissertation 
argues that, as the crisis unfolded, intentional institutional reforms also generated 
uncertainties for specific actors in the media sector, and for supporters of the MDC, in 
addition to the commercial farmers, thus exacerbating the Rebel’s Dilemma. 
In Zimbabwe, the mobilising success of the NCA and other civic groups in 
demanding a new constitution and other reforms was an important expression of 
preferences for institutional alternatives that could generate different political 
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outcomes.  Rational choice institutionalism highlights that members of the ZANU-PF 
regime faced uncertainty about their institutional future, their alternatives and therefore 
their strategic choices.   
Uncertainty about the future consequences of institutional reform, and the 
advantages (or not) of future alternatives may exacerbate the 'State's Dilemma'.  The 
challenges of maintaining group cohesion and of keeping supporters 'on-side' (i.e. 
aligned with future outcomes) needs to be taken into account as future institutional 
alternatives and their consequences are considered and assessed.  Decision-making 
within the group (i.e. governing regime) becomes more complex, particularly in light of 
their strategic interdependence, as different actors may have different preferred choices 
or outcomes.  The uncertainty regarding future consequences and future preferences 
makes institutional design or reform to ensure future distributional advantage more 
complex (Knight 1992: p. 45). 
During the period of the Zimbabwean crisis under discussion, it is clear that 
members of the ZANU-PF regime faced uncertainty over future institutional 
alternatives and their future consequences.  This uncertainty may have driven the 
development of their 'patriotic narrative' for their narrative, was a non-institutionalist 
strategy that communicated clearly (and successfully) ZANU-PF's values, and 
priorities.  But the narrative was also accompanied by a number of the institutional 
reforms that were made by members of the ZANU-PF regime.  In the following 
chapters, this dissertation analyses several of these reforms in the media, public 
security and commercial agricultural sectors.  Through these reforms, the members of 
the ZANU-PF regime, acting in coordination, reduced their uncertainty about future 
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institutional alternatives (e.g. a new constitution, media liberalisation) and the political 
consequences arising from the same.  In so doing they took specific measures to 
resolve their own 'State's Dilemma' and intensified the 'Rebel's Dilemma' faced by their 
political opponents.   
One of the lines of research enquiry examines the management of uncertainty.  
This attention to uncertainty, and the strategic management of the same to address 
collective action problems, adds explanatory relevance to the understanding of the 
Zimbabwean crisis, particularly when combined with rational choice institutionalism's 
attention to group dynamics, strategic decision-making and to institutional reform.  
This discussion on the uncertainty related to membership in a group, and the roles that 
institutional reform and veto-players can play in exacerbating (or reducing) this 
uncertainty for other actors is an important addition to the discussion on the 
Zimbabwean crisis.   
Exit, Voice and Loyalty  
This chapter has, so far, developed the argument for defining institutions as 
rules, and argued that rational choice institutionalism is a theoretical perspective 
relevant to the Zimbabwean crisis, due to both the influence of institutions on the 
strategic choices of actors, and the contestation over institutional reform or stability 
that was a central element of the crisis. The dynamics of actors within groups, the 
strategic interdependence between actors, and the implications for institutional reform 
or stability were discussed, and also with reference to the implications for collective 
action.  Uncertainty about the status of an actor within a group, and the uncertainty that 
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can arise from future institutional alternatives and outcomes were also discussed, with 
reference to strategic decision-making.   
This chapter now turns to a second theoretical argument critical to this 
dissertation: Hirschman's theory of exit, voice and loyalty (Hirschman 1970, 1978, 
1986). These three action-choices: to give voice, to exit in order to signal their 
dissatisfaction, or to remain loyal are fundamentally an actor's core responses in 
situations of contentious collective action, including those of the Rebel’s and State’s 
Dilemmas.  These action-choices were developed at the level of both the individual and 
collective actors, as well as at the levels of individual, aggregated and cumulative 
responses. 
These action-choices are inter-related and Hirschman (1970) discusses these as 
the dynamics of exit, voice and loyalty.  It is perhaps due to this attention on the 
dynamics between the action-choices, that his 1970 analysis does not directly refer to 
the then emerging literature on collective action (e.g. Olson 1965).  His later work 
explicitly examines the dynamics of voice and exit with respect to the state 
development, including issues of migration and displacement (Hirschman 1978).     
For this author, these three action-choices are foundational to analysing an 
actor's response to those situations of contentious collective action where reform is 
demanded.  In the case of the Zimbabwean crisis, dissatisfied with the current 
institutional status quo, members of the MDC and the NCA chose to give voice to their 
demands for reform.  Faced with these demands for constitutional, economic and other 
reforms, the members of the ZANU-PF sought to suppress the action-choice of voice, 
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to encourage exit and to reinforce loyalty, through the introduction of new institutional 
rules that altered the incentives and penalties, as discussed in the next chapters.      
Hirschman (1970, 1978, 1986) discusses each of these action-choices in the 
context of communicating the need for reform, and responding to these demands.  
However, Hirschman's discussion of institutional strategies to constrain (or enable) 
each of the action-choices is more limited, and emerges in his later work.  It fits into his 
original (1970) analysis of "responsiveness", and of "mechanisms" to communicate 
concerns and the need for change, as well as his discussion of organisational rules. As 
this dissertation demonstrates, institutional reform may address (or block) the concerns 
that are generating the dissatisfaction by altering the choices of actors.  In this way, this 
dissertation is an advance on Hirschman’s work.    
Similarly, despite its importance to decision-making about choices, and its 
importance to mobilisation, the issue of uncertainty was not discussed by Hirschman in 
depth.  Uncertainty is likely to influence choices and decisions around the action-
choices of exit and/or voice as well as loyalty.  As discussed throughout this 
dissertation, many Zimbabweans, facing uncertainty about both the economic future, 
and about governance trends, expressed their preferences for different institutional 
alternatives via mobilisation and the aggregation of voice.  Others chose voluntary exit 
via migration to other countries.  Pfaff’s (2006: pp. 28, 107ff) study of the dynamics of 
exit and voice in East Germany, revealed the role of growing economic uncertainty in 
helping to mobilise protesters in their  collective demands for reform.     
For individual members and supporters of a governing regime, such as ZANU-
PF, one choice is to remain loyal.  This dissertation uses Hirschman's definition of 
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loyalty as "...[postponing exit] in spite of dissatisfaction and qualms" (Hirschman 1970: 
p. 104).  This definition, and the analytical developments related to the action-choice of 
loyalty are discussed in more detail in chapter four.  The ZANU-PF leadership actively 
promoted loyalty, including for normative reasons.  Levitsky and Way (2012: p. 785) 
discuss how few defections there have been from the ZANU-PF regime in the post-
independence period, and Ranger (2004) discusses Zimbabwean 'patriots' in the context 
of the liberation struggle, its goals, and a sovereign Zimbabwe, and therefore their 
continuing electoral loyalty to ZANU-PF.  The narrative of patriotic history is 
discussed in the next chapter, and in chapter four with specific reference to the action-
choice of loyalty.    
Promoting loyalty also offers functional benefits, in that loyalty eases the 
'State's Dilemma by facilitating the retention of support by those who are committed to, 
or choose, the status quo or a strategy of change from within (Lichbach 2995: pp. 
256-258; Hirschman 1970: p. 79).  Loyalty can engender "reserves of sacrifice" which 
may not otherwise be mobilised, and may usefully convey a symbolic show of both 
strength and unity as Gaultung (1967: p. 389) discussed in his important analysis of 
Rhodesian sanctions.   
Loyalty, by increasing the costs of exit, may serve as a barrier to exit, helping to 
purchase additional time and opportunity for the leadership to address the existing 
dissatisfaction (Hirschman 1970: p. 79).  The action-choice of loyalty is not without 
costs, including for those actors who choose to use it as a barrier to exit.  ZANU-PF 
needed to retain, and regain, support from Zimbabweans, and actions to strengthen the 
choice of loyalty by its supporters were taken.  Standard principal-agent problems 
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apply: the challenge of both ensuring the availability and reliability of information and 
of monitoring behaviour (e.g. 'tests' that demonstrate an actor's continuing loyalty 
through the provision of contributions).  Uncertainty may be created when actors 
conceal information about themselves and their behaviour (Stone 2002: p. 279), with 
potentially negative consequences for strategic decision-making and/or action.  Rules, 
informal or formal, that explicitly or de facto demand loyalty (e.g. rules against treason, 
adherence or maintenance of party membership by public officials) may alter the costs 
and benefits of loyalty, but may also provide information about "...the probable future 
actions of others (Knight 1992: p. 17), helping others to formulate their expectations 
and to make choices for their own strategic benefit (Knight 1992: p. 57).   
Loyalty’s costs also include the suppression of the action-choice of voice.  This 
occurred during the Zimbabwean crisis as loyalty to ZANU-PF and its priorities was 
demanded, and the expression of opposing voice curtailed.  Institutions that produce 
loyalty are often "...meant to repress voice alongside exit" (Hirschman 1970: p. 92 
italics in original), an analytical finding that fits very well with ZANU-PF's suppression 
of its opponents and its uneasy relationships with non-state actors (Southall 2013: pp. 
174-211). The leadership's short-term interests are to "...entrench themselves and to 
enhance their freedom to act as they wish, unmolested as far as possible by either 
desertions or complaints of members..." even if their longer-term interests are better 
served by enhancing "...feedback, either [through] voice or exit" (Hirschman 1970: pp. 
92-93).   
The action-choice of 'voice' is defined as "any attempt at all to change, rather 
than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs, whether through individual or 
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collective petition to [internal organisational] leadership.... or through various types of 
actions and protests, including those that are meant to mobilise public 
opinion" (Hirschman 1970: p. 30).  This definition is focused on the need to express 
dissatisfaction and to encourage or initiate change or reform, rather than the articulation 
of a preference for the current state of affairs.  This definition is about altering the 
agenda or priorities of the leadership, and recognises that a variety of efforts to amplify 
demands may be strategically pursued.  Hirschman's definition therefore covers only a 
sub-set of public discourse with its competing voices of both support and dissent.   
Although this definition, Hirschman's original, has had its own useful empirical 
developments (as discussed below), it is retained for this dissertation which discusses 
the dynamics of exit, voice and loyalty in resolving the collective action problems 
faced by the members of the ZANU-PF.  This dissertation argues, particularly in the 
following chapter that, in Zimbabwe, the action-choice of voice was suppressed by the 
leaders of the ZANU-PF regime, through coordinated action to reform institutions so as 
to constrain the freedoms of expression, association, assembly and movement – the 
four freedoms fundamental to the expression and aggregation of the action-choice of 
voice, as well as the private media outlets.  Through its focus on the use of institutional 
constraints to suppress opposing voices, it differs from the analysis of 'patriotic history' 
within the Zimbabwean literature.  The next chapter includes a comparative assessment 
of ZANU-PF's patriotic narrative and the action-choice of 'voice'.       
Hirschman's definition explicitly acknowledges that there are two (or more) 
parties – the first, the 'member' (an individual or collective actor) who is expressing his 
or her dissatisfaction and the second, the 'receiver' (or as Hirschman called it, 
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"management") (ibid).  The 'receiver' will, through the information provided by this 
expression of voice, register the dissatisfaction expressed.  This feedback helps 'the 
receiver' to shape expectations and thereafter develop their choices, including choices 
about voice or exit.  Exit is a more direct and less graduated, means of expressing 
concerns or dissent than that of voice but, as discussed further below, one whose effect 
often arises from its cumulative, rather than individual, deployment (Hirschman 1970: 
pp. 17, 23-24).   
Voice too, often has greater effect through its accumulation and aggregation, as 
seen in the unprecedented mobilising success of the MDC and its civic allies. The 
effectiveness of voice through aggregation are realities that arise in the political 
domain, for example, as voices join together through shared concern and/or new 
political parties or entrepreneurial leaders emerge.  Mobilisation arises when "...effects 
and experiences are converted into organised efforts to bring about change” in its 
degree of organisation.  The collective expression of voice, or mobilisation, may occur 
for example, amongst competing factions or groupings, within the groups and/or within 
the "...publics potentially affected by the consequences of the reform" (Stone 2002: p. 
217).   
The potential for exercising voice, however, depends on several factors. 
Hirschman (1970: p. 43) cited the population's general propensity to complain, an 
important consideration in a range of cultures, including Zimbabwe.  Traditional 
chieftaincies, for example, may discourage the expression of voice by clan members.  
Hierarchy may also be a constraint to voice, within specific organisational contexts 
such as the military.  Other cultural norms, such as respect for elders, or the husband 
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speaking for the wife and family members may also influence the expression of voice 
in specific situations and cultures.  Lichbach’s work (1995) also highlights the risks 
associated with the expression of voice, and risk tolerance and capacity are other 
factors that will influence the potential for the action-choice of voice to be expressed.   
The group's internal arrangements, decision-making rules and procedures are 
also important to the exercise of voice. An institutional mechanism within the group's 
arrangements that "...can communicate complaints cheaply and effectively" is also a 
pre-requisite for exercising 'voice' (Hirschman 1970: p. 43).  Group arrangements may 
define who has a right to express voice within the group, as well as how and when that 
voice may be formally expressed.  The degree of competition amongst groups will also 
affect the dynamics between exit and voice (Hirschman 1970: pp. 49ff) and thus actors' 
expectations about the effectiveness of each strategy.  These points regarding group 
dynamics and the arrangements of groups were discussed above and will be analysed 
further below.   
Voice, as an action-choice, often carries higher costs, than the other action-
choices, when it is used as a strategy to demand reform.  It may be time and resource 
intensive, particularly if considerable numbers of actors need to be mobilised in order 
for the action-choice of voice to be effective.  Reputational risks may be a factor as an 
actor asks ‘do I speak up?’ and the costs may accrue as penalties for speaking out may 
be applied, as discussed further in the next chapter.  These private costs are part of the 
Rebel's Dilemma, for they are weighed against the uncertain public benefits (Lichbach 
1995: pp. 15-16).  The assessment of the effectiveness of the action-choice of voice is 
critical, and the decision to exit will often be taken in the light of these prospects 
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(Hirschman 1970: pp. 37, 136).  But Hirschman also notes that the availability (or not) 
of an exit option will also influence the prospects for the effective use of voice, as an 
existing exit option will atrophy the development of the "art of voice" (Hirschman 
1970: pp. 34, 43).  Voluntary exit may simply be the easier, cheaper choice available to 
strategic actors.  The option of exit and whether it is forced or voluntary will now be 
discussed.    
Voluntary vs. Forced Exit  
Hirschman (1970) and Lichbach (1995) both discuss the action-choice of exit, 
as either a voluntary or a forced action-choice during situations of declining 
satisfaction.   Although Hirschman initially discussed voluntary exit largely in 
economic terms (1970: pp. 15-17), by 1986, his definition of exit had broadened to 
explicitly recognise both the political and economic spheres: the "...withdrawal from a 
relationship that one has built up as a buyer of merchandise or as a member of an 
organisation such as a firm, family, a political party or state" (Hirschman 1986: p. 77, 
emphasis added).  His 1978 work explicitly focused on exit within, or from, a state.  
Lichbach (1995: pp. 105-107) discusses different types of voluntary exit, although it is 
Fried (2003) who primarily discusses those situations where voluntary exit is not an 
option.  Each type of exit, i.e. forced or voluntary, has implications for collective 
action, as discussed further in chapter five below.  
An analysis of the literature identifies two broad meta-categories of exit: that 
which is voluntary, and undertaken by the actor, and that which is forced, that is, 
imposed, upon the actor by another.  Juxtaposing these two meta-categories reveals and 
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emphasizes a critical factor:  it matters whether the affected actor is the one who holds 
the power to decide his own exit or not.  Voluntary exit is a rational response to 
increasing dissatisfaction, with exit the action-choice arising from an assessment of the 
costs and benefits of giving voice or of remaining loyal.  Forced exit may be a rational 
strategy imposed to repress voice and/or other forms of dissent.  Other actors may 
impose rules that create new, or alter, existing restrictions on exit.  By denying exit to 
targeted actors, voice may be mobilised, facilitating collective action by its aggregation 
and its expression.  However, by forcing exit, the voice of those targeted may be 
removed, or restricted in their reach. "The state, recognizing a dissident's exit/voice 
option, uses accommodative and repressive response strategies to control the dissident's 
choice" (Lichbach 1995: p. 24).    
Voluntary Exit  
To review, voluntary exit is defined as a decision to act (e.g. to withdraw or to 
disassociate) by an actor in situations of declining market or policy satisfaction 
(Hirschman 1970).  Examples include a decision to leave a political party, a situation of 
unsatisfactory employment, or to migrate from a geographic area for either political, 
social and/or economic dissatisfaction or concern.  Voluntary exit is one means of 
expressing dissatisfaction or grievance, but may be a more direct, and less graduated, 
means of expression than that of voice (Hirschman 1970: p. 17), for it is often an “in or 
out” action-choice.  The effects of voluntary exit often arises from its cumulative, 
rather than individual, deployment (1970: pp. 23-24; Pfaff 2006: p. 28), although a 
single actor’s departure can be significant.  
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For example, the largest trade union leaving the federation of trade unions 
would weaken the both the representativeness and therefore the legitimacy of the 
federation, while the loss of access to the trade union’s significant financial and human 
resources may also limit the effectiveness of the federation.  Individual actors may 
choose to leave a political party or a business, and the role of that individual (member, 
employee, founder, executive) within the organisation will influence the effect of that 
departure on the organisation or business.  Effects will include the assessment by other 
strategic actors, of their future choices following this voluntary exit.  However, the 
effects of voluntary exit may be offset by the participation of other actors who replace 
those who left (Hirschman 1970: pp. 26-27).  
Group dynamics are again relevant to this discussion.  Restrictions on exit may 
help the group to maintain its size despite rising dissatisfaction.  By discouraging exit, 
they support group maintenance and, potentially, group cohesion. Barriers to exit also 
reduce the "permeability" of the group i.e. "...the ease with which one [can participate]" 
in the group (Lichbach 1995: p. 214 citing Lasswell and Kaplan 1950: p. 35).  Group 
size may change if, for example, restrictions on entry to the group are either non-
existent or are less restrictive than those restricting exit.  The composition of the group 
may also be affected if these exit or entry restrictions are targeted on the basis of 
specific criteria (e.g. age, sex, or income).  The temporal aspect is important – 
temporary barriers to exit may not have the same effect as those that are permanent.   
By increasing the cost of the action-choice of exit, exit restrictions or barriers 
therefore alter the benefits of remaining loyal.  These barriers may also assist in 
monitoring defections from the group, for example, by making defections more visible.  
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Loyalty may be sufficiently high (including due to normative reasons), and/or the costs 
of remaining loyal are sufficiently low, for actors to remain in the situation or 
organisation, even when “…exit is a readily available option" (Pfaff 2006: p. 19; 
Hirschman 1970: p. 93).  Selective incentives to may be offered to reinforce the 
benefits of staying loyal, and examples of the strategic deployment of selective 
incentives, by members of the ZANU-PF regime, to reinforce the loyalty of their 
supporters (and to delay their exit at the time of elections) are discussed in the chapters 
below.   
When rules regarding exit (or entry) alter the group's composition and/or its 
internal structure, uncertainty may arise.  These uncertainties may be particularly 
important in those situations where the actor is affected by, but does not control, the 
rule-making process that is altering the group's permeability. For example, rules may be 
introduced or altered to permit forced exit (expulsion).  Changing the group's 
permeability may increase an actor's uncertainty about the actions of others with whom 
they interact, their own uncertainty about their future status within the group and/or 
their future institutional alternatives and consequences (Knight 1992: pp. 44-45).  The 
impact of these uncertainties on an actor's choice to remain loyal, i.e. to defer exit, will 
vary. 
Voluntary exit is an action-choice that is very relevant to this discussion of the 
Zimbabwean crisis.  Many Zimbabweans exited ZANU-PF and became members of the 
MDC, exacerbating the regime’s collective action dilemma, and providing mobilising 
benefits and support to the MDC.  Many Zimbabweans voluntarily left the country, 
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dissatisfied with political and/or economic conditions (Crush and Tevera 2010; UNDP 
2009: p. 101), altering the dynamics of exit and voice, as discussed further below.  
Exit, in the political realm, "...has often been branded as criminal for it has been 
labelled [by political leadership] as desertion, defection and treason" (Hirschman 1970: 
p. 17 italics in original).  Zimbabwe was no exception, and the members and supporters 
of the political opposition in Zimbabwe were often called "traitors", "sell-outs" or 
"enemies" by President Mugabe and other members of the ZANU-PF regime (HR 
NGO Forum 2007; Ranger 2004).  This language featured heavily in the 'patriotic' 
narrative of ZANU-PF, although not for the MDC and civic opposition's physical 
departure from Zimbabwe, but rather for their political departure from ZANU-PF and 
their world view.     
This negative 'branding' may result in additional costs, and these costs will be 
taken into account by actors who may be considering voluntary exit.  The costs may 
criminal penalties, reputational loss, "...life-long associations...[and/or loss] of 
livelihood" (Hirschman 1970:  p. 96 citing Almond 1954: chapter 12), each of which 
are significant, and all of which were part of the response from the regime.  Other costs 
include the costs of identifying and selecting alternatives (i.e. information costs) 
(Hirschman 1970: pp. 82-83), as well as the cost associated with the price of entry if a 
new alternative is chosen.  When entry costs are high, actors may be slow to 
acknowledge the declines occurring, and the “…onset of voice” will therefore be 
delayed, although in these cases, voice is likely to "...be more active than is ordinarily 
the case" (Hirschman 1970: p. 93 emphasis in the original).   
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Also relevant to the Zimbabwean crisis and the analysis of the dynamics of exit 
and voice is the question of mobility of property rights.  The mobility of property rights 
is a key element in increasing the prospects for voluntary exit over voice (Hirschman 
1978: pp. 96-101).  Following Hirschman's argument, those in the agricultural sector, 
for example, where property is more fixed (e.g. land, buildings, equipment) are thus 
more likely to choose voice over voluntary exit. This reflects the higher costs of 
voluntary exit, e.g. due to the loss of fixed assets.  It is not surprising therefore, that 
facing forced exit from their farms, and with low mobility of their property rights, 
many of Zimbabwe's white commercial farmers, chose the action-choice of voice over 
exit.  
Threatening voluntary exit, rather than immediately exiting, may help to 
increase voice's effectiveness, by complementing, and therefore, making clear to others 
the costs of ignoring the substantive demands articulated through voice.  Threats may 
encourage, for example, responsiveness to the demands for change (Hirschman 1970: 
p. 83).  If successful, then the threat of exit will have altered strategic choices and have 
served as a deterrent, i.e. it will have "... persuade[d] an opponent to stop or reverse an 
action” (George and Simons 1994: p. 7).  To be effective, a threat must be credible.  
The credibility of the threat of exit is affected both by its costs and by the ease with 
which it can be implemented (Hirschman 1970: p. 83).  The degree of interaction, and 
the degree of inter-dependency, between the actors, i.e. whether the interaction is of a 
'one-time only' nature, or is likely to be repeated in the future, also matters, for it may 
influence both the timing and the deployment of the threat.  Immediate action may be 
required in order to sustain future threat credibility (Hardin 1982: p. 183).  However, in 
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the case of the threat of exit, exit takes the actor 'out of the game', rendering the threat a 
'one-time only' play which cannot be used again in the future.   
Finally, voice may be a residual choice to voluntary exit.  When exit is 
unavailable, or unlikely (e.g. due to very high costs), voluntary exit may become the 
source of voice (Hirschman 1970: p. 34, emphasis added).  As discussed above, barriers 
or restrictions to voluntary exit may alter the dynamics between exit and voice.  For 
example, the denial of exit due to a minimum membership period could alter the 
preference for using voice in the immediate term.  A change in the pace or scope of 
denials of exit (e.g. new criteria to be met) could also alter strategic choices.  Decisions 
on whether (or not) to deny the choice of exit are also likely to be affected by whether 
the actors are likely to continue to interact in the future.  
Voluntary exit in Sub-Saharan Africa is not new and has long historical roots 
(Herbst 1990; Hirschman 1978; IOM 2009).  Herbst discussed cross-border migration 
during the colonial period as a means of both avoiding colonial control, and of 
protecting those who were "...dissatisfied with the state" (Herbst 1990: p. 186).  Splits 
within communities were also voluntary examples of exit, at times serving as a means 
of resolving or managing conflicts, or, at other times, an indicator of preferences for an 
alternative supplier of public goods or authority (Hirschman 1978: pp. 94-95).  
When aggregated however, voluntary migration may be a threat to the state 
itself (Herbst 1990: p. 186; Hirschman 1978: pp. 101-105; Pfaff 2006: pp. 138-139).  
Once established, in or amongst communities, voluntary exit may become self-
reinforcing, and suppress the development of voice.  Voluntary exit may therefore 
discourage the leadership from finding alternative means of addressing dissatisfaction 
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and conflicts (Hirschman 1978: p. 95), including by the removal of activist voices 
(Hirschman 1986: p. 90).   
During the East German revolution, voluntary mass exit did not suppress voice, 
but rather helped to trigger voice (Pfaff 2006).  Mass exit therefore played a catalytic 
role, a role not included in Hirschman's original theory on the roles of exit vis-à-vis 
voice.  Pfaff's argument, of cumulative exit as a trigger for voice, is an important 
advance on Hirschman's original work.  As discussed in the synthesis section below, 
this advance is one that adds explanatory value to this dissertation's analysis of the 
Zimbabwean crisis.  In East Germany, mass exit revealed the vulnerability of the 
governing regime, thus encouraging others to join in the protests (Pfaff 2006: p. 29).  
Both Herbst and Hirschman argued that, in these cases, responsiveness may not occur 
in the short-term, but rather only when the scope and scale of exit becomes a threat to 
the state itself (Hirschman 1978: pp. 103-104; Herbst 1990: p. 186).    
During this period of the Zimbabwean crisis, an estimated three million citizens 
left Zimbabwe – approximately 25-30 percent of the population (SPT 2004b: p. 29 
citing AP 15 February 2004; UNDP 2008: pp. 108-111).  For many, the option to 
remain in Zimbabwe was not seen as an economically and/or politically viable 
alternative.  Amongst those who left were many of Zimbabwe's most qualified 
professionals (e.g. teachers, nurses) (Crush and Tevera 2010:  pp. 12-13; UNDP 2008: 
p. 110 citing Kirk 2004; SPT 2004b: pp. 29-31) and many others of working age 
(UNDP 2008: p. 110 citing Bloch 2005 and Makina 2007).   
Mass exit may also significantly alter the demographics of a population.  This 
author recognises a specific impact of these demographics for the collective action 
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challenge that is the 'State's Dilemma'.  As a consequence of mass exit, the dependency 
ratio, i.e. the number of dependents per one hundred persons of working age, may 
increase.  In the case of adult out-migration from Zimbabwe, a higher dependency ratio 
means therefore that a higher percentage of the population is either likely to be too 
young to vote, and/or are elderly. In the context of the strategic interdependence that is 
linked to electoral performance, this change in the dependency ratio would ease the 
'State's Dilemma', for the size of the group needed to achieve the 'step-good' would be 
smaller.  By 2004, approximately one-half of the voting population had emigrated and 
was unable to vote (SPT 2004b: pp. 9, 32), while a member of the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe’s Publicity Committee put the percentage at an even higher level:  “60% to 
70% of Zimbabwean adults who should constitute the productive population are living 
abroad” (SPT 2004b: p. 2 citing Herbert Nkala, September 2004).  Zimbabwe's 2002 
census revealed that approximately 50 percent of its population was under the age of 18 
and a further 630,000 people were over the age of 60 years (IOM 2009: p. 28 Table 6, 
author's calculations).  Domestically, these Zimbabweans were more likely to have 
been dependent on access to state resources (e.g. food aid) in the face of high levels of 
poverty, unemployment and economic collapse, although remittances from abroad were 
also often an important source of income for those remaining in Zimbabwe (UNDP 
2008: pp. 111-113). 
In the short-term, mass exit, and the demographic changes it may bring, may be 
advantageous to a governing regime. These advantages may take two forms.  First, 
voluntary exit removes some sources of dissent (SPT 2004b: p. 32; Hirschman 1986: p. 
91 and ibid: 1978: p.102), as opposing voices demanding change leave Zimbabwe. 
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Second, the governing regime faces a reduced burden in terms of public goods 
provision.   ZANU-PF's Organising Secretary said it most starkly: "We would be better 
off with only six million people, with our own people who support the liberation 
struggle. We don’t want all these extra people” (SPT 2004b: p. 2 citing D. Mutasa, 
August 2002).   
While migration may remove sources of dissent, Hirschman's findings now 
need to be qualified, due to developments in information and communications 
technologies.  These developments allowed Zimbabwe’s opposing voices to 
communicate easily and cheaply across borders (e.g. via websites, podcasts etc.) and to 
also by-pass institutional rules that restricted the freedom of speech.  Both of these 
points are discussed further in the next chapter.  Voluntary exit may also be subject to 
the institutional rules regarding citizenship (e.g. whether dual-citizenship can be held, 
loss of citizenship or residency following an extended absence), which may impact the 
ability of these Zimbabweans to return (UNDP 2008: p. 123).  These institutional rules 
may therefore remove these opposing voices from both current and future electoral 
challenges.   
Second, mass, voluntary exit facilitates the provision of public goods to a 
smaller population, thus potentially reducing future dissatisfaction that can trigger the 
action-choice of voice (Pfaff 2006: p. 27).   The ZANU-PF regime faced resource 
constraints, as external financing from international development donors decreased 
during the crisis (UNDP 2008: p. 47), and as the turbulence generated by the 'fast-track' 
land reform programme (see below) affected the commercial agricultural economy 
directly and the larger economy indirectly.  Beyond the reduced availability of financial 
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resources, corruption and economic mismanagement also reduced public expenditures 
and revenues (UNDP 2008).   With fewer resources available, and many resources 
needed to help retain support, a smaller population was advantageous to resolving the 
State's Dilemma.  As discussed in the following chapters, the institutional rules 
governing several public services (e.g. policing, food aid) were altered to allow for 
limited resources to be targeted in a partisan way, i.e. to privilege ZANU-PF 
supporters.  
Forcing Exit, and Situations of No-exit  
Mutasa's statement "We would be better off with only six million people…” 
cited above, speaks to the strategic value of a smaller but more loyal population.  By 
reducing the cost of exit, members of the regime encouraged (or forced) exit over the 
action-choice of voice.  Forced exit or expulsion, is an instrument "... used to restrict 
voice" by members of a political party or organisation (Hirschman 1970: p. 76), and it 
is also a means, used by the state to reduce collective dissent (Lichbach 1995: p. 107; 
Hirschman 1978: pp. 91-93).  Herbst (1990: p. 202) however, recognises that, more 
broadly, restrictions on voluntary and forced exit were “fundamental” elements of state 
consolidation, as these restrictions helped to define borders and project sovereignty.   
Externalities may also limit the option of exit.  The consequences of foreign 
policy is one example cited by Hirschman (1970: p. 101) and is an example relevant to 
the Zimbabwean crisis, with its sanctions and their consequences.   In these situations, 
any exit decision will need to factor in the possibility of continuing decline (Hirschman 
1970: pp. 101-102) and the costs arising from this possibility will be factored into 
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decision-making as a benefit of remaining loyal.  If the benefit of loyalty increases 
along with membership costs, then "…the motivation to exit need not become stronger 
as deterioration proceeds” (Hirschman 1970: p. 103).     
A “no-exit” situation may also exist.  In the economic arena, monopolies mean 
that exit is, de facto, unavailable as an option (Hirschman 1970: pp. 55-63).  Kinship 
ties, or immovability of property, for example, may render the costs of exit too high or 
too difficult (Hirschman 1986: p. 79; 1970: p. 33).  In communities where norms place 
high value on the maintenance of these ties, and/or, where kinship ties are critical 
elements of an individual actor's social and economic "safety net", these ties may take 
on greater weight.  Zimbabwe would be one example, as are many other Sub-Saharan 
African countries, where these considerations will reinforce the costs of exit.   
In this dissertation, 'forced exit' is defined as the intentional, physical 
displacement of others from homes and/or economic activities.  Business discussions 
often refer to firms , entrepreneurs, or other actors, ''exiting" a market (e.g. Brazil) and/
or a productive activity (e.g. halting production of a specific model or product line).  
Hirschman discusses voluntary exit from specific consumer markets (Hirschman 1970: 
pp. 55-60), although his argument could also apply to specific producer markets.  Crisis 
reporting and studies speak of forced physical displacement, as actors flee violence or 
natural disasters.  This definition reflects these broadly understood situations of exit 
and displacement, and includes both elements of economic activity and physical 
relocation.   
This definition while drawing upon Hirschman’s original analysis about exit, is 
more heavily influenced by Lichbach's (1995) identification of solutions to collective 
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action challenges.  This dissertation analyses ‘forced exit' as a solution, deployed 
during the Zimbabwean crisis, not only to specific geographic areas (e.g. 'no-go' zones), 
but also to actors within specific economic sub-sectors, i.e. commercial agriculture and 
the private press in Zimbabwe.  For the state, a solution of 'forcing exit' is a "tactic to 
reduce collective dissent" (Lichbach 1995: pp. 106-107).  In light of the collective 
action challenges facing individual members of the ZANU-PF regime, it is not 
surprising that the solution of 'forcing exit' from homes and livelihoods was deployed 
against their political opponents.   
Summary    
This dissertation introduces to the discussion of this Zimbabwean crisis the 
theoretical framework of rational choice institutionalism, and the works of both 
Hirschman and Lichbach.  While rational choice theory focuses on strategic decision-
making, rational choice institutionalism focuses on how the strategic choices and 
decisions of actors are influenced and shaped by institutions.  Institutions matter to 
outcomes, for they structure choices and have important distributional consequences.  
This period in Zimbabwe involved significant contestation over demands for 
institutional reform and, also about the maintenance of institutional stability.   
Due to the attention that rational choice institutionalism draws to collective 
action challenges, I identified that the members of the ZANU-PF regime faced the 
specific collective action challenge that is known as the 'State's Dilemma' (Lichbach 
1995: pp. 256-258).  This analysis and examination of this dilemma in the Zimbabwean 
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context, and the analysis of the strategic use of institutional reform to maintain 
distributional advantage by the members of the ZANU-PF regime, are new 
contributions to the literature about this period of the Zimbabwean crisis.   
This chapter asserted that members of the ZANU-PF regime are actors in 
situations of strategic interdependence, with the rewards of each varying, and affected 
by, the choices and decisions of others (Knight 1992: p. 48 citing Elster 1986: p. 7, 
emphasis added).  The chapter discussed the situations of strategic interdependency that 
exist, and how this inter-dependency generated, for members of the governing regime, 
the collective action challenge that is known as the ‘State’s Dilemma’.  The State's 
Dilemma is the challenge of sustaining needed support, when the interests of the state's 
supporters may align otherwise (Lichbach 1995: pp. 256-258).   
Institutions were defined as "...a set of rules that structure social interactions in 
particular ways" (Knight 1992: p. 2), and the alternative conceptual approaches to 
discussing institutions were analysed and discussed. Although not selected, it was 
recognised that the definition of institutions as equilibria was important and that it 
revealed the structural equilibrium behind the demands for constitutional reform made 
by many Zimbabweans, particularly the NCA and its allies.  Similarly, although the 
approach of defining institutions as norms was not selected for this dissertation, its 
relevance to this period was discussed, as the MDC and civic allies sought to have 
norms of constitutionalism, rights and democracy institutionalised, while ZANU-PF 
and its allies sought to sustain the current institutions anchored in their liberation 
struggle rather than Zimbabwe's post-independence Constitution. 
!  106
However, the approach of defining institutions as rules was selected due to the 
role of formal rules in defining the powers of many positions and actors; its emphasis 
on rewards and sanctions [penalties] as key constraints on actors.  Non-compliance was 
a central concern in this contestation over institutions, whether it was non-compliance 
with the Lancaster agreements or the non-compliance with Zimbabwe's Constitution.  
Only in the definition of institutions as rules is there an 'or else' consequence (or 
penalty) that both helps shapes expectations and choices, as well strengthen 
compliance.   
Two other analytical elements were discussed in the first half of this chapter.  
The first was the participation of actors in groups, and the dynamics of group 
membership (including decision-making rules and processes).  Second, the analytical 
implications of uncertainty – whether about actor's status within the group, or about 
institutional alternatives and their consequences and outcomes, were also highlighted, 
and their relevance to the situation in Zimbabwe was discussed.  Both are relevant to 
this discussion of the Zimbabwean crisis, and are highlighted due to the theoretical 
framework of rational choice institutionalism.       
The second half of this chapter introduced Hirschman's framework of the 
action-choices of exit, voice and loyalty.  It discussed the institutional and group 
elements of the same, linking Hirschman's analysis, and its subsequent analytical 
developments, to the broader arguments of this dissertation.  This author argues that the 
three action-choices are foundational to analysing an actor's response in situations of 
contentious collective action. This dissertation will demonstrate in the following 
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chapters, the role of strategic institutional reform in altering the dynamics of exit, voice 
and loyalty.  
The next chapter specifically addresses the action-choice of 'voice', i.e. the 
expression of dissent, rather than support.  This action-choice therefore only 
represented a portion of the public debate and contestation underway in Zimbabwe.  
ZANU-PF's own 'patriotic narrative' was introduced in this chapter and will be 
compared against 'voice' in the next chapter.  The next chapter will now also examine 
the specific institutional reforms to the freedoms of expression, association, assembly 
and movement, and the print media sector.   
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Chapter Three:  Targeting the freedoms that support 'Voice' 
 This chapter is the first in the second half of the dissertation.  This chapter, 
along with the two following, sets out the argument and evidence to support this 
dissertation's assertion that the members of the ZANU-PF regime strategically 
reformed institutions in order to resolve their specific collective action challenge 
known as the 'State's Dilemma'.  The chapter discusses Hirschman's construct of the 
action-choice of voice in more detail, and comparatively assesses it against the 
narrative of patriotic history, developed by members of the governing regime against 
this action-choice.  The chapter continues with an analysis of the institutional reforms 
made in Zimbabwe's media sector.  These reforms strategically supported the regime's 
continuing distributional advantage in the access to, and dissemination of, information.  
 This author identified that there are four freedoms that support the action-choice 
of 'voice':  the freedoms of expression, assembly, association and movement. Each of 
these freedoms are defined through institutional rules, and it is the strategic deployment 
of institutional rules to suppress dissenting voices, whether articulated through 
'horizontal' or 'vertical' voice, that is the focus of this chapter.  These reforms, by 
intensifying the mobilisation challenges faced by Zimbabwe's political opposition, 
contributed to easing the 'State's Dilemma'.   
Voice, Dissent and Collective Action:  
'Voice' is one of the three action-choices available to consumers, members of an 
organisation, or to citizens of a state, in situations of declining satisfaction (Hirschman 
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1970, 1978, emphasis added).  It is the expression of dissent, and the action-choice of 
voice may be defined as "…any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape, from an 
objectionable state of affairs, whether through individual or collective petition [to 
internal leadership].... or through various types of actions and protests, including those 
that are meant to mobilise public opinion"(Hirschman 1970: p. 30 emphasis added).  
The action-choice of 'voice' is therefore a sub-set of the larger debate and discourse that 
occurs within families, communities, organisations, groups and/or at the national level.   
As discussed in the previous chapter, the action-choice of 'voice' interacts with 
both the action-choices of 'exit' and 'loyalty'. As an action-choice, 'voice' carries 
uncertainties as well as direct and/or indirect costs (Hirschman 1970: p. 77), including 
when it is expressed within an organisation or group. A key uncertainty is the 
effectiveness of voice, i.e. its ability to influence change.  The strategic choice to give 
voice will therefore be determined, not only by the direct and indirect costs of giving 
voice, but also the prospects for success, the actor's degree of loyalty, and to the 
availability of the exit option, as the action-choice of exit carries both greater 
certainties, and potentially lower costs, for the actor (Hirschman 1970: pp. 37, 77).  
Within groups, in those situations where the exit option is available, loyalty should 
activate voice, and thus defer exit from the group (Hirschman 1970: p. 77).  
Loyalty will encourage influential actors within the grouping or organisation to 
give voice, when they are dissatisfied with the directions taken.  For those who are less 
influential, their loyalty will reinforce expectations that "someone will act or something 
will happen to improve matters", including in political situations where dissatisfaction 
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is directly related to the direction that the country is taking (Hirschman 1970: p. 78 
emphasis in the original). 
The Zimbabwean Constitution guarantees the freedoms of expression, 
assembly, association and movement, and therefore the right to give 'voice' (Zimbabwe 
2000: Articles 19 to 22; Zimbabwe 2005 and 2007). These constitutional rules structure 
the relations between Zimbabwean citizens and the state.  Further, these rules are 
backed by various international instruments (e.g. UN Declaration of Human Rights, 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), to which Zimbabwe, through 
conscious choice, decision and action, voluntarily became a signatory.   
Zimbabwe's Constitution is complemented by specific pieces of legislation (e.g. 
the Public Order and Security Act, the Private Voluntary Organisations Act) that 
further define the rules relating to the freedoms of expression, assembly, association 
and/or movement, either in specific contexts (e.g. public gatherings) or for specific 
types of organisations.  Other legislation (e.g. the Broadcast Act) also codify the rules 
that structure the participation of the various actors in the Zimbabwean media sector.  
The media sector is important, both because of its amplification of voices, debate and 
discourse; its contribution to agenda-setting; and, to the enjoyment of these freedoms 
by those who wish to express their opinions publicly. 
Individuals can also express their views towards others, whether family, 
colleagues or simply to a public. The freedom to express views, and the opportunity to 
support or oppose those other views, are not only examples of freedom of expression, 
but may also be examples of 'horizontal' voice, i.e. the "...the utterance and exchange 
of opinion, concern, and criticism among citizens" (Hirschman 1986: p. 82 citing 
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O'Donnell 1986, emphasis in the original).  When those views, concerns or complaints 
are communicated to the authorities, it becomes an example of 'vertical' voice, defined 
as "...an actual communication, complaint, petition or protest addressed to the 
authorities by a citizen, or more frequently, an organisation representing a group of 
citizens" (ibid: emphasis added).   
This analytical division of Hirschman's concept into two different types of voice 
is very relevant to this analysis of the Zimbabwean crisis, and is also a theoretical 
advance on Hirschman's original work.  Both types of ‘voice’ retain the focus on the 
expression of dissatisfaction. During the Zimbabwean crisis, the voices demanding 
change and reform, regardless whether those voices were individual, collective (e.g. the 
MDC) or aggregated (e.g. Zimbabwe Crisis Coalition, ZCTU) are examples of 'vertical' 
voice. It is the strategic deployment of institutional rules to suppress dissenting voices, 
whether articulated through 'horizontal' or 'vertical' voice, which is the focus of this 
chapter.   
Post-independence, the veterans of the liberation war mobilised and protested 
their situation, and later, also the diversion of allocated welfare funds to corrupt 
members within the regime (Sadomba 2008: Chapters 3 and 4; Kriger 2003; Meredith 
2002: pp. 133-145).  These protests by the war veterans’ movement and the movement's 
evolving relationship with the members of the ZANU-PF regime (Sadomba 2008) 
emphasize two important points regarding the action-choice of voice.   
First, it is both the substantive content being expressed and also the actor to 
whom it is being expressed that determines whether public comment, debate or 
discourse could be considered as the action-choice of 'voice'.  For example, the war 
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veterans' protests, as they sought to improve the welfare of the veterans through 
increased allocation of resources and greater recognition by the state (Sadomba 2008: 
pp. 85-93), are examples of 'vertical' voice.  However, statements or actions by the 
ZNLWVA, in support of the ZANU-PF regime, would not be defined as 'vertical voice', 
for the action-choice of voice is about the expression of dissent, rather than support.   
Second, the views expressed by strategic actors (e.g. ZNLWVA), and the 
actions taken (e.g. petition, protest, violence, support), may vary temporally. Strategic 
actors may adjust their views and actions over time, as new information becomes 
available, altering preferences and choices.  Group cohesion may be affected, with 
some choosing to exit the group, and/or form their own.  Demonstrated responsiveness 
by the authorities to the concerns expressed may alter the need for, or the intensity of 
the action-choice of voice.  For example, when the ZANU-PF regime responded with 
improved pensions or access to land for the veterans, many of the protests then stopped 
(Sadomba 2008: p. 93).  Variance in the views and/or actions of strategic actors may 
also result, as McGregor (2002: pp. 10-11) notes with respect to the ZNLWVA. Finally, 
it is important to note that strategic actors may also, for example, be supportive of 
policies in one area (and therefore their engagement would not be defined as the action-
choice of voice) while critical and protesting in other issue areas.     
'Horizontal' voice, through the information it communicates amongst citizens, 
may have an effect on a governing regime without becoming 'vertical' – for example 
via its impact on public opinion (Hirschman 1986: pp. 82-83).  'Horizontal voice' is 
thus broader in scope and content than 'vertical' voice.  It simply exists in its own right, 
that is, as an exchange of views amongst citizens with no further, intentional action 
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taken to communicate with the authorities.  The media, and/or other organisations or 
groupings, may facilitate the dissemination of this voice, contributing to formation of 
public opinion.   
By both increasing the information available to other actors, and by reducing 
the isolation amongst actors, this horizontal exchange and discussion provides a basis 
for mobilisation.  For this reason, Hirschman (1986: p. 82) argues that 'horizontal' voice 
is a "...necessary pre-condition..." for 'vertical' voice. New groups may also form to 
counter this organised expression of 'voice'. For example, the Zimbabwean teacher 
forced out of her job, may find, via discussion among colleagues that she is not alone, 
but rather part of a larger crack-down on teachers.  She may therefore join an existing 
protest or advocacy group, or new ones may be created, knowing that others share her 
concerns.   
The freedoms of expression, assembly, association and of movement are 
fundamental to the development, mobilisation and exercise of collective voice, whether 
horizontal or vertical. These freedoms, created through institutional rules, permit the 
discussions amongst citizens to expand beyond the smallest, local and most private of 
groupings. These freedoms guarantee that the aggregation of voice can occur without 
incurring additional penalties (e.g. arrest or fines), therefore contributing to 
mobilisation.  To act on specific concerns, citizens and/or residents may choose to 
come together to either join efforts (e.g. to form an issue-based alliance) or to protest 
(e.g. in a strike or a demonstration).   
Mobilisation occurs when “…effects and experiences are converted into 
organised efforts to bring about change” (Stone 2002: p. 217).  The political opposition 
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in Zimbabwe mobilised to amplify their demands and to increase their influence in 
advance of Zimbabwe's elections, the key 'step-good', that represented a time-bound 
collective action challenge for the members of the ZANU-PF regime.  In contrast, the 
regime sought to dampen the expression of ‘voice’, both in its 'vertical' and 'horizontal' 
forms, for the expression of dissent exacerbated their own collective action dilemma of 
retaining support for the status quo. 
The media sector is a critical sector, both through its communication of voices 
and its conveyance of information that helps strategic actors to understand and develop 
expectations about the behaviour of others.  The sector has the power to influence 
public opinion, including on specific issues (e.g. Chari 2010: p. 134) and thus to also 
influence mobilisation.  The private press, through its communications on 
constitutional reform and alternatives, would generate increased uncertainty for 
members of the regime, through its amplification of these discussions.  "The ZANU-PF 
government noted that they had been defeated [in the constitutional referendum] partly 
due to the mobilising effect of the Daily News..." (Dombo 2014: p.246).  This 
dissertation notes that institutions affect decision-making, including through two 
mechanisms, sanctions (penalties) and information, and both are essential to the 
formation of actors’ expectations, and to making strategic choices (Knight 1992:  p. 
49).   
Following independence, the concept of 'developmental journalism' was 
introduced, whereby the media sector was seen as an instrument to convey and 
mobilise new societal values to help advance Zimbabwe's social and economic goals 
(Moyo 2004: p. 17;Moore 2011: pp. 62-63; Mazango 2005: p. 47).  Media was to be an 
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ally to, rather than a critic of, the state (Moyo 2005: p. 112).  Over time, this approach 
both narrowed the range of issues discussed and empowered the government to define 
what was in the public interest (ibid). 
Institutional reforms were also introduced to ensure that Zimbabwe had a media 
sector that would serve the needs of the Zimbabwean majority (Moyo 2004: p. 16), but 
informal rules and norms were also important in shaping the media sector.  
‘Developmental journalism’, was supported by both broadcast and print media actors 
holding memberships in the ZANU /ZANU-PF  party, reinforcing the links between the 
key actors in the sector (Moyo 2004: p. 18 citing N. Shamuyarira in Mosia et al. 1994: 
p. 18).Both Moyo and Mukasa argue that the Zimbabwe's new media structures became 
strategic instruments to mobilise support for ZANU-PF's programmes and priorities 
(Moyo 2004: p. 18) and to serve and protect the interests of the ruling black elite 
(Mukasa 2003).    
Party membership and networks are significant, for they facilitated coordination 
amongst actors, within, and external to, the media sector.  This helped to create a strong 
capacity to control the message.  By removing veto-players, not only are constitutional 
and partisan roles blurred, but agenda-setting may also be simplified   However, in the 
literature reviewed, no author explicitly identified that these overlapping memberships 
also removed key veto-players from within the sector (Tsebelis 2002).  The acquisition, 
by the governing regime, of agenda-setting powers, through both formal and informal 
means, was documented through Zaffiro’s (2002) study, although he does not use this 
term. 
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Post-independence there remained several continuities in the governance of the 
media sector, including the retention of some key elements of the Rhodesian approach.  
These included the practices of political appointments, political control of media 
content and journalists, as well as restrictions on media access for opposition actors 
(Zaffiro 2002: p. 76; Moyo 2004: p. 16).  These studies help to put the events of 
2000-2008 in a broader context, but also highlight the role that institutional reform (or 
stability) played in sustaining distributional advantage in the media sector.  Moyo 
(2005) discusses the continuities in broadcasting monopolies, while Dombo (2014) 
discuss the continuities in suppression of the private press. The Media Monitoring 
Project of Zimbabwe (MMPZ) documented (e.g. MMPZ 2001, 2003, 2005a) the 
restrictions on access to media by Zimbabwe's political opposition, and Msindo (2009) 
discussed Rhodesian efforts to restrict access to media by the nationalist movement.   
Still, by the mid-1990s, a more robust private press had developed, with private 
ownership and new daily papers emerging to complement the existing weekly or 
monthly titles (Dombo 2014: pp. 150-154).  Economic liberalisation had encouraged 
new investment in the media sector (Chari 2010: p. 133; Dombo 2014: p. 152) while a 
period of political liberalisation had enabled a private and increasingly critical press to 
develop (Nhema 2002: pp. 134-136; Dombo 2014: pp. 152-156).  Broadcasting (TV 
and radio) remained, however, firmly within government hands (Mudavanhu 2014: p. 
13 citing Moyo 2012a: p. 182 and Chiumbu and Moyo 2009: p. 180).   
These sectoral developments had important effects on the availability and 
reliability of information in Zimbabwe.  The private press reported on issues that did 
not appear in the government-owned press, including key issues such as corruption, 
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declining living standards and Zimbabwe's military engagement in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (Zaffiro 2002:  pp. 127-128; Chavunduka 2002: p. 283; Chari 2010: 
p. 133).  Through reporting in the private press, greater understandings of the election 
processes, constitutional reform were achieved, and a deeper freedom of expression 
existed (Moyo 2005: p. 114; Dombo 2014: p. 179).   
This new content, as well as the publication of alternative viewpoints on issues 
and events, expanded the information publicly available.  The reliability of information 
also increased, as Zimbabweans were able to triangulate information across different 
media and other sources, important as the polarisation within the sector increased.  The 
broader range of media reports contributed to Zimbabweans' rising dissatisfaction, and 
thus increased political pressure, on regime members (Nhema 2002: p. 136).  Moyse 
(2009: p. 53) also argues that the 2000 election results demonstrated "...the important 
role the private press played in providing sufficient information for the electorate to 
make up their own mind".    
The availability of reliable information, in the context of collective dissent, is 
also an important input into mobilization.  The rules regarding the media sector 
fundamentally enable, or constrain, the availability and reliability of information to 
Zimbabweans.  Decision-making whether it is on 'everyday' issues, their choice of 
elected representatives, or, as seen in the constitutional debates, the institutional 
alternatives available, is affected by unreliable and/or the lack of information. A public 
opinion survey undertaken prior to the 2000 constitutional referendum, underscored the 
importance of the media in informing Zimbabweans about the draft constitution.  Over 
one-half of Zimbabweans surveyed (53.3 percent) obtained information about the draft 
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constitution through the media (radio, TV and/or print), far out-distancing the 
constitutional commission or friends/families as sources of information (MPOI 2000 p. 
5 Table 3).   
The reliability of information about external events may be affected by strategic 
biases in what is not reported, or through strategic delays, errors or omissions in 
specific content (e.g. the size of the crowd at a political rally).  Reliable information 
contributes to the aggregation of experiences (e.g. of political violence) and/or concerns 
(e.g. declining living standards).  It communicates events (e.g. past or future protests) 
and the organisations or groups (e.g. political party, NGO) that are elements of an 
organised effort to bring about change.   
The strategies to control the flow of information, both through the print and 
broadcast media, and through the restrictions on the four freedoms/no-go zones, helped 
to resolve the State's Dilemma by facilitating the retention of support for the status quo 
and by exacerbating the MDC's challenge of mobilisation.  Specific examples are 
discussed below.  
Patriotic History, Patriotic Narrative and the Action-Choice of 'Voice':  
The previous section of this chapter, has discussed the action-choice of 'voice', 
and the analytical developments introduced by O'Donnell.  The section also discussed 
the evolution of Zimbabwe's media sector, and how the reforms to the sector, meant, 
that by the late 1990s, there was an increased availability and some additional 
reliability of information.  This analysis demonstrates that the action-choice of voice 
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varies from patriotic history.  Patriotic history and the concept of a patriotic narrative 
are now introduced, and their variations with the action-choice of voice are now 
discussed across four critical dimensions:  source, target, role and substantive content.   
From a policy perspective, ‘patriotic history’ maybe seen as a causal story 
(Stone 1989; 2012).  In this perspective, it is not 'history', but a political narrative 
anchored in historical events and legacies.  For clarity, the term 'patriotic narrative' will 
be used.  From this public policy perspective, it was a non-institutionalist strategy that 
was used instrumentally to frame the issues of electoral debate within Zimbabwe, and 
to help mobilise support domestically and externally. The concepts of patriotic history 
and causal stories are now introduced, and the patriotic narrative’s variance with the 
action-choice of voice is then discussed.  Both the argument of patriotic history as a 
causal narrative and the analysis of the patriotic narrative against the action-choice of 
‘voice’ are contributions to the literature.  
Throughout the period under discussion in this dissertation, in Zimbabwe, there 
was also a nationalist political narrative, which Ranger (2004) defined as "patriotic 
history".  This narrative was important in the context of the Zimbabwean crisis itself, 
for it was developed and communicated by ZANU-PF to Zimbabweans, helping to 
influence public opinion and seeking to retain ZANU-PF's political support, both at 
home and abroad (Tendi 2008: p. 389; Raftopoulos 2002: p. 415).  It was also discussed 
by Zimbabweans themselves, and within academic circles (e.g. Tendi 2008), attracting 
not only some support, but also some criticism.  When it was the subject of debates and 
discussions of concern and criticism amongst citizens, it may be considered an example 
of horizontal voice (O'Donnell 1986).  
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Patriotic history has been debated within the literature on the Zimbabwean 
crisis, both for its historical content and accuracy (Ranger 2004) and for its legitimating 
role (Kriger2006).  Stemming from ZANU/ZANU-PF’s history, liberation struggle and 
revolutionary commitment, patriotic history:    
 "…proclaims ZANU-PF alpha and omega of Zimbabwe's past, 
present and future.  Zimbabweans are encouraged be 'patriotic', 
which means supporting ZANU-PF. Anything short of this is 
considered 'unpatriotic'.  Patriotic history has four main themes: land, 
no external interference 'western ideals' such as human rights, race 
and a 'patriots' versus 'sell-outs' distinction". Tendi (2008: p. 379)  
This definition, however, misses the important distinctions within patriotic history as to 
who is a 'Zimbabwean'.  Ranger (2004), Kriger (2006) discuss the racial divisions 
within 'patriotic history', while Tendi (2008: p. 380) calls it "race 
essentialism...Zimbabwe is for black Zimbabweans and Africa for black Africans", in 
contravention of the freedom from discrimination set out in the Zimbabwean 
Constitution.  Mlambo (2013) discusses racial divisions, and patriotic history, more 
broadly in terms of the construction of a Zimbabwean identity.   
Patriotic history, however, also makes further distinctions, even within the black 
Zimbabwean community.  It defines 'patriots' as those who fought in the liberation war 
and continue to advance its objectives (as defined by ZANU-PF), whereas it brands as 
'sell-outs' are those who did not fight, and/or who oppose ZANU-PF's continuing hold 
on power (Tendi 2008: p. 380; Mlambo 2013; pp. 61-62; Mazango 2005: p. 43).  There 
was  also an ethnic dimension to 'patriotic history', one built around Mugabe's Shona 
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people, the largest ethnic group in Zimbabwe (Mlambo 2013: p. 51 citing Ranger 2010: 
p. 505). 
Together, these distinctions constructed, from the regime's perspective, who is a 
legitimate Zimbabwean, with political implications for the contestation in Zimbabwe, 
and social implications for the country.  This narrowed version of the liberation 
struggle, neglected the role of the trade unionist movement in the liberation struggle 
with implications for the MDC's legitimacy, and that of its leader Morgan Tsvangirai, 
who emerged from trade union roots (Ranger 2004; Kriger 2006; Dansereau 2003: p. 
185).  With its racial targeting, it excluded both the white-Zimbabwean commercial 
farmers and, by association and history, their farmworkers, many of whom immigrated 
(or were descendants of immigrants) from neighbouring countries. And, until the Third 
Chimurenga, was constructed, it also excluded younger Zimbabweans, a significant 
percentage of the population (see next chapter) who had not fought in the liberation 
war.   
Causal stories are one of several different means of defining political problems 
and assigning responsibility for them (Stone 1989).  From a public policy perspective, 
they help with choices, the identification of alternatives, agenda-setting, decision-
making and the mobilisation of support (Stone 1980; 2012; Majone 1992), and a body 
of research discusses their uses in both domestic and international settings.  There are 
several different types of causal stories (Stone 1989; 2012), but that put forward as 
ZANU-PF’s patriotic narrative could be categorized as one of “intentional cause”, one 
of the most “powerful” types of causal story, for it “…casts someone as wilfully or 
knowingly causing harm” (Stone 2012: p. 209).  Causal stories are important politically 
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for both their assignment of responsibility for causation and/or, for solutions.  A notable 
feature of ZANU-PF’s patriotic narrative, was the assignment, to Britain, to the ‘West’ 
and its values (e.g. human rights), of responsibility for many of Zimbabwe’s problems.   
Through the framing of the electoral battles and contestation in Zimbabwe as 
the 'Third Chimurenga’ and therefore as the continuation of the liberation struggle, the 
senior members of ZANU-PF clearly positioned themselves as the protectors of the 
liberation struggles’ legacy and goals.  Their narrative was anchored in ZANU-PF's 
own history and values, but it varied from earlier historical accounts and debates about 
Zimbabwe's history (Ranger 2004; Tendi 2008; Mlambo 2013).  Considering 'patriotic 
history' as a causal narrative, linked to the electoral contestation, helps to explain the 
variations in the political expression of Zimbabwe’s history and struggle. 
Causal stories may be deployed to “protect an existing social order” and to 
“legitimize and empower particular actors as ‘fixers’ of the problem” (Stone 2012: p. 
224).  ZANU-PF’s patriotic narrative has referenced the need to “protect the gains of 
the liberation struggle” (Ranger 2004: p. 219 citing G. Chokowore, The Herald, 
16/02/2002).  Patriotic history was "...intended to proclaim the continuity of the 
Zimbabwean revolutionary tradition" (Ranger 2004: p. 215).  As a political narrative, it 
therefore helped to frame the elections as a choice between continuing (or not) the 
process of liberation (Ranger 2004: p. 219 citing G. Chokowore, The Herald 16 
February 2002).   
The collective action challenge is much easier, when you can define the 
legitimacy of your opponents, for de-legitimisation negatively affects the prospects for 
the successful use of the action-choice of 'voice'.  The MDC and its allies were labelled 
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as the "puppets", "sell-outs" or "traitors" of the West, de-legitimising their own 
Zimbabwean history, and also the role of the labour movement in the liberation struggle 
(MMPZ 2009a: p. 4; Mudavanhu 2014: p. 100; Raftopoulos and Quantin 2001: p. 44).  
De-legitimising actors may also de-legitimise the issues, alternatives and choices they 
present.     
Finally, it is worth noting the access to selective benefits that accrued to 
'patriots', for they are an explanatory element that contributes to our understanding the 
mobilising effects of the patriotic narrative.  Kriger (2006) argues that the patriotic 
history was used to legitimate the access to power and resources.  In the context of this 
period, and ZANU-PF’s collective action challenge of retaining support, this argument 
speaks to both the competition for distributional advantage and to the intentionality of 
action, with the patriotic narrative playing an important functional role of legitimisation 
(or de-legitimisation) of beneficiaries.  This patriotic narrative, by helping to 
communicate the tangible incentives and penalties associated with being a 'patriot' or a 
'traitor 'affected the effectiveness of the action-choice of voice, both horizontal and 
vertical. 
For this dissertation and its focus on ZANU-PF’s collective action challenge, 
two other points about causal stories are relevant.  First, causal stories may help to 
develop, solidify or restructure political alliances (Stone 2012: p. 228).  This may occur  
through their definition of problems (e.g. in a way that engages one stakeholder group 
over another), their identification of solutions or ways forward; and their mobilisation 
of support.  ZANU-PF's patriotic narrative helped to mobilise support, including, for 
example, from allies in the security sector, and from the SADC neighbouring states.   
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Second, causal stories are about the framing of issues, and this not only helps to 
mobilise the political support needed, but also may help to keep alternatives ‘off the 
agenda’ (Stone 2012: p. 253).  Issue-framing is the process of selecting “...some aspects 
of perceived reality and make them more salient [important or visible]…in such a way 
as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation…” (Stone 2012: pp. 252-53 citing Entman 1993: pp. 51-8).  The political 
and electoral value of ZANU-PF’s patriotic narrative lay not only in its mobilisation of 
support, but also in its success in minimising the public debate on constitutionalism, 
human rights and the institutional outcomes that accompanied it.  The MDC's demands 
for political and institutional reform were also de-legitimised.     
The sources and substantive content of the patriotic narrative clearly lay in the 
country’s colonial history as well as ZANU/ZANU-PF’s liberation experience.  It was 
built upon the racial and economic inequities that had arisen under both the British and 
Rhodesian rule and had not been fully addressed, nor erased in the post-independence 
years.  This new narrative of patriotic history contained both differences and 
continuities from other accounts of both the Zimbabwean fight against the British (the 
first Chimurenga) and the war against the Rhodesians for liberation (the second 
Chimurenga), with the roots of patriotic history pre-date the crisis period currently 
being studied (Ranger (2004 and Kriger 2006).  Ranger (2004: p.222 citing Muhaso 16 
March 2003) also acknowledges the appeal embedded in the patriotic history narrative 
to a "deeper, ancestral memory" that contributes to liberation in a broader, pan-African 
sense.   
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ZANU-PF’s conceptualisation of democracy, as discussed earlier and below, 
stemmed from its role in the transition to majority rule.  It is reinforced by the narrative 
and its reminder of these struggles.  The normative values that arose from ZANU/
ZANU-PF’s history as an organisation, and its revolutionary worldview, are also 
important sources for this patriotic narrative.  I do not question that these norms were 
indeed valued, and that a source of the patriotic narrative was also, therefore, 
conviction.  Indeed, the alignment between this history and this nationalist and 
revolutionary worldview, would add credibility to the narrative, for it is anchored by 
past action and statements.  These norms and values were important motivators.   
However, for this author the source of this patriotic narrative also lay in ZANU-
PF’s interests to retain power.  It was a causal narrative developed in a very competitive 
electoral context, and repeatedly deployed (and evolved) in the context of electoral 
competition.  This patriotic narrative was deployed in the context of competitive, multi-
party elections, in which the members of the ZANU-PF regime were challenged by 
‘State’s Dilemma’, i.e. the need to retain support for the status quo when the interests 
of supporters lie elsewhere.  Facing the most significant collective action challenge of 
their history, the members of the ZANU-PF regime drew upon their own history to rally 
support and to frame the electoral debate to their strengths – as fighters, as guardians of 
the liberation struggle, as nationalists.  And they succeeded in building this support. and 
in blunting the  effectiveness of those voices demanding change.   
The sources and substantive content of the action-choice of ‘voice’ are 
markedly different.  As discussed, the action-choice of ‘voice’ is one of dissent with the 
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status quo. In its ‘vertical’ or ‘reformist’ forms, the sources of the action-choice of 
‘voice’ are from outside government, for in political contestation, the action-choice of 
‘voice’, is directed to the ‘authorities’.  In the case of Zimbabwe, the political 
opposition, civic actors, and ordinary Zimbabweans were the actors giving voice.  For 
many in Zimbabwe, including Morgan Tsvangirai, the action-choice of ‘voice’ was 
anchored in the principles of democracy, participation, rights and inclusion, and the 
social and economic frustrations and dissatisfaction of Zimbabweans (Danserau 2003: 
p. 184; Chan 2005: pp. 24ff; 78-81; McCandless 2011: pp. 48-49, 70-73). 
This action-choice of ‘voice’ was also anchored in material interests, such as the 
lack of jobs, the cost-of-living, and Zimbabwe’s engagement in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo at the time of domestic economic pressures (Mumvuma 2006: pp. 
250-252; IMF 1998: p. 103; Moorcraft 2011: pp. 135-136).  The trade union movement, had 
a multi-year history of engaging, both at the policy and protests levels on economic 
matters (Dansereau 2003: pp. 180-184).  The coalition built by the NCA has been 
discussed, including with reference to their mobilisation for institutional alternatives 
and Zimbabwe’s civic and political opposition also sought different distributional 
outcomes.  As discussed further in the next chapter, Zimbabweans held a strong ‘love 
of country’ with an attachment to being a Zimbabwean that also helped to motivate this 
'voice'.   
The third dimension which varies between the patriotic narrative and the action-
choice of ‘voice’ is that of target.  The patriotic narrative was publicly disseminated by 
the members of the governing regime and its allies, including, through the media and 
party rallies.  In these instances, of communication from authorities to Zimbabwean 
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citizens, the patriotic narrative is neither horizontal nor vertical ‘voice’.  As a causal 
story, it communicated to mobilise and to coordinate electoral support, as well as 
international political support.  External audiences, notably African neighbours and 
states, appeared to be a target of ZANU-PF’s patriotic narrative, particularly in the 
early years of this case study, when the land occupations were at their height.  With its 
explicit references to Britain, Prime Minister Blair, and the issue of land and its 
compensation, it couldn’t help but garner international attention.  And, ultimately draw 
Britain into Zimbabwe’s domestic politics (Chan 2003: pp. 152-154).   
The action-choice of 'voice', as defined and discussed earlier in this chapter, is 
not a means of 'top-down' communications but is rather 'bottom-up’.  It is defined, in its 
vertical and reformist forms, by the communication of views by citizens towards their 
'authorities' rather than the authorities' communicating their views to their own citizens.  
The target of the action-choice of 'voice' is thus different from those targeted by 
ZANU-PF's patriotic narrative.  
The fourth dimension, upon which the narrative of patriotic history and the 
action-choice of ‘voice’ vary, is the role of each in the Zimbabwean crisis.  This author 
argues that ZANU-PF’s patriotic narrative may be seen as a causal story that helped to 
frame the electoral issues and debates, and mobilise support, both internal and external. 
Its role therefore was to help sustain support for the status quo.  Coming on the heels of 
the constitutional referendum result, ZANU-PF’s patriotic narrative helped to reduce 
the uncertainty associated with the public discussion of institutional alternatives to 
ZANU-PF’s revolutionary tradition – and their possible outcomes. 
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Juxtaposed, the action-choice of ‘voice’ clearly has a different role.  As the 
expression of dissent and dissatisfaction, in this context, the action-choice of ‘voice’ 
was clearly to bring about change, not to sustain the status quo.  Like patriotic history, 
it too had a mobilising function, although the groups it sought to mobilise were 
different, and its mobilising strategy was one that was more inclusive and plural.  The 
MDC’s manifesto of “change” also had a strong institutionalist component, with 
attention to rights, the rule of law and constitutionalism (Raftopoulos 2007: p. 128).  
Given the way causal stories frame issues, and the 'State's Dilemma' faced by ZANU-
PF during this period, perhaps the most important role, and contribution, of the patriotic 
narrative was to keep the public debate focused away from these issues – and to remind 
Zimbabweans (and others) of the struggles and goals of liberation.   
This section of the chapter has assessed ZANU-PF's patriotic narrative against 
the 'action-choice' of voice and discussed their differences across four different 
analytical dimensions.  This discussion is also picked up in chapters four and five, 
respectively on the issues of loyalty and land.  The patriotic narrative was sophisticated 
and anchored in ZANU-PF's history and worldview.  But it was developed in the 
context of a very competitive electoral environment, and at a time when ZANU-PF 
faced a very specific challenge.  It must be assessed against these realities, and this 
section has discussed it as a causal story, helping to frame issues and mobilise support. 
It was successful, and therefore it had an impact of the effectiveness of the action-
choice of 'voice'.   
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Patriotic history was complemented, in the media sector, by what Ranger (2005) 
and Chuma (2007) both referred to the development of a 'patriotic journalism'.  Chuma 
defines it as:    
 . "...a form of highly partisan and propaganda journalism which is 
embedded to the state.  It shuns critical debate and shuts out voices 
other than those of the dominant bloc of the ruling party, except 
where the former are up for ridicule.  It frames political contestation 
as a matter of simple good and evil." (Mudavanhu 2014: p. 174 citing 
Chuma 2007: p. 254). 
Like patriotic history, patriotic journalism was partisan and divisive, and it was more 
often 'top-down' from the members of the regime, its agents and allies, and less  often 
'bottom-up' from citizens.  However, Chuma also argues that it faced an 'oppositional 
journalism' in the private media sector that became a "serious political force" in the 
early 2000s, strident in its condemnation of ZANU-PF and praising MDC as "the only 
hope for the future" (Mudavanhu 2014: pp. 72-73 citing Chuma 2008: pp. 32-33).  The 
contestation in the media sector, in terms of substantive media content, was therefore 
primarily between patriotic and oppositional journalism.  This both reflected and 
advanced the contestation within Zimbabwe itself.   
 This oppositional journalism and press may be seen as both horizontal and 
vertical voice, as they communicate (well-founded or not) dissent to the authorities 
(Hirschman 1986 p. 82 citing O'Donnell 1986).  The institutional reforms discussed in 
this chapter created the institutional basis that facilitated the amplification of the 
narrative of patriotic history while also sustained the regime's informational 
advantage.  The intentional rules adopted under the AIPPA and POSA, meant that 
criticism of the President and the regime became a criminal offence, and curtailed this 
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expression of voice.  Both Chuma (2007) and Moyo (2005) observe that the 
polarisation in Zimbabwe affected journalistic ethics, on both sides of the media, to 
the detriment of contributing to a well-informed electorate, while Tendi (2008: pp. 
390-391) also raises this challenge in the context of Zimbabwe's public intellectuals. 
ZANU-PF's patriotic narrative was publicly disseminated by the members of 
the governing regime and its allies, including through the state-owned broadcast and 
print media, as well as at events such as party rallies.  It was however, underpinned by 
institutional reforms that also suppressed the expression of the action-choice of 'voice'.  
These institutional reforms are now discussed, with due attention to the alterations in 
both permissions and penalties.   
Actor selection, permissions and penalties in the media sector 
 This chapter has already asserted that the institutional rules defining the 
freedoms of expression, association, assembly and movement are fundamental to the 
action-choice of voice.  For it is these institutional rules, that enable the development 
and aggregation of collective voice, including through mobilisation.  This section's 
analysis and discussion demonstrates the multiple institutional reforms were 
introduced, by the members of the ZANU-PF to suppress actors that could have 
challenged, and/or mitigated the regime's informational advantage.  By using the 
research questions in the lines of enquiry developed for this dissertation, the analysis 
highlights that these institutional reforms altered the incentives and penalties within the 
media sector, and therefore the effectiveness of the action-choice of voice within 
!  131
Zimbabwean society more broadly.  These reforms also reduced the uncertainty faced 
by members of the regime.   
 The literature on Zimbabwe's crisis has discussed the constraints the members 
of the ZANU-PF regime imposed on both the private press and the limits imposed on 
MDC and other civic actors (e.g. banning of their rallies).  However, these measures 
have not been fully assessed, or discussed, through the lens of rational choice 
institutionalism.   An analysis of the reforms reveals that they provided the members of 
the ZANU-PF regime with strengthened powers to select actors, increased the 
monitoring of actions (noticeability), reduced permissions and strengthened penalties 
for non-compliance.   This discussion is a contribution to the literature for its focus not 
only on these specific elements and their intentionality, but also for its discussion of 
their consequences for collective action.  
 This discussion focuses on the rules and permissions of the media sector itself, 
including, for example, who is eligible to participate in the sector, under what 
conditions, the incentives or penalties, and with what consequences. These rules and 
permissions, in turn, affect the prospects of specific issues making it onto the agenda.  
The media sector is critical to freedom of expression, for although it may be "... clearly 
enshrined in the constitution, [it] was useless if people did not have access to the 
strategic medium of broadcasting" (Mudavanhu 2014: p. 53 citing Moyo 2012: p. 486).  
And in terms of voice, the MDC's Secretary-General, Welshman Ncube, argued that the 
closure of The Daily News was direct attack on the MDC and the opposition forces in 
general:   
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"The attack on The Daily News is not an attack on the owners of the 
paper to prevent them from becoming rich and making money… It is 
principally an attack on the MDC, for the simple reason that if you 
remove The Daily News as a source of news, you have literally made 
it impossible for the opposition’s voice to be heard by the mass of 
people." (Moyo 2005: p. 114 citing The Herald 13 Oct 2003, 
emphasis added).   
 The members of ZANU-PF regime introduced reforms that increased their 
powers of actor selection, and required greater noticeability so as to monitor 
compliance.  These reforms are important, in terms of resolving the State's Dilemma; 
because the powers of actor selection allow for control of the exit option, in this case, 
exit from the Zimbabwean media market.  The power to force 'exit' reduces the 
regime's future uncertainty, in this sector that was critical to retaining popular support.  
  These reforms serve two important roles, first as a signalling device, to help 
coordinate responsive actions based on problem identification, and second, as means to 
incentivise compliance.  The reformed rules created the institutional basis to promote 
the narrative of patriotic history.  Enhanced noticeability communicates additional 
information about the actual, or future, actions of specific actors (Olson 1971: p. 45 
note 67), reducing the transaction costs associated with monitoring the actions of both 
allies and opponents.  It incentivises compliance through a desire to avoid unwanted 
attention and responses.  In this way it discourages free-riding.  These are important 
gains, particularly in time-bound collective action situations, when resources are scarce 
and/or the challenge is decentralised across many locations.    
 For these reasons, strategic decision-makers within the regime, in the face of 
rising collective dissent, will rationally want a more restrictive licensing regime.  New 
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powers, including the right of initiative were created, and the decision-making power 
was suggested from sectoral representatives to members and allies of the regime.  The 
restrictions were narrowed at two different levels:  first, in terms of numbers of actors 
within the market and second, in terms published content.  The powers of actor 
selection allowed the regime to define and enforce who was eligible to work in 
Zimbabwe's media sector.  New requirements for registration and licensing were 
effective tools to monitor performance and incentivise compliance.  Licensing and 
registration powers, in this case, also restricted competition, and therefore reinforced 
the monopoly of the state-owned media.   
 These powers were created under the rules of the Access to Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) (Zimbabwe 2002a).  The strategic timing of the 
adoption of the AIPPA is notable, for it was signed into law just days after the March 
9th-11th presidential elections which saw the MDC achieve over forty percent of the 
vote, an unprecedented achievement, and an unprecedented threat.  The Act established 
and set out the powers of the new Media and Information Commission (MIC).  Initial 
requirements stated that three of the five members of the Commission were to be 
appointed by media sector actors (e.g. Association of Journalists) rather than 
government.  This direction preserved, on paper at least, a nominal degree of 
independence. However, in 2003, new amendments to AIPPA transferred majority 
control of the registration and licensing systems to the representatives and allies of the 
regime (Zimbabwe 2003a; Zimbabwe 2002a), further tightening control over the MIC 
itself (Article 19/MISA-Zimbabwe 2004: p. 4).   The 2003 amendments also gave the 
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right of initiative to the MIC in terms of inquiries into media actions and orders for 
redress (Zimbabwe 2003a). 
  The Commission was endowed with the power of actor selection.  Journalists 
required permissions to work in the Zimbabwean media market, permissions that were 
now held by a partisan MIC.  The new eligibility requirements limited accreditation to 
only those holding Zimbabwean citizenship or permanent residence (Zimbabwe 
2003a) .  The strategic intentions behind these AIPPA provisions set out by Jonathon 2
Moyo, then the Minister of Information and Publicity.  These intentions were very 
much aligned with ZANU-PF's patriotic narrative:  AIPPA was "...meant to protect the 
sovereignty of the country from mischievous people intending to use local media as a 
tool for regime change" (HRW 2005a: p. 27 citing MMPZ's Media Weekly Update, 29 
November-5 December 2004).  
 These requirements for journalists and media houses to be registered with the 
MIC, imposed new obligations on media actors (Crawford and Ostrom 1995: p. 584).  
Two-year jail terms, and/or significant fines (the 'or else' consequence identified by 
Crawford and Ostrom 1995) were set as penalties if individual journalists were found 
to be working without valid registration (Feltoe 2003: p. 14).  Prohibitions on non-
accredited journalists practicing journalism, or the employment of non-accredited 
journalists, were strengthened and broadened in the amendments of 2003.  In 2007, 
amendments to the AIPPA eliminated the criminal penalties imposed on unaccredited 
journalists but other restrictions remained (Zimbabwe 2007c; CPJ 2007).  By 
 Under the 2003 amendments to AIPPA, this could be waived if the accreditation was for less than 30 2
days (ibid).  
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suppressing competing voices and narratives, these rules marginalised some key actors 
that contributed, through their reporting and publications, to mobilising dissatisfaction 
or by helping to catalyse domestic opposition (e.g. by reporting on different issues, or 
issues such as corruption in more depth).   
 Registration and accreditation requirements are barriers to entry to the 
Zimbabwean media market. They determine which selected actors could report on 
Zimbabwean issues to Zimbabweans.  These requirements generate new uncertainties 
for private sector media actors.  Their approval, also has important communicative 
value, for new barriers to entry demonstrate both action and the moblisation of 
authority – to the members and supporters of the ZANU-PF regime, as well as to those 
who are opposed it.  In these ways barriers to entry help to shape expectations. 
 For media actors in the private sector, uncertainty was generated by these new 
requirements and obligations. The fixed term nature of the accreditation and licensing 
validity period created new, mandatory decision-points for assessing compliance.  This 
is an example of rules increasing noticeability.  These requirements generated 
uncertainty related to the current or future standing (or not) of an actor within a group 
(i.e. media practitioners in Zimbabwe), by providing the governing regime (rather than 
an independent body) with the powers of actor selection.  For the members of the 
ZANU-PF regime, fixed-term validity periods provided with greater certainty.  In this 
case, they created, a rule that encouraged compliance (in order to be renewed).  The 
rule also established  a foreseeable end to the perceived problems caused by private 
and/or external participation in the media market.  The barriers to entry meant that 
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many foreign journalists were prohibited, or others 'exited', from the Zimbabwean 
media market as their existing authorisation expired.   
 Coordination between actors within the regime occurred, in order to give effect 
to these requirements.  Those who were "… ‘out of favour’ with the Ministry of 
Information and Publicity [were] passed to the Ministry of Home Affairs, responsible 
for issuing [entry permits]" (Zaffiro 2002: pp. 108-109).  Specific voices were 
suppressed via the denial of entry to Zimbabwe for individual journalists.  By May 
2003, there no foreign journalists were based in Zimbabwe (Mendel and Mukundo 
2004: p. 26).  Some left voluntarily (e.g. for refusing to comply with the censorship 
rules on content, discussed further below, or to avoid the risks of violence and/or 
arrest).  But others were forced to leave if they were found, for example, ineligible for 
registration or were denied entry (Moyo 2005: p. 120).  The foreign correspondents 
were replaced by Zimbabwean freelance journalists: "...[t]he correspondents are all 
nationals so that the government can control them easier than an international 
reporter" (CPJ 2007: citing Wilf Mbanga, editor of The Zimbabwean).   
  The AIPPA also introduced a new barrier to entry at the organisational level 
(Zimbabwe 2003a), complementing those barriers to entry for journalists. Mass media 
services were required to be registered by the Media and Information Commission.   
Throughout the 'chain' of private publication, members of the regime now held the 
power to select actors through their determination of continuing eligibility (or not) to 
work and participate in the Zimbabwean media market.  The AIPPA also specifically 
exempted from registration those mass media services that were governed or founded 
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by an Act of Parliament (Zimbabwe 2002a), thus exempting the government-owned 
media from these new obligations.   
 The formal language of AIPPA was actually permissive, drawing on Crawford 
and Ostrom (1995: pp.584-85), as AIPPA stated that the Commission "...may not 
refuse..." otherwise qualified applicants (Zimbabwe 2003a).  However, since the Act 
allowed considerable discretion in determining the qualifications of applicants, the 
permissiveness was de facto reduced.  It was these discretionary powers held by the 
Minister of Information that transformed administrative requirements into a licensing 
system (Article 19/MISA-Zimbabwe 2004: p. 8) one that encompassed journalists 
(author), media title (forum) and media houses (publisher).   
 Licensing restrictions may also influence media content.  This may occur either 
explicitly "…prohibiting certain kinds of broadcasts, or implicit[ly], as when a 
government might not renew licenses unless it perceives the broadcasting content as 
favourable" (Islam 2002: p. 9).  Institutions that produce loyalty are "...often meant to 
repress voice...", while providing 'managers' with greater short-term freedom 
(Hirschman 1970: p. 92-93).  The AIPPA was opposed by some members of the 
ZANU-PF parliamentary caucus.  In issuing its adverse report, the Legal Affairs 
Committee, in a rare public expression of dissenting voice from within the regime, 
noted that "...the only possible reason for this provision [registration regime for 
newspapers] is to impose control by government over mass media owners and their 
products" (Mendel and Mukundo 2004: p. 4).   
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 Most of the private press complied with these registration requirements, with 
the Daily News being the notable exception (Moyo 2005:  p. 120).  Like other private 
press actors, it challenged the constitutionality of the registration requirements in 
Court.  Unlike others it did not register with the MIC, but still continued publishing, 
thus providing members of the ZANU-PF regime with a legal basis for closing it down 
and the Court with the basis for dismissing its legal challenge (Moyo 2005: pp. 
120-121; Muchena 2013: p. 73). 
 The broadcast sector provided another example of the strategic reform of 
institutional rules to maintain distributional advantage, including through the powers of 
actor selection.  In September 2000, the Zimbabwean Supreme Court ruled that the 
ZBC's monopoly over the airwaves was illegal, and therefore a new radio station, 
Capital Radio, would be permitted to operate in Zimbabwe (Meredith 2007: p. 199; 
Feltoe 2003: p. 39).  The decision re-wrote the rules regarding participation and 
eligibility in the broadcast sector, removing the barriers to entry. This was a far-
reaching decision that would have increased the availability of information 
significantly in rural areas.  In Zimbabwe, 60 percent of the rural population depended 
on radio broadcasts to receive their information (MMPZ 2005a).  This Supreme Court 
decision put the regime's control of the critical broadcast sector at risk through both 
greater participation and its impacts on the flow and availability of information.   
In the days prior to the Court's decision, communications from members of the 
regime set out their expectations.  The Minister of State for Information and Publicity 
stated that the government was not planning to liberalize the airwaves (IRIN 2001), 
while the Minister of Home Affairs stated: "…[t]he days of going to court will soon be 
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past.  We won't accept any resistance" (Meredith 2007: p. 199).  Two weeks after the 
court's ruling, President Mugabe used his special emergency powers to "…sign 
temporary legislation [assigning to] ...the Minister of State for information and 
Publicity in the President's Office... the final authority in issuing broadcasting 
licenses" (IRIN 2001; Feltoe 2003: p. 39).  The army shut down Capital Radio and the 
police seized its broadcasting equipment (IRIN 2001). 
 This legislation was the output of an intentional decision to maintain, rather 
than accept a change in the institutional rules that structured the actors within 
Zimbabwe's broadcasting sector.  The prompt enactment of this temporary legislation 
eliminated the uncertainty faced by members of the regime that private broadcasters 
would, as a result of this court decision, establish themselves in the Zimbabwean 
market.  Given the prospective nature of rules, the court's decision permitting new 
broadcasting licenses would apply not only to Capital Radio but also to any other 
future applicants.  The result was to sustain – for the members of the regime – the 
distributional advantage in the broadcast sector that arose from the maintenance of 
these rules.  It was not until 2011 and 2012, when the regime had more firmly re-
established its hold on power, that any new licenses were issued (Mudavanhu 2014: p. 
53; CPJ 2011).  The primacy of state-run broadcasting media was thus sustained in 
Zimbabwe, for a decade, with all of the advantages to the members of the regime that it 
offered.  The legislation was also an intentional act to ignore the Court’s decision, with 
negative implications for the rule of law.   
 Restrictions on external financing for the Zimbabwean press, were also 
intentional actions that limited eligibility, and therefore also the future choices of 
!  140
private media actors.  They were an institutional reform that negatively affected "...the 
dissident's supplies or input sources" (Lichbach 1995: p. 49 citing Leites and Wolf 
1970: p. 76-78).  The restrictions made it “...illegal for local media organisations to 
receive financial or other material support from foreign individuals or 
organisations" (Chavunduka 2002: p. 286).   
  The AIPPA imposed new restrictions on the foreign ownership of print media, 
and required that foreign owners dispose of their press interests within three months 
(Zimbabwe 2002a).  The Broadcasting Services Act of 2003 was also amended the 
rules to prohibit foreign financing in the broadcast sector (Zimbabwe 2003; Feltoe 
2003: p. 39).  These restrictions were also introduced after MDC's unprecedented 
success in the presidential vote.  While the rules were broad, the consortium owners of 
the Daily News, co-financed by Zimbabwean, British, South African and New Zealand 
companies, with 60 percent foreign ownership (Mukasa 2003: p. 177; Moyo 2005: p. 
113) were a specific target.   
 These new rules withdrew prior permissions to participate in the Zimbabwean 
media market and therefore forced the exit of existing foreign owners of the private 
press.  They served as barriers to entry for new owners.  As discussed above, these new 
rules providing certainty for the members of the regime that the existing situation of 
media freedom would not worsen.  Restricting access to external financing, also 
increased the private media's dependence on domestic financing – at a time of 
economic crisis and hyper-inflation that both significantly curtailed the purchasing 
power of Zimbabweans and limited the domestic funds available for business 
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investment. Moyo (2005: pp. 113-115) discusses the Daily News' financial problems, 
which were exacerbated by these new restrictions.    
 Between 2003 and 2006, the AIPPA was used to close four private newspapers, 
including the Daily News.  These closures reduced both the availability and reliability 
of information, helping to "conceal grievances" and thus weakening mobilisation 
(Lichbach 1995: p. 95).  The new rules established by the AIPPA, contributed 
significantly to sustaining the regime's distributional advantage in public information. 
With information as one of the two critical mechanisms that help shape expectations, 
and thus choices, of actors (Knight 1992: p. 49), this advantage was significant.   
 These closures therefore had implications, not only on the size and nature of the 
media sector, but importantly on the expression of horizontal and vertical voice.  The 
intent of AIPPA's new rules were clear, not only to the Legal Affairs committee of 
Parliament (as above), but also to Zimbabwean civil society and to Zimbabweans.  The 
Media Institute for Southern Africa (MISA) cited AIPPA as "...one of the most effective 
legal instruments of state control over the media and civil society communication 
anywhere in the world..." (IRIN 2004; Institute for Reconciliation and Justice/
Solidarity Peace Trust (IRJ/SPT) 2006: p. 16).  The news editor of The Daily News, 
William Saidi, stated that The Daily News was targeted for punishment:  
"The Daily News had overtaken the government's newspaper The 
Herald in circulation and was accused of influencing the 
[presidential] elections in 2002, so as some form of punishment, the 
government decided they would ban The Daily News" (CPJ 2004 
citing BBC July 2004, emphasis added).  
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It must be noted however, that this 'exit' of the foreign journalistic community (as well 
as specific private newspapers) from the Zimbabwean media market, was aligned with 
the 'patriotic narrative' put forward by the members of the regime.  In this regard, it was 
demonstrated action that matched their stated priorities of sovereignty, and their desire 
to reduce foreign influences on Zimbabwean politics.  There was pressure from within 
the regime to reduce foreign influences on domestic politics, including in the media 
sector Dombo (2014) and Moyo (2005).  The media sector, with its capacity to 
influence public opinion was therefore a natural target.  These institutional reforms 
helped to ease the regime's collective action dilemma by mitigating the potential 
domestic impact of the MDC's international allies (Lichbach 1995: pp. 189-193).    
 Excluding foreign media actors from Zimbabwe also weakened the availability 
and sources of information for international audiences and decision-makers (Mazango 
2005: p. 43), and therefore also their "...influence [on] foreign opinion and coalitions, 
which then pressure their governments or international organisations to undertake 
actions that affect the country..." (Islam 2002: p. 20).  However, this 'exit' was 
somewhat offset by the development of external Zimbabwean news websites and/or by 
the practice of publishing from other countries (e.g. the UK or South Africa).   
 Externally-based websites, radio stations and foreign-based publications 
bypassed the regime's legal restrictions on the private press' operations and the 
Broadcast Act monopoly.  They helped to counteract the shrinking democratic space in 
Zimbabwe by presenting alternative viewpoints and/or different content (Nhema 2002: 
pp. 91-93), expanding the availability of information.  Mazango (2005: p. 50) described 
them as "...a major source of non-official news", and Mudavanhu (2014: p. 55 citing 
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Mabweazara 2013) noted the reach of the pirate radio stations within Zimbabwe.  Their 
potential impact was limited by the sky-rocketing cost of living, and rising 
unemployment, that precluded discretionary spending for so many, and also limited the 
access to internet services (Nhema 2002: p. 94; Bratton, Chikwana and Sithole 2005: p. 
101). 
 These foreign publications, websites and stations served as the "externalization 
of voice" that arises as voice after exit (Hoffmann 2008: pp. 10-11). They were one 
strategy that helped to sustain the action-choice of ‘voice’ and to mitigate the adverse 
information effects created by the regime's intentional reforms. The regime responded 
with the imposition of an import tax on foreign publications, as discussed further below 
(Moyse 2009: p. 51).   
 This section has discussed the narrowed permissions and increased penalties in 
terms of actor selection (eligibility) to participate in the Zimbabwean media market and 
revealed how the re-writing of institutional rules provided members of the regime with 
control of the exit option.  Their approval and implementation, were aligned with the 
messaging within ZANU-PF's 'patriotic narrative', and exacerbated the civic and 
political opposition's mobilisation.   
 Permissions with respect to the substantive content produced by, and 
communicated through media actors, were also narrowed and the penalties for non-
compliance were broadened (i.e. applied to more areas) and toughened (e.g. new 
permitted actions of arrest and enforcement).  These content restrictions, reinforced by 
the broader and tougher criminal penalties enacted under both the AIPPA and the 
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POSA, sharply reduced the availability of information, and muted the public criticism 
of the ZANU-PF regime, its policies and the actions of its members.  This suppression 
of opposing voices, and the concealment of their grievances, greatly exacerbated the 
mobilisation challenges facing civil and political opposition actors and amplified the 
'patriotic narrative' of ZANU-PF.  
  
Narrowed permissions   
In addition to reforms that provided powers of actor selection, and therefore 
control of the exit option, new or amended institutional rules also altered permissions, 
incentives and penalties in the media sector.  Permissions define the scope of compliant 
behaviour, and therefore offer strategic advantages to actors facing collective action 
challenges.  Permissions place the duty to recognize a right, action or outcome on 
others, and narrowed permissions may limit the actors and actions, that can influence or 
affect outcomes (Crawford and Ostrom 1995: p. 585).  The AIPPA narrowed the 
conditions under which specific actions (e.g. investigative reporting) or specific content 
(e.g. criticism of the President) were permitted.   
Permissions, incentives and penalties all communicate expectations and/or 
benefits of compliance, the costs of non-compliance and thus affect decision-making 
and choice.  Under AIPPA, the members of the regime intentionally narrowed the scope 
of permissions, while the penalties for non-compliance were also being strategically 
broadened (i.e. applied to more areas) and toughened (e.g. new enforcement actions 
permitted). As the crisis unfolded, the penalties for non-compliance also included 
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actions of harassment, violence and torture.  In combination, strategic institutional 
reforms that narrowed permissions, and introduced broader, tougher penalties, 
negatively affected the prospects for the effective use of voice (Rowe 2001; Brownell 
2011: pp. 76-77; Hirschman 1970: p. 136).  They greatly eased the collective action 
dilemma faced by the members of the ZANU-PF regime. 
The adoption of the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) in 2002 (Zimbabwe 
2002b) was the principal institutional reform that narrowed horizontal voice, i.e. the 
communication of dissent among citizens.  Put simply, the POSA reduced the scope of 
both permissible discussion and permissible action in Zimbabwe.  This Act was adopted 
prior to the 2002 Presidential elections, demonstrating strategic timing by members of 
the regime, as they could benefit from its new powers, and their negative effects on 
mobilisation, as part of solving the collective action challenge they faced in terms of 
retaining their support and achieving the step-good of electoral success.   
   
For the media sector, POSA markedly narrowed what was permitted to be 
published, strengthened monitoring and created substantial penalties for non-
compliance. The intentional penalties were so significant that they had a deterrent 
effect for many, therefore supporting compliance. To enforce the specific prohibitions 
on media content, increased noticeability was introduced through the monitoring and 
review of published materials.  Section 15 of the POSA allowed for up to five years in 
prison and/or a fine of up to USD$100,000 for "…publish[ing] or communicat[ing] 
false statements prejudicial to the state, including undermining public confidence in a 
law enforcement agency, the prison services or the defence forces of 
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Zimbabwe" (Zimbabwe 2002b; HRW 2005a: p. 31; Feltoe 2003: p. 19).  Section 16 of 
the POSA made it an offence punishable by up to one year imprisonment and/or a fine 
of up to USD$20,000 "…to undermine the authority of, or insult, the president, 
including making any false statements about, or concerning, the president that could 
endanger feelings of hostility or cause hatred, contempt or ridicule of the 
President" (Zimbabwe 2002b; HRW 2005a: pp. 31-32; Feltoe 2003: p. 20).  In 2005-06, 
the POSA's provisions were integrated into the omnibus Criminal Law Codification 
and Reform Act , and more severe penalties of “…up to twenty years in prison and 
heavy fines for publishing or communicating false information deemed prejudicial to 
the state” were introduced (Zimbabwe 2005; CPJ 2006).  "...[W]hen libel is a criminal 
rather than civil offense, journalists lean toward self-censorship" (Islam 2002: p. 13). 
Legislation triggers obligations for actors, and therefore engages them in 
effecting outcomes (Crawford and Ostrom 1995: p. 585).  Both the AIPPA and the 
POSA obligated a coordinated enforcement response from other actors – notably the 
police – given their legal responsibilities under the relevant Acts.  They communicated 
expectations to all, and obligations to their agents.  The statistics on arrests and 
violence against media sector workers document the extent to which the AIPPA and 
POSA were enforced.   
Further, there was an enforcement bias, in that only journalists from the private 
media were being targeted (MISA-Zimbabwe 09 May 2003).  Enforcement bias itself 
communicates information that discourages collective mobilisation, by demonstrating 
the targeted application of penalties.  Human rights groups noted that under the AIPPA, 
more than one hundred journalists were reportedly arrested in the 2002 to 2004 period 
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(HRW 2005a: p. 26 citing Article 19/MISA-Zimbabwe 2004), while prior to the 2008 
elections, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) documented "...at least 19 cases 
[where] police used outdated sections of the accreditation law to harass, obstruct, or 
detain journalists" (CPJ 2009).  The MDC asserted, in 2005, that "...not a single 
journalist working for the state-controlled media" had been arrested under the AIPPA 
(MDC 2005b: p. 14). 
When penalties are applied in specific cases, they communicate information to 
other actors about the costs of the non-compliant behaviour.  Public statements by 
members of the governing regime also communicated the penalties that could be 
incurred, transmitting information for the purposes of deterrence that is, for the 
purposes of reducing future non-compliance.  For example, the Minister of Information 
and Publicity stated "....there was enough space in Zimbabwe's prisons for journalists 
caught dealing with foreign media houses" (Melber 2004: p. 9 citing MISA 30 April 
2004), communicating to Zimbabwean journalists that the criminal penalties permitted 
under the AIPPA and the POSA would be applied. 
A review of the literature also demonstrates two types of economic penalties 
that were applied against private actors in the media sector.  The first were the costs 
that directly arose from the new requirements of AIPPA and POSA (e.g. cost of 
accreditation, licensing, compliance costs).  The second type of economic penalty, one 
of economic disruption via nuisance costs, flowed indirectly from these new 
institutional rules.  Both types of penalties were intentional and strategic actions that 
meant to control journalistic content.  Actors will take penalties into account when 
assessing future choices and actions.  In situations of collective dissent, penalties alter 
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the costs and benefits between voice, loyalty and exit.  The power to impose these fines 
was held by the Minister of Information and Publicity and also by the Media and 
Information Commission.  The consequences of non-compliance were increased for 
individual journalists or broadcast reporters, as well as mass media services under both 
pieces of legislation.   
Loss of employment due to non-compliance is an interesting penalty, in that it 
affected both those working in the state-owned and the private press, and examples 
from each are provided here.  As a penalty, it sends a clear message about the 
importance of both compliance and loyalty.  Some of the editors and executives of both 
the state-owned Zimpapers and also the ZBC were fired when they "...did not toe the 
government line” (Zaffiro 2002: p. 120; Mano 2005: p. 63; MMPZ 2001: p. 13).  For 
example, Henry Muradzikwa, a former Chief Executive Officer of ZBC was fired in 
2008 "...for openly defying the Minister of Information and Publicity, Dr. Sikhanyiso 
Ndlovu, and the ministry's Permanent Secretary, George Charamba, to deny positive 
radio and television publicity to the MDC.  He was also reportedly accused of denying 
President Robert Mugabe favourable coverage" (IFEX/MISA This Week 20 May 2008 
emphasis added; Moore 2011: p. 61).  Mano (2005: pp. 64ff) discusses how proprietors 
in the private sector also fired editors who did not align with their priorities.   
Nuisance economic penalties were also commonly deployed by the members of 
the regime to increase the cost of ‘doing business’ (i.e. participating) in the 
Zimbabwean media market, including by creating disruption.  Voluntary exit as a result 
of these additional costs would be a rational response by the media actors targeted.  
One example of a nuisance economic penalty were the attacks on newspaper vendors 
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selling the private press (Mendel and Mukundo 2004; Dombo 2014: p. 205; MMPZ 
2003: p. 20) and the distribution of the Daily News was blocked in some areas (Moyo 
2005: p. 119).  These attacks and sales restrictions increased the costs of distribution, 
generated economic losses and created uncertainty for the individuals who sold those 
newspapers. 
The use of economic penalties to help suppress the private press dates back to 
the mid-1990s and Dombo (2014) also identifies continuities from the Rhodesian era.  
In 1993, the private Financial Gazette newspaper was critical of the structural 
adjustment programmes and their economic consequences.  It learned "…that the 
government was instructing companies not to advertise with them, and had placed tight 
controls on the allocation of newsprint" (Zaffiro 2002: p. 125 emphasis added).  These 
instructions communicated clearly the expectations, and were repeated less than a 
decade later against the Daily News, when it was blocked from accessing domestic 
newsprint.  When it began to source newsprint internationally, an import tax was 
imposed, further increasing costs (Dombo 2014: pp. 198, 206-207). 
An import tax was also applied against foreign publications distributed in 
Zimbabwe, for example, the private newspaper The Zimbabwean.  This tax increased 
the cost, to consumers, of foreign publications during a period of significant economic 
contraction, and the editors attributed to it their 70 percent drop in circulation while the 
duty was imposed (CPJ 2010 citing The Zimbabwean's editor).  To broaden news 
sources, the duty was removed, in 2009, by Zimbabwe's new MDC-Tsvangirai faction 
(MDC-T) Finance Minister in the Government of National Unity, created after the 
failed 2008 elections (HRW 2010: p. 16).    
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As the arrests and harassment of journalists, editors and publishers increased, a 
key economic penalty was to force the payment of significant legal costs.  This strategy 
increased the costs of pursuing the practice of journalism, while depleting the resources 
available to support the private media's operations.  These arrests must be seen as 
economic and legal penalties for the current acts of perceived disloyalty and a deterrent 
against future non-compliance.  The former editor of The Standard explained that the 
"...strategy involves charging journalists under various laws and securing long periods 
of remand or postponement of the cases, even when the charges are… spurious and 
have no chance of succeeding" (Chavunduka 2002: p. 286).  The Institute for 
Reconciliation and Justice/Solidarity Peace Trust (IRJ/SPT) analysed nearly 2,000 
political arrests between the years 2000 and 2005.  This analysis found that virtually all 
of the arrests failed to lead to convictions:  "…[a]lmost 90 percent of politically 
motivated arrests do not result in a trial, and in the few instances when cases go to trial, 
the State has obtained convictions in only 1.5 percent of cases" (IRJ/SPT 2006: p. 8, 
emphasis added).   
Together, these taxes, economic restrictions and penalties are examples of the 
intentional targeting of financial rules in a ‘carrot and stick’ manner (Bemelmans-
Videc, Rist, and Vedung 1998).  These rules, that restricted sources of financing and/or 
added tax for the private press, stand in clear contrast to the continuing subsidies from 
the national budget to the state-owned press (e.g. The Herald) and the ZBC.  This 
author argues that these measures, taken through law or regulation, altered the costs and 
penalties of participating in the Zimbabwean media market.  In this regard, the author 
disagrees with Dombo (2014: p. 203) that these were examples of extra-legal costs, and 
!  151
we both agree that press freedom was curtailed as a result, and I would argue the 
communication of both 'horizontal' and 'vertical' voice as well.     
The reforms and examples discussed in this section demonstrate the range of 
actors coordinating to suppress the voices of the private press:  the President, ministers 
and ministries (e.g. Home Affairs, Finance, Information and Publicity), members of the 
Media Information Commission and the Broadcasting Authority as well as police and 
security services.  Specific rules were introduced and adopted in parliament with the 
support of ZANU-PF members (although with some internal opposition) including the 
adoption of the AIPPA and the POSA, as well as reforms to the Broadcasting Services 
Act, and the Interception of Communications Act.   These rules allowed the ZANU-PF 3
regime to maintain and extend its control over the media sector – the sector 
fundamental to the expression and aggregation of voice, and to publicising the 
information needed to guide current strategies and future action. 
The powers of actor selection were perhaps the most significant in terms of 
reinforcing the ‘Rebel’s Dilemma’ for they significantly curtailed the choices of the 
private media actors.  First, in situations of strategic interdependence, these powers of 
actor selection greatly increase the odds that the 'choices of all' will be aligned (in this 
case) with the choices of the governing regime, facilitating all members of the regime 
to obtain their 'reward' at the next round of elections (Knight 1992: p. 48 citing Elster 
1986: p. 7).  Second, for the private media, they no longer control the option of exit – 
 August 2007 amendments to the Interception of Communications Act allowed the authorities to intercept 3
electronic and postal communications (Zimbabwe 2007).  The intention of these reforms was to increase 
the noticeability of the actions of targeted actors.  The Minister of Information and Publicity "…told the 
CPJ [that] the surveillance law will target 'imperialist-sponsored journalists with hidden agendas’…" and 
will "…protect the president, a minister, or any citizen from harm" (CPJ 2007).  
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for the power to force exit now belongs to actors in the regime (e.g. the Minister of 
Information, the Minister of Home Affairs).  While exit may remain a voluntary choice 
in response to a deteriorating situation, it now also could be imposed as a sanction for 
simply 'doing your job'.   
Third, by denying a forum (e.g. a newspaper or radio station) to amplify the 
voices of ‘rebels’ (i.e. individuals and civic organisations), the prospects for dissenting 
voices (whether inside the regime or outside), to be heard by other actors are markedly 
reduced.  Given that information is a key mechanism to help shape the expectations, 
and therefore the choices and actions of other actors (Knight 1992: p. 49), the reforms 
to the rules governing the media sector helped to ensure that the information available, 
to those Zimbabweans seeking political change, was both incomplete and unreliable.  
By "...concentrat[ing] their attacks...on the dissident's supplies or input 
sources" (Lichbach 1995: p. 49 citing Leites and Wolf 1970: p. 76-78), the probability 
of MDC's demands for reform making a difference was reduced.  Information problems 
exacerbate the challenge of coordination of both expectations and actions.  This was 
particularly the case during electoral periods, where the dominance of the state-owned 
media was very evident (MMPZ 2003 and 2005a, 2005b; CPJ 2006).  Regime members 
intentionally acted to restrict the availability of information.   
The aggregate impact of these restrictions and penalties is found in the 
documented analysis of Zimbabwean media reports undertaken by the Media 
Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe (MMPZ), and the public opinion polling undertaken 
by the Zimbabwean partner in the Afrobarometer consortium.  Afrobarometer conducts 
statistically-based public opinion surveys both within countries over time (successive 
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rounds of surveying) and across different countries in Africa.  Afrobarometer have 
produced a number of reports documenting the views of Zimbabweans on economic, 
social and governance issues , while the MMPZ monitors both state and private media 4
in Zimbabwe against constitutional standards and the Southern African Development 
Community Principles and Guidelines for Democratic Elections (SADC 2004).    
Afrobarometer confirms that these efforts to suppress the action-choice of 
'voice' did not go unnoticed by Zimbabweans.  Zimbabweans surveyed noted that 
"...some 61 percent consider that the government often or always silences opposition 
parties or their supporters" (Bratton and Masunungure 2012: p. 6 emphasis added).  
They "...also worr[ied] about freedom of expression.  Fully 89 percent assert that 
people often or always have to be careful of what they say about politics.  Again, this is 
the highest rate ever recorded by [Afrobarometer] in Zimbabwe or anywhere else in 
Africa" (ibid).   
Afrobarometer's survey data noted marked declines in the perceptions about 
freedom of speech (expression) between 1999 and 2005 and similar declines in 
perceptions of freedom of association, as expressed through the right to join the 
political party of one's choice (2009: pp. 11-12, Tables 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7) .   These 5
declines are shown in chart one of this dissertation.  Afrobarometer’s 2012 survey also 
documents a significant variance in perceptions of political fear by supporters of 
ZANU-PF and MDC, the first of their surveys to ask this question: "More than twice as 
 Reports are available at www.afrobarometer.org   4
 With regard to the freedom of association, in 2009, 53 percent said they felt "somewhat" or "completely" 5
free to join the political party of their choice, responses that appear to be at odds with the experiences of 
many Zimbabweans during the 2000-2008 crisis (see next chapter).  The formation of a Government of 
National Unity, in late 2008, and which included Morgan Tsvangirai as Prime Minister, may account for 
these more positive answers.  
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many MDC-T than ZANU-PF loyalists consider that opposition parties and their 
supporters are often or always silenced by government by 81 versus 37 
percent" (Bratton and Masunungure 2012:  p. 12).     
The distributional advantage gained through these institutional reforms that 
defined permissible content, and therefore also permissible voice, in the media sector 
was significant.  The reformed rules created the institutional basis to promote the 
narrative of patriotic history and to suppress the voices of dissent.  MMPZ's tracking of 
the media coverage (print and broadcast) during the 2000 elections campaign reveal 
just how significant was this advantage.  Of the 558 election campaign stories in the 
ZBC's news bulletins, "...exactly 500 - nearly 90 percent - favoured ZANU-PF or were 
critical of the MDC.  Only 32 (or 6 percent) covered MDC statements and activities…” 
with the same pattern also applied to radio broadcasts (MMPZ 2001: p. 8).  In the 2002 
presidential elections, MMPZ described the legal and political environment as “…
extremely hostile to free and impartial reporting” (MMPZ 2003: p. 9), with biases in 
the issues covered by the public media (e.g. land, foreign relations, political violence) 
to the political advantage of ZANU-PF (MMPZ 2003: pp. 9-11).  This finding 
regarding the bias in issue coverage, demonstrates the pre-dominance of the key 
elements of patriotic history in the public sector's media coverage in the pre-electoral 
period. 
In the 2005 harmonized elections, the MDC made some gains in terms of its 
access to ZBC, however the coverage remained unbalanced, both in terms of quantity 
and content, to the continuing advantage of the ZANU-PF regime.  The coverage 
allocated to the MDC was 15 percent of that of ZANU-PF in the pre-electoral period 
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(beginning 01 January 2005), as measured by number of stories, and only 7 percent as 
measured by the broadcast time (MMPZ 2005b).  Although ZANU-PF and MDC were 
both allocated official “elections programmes”, the MMPZ noted that the interviewers 
were markedly more “hostile” to the MDC than was the case with ZANU-PF.  MMPZ 
concluded “[t]he biased approach of the questioning during these programmes was 
clearly structured in a way that was designed to further discredit the opposition and 
enhance the image of the ruling party” (MMPZ 2005b).  By the run-off of the 2008 
Presidential elections, the limited access the MDC had obtained on the ZBC network of 
radio and television services ended, as "...Tsvangirai's campaign activities were 
completely censored in all of ZBC's radio and TV news bulletins" (Moyse 2009: p. 39).   
Freedoms of Expression, Association, Assembly and Movement  
 This discussion has demonstrated that reforms to the institutional rules imposed 
restrictions and penalties on the private media actors, suppressing both horizontal and 
vertical voice.  These strategic reforms allowed the regime to select actors, and to 
control the exit option, as well as reduce the availability and reliability of information.  
They constrained the aggregation of dissenting voices in the media sector, and through 
their negative effects on mobilisation, in Zimbabwe more broadly.  But freedom of 
expression is much broader than the existence and work of different media actors – it is 
a constitutional right of individual Zimbabweans.   
 The NCA defined freedom of expression in Zimbabwe as simply the "...ability 
to express oneself freely and read a newspaper of one’s choice" (Reeler and Chitsike 
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2005: p. 20).  This definition, despite its simplicity of phrasing, encompasses both 
horizontal and vertical voice (O'Donnell 1986), as well as the availability of 
information.  It applies to a range of contexts – to public expression in the media, to 
community gatherings, or simply to an argument in the beer hall or in the line to buy 
'mealie-meal'.  It also underscores the importance of the press to freedom of expression.  
However, broadcast media (e.g. radio) is notably absent from the definition.   
 The Public Order and Security Act (POSA) imposed important restrictions on 
both the freedoms of expression and assembly, and through the latter, also on freedom 
of movement. Kriger (2005) discusses similar efforts, in earlier elections, to limit the 
freedom of assembly through actions to deny rallies, and disperse opposition supporters 
under prior state of emergency regulations.  The criminalisation of statements against 
the President or against the regime’s behaviour (e.g. political violence by the police), as 
discussed above, were part of the content restrictions that limited the media's freedom 
of expression.  However, the POSA also curtailed the right of assembly, through its 
regulation of "…the organisation and conduct of public gatherings" (Zimbabwe 2002b; 
Chavunduka 2002: p. 284).  POSA also contained penalties for "...harbouring, 
concealing or failing to report insurgent, bandit, saboteur or terrorist" (Zimbabwe 
2002b).  This penalty would also impact on the freedoms of assembly and movement, 
by discouraging the welcome of, and/or meeting with, perceived opponents of the 
regime, whether MDC members, civil society actors or simply Zimbabweans with 
different views than those recognized as 'patriotic' by the members of the regime. 
 As discussed at the start of this chapter, freedom of assembly is closely linked 
to freedom of expression – for in the context of contentious collective action, it is 
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through the right to assemble that lawful opposition (or demands) to the state can be 
voiced in aggregate, and common interests can be articulated or defended.  The 
freedom to assemble is an important enabler of collective action, for it allows like-
minded individuals to meet and mobilise around shared issues, whether 'horizontally' 
amongst themselves and/or 'vertically' to the Zimbabwean regime.  
 Facing strong political opposition from the MDC, as evidenced by their success 
in the 2000 parliamentary elections, members of the Zimbabwean regime introduced 
POSA prior to the 2002 presidential elections.  They demonstrated through their 
actions, their awareness of the impact of the right to assemble on the prospects for 
successful collective dissent:  
 "…[i]mmediately on passing into law [POSA] was used to clamp 
down on the activities of the MDC, and also to prevent civil society 
activities, including peaceful protest, public debates and 
workshops" (IRJ/SPT 2006: p. 16; Sachikonye 2011a: p. 140).   
However, the strategic application and targeted enforcement of POSA meant that these 
restrictions did not apply to ZANU-PF, facilitating its efforts to mobilise its own 
supporters:  
"… it is almost always the opposition political parties, primarily the 
MDC, and civil society groupings including the NCA, the ZCTU, 
Women of Zimbabwe Arise, rate payers associations and others, that 
are routinely prevented from gathering.  ZANU-PF on the other hand, 
is able to continue with political activities without having to comply 
with POSA, and is seldom refused permission to gather" (IRJ/SPT 
2006: p. 19 emphasis added).  
Masunungure also concurs with the targeted enforcement:   
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"[t]he police force has largely abrogated the right of free of assembly 
for opponents of the government.  It has freely allowed meetings and 
demonstrations by ruling party supporters, but has frequently 
disallowed and brutally broken up meetings and demonstrations by 
the opposition and by organisations that are critical of the Mugabe 
administration"  (Masunungure 2009b: p. 71 citing Zimbabwe 
Human Rights NGO Forum, 18 March 2008 pp. 4-5, emphasis 
added). 
The MDC itself documented and reported many instances, across all Zimbabwean 
provinces, of denial of its own rallies, meetings etc., while noting that these 
prohibitions did not affect ZANU-PF (MDC 2005b).    
 Targeted enforcement communicates to members and supporters of the ZANU-
PF regime that action to address a problem is being taken.  In this way, it allows both 
supporters and opponents to factor specific actions into their strategic decision-making.  
By demonstrating action, for the members of the regime, targeted enforcement helps to 
address their collective action problem through the retention of support, as well as 
through the suppression of opposition.  Enforcement actions that are strategically timed 
(discussed below) may amplify these effects, particularly in time-bound collective 
action challenges such as an electoral campaign.  
 The scope and breadth of the prohibitions within POSA, combined with the 
discretion available within its permissions (e.g. to determine whether a statement 
"could endanger feelings of hostility or cause hatred, contempt or ridicule of the 
President"), meant that its use became widespread as ZANU-PF sought to suppress 
dissenting voices, and retain its support.  As was the case for the charges laid under 
AIPPA, the charges under this Act should be seen as economic and legal penalties for 
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the current action of perceived disloyalty and a deterrent against future non-
compliance.   
 An analysis of the arrests reported during 2003-2005, found that POSA was 
cited in 52 percent of the arrests (IRJ/SPT 2006: p. 23), leading the IRJ/SPT to 
conclude that “…[l]aws such as POSA are not there to enforce law and order, but to 
undermine the rights of citizens to freedom of association, expression and movement 
(IRJ/SPT 2006: p. 8, emphasis added).  Of the more than 1000 arrests made under 
POSA between 2003-2005, "…not a single conviction had been obtained by the end of 
2005 for those sections of POSA that relate to public order or public gatherings – yet 
these are the sections most commonly charged" (IRJ/SPT 2006: p. 33).  
 New requirements and obligations that strengthened noticeability were 
introduced to facilitate enforcement and compliance.  A significant advantage in terms 
of information arose from POSA's requirements that four days of notice of any public 
gathering (e.g. a protest, political rally or community meeting) be given.  Failure to 
provide this notice was, in and of itself, a criminal act (Zimbabwe 2002b).  This 
requirement provided an informational advantage to the members of the regime, by 
revealing important expectations on the part of the other actors (e.g. the anticipated 
number of participants, speakers, and objectives) (SPT 2004a: p. 12).   
 This informational advantage allowed the members of the ZANU-PF regime to 
make their own strategic choices, including acting to suppress civic voices or political 
opponents in advance of the planned gathering through targeted enforcement.  From 
civil society, two examples, of the use of POSA as a deterrent: 
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"…[i]t took another 24 hours to get [them] released without charge. 
These 30 detainees were effectively in detention from 31 May to 3 
June 2003, which meant they were unable to play a role in the June 
[strike]– which was clearly the main intention behind their 
arrests" (IRJ/SPT 2006:  p. 28 emphasis added).  
"On several occasions, youth militia invaded rally venues the day 
before the MDC rally was scheduled.  MDC officials would arrive to 
find threatening youth militia ensconced on the pitch with the police 
refusing to remove them.  This resulted in cancellation of rallies, or in 
violence disrupting rallies" (SPT 2003: pp. 32-33 emphasis added).   
These actions may be seen as an effort to suppress the action-choice of collective voice 
prior to its public exercise. Strategies were also deployed by members of the regime to 
deter and punish future participation, i.e. to limit the aggregation of voice:  
"… the process of keeping political detainees in such [dreadful] 
conditions for the maximum length of time permitted by law... and 
frequently longer, is done deliberately by the police who know that 
they will not be able to successfully prosecute these cases:  being 
kept in filthy and degrading conditions for a few days is a form of 
quick sentence meted out by the police – and a deterrent to future 
participation in peaceful protests" (IRJ/SPT 2006: p. 26 emphasis 
added). 
 Earlier in this chapter, the economic penalty of imposing high legal costs 
against private media actors was discussed.  This sanction (penalty) was also deployed 
in order to discourage the expression of voice by both members of the political 
opposition, and of civil society organisations:   
"… the routine practice of arresting people at every opportunity is 
being used to ensure that a large proportion of funds that accrue to 
the opposition party or to civil society are used up in legal defence….
[it] adds up to a huge sum each year.  The time and emotional stress 
that the opposition has had to devote to dealing with false charges has 
!  161
taken attention away from more constructive processes, and has 
fuelled pre-existing internal divisions (IRJ/SPT 2006:  p. 19).   
 An arrest is a penalty for current participation, while the existence of 
outstanding charges multiplies the costs of participating in future events.  Outstanding 
charges also create uncertainty, as it means the individual can be "...taken back into 
custody for further interrogation at any time" (IRJ/SPT 2006: p. 31), incentivising 
compliance.  Although only 1.5 percent of the arrests resulted in convictions (IRJ/SPT 
2006: p. 8), the impact of these strategies on mobilisation was noted:   
"The State is aware that there is a very small chance of a successful 
prosecution in most of these instances of arrest: in particular in 
relation to POSA arrests, it is useful to an oppressive State to hang 
the charges unresolved over the head of the accused… Having an 
unresolved case can also be an inhibiting factor when taking part in 
further democratic activities, as the old case could be revived if there 
is a further arrest" (IRJ/SPT 2006: pp. 30-31 emphasis added).   
The link between arrests under the POSA and mobilisation is clear, based on the IRJ/
SPT analysis.  Arrests:  
"...peaked in 2003, when the ability of the opposition to organise was 
at its zenith", declining in parallel with "... the demise of the 
democratic movement’s ability to mobilise cohesively. This decline is 
an indicator of the cumulative effects of state repression on the 
capacity of the opposition to confront the state, rather than an 
indicator of less oppression" (IRJ/SPT 2006: p. 8 emphasis added).    
Arrests increased again in 2007, "...as a response to the growing 
mobilisation by the opposition MDC, the trade unions and other civic 
bodies ..." and a blanket ban on public gatherings, for a period of 
three months, was imposed in Harare, the capital city (SPT 2007: p. 8 
emphasis added).   
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 The freedoms of assembly, association and movement are enablers for the 
mobilisation of both horizontal and vertical voice.  Political leaders, candidates, 
campaign workers, election observers and officials all require the ability to move 
around their assigned territory - whether a rural district, urban ward, municipality, 
province – or to realize a national campaign.  Journalists and reporters need to visit 
locations to identify and/or report on issues and events.  Civil society organisations 
need to visit programme activities, meet members in different locales, hold meetings, or 
protest; staff need to be publicly identified with the organisation they represent. 
 Political parties also need to recruit members, and members should not fear 
being associated with a legally registered political party.  By law, candidates must 
register their party affiliation, while at campaign rallies and other events candidates to 
communicate this information to potential voters. Citizens should be able to attend any 
political party meeting, simply to be informed.  As discussed further in the next chapter, 
by exercising their freedom of association, i.e. by becoming a member of the MDC 
party, many Zimbabweans became vulnerable to political violence.   Based on their 
perceived disloyalty, they were the denied selective incentives available to ZANU-PF 
supporters and loyalists.  This combination of penalties and incentives, not only 
reinforced loyalty, but further contributed to suppressing the freedom of association.   
 Both the freedom of association and the freedom of movement were jointly 
suppressed in the 'no-go' zones that were created across Zimbabwe during this period.  
These were especially common in Zimbabwe's rural areas, particularly in the regions of 
known and/or suspected MDC support (SPT 2003: p. 25 note 62; Anatomy of Terror 
2011: p. 4).  While the formal rules were not altered, these 'no-go' zones were 
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communicated and enforced as informal rules that de facto created restrictions on the 
freedoms of association and movement.  These restrictions narrowed the permissions 
inherent in the freedom of movement, by limiting its geographic scope and/or by 
limiting the purposes for which freedom of movement were allowed. 
 These 'no-go' zones were introduced for ZANU-PF's partisan advantage and 
operationalised, for example, through roadblocks and unofficial requirements for travel 
authorisations.  They significantly curtailed the freedom of movement for MDC 
candidates, officials or supporters, and therefore also limited the MDC's development 
as a political party.  They were created and enforced by ZANU-PF supporters, its youth 
militia, and/or the war veterans (SPT 2003: p. 33-34): 
 "The policeman said: 'M Growth Point is a no-go area occupied by 
ZANU-PF youth.  Anyone suspected of being MDC will be beaten 
up" (PHR 2002:  p. 31, emphasis added). 
  "Case 4 reported his assault by war veterans and militias to the 
police, who told him that the area was a 'no-go area for MDC 
supporters' who could expect to be beaten up.  The police took no 
action at all" (PHR 2002: p. 46, emphasis added). 
  A former member of the youth militia revealed that his training was 
about "...how to set up road blocks and how to harass civilians" (SPT 
2003: p. 22) rather than the about job skills and "responsible 
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citizenship" as had been the original programme objectives cited by 
the Government .    6
  
By limiting freedom of movement, these 'no-go' zones also created restrictions 
on the freedom of association (e.g. at a village level MDC rally), thus constraining 
collective mobilisation and the aggregation of voice across, for example, villages, 
constituencies, or within trades or professions (e.g. a trade union meeting, teachers 
association meeting).  That they largely targeted specific groups of citizens, and those 
engaged in the action-choice of ‘voice’, revealed the largely partisan intentions behind 
these informal rules.  Although these 'no-go' zones had also been deployed for earlier 
rounds of elections (NCA 2005; PHR 2002), their widespread scale-up for the 2008 
elections was documented in the constituency reports of the Anatomy of Terror (2011). 
 This dissertation's focus is on the collective action challenge faced by the 
members of ZANU-PF, and it has been stated that their challenge, the 'State's Dilemma' 
was a decentralised one.  The scale of these 'no-go' zones, across so many 
constituencies, is a demonstration of intentional action to limit the freedoms that 
supported the action-choice of 'voice'.  Creating 'no-go' zones were strategic decisions 
taken by members of the regime, and communicated to their allies or agents (e.g. war 
veterans, youth militia members) in order to reduce the electoral challenge posed by the 
 The programme of 'national youth service' for youth 10 to 30 years old was announced in October 2000, 6
initially to promote 'responsible citizenship'.  By April 2001 the programme was re-oriented to provide 
youth with a "sense of nationalism and patriotism" and pride in their "culture, their history and their 
country" (SPT 2003: p. 14).  However, as Ranger (2004) discusses, the teachings were of a partisan 
nature.  The selective incentives of privileged access to jobs and to tertiary level education for the 
programme's graduates were also announced (SPT 2003: pp. 13-14, 20-21l Sachikonye 2011b: p. 21).  In 
July 2003 the Minister of Defence announced that the youth programme would also include weapons 
training, so as to help "create a reserve security force for the nation" (SPT 2003: p. 23).  This youth militia 
was estimated by Moorcraft has having 15,000 members (2011: p. 164).  In September 2003, 
Zimbabwean and South African church leaders expressed concerns about the programme:  "[t]he reality is 
a paramilitary training programme for Zimbabwe's youth with the clear aim of inculcating blatantly anti-
democratic, racist and xenophobic attitudes" (SPT 2003: p. 6, emphasis added).  
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MDC (HRW 2008a: p. 39).  The MDC identified these zones as one of its three 
"...major strategic problems" following their 2000 referendum success (with the second 
being "...the lack of alternative sources of information in the rural areas", as discussed 
above, and, the third, as will be discussed in the next chapter, "...the elimination of 
MDC structures and personnel..."(Raftopoulos 2007: p. 129 citing MDC strategy paper 
April 2000).  
  The 'no-go' zones prevented the MDC from organising, for example, in specific 
villages or constituencies.  The 'no-go' zones also made it more difficult for the MDC to 
maintain, communicate, develop and/or support their networks at local levels, 
particularly in rural Zimbabwe, and to connect these local units to the national level 
(e.g. MDC 2005b: pp. 26-28; SPT 2003: pp. 33-34).  'No-go' zones limit physical 
travel, make difficult the transfer of resources from one area to another and may also 
increase both risks and costs.  Whether it is Zimbabweans having their party cards 
checked at an informal roadblock (e.g. HR NGO Forum 2002: p. 11; 2006: p. 14) or the 
risk of violence associated with the roadblocks themselves.  These 'no-go' zones had 
implications for the prospects for the MDC's successful collection action.  Lichbach 
argues “...[i]f all collective action is 'local' then.. dissident organisations that link local 
and national issues will be more successful than national only” (1995: p. 232). 
 Due to their informal nature, there is no official data on the 'no-go' zones; rather 
their scale and scope have been documented by civic groups.  In March 2005, in 
advance of the harmonised elections, the NCA reported that 77 percent of the 
constituencies sampled reported limits on the freedom of association, with the MDC 
more affected than ZANU-PF (NCA 2005: p. 6 Table 2), while 86 percent and 60 
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percent of the constituencies sampled reported movement restrictions on entering or 
leaving constituencies.  In all cases, ZANU-PF supporters or members of the police, 
youth and/or security forces were identified as those limiting the freedom of movement 
(NCA 2005: p. 6 Table 3).  These 2005 findings by the NCA were not unique.  Similar 
findings for other electoral rounds were also reported in separate studies by the 
Anatomy of Terror (2011: constituency annexes) and in the HR NGO Forum's Political 
Violence reports.  Reforms that were introduced for the 2008 harmonized elections (see 
'Synthesis' below), facilitated the mobilisation by the MDC through their increased 
access to these 'no-go' zones (Masunungure 2009b: p. 73).   
Summary  
This discussion of the intentional reform to the rules of assembly, expression, 
association and movement, reveal the official, coordinated actions to suppress the 
voices of the opposition and its allies.  These four freedoms support the action-choice 
of voice, and influence the prospects for its effectiveness.  These institutional reforms 
helped to underpin the core messages of ZANU-PF's patriotic narrative, deployed 
during this period of profound electoral and institutional contestation.  The differences, 
across four different dimensions, between this 'patriotic narrative' and the action-choice 
of 'voice' have been discussed.   
In keeping with the lines of enquiry for this research project, this chapter 
examined the impact of these reforms on permissions and prohibitions, compliance and 
the dynamics of exit and voice.  Strategic institutional reform allowed members of the 
regime to gain control of both actor selection and of the exit option, greatly reducing 
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their future uncertainty and increasing the dependency of private media actors on the 
regime. In the media sector, these reforms reduced both the availability and reliability 
of information, exacerbating coordination challenges for the opposition, while 
facilitating the regime's communications to its supporters and other Zimbabweans.   
A pattern of targeted enforcement of the rules also communicated to supporters 
and opponents information for strategic decision-making.  Enforcement was also 
facilitated by new rules to increase noticeability that further supported the regime's 
informational advantage.  Together these reforms suppressed the action-choice of voice 
(i.e. the communication of dissent) exacerbating the MDC's collective action and 
mobilisation challenges, and easing those faced by the ZANU-PF regime.  The next 
chapter examines the fields of politically motivated violence and the deployment of 
selective incentives and strategies to reduce free-riding, in order to help ZANU-PF 
achieve the 'step-good' of electoral victory, despite its collective action challenge.     
This rational-choice institutionalist discussion of patriotic history and causal 
stories, suggests two new areas for future research.  The first pertains to whether, and 
how, the patriotic narrative has become institutionalised over the last fifteen plus years.  
The scope and time-frame of this study are too narrow to assess this question. However, 
this future research would offer not only new insights into Zimbabwe, but also be of 
wider theoretical value in terms of understanding if, how, and under what conditions, 
narratives may become institutions.   
A second area for further research would be to assess, in greater detail, the 
communication of patriotic history as a causal story (Stone 1989; 2012).  This 
assessment, with a focus on the definition and framing of political problems and, 
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particularly the consequent implications for the development of policy alternatives, 
would complement other analysts' valuable assessments on the development and effects 
of patriotic history.  This more detailed analysis, could perhaps contribute additional 
explanatory value in understanding the challenges of responding to it in an electoral 
context.  This future assessment would also be of relevance to the study of other 
liberation movements within the region.    
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Chapter Four: Incentives, threats and no free-riding.   
  
Second, mass, voluntary exit facilitates the provision of public goods to a 
smaller population, thus potentially reducing future dissatisfaction that can trigger the 
action-choice of voice (Pfaff 2006: p. 27).    
This dissertation's theoretical framework of rational choice institutionalism 
requires a focus on individual and collective actors and the institutional environment in 
which they make their strategic choices and decisions, including in order to address 
their collective action challenges.  One of the research lines of enquiry generated for 
this dissertation and stemming from this theoretical framework addresses the question 
of whether these reforms to rules altered the incentives and penalties faced by actors.  
This chapter examines the regime's use of informal rules to strategically alter penalties 
and incentives in order to retain the electoral loyalty of both their agents and of 
Zimbabweans.  It complements the previous chapter's discussion of the alteration of 
formal rules to control actor selection and the exit option, and to encourage compliance 
via a narrowing of permissions and the introduction of stronger, tougher penalties to 
discourage the action-choice of voice.   
Incentives and penalties are often the outputs of institutional reform. Incentives 
and penalties are important to the ‘State’s Dilemma’, recalling that it is the challenge of 
retaining support, when the interests of Zimbabweans may align otherwise.  Incentives 
and penalties "...motivate people to act differently than they might otherwise choose, 
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with both relying... on getting other people to choose actions we would desire" (Stone 
2002: p. 265).  They are an important means to align the interests of supporters with 
those who control the State. The strategic deployment of these inducements is a rational 
response to resolving your collective action challenge.  
This chapter discusses the following incentives and penalties:  the reward of 
protection from political violence – either as victims or as perpetrators; the use of 
political violence as a penalty (punishment) for disloyalty, and as a disincentive (or 
deterrent) for future disloyalty; and, the strategic distribution of material benefits 
(selective incentives), particularly the allocation of food aid.  Rational actors, in 
situations of strategic interdependency, may offer selective incentives to encourage 
specific outcomes.  If so, they will want to reduce free-riding via demands for specific 
demonstrations of loyalty and through strategies to increase the visibility or 
noticeability of contributions (monitoring).    
This chapter examines the incentives and penalties that resulted from the 
development of new, informal rules that de facto replaced the formal rules governing 
the actions of the members of the security sector as well as the distribution of material 
benefits to Zimbabwe's citizens.  Informal rules are those that are "...created, 
transmitted and enforced outside of official channels" (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: p. 
727).  Informal institutions are "...shared amongst members of the relevant community 
or society" and include some sort of sanction (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: p. 727 italics 
in the original; Knight 1992: pp. 2-3).   
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This chapter also briefly discusses the problem of free-riding and the 
importance reducing this problem to group success.  This is followed by a more 
detailed analysis of Hirschman’s conceptualization of loyalty and more recent 
analytical developments, situating these arguments within larger debates about patriotic 
history.  Public opinion data from Zimbabwe is integrated into this analysis and 
discussion, revealing the extent of Zimbabweans dissatisfaction with the governing 
regime’s performance.  Finally, further areas of research are identified.  
At each election, the members of the ZANU-PF regime faced the collective 
action challenge of retaining the electoral loyalty of ZANU-PF supporters in sufficient 
numbers so as to win the required number of votes (presidential) and seats (local or 
parliamentary elections).  Hirschman's definition of loyalty, despite its weaknesses 
(discussed below), is relevant in time-bound collective action situations, such as the 
‘State’s Dilemma’. For this dissertation, loyalty is defined as to "...[postpone or defer 
exit] in spite of dissatisfaction and qualms" (Hirschman 1970: p. 104).  Its relevance 
stems from the strategic interdependence in the collective action challenge itself.  
Selective incentives help to reinforce loyalty by prioritizing the certainty of the current, 
but unsatisfactory, situation over the uncertainty of future improvements in 
performance (ibid: p. 38).  Penalties increase the costs to rational actors of choosing a 
specific course of action, while incentives may reduce costs or offer additional gains.    
A change in an unpopular regime (or its fundamental reform) is a public good 
(Pfaff 2006: p. 9 note 7), as noted above.  The public opinion data discussed below 
reveals Zimbabweans’ widespread dissatisfaction with the ZANU-PF regime.  Pfaff's 
insight highlights the free-riding challenge that comprises part of collective dissent 
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generally and the 'Rebel's Dilemma' specifically (Lichbach 1995).  Free-riding, i.e. 
benefiting from the provision of a collective good without having participated in its 
production is common in the production of public goods (Olson 1971: p. 91).  The 
'State's Dilemma' is also a dilemma of interdependency, and it is this interdependency 
that underscores the problem of free-riding, especially in time-sensitive collective 
action challenges such as electoral victory.  Strategies to reduce free-riding and/or to 
defer exit, therefore help to ease this collective action challenge.  Free-riding has 
adverse effects on the prospects for group success (Hardin 1982: p. 98).   
As this period of the crisis unfolded, individual ZANU-PF party members, 
supporters and other Zimbabweans were called upon to increase their contribution to 
the ZANU-PF regime (e.g. votes, demonstrations of loyalty).  These contributions 
reduced the free-riding problem faced by members of the regime, easing their collective 
action problem.  Inducements, either positive incentives or rewards, but also threats or 
penalties, were directed by members of the regime at ZANU-PF supporters, either 
individually or collectively, so as to help generate the needed contributions.   
Although it has been criticized, Hirschman's definition of loyalty remains the 
most pertinent for these discussions, given the time-bound nature of ZANU-PF's the 
collective action challenge.  His definition speaks to a decision to ‘defer’ which has a 
temporal element that is important in this case study.  Neither of the two primary 
criticisms of his definition addresses this dimension.  Dowding et al. (2000: pp. 
476-478) have criticized Hirschman's concept of loyalty for not being sufficiently 
distinct from either the action-choice of exit or of voice, whilst (Laver 1976: p. 478 
citing Barry 1974: p. 90) has criticized it for mixing both functional and rational 
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elements.  Pfaff continues Dowding et al.’s thinking and so re-formulates loyalty to be 
seen as "...the dispositions and preferences that determine an actor's relative costs and 
benefits for voice and exit behaviour" rather than treating it as "a course of action", as 
is the case for exit and voice (2006: p. 20).   Some of the other helpful analytical 
developments by Dowding et al. (2000) and Pfaff (2006) have been integrated into this 
dissertation’s analysis and are discussed below. 
The 'State's Dilemma' is a time-bound collective action challenge.  Political 
parties, including ZANU-PF, have genuine supporters for whom the action-choice of 
loyalty does not apply, as the action-choice of loyalty, applies in situations of “…
dissatisfaction and qualms” (Hirschman 1970: p. 104), rather than support.  It is a 
conscious decision by a rational actor, taking into account preferences, as well as the 
costs and benefits of this action-choice and those of the other alternatives available.  
Despite current concerns, a rational actor may also decide to choose loyalty, for 
example, as a reward to the state or in recognition of past benefit (e.g. liberation) or 
gain (e.g. employment, land, education), or in expectation of future benefits and gain.  
Normative reasons may also result in the actor choosing loyalty.   
In the Zimbabwean context, there are two analytical developments to 
Hirschman's conceptualisation of loyalty that are particularly important.  First, 
Dowding et al. (2000: pp. 476-478) argue that there are differences between loyalty to a 
product versus loyalty to an organization, group or country, to which an actor belongs.  
Dowding et al. argue that an actor may retain "...loyalty to his country no matter how 
much he disagrees with the policies of the government representing the country...the 
object of loyalty is different from the people held responsible for its 
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decline..." (Dowding et al. 2000: p. 477).  Second, Dowding et al. also argue that the 
"degree of loyalty", depends on "...first, one's identification with the object of loyalty, 
and secondly, the amount one has invested in that object" (ibid: emphasis added).   
These distinctions are both important when analyzing ZANU-PF as a liberation 
movement that holds power.  For those senior leaders of the ZANU-PF regime that had 
fought in the liberation war, their identification with, and their investment in, the 
liberation struggle was clear and significant.  There was a "...continuing belief in 
ZANU-PF that politics in Zimbabwe are essentially an extension of the liberation 
struggle and consequently that they are the only party with the ‘right’ to govern”, a 
belief that also “...rejects the concept of a valid opposition to its policies” (CCJPZ 
2005: p. 23).   Leaders of liberation movements often equated democracy with the post-
colonial transition to majority rule (Southall 2013: p. 70), and the members of the 
ZANU-PF regime during this crisis were clear on this point:”We brought democracy to 
this country at independence.  So when some people say they want to bring democratic 
change they are forgetting that we brought this in 1980” (The Herald, citing Comrade 
Sekermyi 22/5/2000).  This perspective conflates the result (liberation) with democratic 
rule.  In that democracy is the rule by the people, the expansion of political rights and 
voice that arose from liberation is indeed a new democratic beginning.  However, 
democracy is not a “winner takes all, forever” proposition, for democratic rules provide 
for regular choices (elections) and, importantly for the possibility of a change in 
government.        
Public opinion polling at the time of the crisis, showed, not surprisingly that 99 
percent of Zimbabweans surveyed said that majority rule was "absolutely essential" or 
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"important" to their understanding of the term democracy (Chikwanha-Dzenga et. al. 
2001: p. 10 Table 2).  However, Zimbabweans also indicated that "regular 
elections" (86 percent), freedom of speech (82 percent), competing political parties (82 
percent) were also "absolutely essential" or "important" part of their understanding, 
along with high ratings for a number of socio-economic rights (ibid).  The views of 
Zimbabweans therefore balanced the democratic achievement of majority rule, but 
were internalizing, to a significant degree, the institutional rules that underpinned 
constitutionalism.  This may be explained, in part, by the very significant percentage of 
the population that were born or came of age under Zimbabwe's Constitution with its 
framework of political rights. 
  
This public opinion data suggests that Zimbabweans would be supportive of 
this broader argument, i.e. that loyalty to country still allowed for policy disagreements 
with the government.  Their support for the freedoms essential to the action-choice of 
‘voice’ (e.g. freedom of expression, speech ) is considerable.  However, these opinions, 
and this argument, contrasts with ZANU-PF's 'patriotic narrative’ and its condemnation 
of voices of dissent.    
This ‘patriotic narrative’ was clear on both ‘loyalty’ and ‘disloyalty’, and 
through its communications demonstrated that the separation identified by Dowding et 
al. was not part of their expectations.  ZANU-PF’s ‘patriotic narrative’, de facto, saw 
both loyalty to a liberated country and to the ZANU-PF governing regime, as one and 
the same, as Tendi (2008: p. 379) defined above.  This narrative, with its conflation of 
democracy, party and liberation, perhaps reflected, too, the bias of many senior 
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members of ZANU-PF towards a party-state.  The leaders and members of the MDC 
and those who supported them were branded as 'traitors' or 'enemies' (e.g. HR NGO 
Forum 2007:  pp. 11, 16, 24-25) for their challenges to ZANU-PF's rule, including their 
efforts to replace ZANU-PF, via elections.  Loyalty, also meant not siding with the 
'Western imperialists' (Mudavanhu 2014: p. 100 citing Chuma 2008), integrating the 
theme of sovereignty into its construct, while also simultaneously helping to de-
legitimise the MDC due to its support in many Western countries (Raftopoulos 2009: p. 
218).   
 There is no question that individual members of the ZANU-PF regime, of the 
political opposition, civic organisations or other groups (e.g. community associations), 
and indeed many Zimbabweans, had a "subjective attachment" to the success of an 
independent Zimbabwe, including due to a ranger of  "...ideological, social or material 
reasons" as Pfaff (2006: p. 20) argued with reference to East Germany.  Independence 
was hard-fought, and the socio-economic aspirations of Zimbabweans (and many in the 
international community) were high.  In mid-2001, over 70 percent of the 
Zimbabweans surveyed agreed that "being Zimbabwean" was an important part of their 
personal identity (Tevera 2002: p. 50 Table 3.10).   Indeed this attachment may have 
activated and mobilised 'reformist voice', i.e. "...political action intended to improve the 
performance or responsiveness of an organisation or state (Pfaff 2006: p. 21) as 
Zimbabweans, through the action-choice of voice (e.g. strikes and stay-aways), 
expressed their concerns and dissatisfaction about the declining performance of 
Zimbabwe's economy, and/or governance.    
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The concept of the “degree of loyalty", defined to include both the "...amount 
one has invested in that object" and "...one's identification with the object of 
loyalty" (Dowding et al. 2000: p. 477), is relevant, particularly when juxtaposed against 
the demographics of Zimbabwe during the years prior to, and throughout, the political 
crisis.  As shown in chart four, by 2000, approximately 50 percent of the Zimbabwean 
population was under the age of 18 (IOM 2009: p. 28 Table 6 citing Central Statistics 
Office 2004, author's calculations).  This group, the ‘born-frees” had no direct 
experience of the liberation war, for the simple reason that they were born after its 
conclusion. 
By 2002, when this census occurred, the institutionalised racism of the 
Rhodesian and colonial periods, as well as the suffering, heroism and struggle of the 
liberation war, were not part of the personal experience of most Zimbabweans.  They 
featured heavily in the ‘patriotic narrative’ but only thirty-six percent of the population 
would have been alive during the Rhodesian period (IOM 2009: p. 28 Table 6 citing 
Central Statistics Office 2004, author's calculations), with approximately a further 
thirty percent coming of age since Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, and a further 
40.5% had born since independence (ibid).  
Demographics alone meant that, first, for the majority of the Zimbabwean 
population, there was, therefore, an important degree of separation from ZANU-PF's 
historic political achievement and the experiences of the majority of Zimbabweans.  
Second, 70 percent of Zimbabweans came of age or were born under its post-
independence Constitution.  For this author, building on Dowding et al.’s argument, the 
members of the ZANU-PF regime were increasingly dependent on the choices of a 
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population that were likely subjectively attached to Zimbabwe, and perhaps to ZANU-
PF as the party of liberation and of Zimbabwe's early development accomplishments, 
but, that as a population, had a decreasing percentage of Zimbabweans with a personal 
investment in those events and achievements. Given the youthfulness of Zimbabwe's 
population, this would increasingly be the case in each future round of elections, as the 
number of youth eligible to vote increased, and the older Zimbabweans passed away or 
migrated from the country.      
This census data underscores the political challenge facing the members of 
ZANU-PF regime, and suggests some areas for further research.  Dorman (2006: p. 
1095) posits that to avoid facing this demographic 'built-in expiry date', the ZANU-PF 
leadership took strategic initiatives to mobilise youth and to train them in the history of 
the liberation war.  Further research could usefully assess whether, and to what extent, 
there are causal links between the demography, the high levels of youth dissatisfaction 
with the government’s performance, and the development of ZANU-PF’s narrative of 
the Third Chimurenga.  Further age-based research on Zimbabweans' views about 
constitutional democracy, liberation movements and narratives, may usefully contribute 
to the on-going debates about governance and identity.  This research may also have 
larger theoretical relevance to Southern Africa's liberation movements and political 
cultures more broadly.   
Many Zimbabweans were dissatisfied with the performance of the governing 
regime in delivering public goods and material benefits (Tevera 2002: pp. 48-49 Table 
3.7 and 3.8).  Sachikonye (2011a: p. 132) argued that the social contract between 
Zimbabweans and the governing regime was breaking – that the regime was no longer 
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providing the economic growth, jobs and opportunities promised, although it was still 
demanding political loyalty and contributions (e.g. taxes and fund-raising "levies").  As 
the liberalising ESAP and its successor programmes were implemented, the GOZ 
altered its role and reduced its contributions in many policy areas, particularly social 
services delivery and local development (Saunders 2000: pp. 63-72; IMF 1998: p. 103).  
Often it was individual Zimbabweans, NGOs, churches and/or community associations 
who had to replace this investment via greater contributions of time, effort and 
financing.  Dorman (2006) argues that these new roles provided these actors with a new 
legitimacy.    
Public opinion polling, as well as the rise in the number of acts of collective 
dissent, reveal the increasing dissatisfaction with a governing regime seen as 
unresponsive to the needs of Zimbabweans.  Zimbabwe's declining economic 
performance and its demographic shift may both be seen as factors undermining 
Zimbabweans' traditional loyalty to the ZANU-PF regime, and in turn, generating a 
greater collective action challenge for the members of the regime as they sought to hold 
onto power.  Limited job creation, and a shrinking economy, meant that Zimbabwe's 
youth faced dim future economic prospects.  Their reported levels of satisfaction with 
their personal economic circumstances, as well as with their country's economic 
performance were the lowest in the SADC region (IOM 2009: p. 70 Table 22 citing 
Chikanda 2005).  As the political and economic crises unfolded,  Zimbabwean 
graduates reported that they intended to leave the country (voluntary ‘exit’) within five 
years of graduation – again at levels that were higher than those in other SADC 
member-states (IOM 2009: pp. 66-67, Table 19 citing Crush et al. 2005).   
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With little or no lived experience of the liberation war, and therefore a weaker 
degree of loyalty to  ZANU-PF's singular achievement, and facing declining economic 
prospects, some young Zimbabweans chose to express their dissatisfaction (‘voice') 
through their strong support of the MDC (SPT 2008a: p. 44), while others chose, or 
considered, voluntary exit.  Dowding et al.'s argument (2000: p. 477) that the degree of 
loyalty may vary based on the amount invested, and this data suggests reluctance, 
particularly by young Zimbabweans, to invest further.   
A number of public opinion polls and other surveys allowed Zimbabweans to 
express their views on economic performance, and democratic governance.  Both of 
these issues were important sources of the action-choice of ‘voice’ but also raise points 
about the separation that existed between the regime and many Zimbabweans, with 
concomitant implications for their challenge of retaining support and electoral loyalty.  
These polls and surveys are an increasingly important source of data for they represent 
the views ‘at the time’, and therefore may also serve as helpful baselines for future 
research.  The introduction (or re-introduction) of some of this data into the 
Zimbabwean literature adds value for its integration into a discussion that is focused on 
institutions, and the choices and preferences for institutional stability or change during 
this case-study period in Zimbabwe.   
The widespread extent of economic dissatisfaction revealed, confirms the basis 
of the expressed rational preferences, for a different future, including through needed 
economic and political institutional reforms.  This dissatisfaction is important for the 
mobilisation efforts during this period of contestation.  For the MDC, ZCTU and 
others, it provided an interests-based motivation for the expression of ‘voice’, 
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particularly in the face of a repressive response.  Morgan Tsvangirai (cited in Chan 
2005: p. 80) argued, “You cannot continue to appeal for patriotic commitment to 
ZANU-PF while a few elites are benefiting, and the rest of society is poor. You cannot 
do that”.  However, this dissatisfaction also provides an explanatory element for the 
campaign slogans that linked economic recovery with land acquisition -- ‘the land is 
the economy and the economy is the land’ (cite ad from The Herald).    
Survey data from late 1999 found that "[one-h]alf the adult population think 
they are worse (25 percent) or much worse (26 percent) off [economically than during 
the colonial period] in contrast to 28 percent who view the situation positively.  A 
further 13 percent see no change in the standard of living of 
Zimbabweans" (Chikwanha-Dzenga et. al. 2001: p. 13).  Seventy-five percent of 
Zimbabweans' reported themselves as "very dissatisfied" and an additional nineteen 
percent “dissatisfied” with current economic conditions (Chikwanha-Dzenga et al. 
2001:  p. 28 Table 12, emphasis added).  This public opinion survey’s findings 
correspond with those in Tevera's (2002) study on migration and those of cross-
national polling work on democracy in Southern Africa (Johnson 2000: pp. 5-10).   
The high levels of economic dissatisfaction suggest that Zimbabweans' 
investments in an independent Zimbabwe were not perceived as generating adequate 
returns.  By the late 1990s, the failures of and its successor reforms, and the economic 
costs of Zimbabwe's engagement in the Democratic Republic of Congo, contributed to 
the decline in Zimbabwe's economic performance, while social service delivery, a key 
benefit for poorer Zimbabweans, was also significantly cut-back (Mumvuma 2006: pp. 
250-252; IMF 1998: p. 103; Moorcraft 2011: pp. 135-136).  Economic well-being was 
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also part of the normative concept of democracy within Zimbabwe, one that 
encompassed both political and social rights (Chikwanha-Dzenga et al. 2001: p. 10).  
Zimbabweans surveyed in late 1999 indicated that "[t]he provision of basic necessities 
for everyone is also a valued dimension of democracy with 88 percent mentioning it as 
either 'absolutely essential' (67 percent) or 'important' (21 percent)" (Chikwanha-
Dzenga et al. 2001: pp. 10-11).    
Zimbabweans' identification with the members of the governing regime was 
also declining, although their support for democratic governance was strong.  The same 
1999 survey found that over 70 percent of those surveyed preferred democracy as a 
mode of governance and 74 percent rejected a one-party model (Chikwanha-Dzenga et. 
al: pp. 6-7).  And "...nearly seven out of ten Zimbabweans felt that their President does 
not bother about their fate or what they think" and nearly 60 percent felt the same about 
Parliamentarians (ibid: 2001: p. 24).   
This chapter has analysed Hirschman's initial conceptualisation of 'loyalty', and 
the analytical approaches developed to address the perceived weaknesses in 
Hirschman's initial work.  These have been discussed with specific reference to the 
Zimbabwean crisis, and to the larger post-liberation conceptualisation of democracy, 
whereby democratic legitimacy stems from the historic achievement of liberation rather 
than constitutional rules guaranteeing citizens sovereignty.  This dissertation's analysis 
of public opinion polling data revealed a significant difference in the understanding of 
democracy held by Zimbabweans and that held by the senior members of the ZANU-
PF regime.   
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Together, this data has documented the underlying fragility of Zimbabweans' 
assumed loyalty and support to the governing regime.  Demographic changes, 
Zimbabweans' own dissatisfaction in terms of their returns on investment (i.e. as 
measured by improvements in the standard of living), and perceptions of 
unresponsiveness if not uncaring ("...does not bother about their fate...") all contributed 
to a fragile basis of loyalty to the ZANU-PF regime.   
Returning now to the action-choice of ‘loyalty’, i.e. to defer exit despite 
dissatisfaction (Hirschman 1970: p. 104)  it is important to emphasize that the decision 
to remain loyal is one that belongs to individual actors.  As discussed with reference to 
the action-choice of voice, in this way, the action-choice of loyalty differs from the 
conceptualisation of loyalty within ZANU-PF’s patriotic narrative.  The patriotic 
narrative was the articulation, by the ZANU-PF regime of their concept of loyalty, and 
was a top-down communication to Zimbabweans, reflecting their revolutionary history, 
but one that appeared to disregard Zimbabweans' own electoral agency.  Finally, loyalty 
may be the preferred choice, due to the lack of better alternatives, through whom voice 
could be expressed and/or expectations met.  The declining voter turn-out, from the 
1990 elections, and the suppression, by members of the regime, of earlier, nascent 
opposition parties would be relevant in these cases (Sithole 1999: pp. 206-211).   
 Within political parties, changes in loyalty have implications for free-riding and 
mobilisation.  When returns from loyalty are declining, organisational effectiveness 
(e.g. of a political party to mobilise its supporters) will also decline due to increasing 
"passivity" and a reluctance to contribute (Pfaff 2006: p. 60).  In other words, the 
effectiveness of political parties will be negatively affected by greater free-riding.  
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Declining loyalty would have therefore posed a major risk to the members of the 
ZANU-PF regime, given that electoral success is a situation of interdependence.  It is 
not surprising therefore that new measures were introduced to address the free-riding 
problem, as discussed further below.  
This chapter now discusses the actions undertaken by the governing regime to 
retain and/or defer the 'exit' of their political support, as well as measures to strengthen 
the contributions of Zimbabweans.  Informal rules to offer the incentive of impunity 
were strategically developed or reinforced.  These altered, if not de facto replaced, the 
formal rules that governed the actions of the members of Zimbabwe's security sectors, 
as well as their relationship with members of the regime.  Similar informal rules to 
govern the distribution of material benefits to Zimbabwe's citizens were also 
developed. To defer exit, incentives, rewards, threats and penalties would be deployed 
as inducements to alter the choices of Zimbabweans.   
Three key inducements deployed by members of the regime to encourage 
loyalty, and thus to defer partisan exit will be discussed.  These three are: the reward of 
protection from political violence, for both specific victims and for the perpetrators; the 
use of political violence as punishment for disloyalty, and as a disincentive for future 
disloyalty; and, the strategic offer of material benefits, i.e. selective incentives, in 
particular the availability of needed food aid.  This chapter also discusses the demands 
made, by members of the regime, for specific demonstrations of loyalty (i.e. 
contributions to reduce free-riding).  Strategies to increase the visibility of 
contributions allow monitoring, and therefore both encourage compliance and reduce 
defections (i.e. exit) (Lichbach 1995: pp. 211-214).  
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The selective targeting of political violence  
Political violence was used to alter the electoral choices of rational 
Zimbabweans. As presented in chart three, an analysis of the political violence events, 
demonstrates the strategic timing of this violence, with its clear pattern of scaling-up 
either prior to, or following electoral periods during the period under study.  
Sachikonye discusses political violence as a strategy of political control (2011b), and 
argues that it was an "...indirect admission that a ruling party [had] lost popular support, 
hence the resort to terror and violence to compel voters to vote for it" (Sachikonye 
2011b: p. 17).  Kriger’s (2005) analysis of the regime’s strategic use of political 
violence across multiple elections demonstrates the continuity in ZANU-PF’s use of 
political violence as a tactic of both deterrence and punishment throughout the 
country's post-independence history.  Targeted political violence may also be seen as a 
strategy to reduce free riding, when analysed from the perspective of the collective 
action challenge faced by the members of the ZANU-PF regime.  
This author concurs with both Sachikonye and Kriger in the strategic 
intentionality of the political violence, and in this regard, their perspectives align with 
the broad argument of this dissertation.  However, this section of this chapter focuses 
on the development of informal rules, in the security sector, that enabled members of 
the regime to offer the selective incentive or reward of protection from political 
violence – either as victims or as perpetrators – to those who loyally supported ZANU-
PF.   
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Selective incentives are a device that helps to motivate collective action by 
"...inducing individuals to join in group cooperation..." (Hardin 1982: pp. 17, 15).  
Lichbach defines selective incentives as: "...private goods or side payments that are 
offered to [those] who participate in collective dissent" (1995: p. 216).  However, this 
definition also applies to those participating in collective action more broadly, 
including on behalf of the members of a regime in power.  Lichbach acknowledges the 
state's privileged position that results from its ability to "...draw upon selective 
incentives and disincentives to mobilise its supporters" (Lichbach 1995: p. 258). 
Zimbabwean analysts have articulated multiple definitions of political violence. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, political violence is defined as “…any form of 
violence that seeks to achieve certain desired political objectives by either enhancing 
the political fortunes of the perpetrator or negating those of the opponent” (CCJPZ 
2001: p. 15).  This definition encompasses the contestation between political actors, the 
intentionality and strategic deployment of the violence, and thus aligns with the core 
argument of this dissertation, i.e. strategic decision-making linked to achieving or 
sustaining distributional advantage.  The Government of Zimbabwe itself defined 
political violence (in order to give clemency to perpetrators of this violence) as:  “…
any offence motivated by the objective of supporting or opposing any political 
purpose…[including] conspiracy, incitement or attempt to commit such an 
offence” (CCJPZ 2001: p. 15 citing GOZ Clemency Order #1 of 2000, emphasis 
added).  This definition, is vast and permissive in its scope, but also captures the 
intentionality of the violence.   
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Sachikonye defines political violence as:  "...a strategy with a specific aim...to 
obtain power or leverage, to intimidate or force concessions, or a means of defending 
certain positions.... [it is] a tactic to cause conditions of disorder or panic..." (2011b: p. 
27).  This author concurs with Sachikonye's view of the intentionality and strategic 
nature of the political violence.  However, this dissertation, also argues that, during this 
period, the political violence eased the collective action challenge faced by members of 
the regime, as they sought to resolve the ‘State’s Dilemma’ and therefore did not simply 
cause “…conditions of disorder or panic”.  The political violence undertaken by 
members of the ZANU-PF regime and its agents and allies was intentional and did 
generate important spill-over effects into a larger group of indirect victims (e.g. family, 
community members, and/or other opposition supporters).  Spill-over effects magnify 
the impact of intentional action and therefore may affect the choices of other actors 
through their communication of costs (consequences) and benefits. 
Although Sachikonye (2011b) declared "...the state turn[ed] on its citizens", it is 
clear, from both qualitative and quantitative reports of the violence, that the members 
of the Zimbabwean regime and their agents did not turn on all of its citizens equally, for 
specific targeting of actual or perceived opposition supporters occurred (Alao 2012: p. 
104; Anatomy of Terror 2011; Reeler 2009; HR NGO Forum: Political Violence 
reports).  As one member of the ‘Green Bombers’, ZANU-PF’s youth militia stated:   
“…We were trained to be vigilant, always looking for opposition 
supporters, and were told that if we saw anyone with a MDC T-shirt 
we must assault them with whips, catapults, steel bars.  The idea was 
to instill fear in people so they would be frightened to vote and to 
take revenge against those who had…” (Worby 2003: p. 78 note 45 
citing Sunday Telegraph (UK) 25 August 2002).   
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This statement is an example of the targeting that occurred and its link to the 
freedom of expression and the action-choice of voice (i.e. wearing of a MDC T-shirt). It 
is also an example of the deterrent and punitive natures of the violence itself, as well as 
the intentionality of its spill-over effects.    
This targeting of victims was permitted by the development of informal rules 
that enabled partisan policing that served the interests of the ZANU-PF party rather 
than upheld the rights and freedoms within the Zimbabwean Constitution.  The key 
reward offered by the regime to individual party members and loyalists, was the 
protection from the regime-sponsored campaigns of organised violence and terror that 
generated losses (direct and indirect) for those targeted.  In the context of this 
dissertation, physical safety and security is defined to not only include protection from 
physical violence and torture, but also to include the safety of one's home or business. 
Those individuals who were members of the security services and party militias 
perpetuating this violence were rewarded with strategically granted impunity for their 
acts – that is, protection from the consequences of the violence and terror they inflicted.    
An analysis of the SPT and Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum reports, 
cited in this dissertation identifies multiple statements by individuals on the impunity 
they enjoyed as ZANU-PF agents or allies perpetrating political violence.  One 
example is this statement by a member of the ZANU-PF youth militia:  
"We got a lot of power. Our source of power was this encouragement 
we were getting, particularly from the police and others…. it was 
instilled in us that whenever we go out, we are free to do whatever we 
want and nobody was going to question that” (SPT 2003: p. 4 based 
on interviews, August 2003, emphasis added). 
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Increasing costs, threats and punishment reduced the prospects of successful 
mobilisation and, thus, also the prospects of MDC's electoral challenge succeeding, i.e. 
they reinforced the 'Rebel's Dilemma'.  To increase the costs of political dissent, 
targeted threats and punishment were intentionally applied against current or potential 
opponents, i.e. those who were not, or may not continue to be, electorally loyal to the 
ZANU-PF regime.  The violence and terror was very clearly targeted against known or 
suspected MDC supporters, or as members of groups (e.g. teachers, civil society 
leaders) that were perceived to support the political opposition (Alao 2012: p. 104; 
Anatomy of Terror 2011; Reeler 2009; HR NGO Forum: Political Violence reports).  
The Zimbabwean Human Rights NGO Forum (HR NGO Forum) has provided 
an important temporal record against which patterns, scale and scope can be evaluated.  
Their monthly reports have documented the political violence  throughout the period of 7
the Zimbabwean crisis discussed in this dissertation.  However, it is the 2011 report, the 
Anatomy of Terror  that provides the most detailed record of the formal organisation of 8
the violence by members and allies of the regime in 15 different electoral 
constituencies during the decade 2000 to 2010.  This report also documents specific 
examples of the reward of impunity enjoyed by individual members of ZANU-PF and 
its allied organisations and actors.  Details (dates, locations, perpetrators and violence 
committed, impunity enjoyed) have been recorded, particularly during the 2008 
elections.   
 These reports are available at: http://www.hrforumzim.org/category/publications/monthly-political-7
violence-reports/?theme&source.  
 The Anatomy of Terror was published in 2011, and the body of the report is complemented by detailed 8
reports from 15 different constituencies.  Each constituency report is simply identified by its name.  No 
page numbers are provided, and therefore pagination is based on the PDF version downloaded.
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The Anatomy of Terror also provides a detailed record of the cooperation and 
coordination amongst members of the ZANU-PF regime, its affiliated organisations 
(e.g. security sector agencies) and actors (e.g. traditional chiefs, war veterans).   
Coordination and cooperation are needed to resolve a time-bound collective action 
challenge such as the State’s Dilemma.  The data within this report confirms the 
intentionality of the political violence, detailing the establishment of 'operating bases' 
from which the political violence was directed and/or carried out, including during 
specific electoral campaigns.   
Losses and impoverishment also have implications for collective action.  The 
greater an individual's (or group's) resources (e.g. skills, financial, material), the greater 
the potential for that individual (or group) to participate in collective dissent.  A loss of 
resources constrains mobilisation and participation, including through the diversion of 
time and effort to the production of private rather than public goods (Lichbach 1995: 
pp. 48-50).  Economic pressures on Zimbabweans were increasing throughout this 
crisis period, exacerbating the impact of any losses.  
The burning and/or looting of homes, farms or other businesses was a common 
form of political violence (Anatomy of Terror 2011; HR NGO Forum 2001: Section E).  
This often led to displacement (i.e. the temporary or permanent 'exit' from the local 
area, community or economic activities).  It certainly led to greater poverty, as these 
critical assets were lost, in whole or in part.  The Anatomy of Terror report notes 
"...ZANU-PF extends its control by raiding the meagre food, stocks, livestock, and 
other property of MDC sympathizers.  In addition, ZANU-PF torches the homes of 
MDC activists and sympathizers.  To avoid this, locals are forced to join ZANU-
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PF..." (Anatomy of Terror 2011: Mudzi North p. 24, emphasis added), with similar 
examples provided in several other constituency reports (e.g. Hwedza South, Buhera 
South).  The theft of household grain reserves would increase the family's dependency 
on food aid distribution, for potentially up to one year (i.e. until the next harvest 
season), and the issue of partisan food aid distribution is discussed further below.   
In particular, the prospects for group success will be adversely affected by the 
loss of assets (or inputs) that directly support the contributions of individual actors (or 
groups of actors) to collective action (Lichbach 1995: p. 49 citing Leites and Wolf 
1970: pp. 76-68).  Advancing Lichbach's finding, this author asserts that the impact of 
losses on group success will be particularly material both in situations of a time-bound 
collective action challenge such as electoral victory, and/or in resource-poor settings 
such as rural villages in a developing country like Zimbabwe.   
The time-constraints, the size of an actor's remaining asset base, and the 
additional or alternative assets available to them in their immediate vicinity (e.g. the 
availability of alternative employment, access to financial services) will limit the 
capacity of actors to replace their losses, including the needed inputs to achieve their 
collective action goals.  The loss of some resources may go therefore beyond a 
diversion of efforts from the production of public to private goods.  Relevant examples 
from the Zimbabwean crisis include the looting of a freelance journalist's cell phone or 
laptop (CPJ 2009), the theft of a MDC activist’s car (SPT 2003: p. 34) or the seizure of 
an individual’s national identification card (SPT 2003: p. 33) which is needed to vote or 
to obtain formal employment.   
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Many attacks occurred in homes or businesses, and the homes of MDC 
supporters or activists were often also the target.  Direct attacks in the home increased 
the cost of supporting the MDC, by not only damaging or destroying what is often the 
most significant private asset of individuals, but also by extending the political violence 
to family members. Private homes were the “most common site” of attacks against the 
MDC leadership during the period of March to May 2007 (SPT 2007: pp. 21-22).  The 
Solidarity Peace Trust states that they are"... a very deliberate act, requiring prior 
intelligence and intentionality..." (SPT 2007: p. 23).  Family members, including 
children not yet of voting age, also suffered from the trauma of the attacks, as well as 
their impoverishment and/or displacement (HRW 2008: p. 14; SPT 2007: p. 25; SPT 
2008b: pp. 29-31).  The attacks would also underscore to ZANU-PF supporters and 
members the value of staying loyal.   
These targeted attacks and displacements also disrupted collective action 
through its disruption of the local networks of political support.  Networks facilitate 
collective action through their roles in coordination, mobilisation and information-
sharing.  Both the disruption of local networks and targeted displacement create new 
uncertainties for rational actors, for example, as they adjust to new locations and assess 
whether and/or how to rebuild their networks of support.  The costs of continuing to 
choose the MDC over the ruling ZANU-PF regime have been increased.  The 
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum Political Violence Report (2000/2001: section 
E) documents multiple examples of disruptions to the MDC's local constituency 
networks.  These examples include violence and temporary displacement against their 
members involved in court challenges of specific election results.  Not only do these 
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disruptions affect the local level, but in those cases, where the MDC member failed to 
appear in court, or pulled away from other active engagement and effort on behalf of 
the MDC, the disruptions affect the national prospects of success as well.  The 
Solidarity Peace Trust documented the targeting of MDC's structures in the 2008 
violence which occurred between the two rounds of elections (SPT 2008b: p. 29).  
The strategic deployment of political violence and/or torture , may have been 9
experienced by individuals in isolated, targeted instances (e.g. a local attack), in small 
groups as individuals participating in activities of collective dissent (e.g. women 
protesting at the rising cost of living), or, through planned and coordinated attacks 
across a number of different sites by groups of affiliated actors.  The frequency, scale 
and the targeting of both the political violence and the political impunity to enforce 
loyalty to ZANU-PF are well documented in published reports and research (e.g. HRW: 
2007, 2008a and 2008b; Reeler 2009; Anatomy of Terror 2011; Sachikonye 2011b).  
Those Zimbabweans who remained loyal to ZANU-PF benefited from the 
selective incentive of physical protection from violence to an overwhelmingly greater 
extent than those who opposed to the regime.  The Governor of Masvingo was clear:  
"If you want peace you should support me and the ruling party... If you want trouble 
vote for another party” (HR NGO Forum 2001: p. 44 citing Daily News 12 May 2000).  
Available data confirms that the political violence was targeted to the regime's 
opponents.  The Solidarity Peace Trust found in their 2008 report that "...ZANU-PF 
supporters were only 1 percent of the total..." number of documented victims of the 
 Reeler draws upon the UN Convention against Torture to describe torture's four defining characteristics: 9
"...involves the infliction of severe pain and suffering, whether physical or mental; [is] done intentionally; 
[is] done with a purpose in mind – to intimidate, to force a confession, etc; [and, is] done with the consent 
or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity" (2009:  p. 1).  
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political violence (SPT 2008b: p. 5), although other reports provide somewhat higher 
estimates (e.g. SPT 2008a).  Intra-party violence also occurred within both the ZANU-
PF and MDC parties (Sachikonye 2011a: pp. 60-61; SPT 2008a).   
Faced with the scale of political violence against their supporters, the MDC 
itself began to engage in political violence, despite their normative and public 
commitments to human rights.  This resort to violence was multi-causal, in part 
resulting from the closing of political space, leading to more radical responses from the 
MDC’s supporters (Alexander and McGregor 2013: p. 755 citing LeBas 2013), while 
Raftopoulos (2007: pp. 131-133) discusses the relevant dynamics within the MDC 
itself.  Several reports confirm that during the period of 2000 to 2008, the political 
violence inflicted by MDC supporters on ZANU-PF supporters, was "…basically 
retaliatory... relatively small and unsystematic in scale..." (Sachikoyne 2011a: p. 59 
citing HR NGO Forum reports; HRW 2008a: p. 52; SPT 2007: pp. 35-36; Anatomy of 
Terror 2011).  This scale and organization of this political violence, while outside of the 
foundational principles of the MDC, contrasts sharply with the broad and systematic 
political violence perpetrated by the leadership of the ZANU-PF regime and their 
supporters against its political opponents (Anatomy of Terror 2011; monthly reports by 
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum; Reeler 2003 and 2009).   
Political violence against the governing regime's own supporters should be seen 
as a punishment or penalty (sanction) for disloyalty.  Political violence as a penalty for 
disloyalty is designed to alter the future electoral choices of Zimbabweans, so that once 
again their choices aligned in support of the ZANU-PF leadership.  Inducements are 
often used in combination: "...rewards as long as you cooperate and penalties as soon as 
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you don’t" (Stone 2002: p. 265).  This violence was "...both retributive – no betrayal is 
greater than the betrayal of your own previously most loyal constituency - and as an 
attempt to reverse the flow – to cut out the cancer before it spreads" (SPT 2008a: p. 
36).  By dramatically demonstrating the future cost of future disloyalty, the threat to 
Zimbabweans was clear. 
During the period of this dissertation, it was the violence in the three months 
prior to the second round run-off of the 2008 presidential elections that provides the 
clearest example of penalizing the regime's own supporters for disloyalty in the first 
round of voting.  These elections were the most significant electoral challenge to the 
members of the ZANU-PF regime and their continuing hold on political power.  The 
MDC had achieved significant electoral success (discussed in the synthesis section 
below).  It was announced, by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), after weeks 
of delay (and vote rigging Chan 2011: p 140-146) that President Mugabe lost the first 
round of the presidential elections, although Morgan Tsvangirai, the Movement for 
Democratic Change - Tsvangirai faction (MDC-T) challenger, while obtaining the 
greatest number of votes, had not, officially, passed  the crucial 'fifty percent plus one' 
votes required to be elected President ("the step") (Table 1; Moorcraft 2011: p. 151; 
Reeler 2009: p. 8; SPT 2008a:  pp. 6, 11-14).  A second ‘run-off’ presidential election 
was scheduled, and then delayed, until June 2008.  
To resolve the 'State's Dilemma', members of ZANU-PF had to, without fail, 
deliver the required contribution, that is, a majority of the ballots cast, during the 
second-round 'run-off' in the Presidential elections.  Free-riding by individual ZANU-
PF members needed to end, given the significant risks it posed to the prospects for 
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group success (Hardin 1982: p. 98).  The loss of rural seats in their traditional 
powerbase, created "political insecurity" amongst the members of the governing regime 
and "...hence the acts of retribution" that occurred in the rural areas (ZPP 2008a: p. 15 
emphasis in the original).  From April to June 2008, ZANU-PF's traditional 
Mashonaland strongholds were punished for their voting shift towards the MDC, which 
won 12 of the 60 parliamentary seats available (Raftopoulos and Eppel 2008: p. 371; 
SPT 2008a: p. 7; Ranger LSB letter).   
The March 2008 elections were the first to require individual polling stations to 
publicly post their voting returns, increasing the information available to voters, 
observers, the members of the MDC, but also, to members and agents of the governing 
regime (SPT 2008a: pp. 10-11 citing Feltoe 2008). These reforms communicated 
information that allowed the clear identification of the specific polling areas that had 
demonstrated 'disloyalty' by voting against ZANU-PF, thus allowing for the 'easy' 
targeting of the violence as a collective punishment or penalty (SPT 2008a: p. 36; 
Lichbach 1995: p. 215).  Increased violence against (former) ZANU-PF members and 
supporters was deployed as a penalty ('stick') to help reinforce loyalty and to reduce 
free-riding during the several weeks that the ‘run-off’ was delayed. The first-round 
election results revealed that the selective incentives ('carrots'), of, for example, 
protection from the violence were no longer sufficient (Bemelmans-Videc, Rist, and 
Vedung 1998) to defer the exit of supporters.   
The political violence of April 2008 to June 2008 (i.e. the presidential run-off 
period) differed in its geographic distribution, given that "...during previous pre-
election periods, most violence [against MDC and its allies] has taken place in the rural 
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context, in order to protect [for ZANU-PF their] strongholds in rural 
Mashonaland..." (SPT 2007: p. 33 emphasis added).  Forty-six percent of the political 
violence recorded by the Solidarity Peace Trust during this period occurred in the three 
Mashonaland provinces, a markedly different geographical distribution of political 
violence than that observed in earlier elections (SPT 2008a: p. 35). The Anatomy of 
Terror (2011: pp. 21-22) also documents the important rise in the number of bases in 
the Mashonaland provinces in 2008 from which many of the acts of political violence 
were coordinated and/or conducted.   
Once again, the rural areas of the Mashonaland provinces became ‘no-go’ zones 
for members of the MDC and its supporters, suppressing mobilisation and extending 
political control (Sachikonye 2011a: p. 35).  These 'no-go' zones were intentionally 
distributed across those specific rural areas that were the most politically vital for the 
collective retention of power by the members of the regime.  As discussed further 
below in this chapter's section on impunity, informal rules differ in three important 
ways from the simple, non-enforcement of formal rules: they communicate new rules, 
they provide new permissions or impose new prohibitions, and the decision-making 
forum is different than that where formal rules, and their enforcement, are decided.   
Many actual or perceived MDC supporters were violently displaced from their 
home communities (Tsvangarai 2008; SPT2008b).  This displacement effectively 
disenfranchised those MDC supporters from the upcoming round of the elections, i.e. 
the next 'step' faced by members of the regime.  Zimbabwe's electoral rules required 
that voters must return to their home constituency to vote where they are registered 
(HRW 2008a: p. 15; SPT 2008a: p. 22).  For example, in the Mount Darwin South 
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constituency "...[a]rson is widespread during elections.  This is done to displace people 
who are perceived to be MDC votes" (Anatomy of Terror 2011:  Mount Darwin South 
report: p. 18).   
During the elections studied for this dissertation, the political violence inflicted 
on members of the opposition and their supporters was often incited by the leaders of 
the regime and linked to the electoral performance by ZANU-PF (Sachikonye 2011b: p 
18; Kriger 2005).  For Zimbabweans, their prior knowledge of ZANU-PF’s use of 
political violence would help to confirm the reliability of these statements, and made 
the threats within these statements more credible.   The political violence that marked 
earlier elections, as well as the Gukurahundi killings of the 1980s, provided both 
ZANU-PF members, and Zimbabweans more generally, with knowledge of the 
strategic use of political violence by members of the regime.  The deployment of 
violence as a strategy for ZANU-PF to retain and/or consolidate its political support is 
a strategy that pre-dates this political crisis (Dorman 2005; Sachikonye 2011a and 
2011b; Moorcraft 2011; Alao 2012).   
President Mugabe himself, as well as other members of the governing regime, 
spoke, on many occasions, of the violence that would be unleashed against the 
opposition (HR NGO Forum 2007; MMPZ 2009a;  Anatomy of Terror 2011: 
constituency reports).  For example:  
"Elliot Manyika, the Political Commissar of ZANU-PF, 
reportedly ...told party members at gatherings in the... towns of 
Zvimba and Karoi that they should not tolerate opposition parties in 
their areas and they should beat up opposition members and silence 
them in the approach to the presidential, parliamentary and rural 
council elections slated for March 2008.  He exhorted them to ensure 
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that ZANU-PF won these elections" (HR NGO Forum 2007: pp. 
15-16 citing Voice of America, 24 April 2007, emphasis added).  
For individual ZANU-PF members, these public statements by the 
leaders of ZANU-PF signaled the leadership's encouragement of the violence 
to be unleashed against the opposition. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, statements by ZANU-PF leaders 
(principals) set out expectations for agents, advancing coordination, amplifying the 
impact of these words – and multiplying the levels of violence.  The quote above “…
and they should beat up opposition members and silence them”… (ibid) demonstrates 
this, as well as the intentional suppression of the action-choice of voice.  Public 
statements communicate information about future intent.  Public statements that 
encouraged attacks on members of the political opposition, or their supporters, also 
reinforce the tangible benefits of remaining loyal to ZANU-PF (i.e. physical safety and 
protection from violence).  Many of these statements also made a direct call for 
increased contributions and for demonstrations of loyalty (i.e. violence).    
For rational Zimbabwean actors, to be protected from political violence, 
remaining loyal to the governing ZANU-PF regime was the beneficial strategy.  These 
public statements also communicated the private costs of voluntary exit from the party, 
via the future loss of this physical.  Through the demonstration of benefits, and the 
costs of exit, this selective incentive may therefore help to affirm the action-choice to 
be loyal, whether from individual ZANU-PF party members or other Zimbabweans.  
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Voluntary exit from the party may thus be deferred (Hirschman 1970: p. 104), easing 
the State’s Dilemma' as political support is retained (Lichbach 1995: p. 257).     
Many reports document the scale and scope of the strategic political violence 
unleashed in Zimbabwe.  Reeler's 2009 study assessed the reliability of reports from 
three key sources – the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, the Solidarity Peace 
Trust (SPT), and the Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) – each of which were 
documenting and/or surveying Zimbabweans' experiences of political violence, 
including torture.  Reeler found "...[f]rom all reports it is evident that members of the 
MDC, people suspected of being affiliated to the MDC, election observers, and 
members of other civic groups constituted the overwhelming majority of the 
victims" (Reeler 2009: p. 30, emphasis added).  Reeler aggregates the HR NGO 
Forum's detailed monthly reports on political violence prepared during the period 
2001-2008, which identified a total of 40,559 documented cases of gross human rights 
violations (2009: p. 12 Table 2) .   10
The arguments in this dissertation support Reeler's assertion that there was 
intentional and coordinated action by members of the regime (and its allies) to unleash 
significant political violence and to violate the rights of individual Zimbabweans (e.g. 
freedoms of expression and assembly).  The politically motivated arrests under the 
Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information and Privacy Act 
(AIPPA), discussed in the previous chapter, were often accompanied by violence (SPT 
2006: pp. 25-26).   
 Reeler uses the term 'gross human rights violations' rather than simply 'political violence' to emphasize 10
both the Government of Zimbabwe's role in the violence and its systematic and/or widespread nature and 
the legal nature of his argument (2009: p. 30).  The more general term of 'political violence' will be 
retained unless the term  gross human rights violations is specifically used in the works cited.  
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The MDC’s leadership was a particular target, given their role in mobilizing the 
action-choice of voice, actions that threatened ZANU-PF's distributional advantage and 
ran counter to their own views of their democratic legitimacy.  Reeler (2009) found that 
the rates of reported torture seemed to “…increase markedly in frequency when the 
population can be described as activist”, i.e. “…supporters of the MDC, [Women of 
Zimbabwe Arise], or farm workers employed by commercial farmers who were MDC 
supporters" (Reeler 2009: p. 23, emphasis added).  A 2004 report found over 90 percent 
of the MDC's MPs, and over 50 percent of their candidates, had directly experienced 
political violence, while over 60 percent of the MPs, and "nearly 80 percent" of the 
candidates reported that their families were affected by the actual or threatened political 
violence (Zimbabwe Institute 2004: pp. 15-16).  This data reinforces Reeler's assertions 
regarding the targeting of activist populations, in this case, individuals running for 
political office on behalf of the MDC.  The Anatomy of Terror (2011), Human Rights 
Watch (particularly 2007, 2008a, 2008b and 2011) as well as the SPT reports cited in 
this dissertation provide details of the suffering from violence and torture, based on the 
strategic and intentional actions of individual members of the regime and their allies.  
The close timing of political violence with the elections (the electoral 'step') is 
strategic behaviour, in that it strengthens the "correspondence" between the 
"inducement itself" and the future actions (i.e. voting) of the receiver of the inducement 
(Stone 2002: p. 268).  To assess whether this correspondence held in the case of 
Zimbabwe during this period, this author identified the selected types of political 
violence most closely linked to 'voice' and 'exit' (chart two), and analysed the reported 
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incidents of this violence against the timing of the 2002, 2005 and 2008 national 
elections.  The results are presented in chart three of this dissertation.   
Reeler also analyses the data from the monthly human rights reports temporally, 
finding that during the 2001-2008 period, recorded human rights violations (a broader 
category than those used in the analysis above) were over 50 percent higher in those 
months in which elections were held (Reeler 2009: p. 13 Table 3).  Both analyses 
confirm the strategic timing of the violence and underscore the political motivation 
behind the targeting of the violence, and thus the strategic and intentional behavior by 
the members of the ZANU-PF regime.  The strategic timing of this violence would 
enhance the political fortunes of the members of the ZANU-PF regime and negate 
those of their political opponents (CCJPZ 2001: p. 15). 
Addressing the coordination challenges of scale and time   
The collective action challenges faced by members of the regime (the 'State's 
Dilemma') was one that was time-bound – for elections occur at set dates and therefore 
the challenge must be resolved successfully on that date if electoral victory was to be 
achieved.  The 'State's Dilemma' is one of inter-dependencies between the choices of 
Zimbabweans and the rewards reaped by the members of the regime.  Coordination was 
needed in order to address the scale of their challenge:  time-bound and dependent on 
success across multiple constituencies in several geographic regions.  
The strategic timing of political violence to coincide with the electoral periods, 
the targeted geographic distribution of the violence, including the use and 
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establishment of both operational bases and 'no-go' zones, all reveal a high degree of 
intentionality, of coordination and contributions, amongst members of the regime and 
their supporters.  In 2008, the multi-week delay in announcing the first-round electoral 
results, and further delays in holding the second round of the presidential election, 
despite formal, electoral rules that stated otherwise, furnished ZANU-PF with 
additional time to carry out the targeted political violence (SPT 2008a: p.15;Tarisayi 
2009: p. 21) needed to suppress voice, encourage loyalty and/or force exit.    
Coordination mechanisms were needed to resolve the ‘State’s Dilemma’, and         
Lichbach discusses 'decentralisation' as a specific solution to collective action 
challenges (Lichbach 1995: p. 201).  However, Lichbach does not discuss the top-down 
approach of sub-dividing a national collective action challenge into smaller, local ones 
as was done by ZANU-PF.  Segmenting a collective action challenge into discrete 
geographic (or other) units is an effective coordination strategy, especially when the 
problem is time-bound.  It allows for the deployment of additional resources to the 
problem, facilitates the local mobilisation of resources and the monitoring of progress.  
It is both a strategic and an intentional response to a collective action challenge that 
contains an inter-dependency of the type "the rewards of each depend on the choice of 
all" (Knight 1992: p. 48 citing Elster 1986: p. 7).    
Above and beyond the regular political party structures, which allow a political 
party to coordinate and communicate across constituencies, Zimbabwean evidence of 
this segmented coordination is found in the establishment of 'operations' bases.  These 
were used to coordinate the political violence (Anatomy of Terror 2011) which occurred 
throughout this political crisis.  More than 100 'operations' bases were documented and 
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each were led, managed and resourced in "rough uniformity" across the different sites 
(Anatomy of Terror 2011: pp. 6-7 and individual constituency reports).  In 2005 the 
NCA observed (2005: p. 3) the spread of these bases to urban areas.  There was a clear 
correlation between the presence of these operational bases and higher levels of 
political violence, as well as violations of the freedoms of assembly, association and 
movement (NCA 2005: pp. 11-13) that are associated with the action-choice of voice 
and exit.   
The 2008 leadership of these bases was described as follows.  In a meeting on 
14 April 2008, in the Nkayi Business Centre, it was agreed that "...'ward command 
centres' [would be established] composed of three police officers, one war vet and a 
chief’s messenger, thus combining official, paramilitary and traditional 
structures" (SPT 2008a: p. 15 citing Sunday Independent 20 April 2008 and Annex 3).  
"[T]he chief warden will be given a police uniform and a temporary force number.  The 
role of the chief wardens – the war vets in uniform – is to monitor the police officers at 
ward level.  If the vote is lost, it will be the police that have sold out.  The exercise is a 
fast track one to achieve desired goals" (SPT 2008a: pp. 57-58 citing Senior Police 
Commissioner P, emphasis added).  Participant statements from that same meeting 
confirmed "[t]here is a need to build TEAMWORK [sic]: There should be total 
cooperation between ZRP [police], ZNA [army], war vets and the ZANU-PF party 
members at the ward level to achieve the desired goal in a rerun" (SPT 2008a:  Annex 3 
emphasis added).  
The Anatomy of Terror's constituency reports also identified the leadership roles 
of local ZANU-PF MPs (or former MPs) in commanding (e.g. in Epworth, Hurungwe 
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North) and/or directing (e.g. in Maramba Phungwe, Uzumba South) and/or supporting 
(e.g.in Hwedza South) the bases from which the 2008 political violence, terror and 
intimidation was occurring.  The report also names specific, senior members of the 
regime (e.g. Vice-President Mujuru, Chairman Gono of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
and Police Commissioner Chihuri (Anatomy of Terror 2011:  Mt. Darwin South, 
Nyanga North and Shamva South annexes) based on eye-witness accounts and/or local 
knowledge.  
These statements are examples of the coordinated, segmented mobilisation of 
additional resources in order to achieve the 'step-good' of electoral victory in the 
presidential vote run-off of June 2008.  From the perspective of resolving the 'State's 
Dilemma', the command structures, with their standardised participants and defined 
roles in the targeting and conduct of the political violence, helped the members of the 
regime to improve the efficiency of their tactics (Lichbach 1995: pp 50-52).  Efficient 
and effective coordination across constituencies was needed if their national goal of 
retaining political power was to be achieved, as the quote above acknowledges.   The 
breadth and extent of the cooperation and coordination – across sites as well as between 
actors and entities – allowed for the needed strategic distribution and deployment of the 
resources that mobilised and/or undertook the political violence against actual or 
perceived opponents of the regime.  The cooperation and coordination, from the central 
to local levels, and across local units, were the result of the intentional actions by senior 
parliamentary officials, security sector agents and partisan actors and groups.   
This section has discussed three dimensions of the collective action problem 
faced by members of the regime – their situation of inter-dependency, the time-bound 
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nature and the vast geographic scale that is needed for electoral victory in a national 
poll.  Coordination mechanisms were introduced, additional resources were mobilised, 
and free-riding was reduced.  This coordination and cooperation was a rational 
response to the high degree of uncertainty that existed following the results of the first-
round of the 2008 presidential vote, and it reflected the strategic dependency of 
members of the regime on each other, their agents, and on the choices of Zimbabweans.  
These intentional actions and strategic responses reduced the uncertainty faced by the 
members of the regime.   
An analysis of the individual findings of the fifteen constituency reports of the 
Anatomy of Terror reveals two additional patterns that support this argument.  First, is 
the extent to which these bases lie dormant between electoral periods.  The Anatomy of 
Terror (2011) documented, by constituency, the number of bases which remained active 
or were dormant between elections.  This pattern further confirms the strategic and 
coordinated nature of the timing of the response and its political violence.  Second, 
there is a notable scale-up in the number of bases established and used for the 2008 
elections, when the number of bases grew from the previous high of 82 (in 2005) to a 
2008 peak of 130 active bases (Anatomy of Terror 2011: p. 7 Table 2).  This significant 
increase confirms the extent of the strategic and coordinated approach deployed by 
members of the regime and its allies at this critical time of pre-electoral decision – and 
when ZANU-PF was facing its most significant challenge from the MDC.   
Operation Makavhoterapapi ('Operation Where Did You Put Your Vote?') is an 
example of "improving the productivity of tactics" as a solution to collective action 
challenges (Lichbach 1995: pp. 50-52).  The Operation was coordinated and put in 
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place in 2008 to collectively punish the former ZANU-PF areas that had shifted their 
votes to the MDC in the first round (ZPP 2008b: p. 5):    
"ZANU-PF supporters and their allies have not found it necessary to 
prove that a person voted for the MDC before meting out punishment.  
Instead they have examined results posted outside polling stations to 
identify areas where people voted for MDC in large numbers, even if 
the MDC lost to ZANU-PF in those areas" (HRW 2008b p. 16 
emphasis added). 
SPT concludes, based on their research, that the Joint Operations 
Command was "...implicated in 56 percent of post-election [human rights] 
violations" (SPT 2008a: pp. 28-29). 
Collective punishment can be an effective monitoring and enforcement strategy.  
By targeting the group as a whole, rather than specific individuals, members of the 
regime found an efficient strategy for imposing penalties on Zimbabweans. A collective 
strategy also facilitates the monitoring of future defections by engaging peers in 
encouraging, and monitoring, of compliance (Lichbach 1985: p. 215 citing Hechter 
1988: p. 153), thus reducing transaction costs.  Penalties help to defer exit (reinforce 
loyalty) by altering the costs of exit.  They therefore also alter the choices, of rational 
Zimbabweans.  
Operation Makavhoterapapi, imposed penalties in order to align Zimbabweans' 
choices towards supporting the ZANU-PF leader in the run-off round of the 
Presidential elections.  The Operation was organised by the Joint Operations Command 
(HRW 2008a: pp. 1-2), covered a number of provinces and localities (HRW 2008a: pp. 
14-15) and involved senior officials:    
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"...our [interviewees]... named at least 10 senior ranking police, 
prison and army officers who report to the heads of the [Joint 
Operations Command] as inciting or participating in abuses. Their 
participation could not have occurred without the knowledge and 
acquiescence, if not direct participation, of the JOC (HRW 2008a: p. 
18 emphasis added).The Operation appears to have scaled-up the 're-
education' sessions (pungwes) that were occurring across Zimbabwe 
–  "...in which they beat and at times torture[d] local residents to 
force them to denounce the MDC and swear allegiance to ZANU-PF" 
(HRW 2008a: p. 14).   
Collective punishment was the 'stick' intentionally unleashed against the MDC 
leadership and activists (e.g. polling station agents), as well as other civic 
organisations, including the Zimbabwe Elections Support Network (ZESN) that had 
independently monitored the election (HRW 2008c: p. 31; Matyszak 2009: p. 146).  
The MDC's "...leadership and key grassroots activists, particularly those organisers who 
could have been expected to have created problems for the state by mobilising 
resistance in the event of a contested outcome to the run-off" (SPT 2008b: p. 29 
emphasis added) were also attacked.  In June 2008, during the final weeks of the run-
off campaign, Morgan Tsvangirai was arrested five times, and over 400 MDC 
supporters were also arrested (Tarisayi 2009: p. 22).  Once again activist voice was 
targeted, suppressing the voices demanding reform. 
The arrests of MDC leaders negatively affected the MDC's ability to organise, 
campaign and mobilise its supporters (SPT 2008a: p. 22), i.e. to act collectively.  
Undertaken by members of the regime to reinforce the loyalty of ZANU-PF supporters 
in advance of the elections, the political violence did indeed serve the "...purpose of 
preventing deterioration from becoming cumulative, as it often does when there is no 
barrier to exit" (Hirschman 1970: p. 79).  Sachikonye argues for the strategic 
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intentionality of the violence in building and/or maintaining electoral support:  "[t]he 
immediate factor in the unleashing of the violence was to tip the balance in favour of 
the incumbent party...", while the ferocity and scale of the violence in the 2008 run-off 
period also "...sought to broadcast a wider lesson that ruling party hegemony should not 
be challenged at all" (Sachikonye 2011b: p. 31 emphasis added).  In this case, the 
political violence inflicted upon so many Zimbabweans served to reinforce both current 
and future loyalty.   
The political violence in the presidential run-off of 2008 was so severe, so 
systematic and so targeted that the front-runner withdrew rather than subject his 
supporters to any further violence.  The scale and coordination of the penalty of 
political violence had brought mobilisation to a halt, and indeed, altered the available 
choices for Zimbabweans - including Zimbabwe's MDC-T presidential candidate.  The 
scale of violence against Zimbabweans seeking change, including the MDC leadership 
and its supporters, was summarised by Morgan Tsvangirai as he announced his exit 
from the presidential elections:   
"This violent retributive agenda has seen over 200 000 people 
internally displaced and over 86 MDC supporters killed. Over 20 000 
homes have been destroyed and over 10 000 people have been 
injured and maimed in this orgy of violence. 
The MDC Secretary General, Hon. Tendai Biti and MP Advocate 
Matinenga are illegally detained. Over 2000 MDC supporters, including our 
polling agents, are in illegal detention. The arrests have targeted Members of 
Parliament, Councilors, the MDC structures and election agents. Over 
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200,000 people have been internally displaced. The whole game plan is 
designed to cripple the MDC campaign" (statement, 22 June 2008, emphasis 
added). 
His statement specifically cites the roles of security forces, militia, youth forces 
and the Joint Operations Command in organizing the political violence, and cites the 
existence of "...over 3000 militia bases..." across the country from which the political 
violence is coordinated (Morgan Tsvangirai, statement, 22 June 2008).    
Informal rules to enable impunity  
Loyalty may stem from shared norms and values, but loyalty, as an action-
choice, i.e. a decision to defer exit, may also be influenced by both penalties and/or 
incentives.  Selective incentives may encourage individuals to cooperate, thus helping 
with mobilisation (Hardin 1982: pp. 17, 15; Lichbach 1995: p. 216) or may reward past 
compliance.  The use of political violence during this crisis was not new, for ZANU-PF 
had deployed this penalty and deterrent before.  The members of the regime have also 
previously given impunity for the perpetrators of this earlier political violence (Kriger 
2005; Sachikonye 2011b).  Impunity reduces the future costs and uncertainty associated 
with undertaking political violence.   
The reward of impunity, as an incentive offered to the perpetrators of the 
political violence, helped to resolve the collective action challenges faced by the 
members of the governing regime.  This incentive became available through the 
development of informal rules that de facto replaced the formal rules governing the 
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security sector.  Some of these informal rules were retroactively formalised (e.g. Rural 
Land Occupiers (Protection from Eviction) Act.   As discussed by Knight, informal 
institutional rules may be formalised as a means of 'locking-in’ the distributional 
advantage that has accrued (1992: p. 143).  The vast majority of the perpetrators of this 
violence were ZANU-PF supporters and allies (Reeler 2009: pp. 31-32, Tables 26 and 
27; Sachikonye 2011b; Anatomy of Terror 2011: constituency reports; HR NGO Forum 
2001; HRW 2008a; HR NGO Forum and JAG 2007: pp. 23-24).  The perpetrators 
benefited from impunity for many of their actions, including those carried out around 
the 2008 electoral campaign.   
Informal rules are those that are created, transmitted and enforced outside of 
official channels and shared amongst members of the relevant community or 
society" (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: p. 727 italics in the original; Knight 1992: pp. 
2-3).  Like formal rules, informal rules include a common understanding that actions 
inconsistent with those that are proscribed or required, are likely to be "...sanctioned or 
rendered ineffective if actors with the authority to impose punishment are informed 
about them" (Crawford and Ostrom 1995: p. 583).  They replace, in this instance, for a 
specific set of actors, the formal rules that are written, for example, in the Constitution 
and the Police Act.     
Informal rules differ in three important ways from the simple, non-enforcement 
of formal rules.  First, they communicate new rules that specifically structure and/or 
alter relationships between specific groups of actors (e.g. the youth militia and the 
police).  In the case of the Zimbabwean security sector these informal rules emerged 
through intentional and strategic decisions by members of the regime.  Second, these 
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informal rules may provide new permissions that differ from those provided under the 
formal rules.  These permissions may include new freedoms, roles or entitlements.  
Third, the decision-making sphere and the scope for creating informal rules is different 
than that where formal rules, and their enforcement, are decided.   
Like formal rules, informal rules "guide future action" (Knight 1992: p. 54), 
including the calculation of the costs and benefits of compliance in making future 
choices.  Both formal and informal rules communicate information to actors that may 
be incorporated into their strategic decision-making.  Although individual perpetrators 
were still subject to the provisions of Zimbabwe's criminal and civil laws (formal 
rules), the emergence of informal rules to provide impunity weakened the formal rules 
that provided sanctions for acts of political violence, abuses and/or crimes. For 
members of the ZRP these included, for example, professional sanctions under the 
Police Act, and/or legal penalties under the Criminal Code (IBAHRI 2007: p. 53).   
The targeted non-enforcement of Zimbabwe's own laws (i.e. the intentional 
decision to 'turn a blind eye') communicated clear information to members of the 
police, army, youth militia etc. – and also to Zimbabweans.  Public statements of the 
new informal rules communicated to the perpetrators, individually and as a group that 
they could continue with future violence and human rights violations without 
expectations of punishment.  Targeted non-enforcement of criminal law (e.g. in cases of 
assault, kidnapping or rape), and the failure to enforce existing professional sanctions 
meant that the direct costs of pursuing the violence, including those that resulted in 
human rights violations, were not borne by the perpetrators of this political violence.  
The members of the youth militia, although they operated under informal rules rather 
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than the formal rules that governed state security actors in Zimbabwe (e.g. the Police 
Act), were still subject to Zimbabwe's criminal and civil laws.  These informal rules 
created roles, and extended permissions and entitlements to the youth militia and its 
members.  An example of the impunity offered to ZANU-PF members and supporters 
is the following statement:     
One of them [senior police officer] said, 'You are under instruction 
not to arrest ZANU-PF supporters who may be implicated in political 
violence or whom you may come across committing acts of political 
violence. Do not use force when dealing with them. At most, you 
may, when you find them in the act of committing political violence, 
gently disperse them, but make no arrests, I repeat, do not arrest 
ZANU-PF supporters' (HRW 2008: p. 26 citing interview with a 
police constable, Marondera, 21 August 2008c emphasis added). 
Neither internal disciplinary measures nor public condemnation of the violence, 
by members of the regime, was forthcoming (HR NGO Forum 2001; IBIHRI 2007).  
Public statements communicated these new informal rules and endorsed their 
subsequent political violence and human rights violations.  Weakened, the formal 
sanctions within the security sector were often no longer a credible constraint on 
behaviour:  
Members of the police force act as if they are above the law because, 
in fact, they are rarely prosecuted even when they commit the most 
serious of crimes... There has been no public condemnation by the 
President, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Home Affairs, the 
Police Commissioner and other senior government officials of even 
the most shocking cases of torture and ill-treatment by police or any 
show of a commitment to investigate, discipline and prosecute those 
responsible, are notable by their absence. On the contrary, the public 
support expressed by those in key positions of power, such as the 
President, the Minister for Home Affairs and the Police 
Commissioner amongst others, for the various actions of the ZRP, 
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appears to have exacerbated the impunity surrounding abuses by 
police and emboldens them in their unlawful behaviour (IBAHRI 
2007: p. 53 emphasis added). 
Statements supporting the political violence occurred, for example this example 
which justified the violence against Zimbabwe's Leader of the Opposition:   
Of course he [opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai] was bashed. He 
deserved it… I told the police to beat him a lot" (HRW 2007: p. 1 
quoting President Mugabe 29 March 2007, emphasis added). 
These informal rules communicated clearly to the perpetrators that there were 
certain benefits and no uncertainty as to the private costs, arising from their 
participation in violent collective action on behalf of the members of the governing 
regime.  Lichbach states "...[i]t does not pay the typical official of a regime to carry 
out the orders of the leadership unless there is some incentive for him to do that 
separate from his belief in the established system" (Lichbach 1995: p. 257 citing 
Olson 1990: p. 15 emphasis added).  In this case, the incentive included current and 
future immunity from the consequences of the violence inflicted.    
The continuing existence of the formal rules, meant that individual members in 
the regime's security and enforcement apparatus had an option to not act, that is, to 
disobey the orders to follow these informal rules and instead to simply obey the formal 
rule of law.  Compliance with informal rules is, however, more likely in those situations 
where there is a longer-term (iterated) relationship between actors, and by those 
"favoured" by the distributional consequences of the new institutional rule (Knight 
1992: p. 178).   
!  215
Many Zimbabweans, as well as international actors such as the EU and NGOs 
such as Human Rights Watch, demanded an end to the political violence and a return to 
the formal rule of law, encouraged compliance with the informal rule.    The Zimbabwe 
Human Rights NGO Forum asserted that the "....an amnesty for all perpetrators [was 
needed] in order to avoid confirmation of the allegations of state complicity" (2001: p. 
33).   
The emergence of new informal rules, the targeted enforcement of formal laws 
(e.g. Public Order and Security Act) against perceived opponents of the regime, and, 
the targeted non-enforcement of the formal laws against the perpetrators of the 
violence, created a what some have described as a partisan, rather than professional, 
policing environment (SPT 2005a; IBAHRI 2007).  Both the informal rules and the 
targeted enforcement (and non-enforcement) of formal rules, communicate important 
information that actors will factor into their strategic decision-making and behaviour.  
The contrasting bias in enforcement patterns is in itself further information that 
discourages collective mobilisation, in this case by the opponents of the regime.  For 
individual officers, the public statements, as well as the lack of internal discipline 
against those committing the violence, would also provide important reference points 
as to the type of behaviour expected of them.   
Impunity was not the only incentive offered.  Material benefits were also 
offered, including "[p]romises of cash, food, alcohol, jobs, promotion, land, housing, 
education amongst others…" (Sachikonye 2011b: p. 29; Alexander and Chitofiri 2010: 
p. 678).  In rural areas, retaining the loyalty of the village chiefs was essential, 
particularly in light of the MDC's electoral success in the urban areas.  Material 
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incentives were offered to these critical allies as Sachikonye (2011a: p. 32 emphasis 
added) noted:  "It is not coincidental that in the period between 2000 and 2008, the 
salaries and perks of chiefs were significantly increased by a ZANU-PF government 
intent on drawing on their capacity to mobilise the rural vote".    
Through the formal state system, strategic pay raises were offered to members 
of the security service in order to help retain their loyalty:   
The 200 percent salary rise for the army, police and prison services 
follows a promise made by President Robert Mugabe last week 
during Independence Day celebrations to review their pay... Political 
commentator Tendai Murambiwa alleged the salary hike was 
designed to retain the support of the security forces. Remember, 
MDC president, Morgan Tsvangirai, only recently told the armed 
forces that they were suffering like everybody else and needed to side 
with the people..." (IRIN 2006, emphasis added).   
Material benefits to members of the security forces and the ZANU-PF militia 
were also distributed through ZANU-PF's patronage networks, and included beneficial 
access to state resources.  Many of the most senior members of the regime, including 
the leadership of the security services, received significant financial incentives, 
including the allocation of commercial farms, and privileged access to foreign 
exchange or other goods (e.g. fuel) that were in very short supply (Matondi 2012: pp. 
81-82; Dawson and Kelsall 2012; IRIN 2007).  These material benefits were incentives 
that went above and beyond the impunity arising from their roles in instructing and/or 
organising the political violence.   
The partisan distribution of these material benefits and their relationship to 
loyalty were noted by Zimbabweans.  The Anatomy of Terror (Maramba Phungwe 
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annex: p. 18) confirmed that "...small [gold] mining claims are given to the militia... 
while ...MDC supporters are denied access...".  In the district of Shamva South the 
conditionality of these rewards was made explicit:  "...Nherera gold claims belong to 
ZANU-PF perpetrators who illegally pan gold.  In return they give 70 percent of the 
output to ZANU-PF", but ZANU-PF also "...ensures that every beneficiary of the 
illegal gold panning participates in ZANU-PF orchestrated violence" (Anatomy of 
Terror, Shamva South annex:  pp. 3, 19, 23, emphasis added).  This constituency also 
report notes that "...most ZRP [police] members were allocated land in the area and 
hence openly and actively support ZANU-PF" (Anatomy of Terror, Shamva South 
annex: p. 11, emphasis added).   
This section has discussed the emergence and enforcement of informal rules to 
enable the impunity of ZANU-PF and its allies during this period.  This discussion of 
informal rules is an important finding that emerges from the theoretical framework of 
rational choice institutionalism.  Rules, formal and informal, structure the relationships 
between actors, and go beyond norms, to set out the expectations of sanctions or 
penalties and means of enforcement.   
Contributions, Threats and Demands for Compliance 
This chapter has already discussed introduced the importance of free-riding.  
ZANU-PF's conceptualisation of their liberation history and thus of their right to 
govern, may have, in their view, provided a normative justification for these demands 
and threats, however their collective action problem was real.  Members of the regime 
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faced the problems of free-riding, strategic inter-dependency and the reality of the 'step-
good' of elections.  Strategies to reduce free-riding, including strategies of coordination 
to defer exit, were important to easing ZANU-PF’s collective action challenge, as free-
riding negatively affects the prospects a group’s success (Hardin 1982: p. 98).   While 
selective incentives, including material benefits, were offered to the many actors within 
the regime and to their supporters, demands for contributions and threats were also 
made, backed by penalties for non-compliance.  Incentives and penalties may alter 
choices, reducing free-riding as a result.   
As a demonstration of loyalty, serving police and army personnel and their 
families were demanded to vote for ZANU-PF.  The loyalty of the security services was 
important to ZANU-PF, both for their traditional security function but also for their 
actions to weaken the challenge posed by the MDC (Alao 2012: p. 102).  Within the 
narrative of the Third Chimurenga, with its military and war references, visible support 
from the security services, would symbolically reinforce ZANU-PF's narrative, while 
functionally also contributing tens of thousands of real and needed votes.  Reducing 
free-riding and increasing the penalties for non-compliance were therefore a targeted 
strategy by members of the regime to align the electoral choices of these Zimbabweans 
in support of ZANU-PF.  Threats included for example, eviction from the police camps 
(displacement from homes), on the basis of perceived or actual support for the MDC.  
Other threats included the loss of employment or of future advancement opportunities.   
Cooperation to avoid a loss may be more readily mobilised, in part because 
losses and gains will be perceived differently (Hardin 1982: pp. 62-64).  Losses may be 
immediate and quantifiable, while a future gain is deferred and may range be less 
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tangible (e.g. a promise or potential opportunity).  Stone argues that "...[individuals] are 
more ready to sacrifice and take risks in order to avoid a loss" (2002: p. 220).   
In Zimbabwe, adjusting behaviour and/or decision-making to retain 
employment is a common example of avoiding future losses at the individual and/or 
household levels.  Those individuals who were suspected of being MDC sympathisers 
often lost their public sector employment, or were rejected for such openings (HR NGO 
Forum 2001: pp. 36-38).  The Minister of Foreign Affairs Mudenge was very clear on 
the matter of losses:  "….[y]ou are going to lose your jobs if you support opposition 
political parties in the [2002] presidential election.  As civil servants, you have to be 
loyal to the government of the day.  You can even be killed for supporting the 
opposition and no one would guarantee your safety" (HR NGO Forum 2007:  p. 29 
citing Daily News 18 July 2001, emphasis added).  Disobeying orders creates new 
private risks for individuals, including the loss of employment and its associated social 
and material benefits.  
Individual rejections (or exclusion) may be seen as a punishment or a penalty 
for their perceived or actual electoral support of the MDC, while also reserving job 
opportunities as future rewards (incentives) for ZANU-PF supporters.  Maintaining or 
receiving employment was a significant incentive in the context of Zimbabwe's 
economic collapse and its accompanying rapid increase in unemployment that led to 
the vast majority of adult Zimbabweans being unemployed (UNDP 2008: pp. 106-107).  
However, the public sector was not exempt from the ravages of the country's hyper-
inflation and its consequent impact on salaries, making public sector jobs and their 
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formal salaries less attractive.  Nevertheless, with jobs so scarce, for many, a job was 
better than no job.   
Combining the demand (loyalty) with the threat (e.g. loss of employment), 
clearly sets out the costs (consequences) of non-compliance.  The credibility of the 
threats will be enhanced when non-compliance is readily observed, including through 
monitoring.  The threats commonly made, i.e. the loss of employment and/or housing, 
are private losses, whereas the behaviour demanded, i.e. continued loyalty to ZANU-
PF, is often public.  This combination of demanded public behaviour against certain 
private losses helped to incentivize the partisan behaviour by members of the ZRP and 
others, for rational actors will seek to avoid the private losses when it is possible to do 
so.  Given the degrees of interaction between employer and employees in worksites or 
camps, or the presence of security, police and/or militia in the communities, non-
compliance may be easily observed and the threat readily acted upon.  Prior evictions, 
whether localized in villages, or widespread such as the eviction of farm-workers, 
would have also reinforced the credibility of the threat.    
This example below demonstrates the coordination that occurred to deliver the 
threats and demand the contributions.  Different hierarchical levels, across multiple 
organisations – the Zimbabwean police, the war veterans, armed forces, and 
parliamentary caucus members – are involved.  This example is clear on the demands 
for loyalty and the contribution of votes, as well as the threats of future losses and the 
sanctions for non-compliance (i.e. displacement and loss of employment):    
"….[t]he veterans, led by Sinini Mangena, Stewart Khumalo and the 
Senator-elect for Gwanda, Japhet Dube (ZANU-PF) were reportedly 
!  221
accompanied by the officer commanding the province, Ronald 
Muderedzwa, and the officer commanding administration, Joram 
Mlilo.  They told the wives and dependents of the police officers they 
would be evicted from the main police [residential] camp, and their 
husbands and parents dismissed from the force if they did not vote for 
Mugabe, said a police source… The meeting followed [one a week 
earlier] where police officers were warned against voting for the 
MDC’s Morgan Tsvangirai. They were told a Tsvangirai win would 
see the country sliding into civil war.  About 500 Matabeleland South 
police officers attended the initial meeting.... Mlilo was in the chair.... 
accompanied by Officer Commanding Gwanda District, Chief 
Superintendent David Difala and Superintendent Konrad Manhai, the 
deputy officer commanding Gwanda District….The chairperson said 
all police officers and members as well as their dependents, wives 
inclusive, must vote for ZANU-PF, said the source. This was to 
ensure that more than 20,000 ZRP members gave ZANU-PF more 
votes and an outright victory for Mugabe (Zimbabwe Standard 31 
May 2008, emphasis added). 
  
The words of one serving police officer reveal the pressure to be loyal:   
...[i]t is dangerous [for police officers] to appear to be openly 
professional when dealing with political cases. If…there is even the 
slightest suspicion that you are sympathetic to opposition forces then 
you may even lose your job. I know that the officer-in-charge of 
Mazowe Central Police Station, was forcibly and on short notice 
transferred to another station... as punishment for appearing to be 
sympathetic to MDC supporters. Again, just before the end of April 
2008, the officer-in-charge for Shamva tried by all means to be 
professional and non-partisan, but was dismissed from his job 
because ZANU-PF leaders in the area complained about him (HRW 
2008c: p. 38 citing interview with police officer, Bindura, 19 August 
2008, emphasis added).  
The HR NGO Forum and JAG (2007: p. 26) reported multiple cases of 
members of the police, sympathetic to the commercial farmers being transferred and 
found a strong correlation between these transfers and the levels of intimidation of the 
police by war veterans and the youth militia.  Promotion opportunities were also 
affected, and were contingent on demonstrated contributions of loyalty, for example, 
through participation and engagement in ZANU-PF meetings:  
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"Since 29 March [2008] a ZANU-PF branch was set up within the 
[police] camp and it holds weekly meetings on a Thursday evening.  
Attendance at these meetings is mandatory. I make it a point to attend 
each weekly meeting and say a few words each time because if I do 
not attend I risk being labelled an MDC supporter. Once you are 
labelled an MDC supporter, you are victimised and you can be 
guaranteed that you will never be promoted. Promotion in the police 
now is not on merit, but is based on active participation in ZANU-PF 
meetings and activities. That is what in police circles is called 
defending the country" (HRW 2008c: pp. 37-38 citing interview with 
police officer, Harare, 27 August 2008).  
  
Visible, rather than secret, contributions are easier to monitor and often there 
are specific measures to allow for contributions to be "identifiable and 
traceable" (Lichbach 1995: pp. 213-214).  Mandatory participation in meetings is one 
example of a monitoring strategy – individuals are either present or not – and 
attendance can be recorded or otherwise traced.   
A vote is also a contribution that is well defined and is delivered at a specific 
time and location (i.e. on polling days and at specific polling centres).  Democratic 
standards normally hold an individual's vote as a private matter through the use of a 
'secret ballot'.  However, members of the ZANU-PF regime took specific steps to 
reduce the secrecy of the ballot.  These make the information from each vote 
(contribution) more transparent, and, in turn, allow for easier monitoring of 
'defections' (Lichbach 1995: pp. 212-213).  For example: 
"...[t]hose people known to be active in MDC were warned that their 
names were already on lists of those who had to make assisted votes, 
on grounds of being illiterate. This meant being forced to ask the 
election officials and the police to place the ‘X’ on the ballot" (SPT 
2008b: p. 32).   
Collective, rather than individual, monitoring was also applied (Lichbach 1995: 
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pp. 213-214) based on actual or perceived group membership.  "Suspected opposition, 
human rights activists and teachers, were expected to repent, and that repentance had 
to be demonstrated by feigning illiteracy on polling day and seeking assistance from 
polling officers, comprising mostly of ZANU-PF youth and so-called war 
veterans" (ZPP 2008b: p. 7).  In other areas, village headmen:  
"...were also given lists of all the registered voters that they would be 
responsible for... In some areas, [voters] were told to write down the 
last two digits of their ballot paper on their hand, to submit to their 
headman after the vote, so that their precise vote could be traced back 
afterwards. In a polling station where only a few hundred votes are 
cast, it would indeed have been possible using this system to check 
who had dared to vote for MDC in this intimidating 
environment" (SPT 2008b: p. 32). 
This discussion has highlighted the intentional measures introduced by 
members of the ZANU-PF regime to ease their collective action challenge in advance 
of the next electoral 'step'.  As this section has shown, threats, as well as demands for 
contributions were deployed to reduce free-riding. Specific measures to make 
contributions more visible (participation requirements, vote reporting) were also 
intentionally introduced.   
Selective incentives – the strategic, partisan use of food  
The partisan distribution of food aid is an example of both the reform to formal 
institutional rules, of cooperation and coordination, and the development of informal 
rules in order to reinforce political loyalty and sustain distributional advantage. In this 
regards, it brings together the different elements of the discussion in each section of this 
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chapter.  To access this material benefit contributions (e.g. votes, party membership) 
were demanded, helping to reduce free-riding.  This final section of the chapter will 
discuss the strategic, partisan use of food aid (and agricultural inputs such as seeds or 
fertilizer) as a valued selective incentive to individual ZANU-PF party members, 
supporters and their families.   
As discussed, selective incentives help to alter the choices and decisions of 
rational actors.  Regimes in power are able in a "privileged position" in terms of the 
ability to strategically draw upon and target selective incentives that may help to 
mobilise their supporters (Lichbach 1995: p. 258).  Offers of material benefits help to 
defer voluntary exit (Lichbach 1995: pp. 318-319).  Food aid is a material benefit that 
was to be available to Zimbabweans in situations of hunger and food insecurity.  But 
during this crisis, it largely became available only to those who demonstrated their 
electoral loyalty to ZANU-PF.   
The National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) defined the political use of food 
as "...being refused food due to political affiliation, as well as threats to deprive citizens 
of food for failure to vote for a political party" (Reeler and Chitsike 2005: p. 24).  
Given official estimates that over six million people early in the crisis, and, by 2005, 
over seven million people were in need of food assistance (Human Rights Watch 2003; 
Meredith 2007: p. 231).  This incentive was significant for both individual households 
and for the governing regime.    
Pfaff argues that these incentives is likely to have an especially "…robust 
[effect on loyalty] when members are dependent on a collectivity for scarce or highly 
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desired goods" (2006: p. 20 citing Hecter 1987, Coleman 1990).  In the context of 
Zimbabwe's droughts, economic collapse, high rates of poverty and the disruptions to 
agricultural production wrought by the farm occupations, the value of food aid as a 
material benefit would be significant.  Food aid would be, in this context, both a 
'scarce' and a 'highly desired' good.   
This discussion of institutional reforms and constraints is a key value addition 
of this dissertation, for it is a point not directly addressed by the reviewed research on 
patriotic history.  As set out in one of the research questions for this dissertation, these 
alternative institutional powers enabled the incentives and penalties to be altered and 
relationships between actors to be restructured. By altering both the decision-makers 
and the rules of decision-making the content of the decisions was influenced (Stone 
2002: p. 262).   
Since independence, food aid has been provided on the basis of either partisan 
criteria (e.g. to reward or encourage political supporters) or technical criteria (e.g. the 
percentage of children under the age of five that are malnourished).  Munemo, in his 
2012 study of drought relief pathologies, argues that the key variable in determining the 
partisan use of food aid programmes is the relative degree of political security felt by 
the ZANU-PF regime (Munemo 2012: p. 88).  When the regime was politically 
insecure, as in the early-to-mid-1980s, the regime resorted to political partisanship in 
the deployment of this essential, but scarce, resource.  During the drought of the 
mid-1990s, with the 1987 Unity Accord, a new Executive Presidency created, and a 
significant parliamentary majority, the regime was more confident and continued with 
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targeted (e.g. under-five children, food-for-work), rather than general food relief 
programming (Munemo 2012:  pp. 99-101, 109).   
However, after the 2000 constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections, 
facing a significant political challenge from the MDC and its supporters, the partisan 
systems of food aid distribution again began, including the use of “ZANU-PF 
personnel…. Munemo recognizes the political objective behind these reforms, arguing 
that ZANU-PF again used the partisan distribution of food aid to "...breathe life into 
their collapsing rural electoral coalition" and they "…reintroduced the political 
selection of beneficiaries and a reliance on ZANU-PF personnel [particularly the war 
veterans] in the administration of relief at the local level" (Munemo 2012: pp. 
117-118).  His study confirms the history of a partisan deployment of food assistance as 
an incentive to re-inforce political loyalty, and supports therefore the argument of this 
dissertation.  His findings are congruent with Kriger’s 2005 study on the use of political 
violence by ZANU-PF since independence, i.e. that the degree of political security is a 
critical factor in how the regime responds.  
As discussed earlier, the ZANU-PF regime’s narrative of patriotic history 
identified patriots and enemies and sought to both assert the regime’s sovereignty as 
well as reduce Western influences within Zimbabwe (Tendi 2008; Ranger 2004).   As 
the discussion below demonstrates, many elements of this patriotic history narrative 
were evident in the political use of food.  In particular, the privileged access to the 
valued, selective benefit of food aid that accrued to ‘patriots’ is an explanatory element 
that contributes to understanding the mobilising effects of the patriotic history 
narrative. 
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To enable the partisan distribution of food aid, alternative institutional powers 
were established.  Decision-making was transferred from the Ministries of Home 
Affairs and Agriculture, the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), the United Nations’ World 
Food Programme, and local and international NGOs, all of whom were, previously, the 
key actors in Zimbabwe’s food relief programmes (Munemo 2012: pp. 99-101).  A new 
committee, the Task Force on Maize Distribution (also known as the Food Committee), 
chaired by the Minister of State for Security, replaced the “...long-standing National 
Drought Management structure, which is comprised of officials and technical staff from 
the village level to the Vice President’s office" (HRW 2003: p. 34).  The role of the 
army in the operations of the GMB and also the Food Committee, from national to 
district levels was significant and central (HRW 2003: pp. 3, 35; HR NGO Forum 
2005b: p. 38, Munemo 2012: p. 118; Reeler and Chitsike 2005; Anatomy of Terror 
2011: constituency reports).  The police and youth militias were also engaged in the 
enforcement of this partisan food distribution (HRW 2003: p. 3; Munemo 2012: pp. 
117-118; Reeler and Chitsike 2005; Anatomy of Terror 2011: constituency reports).  
Munemo identifies continuities with ZANU-PF’s earlier periods of political insecurity, 
and highlights the considerations of partisan gain, however he does not making links to 
the issues of institutional reform, nor collective action problems. 
The involvement of local ZANU-PF representatives (e.g. village chairmen, 
youth organisers) in selecting the beneficiaries of the available food aid and agricultural 
support (e.g. seeds) as well as its distribution was well-documented by Human Rights 
Watch (e.g. 2003, 2008a), the Zimbabwe Peace Project (2007) and the Zimbabwe 
Human Rights NGO Forum (e.g. 2005a and 2005b) as well as research by Reeler and 
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Chisike (2005) and Munemo’s 2012 study. The scale of engagement and coordination 
in the 2008 elections was summarized by the ZPP: “...[e]xperiences from all provinces 
point to a tight, partisan and highly centralised food distribution network” (2008b: p. 
27).  Food aid programming involves both registration and distribution processes.  To 
simply manage, let alone manipulate, these processes requires both cooperation and 
coordination among national, provincial and local levels.   
Intentional changes to the grain import and distributions rules provided the 
government-controlled Grain Marketing Board with a monopoly, increasing the 
dependency of both millers and consumers on the regime (Rowe 2001:  pp. 63-95, with 
reference to Rhodesian monopolies).  The Grain Marketing Act provides the authority 
to control the import, sale and movement of controlled agricultural products (Anatomy 
of Terror 2011 Annex C: p. 20).  Through their control of the GMB, the registration and 
distribution processes and the regulatory restrictions on the sale and movement of grain 
(e.g. from rural to urban areas), de facto the regime controlled all access to staple grains 
(HR NGO Forum 2005a: pp. 12-13). 
Members of the regime also deployed the powers of actor selection, i.e. 
eligibility to distribute, and to benefit from, food relief.  Mirroring the actions taken in 
the media sector, specific international and domestic actors were removed from the 
food aid registration and distribution processes.  By forcing the 'exit' of the 
international humanitarian community, through intentional, new rules of non-
participation, members of the regime removed, in whole or in part, their influence from 
domestic Zimbabwean politics (Islam 2002: p. 20), while demonstrating actions that 
supported their statements on sovereignty and reducing Western values.  International 
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NGOs, UN agencies and their local partners were removed from the food aid 
assessment and distribution processes.  In so doing, a product of their relief efforts, i.e. 
the information generated via reporting on the food insecurity situation, beneficiaries, 
losses etc., would not be available to the international donor community, generating 
new uncertainties as to the humanitarian realities in Zimbabwe and affecting both the 
availability and the reliability of information.   
Changes in the institutional permissions that restricted and/or banned 
international organisations and NGOs from providing humanitarian relief, were once 
again a solution that helped to resolve the 'State's Dilemma', for these mitigated the 
domestic impact of the (perceived) international allies of the MDC (Lichbach 1995: pp. 
189-193).  For example, in Binga District, the United States' Representative to the UN 
Food and Agriculture Organisation commented:  "...Government officials confirmed to 
me that they will not allow those non-governmental organisations to distribute food aid 
for political reasons, because the government views them as loyal to the opposition 
party" (PHR 2002: p. 12 citing The Guardian 17 October 2002).   
Decisions by some members of the international community to not provide food 
aid to those newly resettled on the former commercial farms could be seen as the 
politicisation of aid by the donors (HRW 2003: pp. 45-46), and likely reinforced the 
perception, within the regime, that the international community was not working on the 
basis of humanitarian law but, rather, on the basis of its own political preferences.   
Powers of actor selection were also used to deny entry into the food aid market 
and new restrictions on actors were imposed.   These reforms provided the members of 
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the regime with a literal distributional advantage as well as a political one.  When in 
2002, the MDC itself sought to respond to the significant hunger in Zimbabwe, their 
requests for food import and distribution permits was rejected by the government 
(HRW 2003: p. 34), thus denying the MDC permission to participate in the food relief 
market.   
The MDC's ineligibility increased the dependency of the MDC’s supporters on 
the ZANU-PF regime, as it was denied an opportunity to directly help its supporters 
through the provision of a much-need material benefit.  The MDC’s prospects for 
successful collective action were reduced, since, as discussed, the provision of material 
benefits is one means to mobilise support.  For the opposition, the challenge of 
mobilising support would certainly be exacerbated by the hunger faced by poor MDC 
supporters, whose time and energy would rationally prioritize access to income and 
food over political protest and engagement.   
Institutional reforms that permitted the partisan distribution of food aid 
provided an important means by which a selective incentive could be strategically 
targeted and distributed to help enforce loyalty.  These actions were widespread with 
"... ‘an average count' of around 402 acts of harassment and intimidation involving 
food every month” (Reeler and Chitsike 2005: p. 32 citing ZPP 2005).  Specific 
examples point to both the distribution of food aid as an incentive for loyalty and, to 
the denial of access of food aid as either a punishment for disloyalty, or to discourage 
mobilisation of support by the MDC.  As an example, in Mt. Darwin South, a ZANU-
PF stronghold: “...[t]hrough the assistance of youth officers, names of those who will 
receive inputs are screened, depriving perceived MDC supporters access to food and 
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agricultural inputs. When they are hungry they are told to join ZANU-PF 
first...” (Anatomy of Terror 2011: Mt. Darwin South p. 18 emphasis added).   
Even when the food aid had been distributed through UN or NGO channels, 
partisan manipulation of the beneficiary lists occurred.  As an example, a mother of 
nine children in the Midlands province, during a meeting to revise the list of food aid 
beneficiaries, ten MDC supporters were called out by name and forced to leave the 
meeting; once one of those supporters had renounced her MDC affiliation and 
purchased a ZANU-PF party membership "…her name was then added to CARE 
International feeding lists…" (PHR 2002: p. 23).   
These inducements were allocated (or denied) either individually, as the two 
examples above demonstrate, or were allocated (or denied) collectively.  In the 
constituency of Hdweza South: 
"...[f]ood and agricultural inputs are distributed through the Grain 
Marketing Board. MDC supporters are denied access to this 
facility...The traditional leadership working with ZANU-PF 
councillors segregate MDC supporters and reward members of 
ZANU-PF who are the key perpetrators of violence.  Stanley 
Mapako, the councillor for Ushe ward, is the chief culprit” (Anatomy 
of Terror 2011:  Hdewza South p. 9, emphasis added).  
  
In an example of collective penalty, groups of perceived MDC supporters, 
including many teachers and ex-commercial farm workers – both thought to support 
the MDC as well as urban residents (HRW 2003: p. 2) – were also denied access to 
this material benefit.  Food aid programmes were shut down “...in areas where 
residents were thought to support the MDC …” (HRW 2003: p. 3), deliberately 
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increasing the risks of hunger or starvation in MDC areas (Hammar and Raftopoulos 
2003: p. 14).  As Human Rights Watch (2003: pp. 1-2 emphasis added) stated: 
"...local officials – mostly ZANU-PF – have been able to manipulate 
the processes for registering beneficiaries, preventing non-ZANU-
PF-supporters from receiving food aid... Those experiencing trouble 
accessing [Grain Marketing Board] maize share a common identity: 
they are perceived political enemies of ZANU-PF and the 
government.  Known members of the main opposition party, the 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), top this list of perceived 
enemies." 
In this context of economic collapse, drought and agricultural disruptions, the 
intentional denial of access to essential food aid dramatically increases the cost of an 
individual sustaining their allegiance and/or contribution to the MDC.  Sustaining this 
allegiance can be a matter of life and death for both individual supporters and their 
families, many of whom, given Zimbabwe's population age structure, would be 
ineligible to vote.   
Not surprisingly, the partisan deployment of food aid altered the choices of 
some MDC supporters – a rational response to scarcity and altered incentives and 
penalties.  For example in Mutoko:  
"…his mother and others, whom he said no longer support ZANU-
PF, ‘are buying party cards for security, because to get GMB maize 
you have to have a party card’. Therefore '…you buy the card, you 
pay the money, nothing else will do…. You can’t refuse. If you refuse 
you get no maize [The ZANU-PF party membership card] is a must 
in the rural areas (HRW 2003: pp. 41-42 citing HRW interview, 
gardener in Harare, 2 March 2003, emphasis added).   
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The provision of material support to the supporters of either the regime or of 
opposition/dissident groups is a well-established incentive that offers a particular 
benefit which helps to reduce defections or voluntary exit (Lichbach 1995: pp. 
318-319).  Loyalty is especially likely to be robust where members are dependent on a 
collectivity for “scarce or highly desired goods" (Pfaff 2006:  p. 20 citing Hechter 
1987, Coleman 1990).   
The requirements for contributions to ZANU-PF, by Zimbabweans wishing to 
access needed food aid, has also been identified, underscoring the efforts to reduce 
free-riding through the strategic allocation of selective incentives.  In July 2004, the 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abednico Ncube, "...told villagers in Matebeleland 
that maize 'will be available only to those who dump the opposition and work with 
ZANU-PF'. The party would “start feeding its children before turning to those of the 
MDC” (HR NGO Forum 2005a: pp. 12-13 citing The Standard 18 July 2004 emphasis 
added; see also Matyzak 2009: p. 97).  The ZPP reported “... [t]hose who did not attend 
village and political meetings were more vulnerable to removal from the list. 
Beneficiaries were also expected to chant party slogans or denounce one’s party before 
they could benefit from this aid” (ZPP 2007: p. 7).  In “…some places, one must appear 
‘very active’ and pro-ZANU-PF, willingly attending rallies, joining the local ZANU-PF 
women’s or youth group, etc. to access food” (HRW 2003: p. 43 citing HRW interview, 
professional in Harare, 2 March 2003).  During the 2008 electoral period, the ZPP 
(2008b: pp. 27-29) also documented multiple cases of both demanded contributions of 
loyalty in exchange for food, as well as cases where access to food was denied for 
failure to have made the required contributions. 
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In addition to the reports cited from which the specific examples are taken, 
research for this dissertation identified two meta-analyses, as well as public opinion 
data relevant to the partisan distribution of food aid.  The Anatomy of Terror (2011: 
Annex 'H' p. 4) analysed the correlations between MDC political success in the 2000 
elections and the partisan distribution of food aid.  It found that there were greater 
difficulties in accessing food aid in ridings where the MDC, rather than ZANU-PF, had 
won.  In the run-up to the 2005 elections, partisan food aid distribution was correlated 
with other types of political intimidation against members of the opposition (ibid).   
Public opinion polling also revealed the scale and scope of this manipulation of this 
material benefit during the 2008 elections.  Afrobarometer (MPOI 2010: p. 53) reported 
that 12 percent of rural respondents and 17 percent of urban respondents reported that 
they were "personally affected" by "denial of food or starvation" during the 2008 
election campaign. 
This discussion of the partisan use of food, using the analytical framework of 
rational choice institutionalism is important for a number of reasons.  This discussion 
addresses a number of the research questions identified for this dissertation, notably 
with respect to incentives, penalties, free-riding and the consequences of these reforms 
for the dynamics of exit and voice.  It contributes to the literature by identifying 
examples of strategic institutional reform (e.g. reforms to the Grain Marketing Act, the 
creation of the 'food committee') to ease the regime's collective action challenge.  New 
permissions and roles regarding food distribution responsibilities to non-traditional 
actors that were aligned with the regime (e.g. security sector actors, youth militia) were 
introduced.  Changes in the permissive rules as to who may benefit from food aid (i.e. 
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the selection of beneficiaries) were altered from humanitarian criteria to the partisan 
criterion of political affiliation.    
This analysis also demonstrates the strategic use of selective incentives by the 
individuals and entities within the regime to retain their own supporters, thus 
contributing to the resolution of the ‘State’s Dilemma’ as identified by Lichbach (1995: 
p. 257 citing Olson 1990: p. 15).  This chapter’s discussion also underscored the scale 
and the extent to which a selective incentive was provided (or withheld), at both the 
individual and community levels across Zimbabwe.  Such provision, or withholding, 
cannot be achieved without coordination amongst individual actors – coordination 
strategically undertaken to sustain distributional advantage.   
The examples cited document the mobilising effect, for ZANU-PF of this 
valued incentive, e.g. new ZANU-PF memberships were purchased, and/or additional 
contributions to the party made.  Both were cited as pre-requisites to accessing the 
much needed food assistance.  The reforms to the rules, and the partisan deployment of 
selective benefits, increased the dependency of Zimbabweans on the regime, 
consequently deferring exit.  Increased dependency also reduced the prospects for 
successful collective action by the MDC.  Food was provided in exchange for votes:  
"[f]ood is now a very big campaign tool for ZANU-PF…" (HRW 2003: p. 38 citing 
HRW interview, human rights activist, 24 February 2003).  Or as the title of the 
Physicians for Human Rights’ 2002 report succinctly puts it:  "Vote ZANU-PF or 
Starve".   
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Chapter Five:  Forcing exit:  the challenge of credible 
commitments  
The seizure of white-owned commercial farms, the scale of the farm 
occupations, and the associated political violence were amongst the events that 
generated considerable international attention to the crisis in Zimbabwe.  The return of 
these lands to black Zimbabweans was a priority of the liberation struggle (Sachikonye 
2005: pp. 31-32; Utete 2003: pp. 12-13; Alexander 2007: p. 183).  Although some 
progress in resettlement had been achieved in the two decades of independence (Utete 
2003: p. 15), a considerable share of Zimbabwe's best agricultural land remained in the 
hands of a small number of large-scale commercial farmers.   
For many different political and economic reasons, discussed below, the land 
acquisition issue came to a head at the turn of the century, including due to the 
constitutional debates and referendum held in March 2000.  Zimbabweans were very 
sceptical about the government's commitment to, and performance on, the land 
distribution question, as shown by public opinion data from the period.  Land 
acquisition and redistribution were important issues for two of ZANU-PF’s key 
political constituencies: rural-based voters and the war veterans (Sithole and Rusaw 
2003: p. 16; Sadomba 2008), and were issues by which ZANU-PF could distinguish 
itself politically from the more urban-based MDC.  In advance of the June 2000 
elections, members of the ZANU-PF regime, needed to demonstrate a credible political 
commitment on this central issue.  The constitutional rules were rewritten, some 
support to some of the land occupations was provided, and, later, the 'fast-track' 
acquisition of the farms through forced exit was initiated.  These were all intentional 
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actions that helped to demonstrate their commitment to the political priority of land 
acquisition and redistribution. These actions reinforced the patriotic narrative being 
promulgated by the members of the ZANU-PF regime, and built upon ZANU-PF long-
standing policy commitment on land (Chan 2003: p. 133). 
This dissertation contributes to this literature by arguing that the reform of the 
institutional rules governing property rights altered the action-choice of exit from one of 
voluntary to forced exit.  The institutional reforms were thus essential enablers for the 
land seizures, and the reforms were the result of specific decisions by the members of 
the regime.     For the members of the ZANU-PF regime, forcing exit reduced 
transaction costs, allowing for the acceleration of land acquisition.  Forced exit 
demonstrated commitment to rural voters through visible action (including through the 
regime's support for the land occupations).  With respect to the action-choice of ‘voice’, 
forced exit, helped to suppress and/or punish the voices of dissent within the 
commercial farming sector.  Finally, it also permitted a selective incentive (i.e. the 
material benefit of land) to be accessed, and/or allocated to, many current or future 
supporters – including elite members of the regime.     
 The occupations engaged an increasing number of veterans, subsistence 
farmers and youth as their number and geographic scope increased, while the formal 
gazetting of the acquisition of commercial farms communicated further intent on the 
part of the regime.  Both the mobilisation and the intentional actions reinforced the 
credibility of the regime's commitment to land redistribution, although, as the partisan 
allocation patterns became clearer over time, Zimbabweans would become more 
sceptical about the motives of the programme (discussed below).   This chapter 
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discusses the importance of the institutional reforms, the land occupations and seizures, 
acknowledging that each contributed to addressing the 'State's Dilemma', including 
through the needed mobilisation and commitment.   
 The literature uses a wide variety of terms to discuss the physical occupation of the 
privately held commercial farmland in Zimbabwe.  For the purposes of this dissertation, the 
term 'occupations' as defined by Matondi (2012: p. xi) will be used, i.e. "...the forcible takeover 
of land (outside the law)".   To occupy, invade or squat on land are all intentional actions, that 
may (or may not) be the expression of the action-choice of voice.  Matondi's definition reflects 
this intentionality, references the institutional framework of the law and also speaks to the issue 
of forced exit that are the focus of this dissertation.  As a definition, it is silent on the question 
of political support (or not) in the occupations.    
The literature on the issues of land and agrarian reform in Zimbabwe is vast and 
significant. This is unsurprising given the land's own symbolic value, the centrality of 
the agricultural sector to Zimbabwe’s economy, the racial and other inequalities in the 
sector, and the implications (and intersections) of these dimensions for rural 
development, poverty reduction, growth, equity and culture.  Sachikonye (2003a) and 
Alexander (2007) provide valuable summaries of the key strands of this literature 
during the different post-independence periods and debates.  The land occupations and 
seizures, interacting with the patriotic narrative, have also driven new research agendas, 
including those relating to the issues of land, identity, nationhood and citizenship 
(Alexander 2007: p. 170 citing Hammar, Raftopoulos and Jensen 2003).   
In analysing the literature on the land occupations and seizures, three main 
strands become clear. One strand of the literature focuses on the outcomes of the land 
seizures and occupations (e.g. their impact on equities, food security, employment and/
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or productivity, tenure).  Key authors include Moyo (e.g. 2001, 2006 and 2011) and 
Scoones et al. (2010).  A second strand, focuses on the process (e.g. political violence, 
evictions, legal and rights violations) and actors (e.g. veterans, commercial farmers, 
farmworkers, ZANU-PF members and allies), often linking these into larger patterns of 
ZANU-PF's governance with both continuities and discontinuities identified (e.g. 
Marongwe 2003; Alexander 2003 and 2013; Hammar 2008; Sadomba 2008; 
Sachikonye 2003a and 2003b). 
Applying this categorisation of the literature to this dissertation, it would be 
classified within the 'process and actors' strand, for its examination of the strategic 
reforms to institutional rules that altered the dynamics of exit and voice, and thus 
contributed to the political outcomes. As such, it contributes new analytical 
perspectives, and contributes to answering – through its focus on how institutions align 
and aggregated choices, as well as their distributional consequences – to Alexander's 
call (2007: p. 194) that future research help "...to understand how and why policy 
choices are being made".  This dissertation contributes to the 'how and the why' through 
its attention to the strategic reform of institutional rules, the incentives and penalties 
that influence choices and decisions, and therefore also distributional outcomes.  This 
analytical division of the literature is constructed to help situate this dissertation within 
the larger body of research, and it does miss some of the richness in the body of work 
on the social and cultural understandings of land.   
 This dissertation, and specifically this chapter, contributes to the literature 
through an analysis of the institutional reforms, and the dynamics of exit and voice in 
the commercial farming sector, during the period 2000-2008, and their implications for 
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ZANU-PF's collective action challenge, i.e. the State's Dilemma. In keeping with the 
research questions identified for this dissertation, particular attention is given to 
analysing how the reforms restructured relations between actors in the sector,  altered 
penalties or incentives and generated (or reduced) uncertainty.  With such profound 
turbulence in the sector during the early years of this study period, the dissertation also 
contributes to the literature by highlighting both the strategic actions taken, and the 
effects of these decisions.   
This chapter opens with a discussion of theoretical literature on the two meta-
types of exit – forced or voluntary – and their implications for collective action.  It is 
followed by an institutionalist analysis of the reforms to the rules that governed 
Zimbabwe's commercial agricultural sector and argues that these reforms had provided 
the government, by the mid-1990s, with the powers of both initiative and of actor 
selection.  Further institutional reforms, undertaken in 2000, enabled the acceleration of 
land occupations that occurred under the ‘fast-track’ land reform programme by 
providing a broad power of compulsion.  Voluntary exit ('willing buyer, willing seller') 
had become forced exit, with implications for both the action-choice of voice and for 
mobilisation.  Building on earlier chapters, this chapter also examines the issues of 
rewards and impunity, and briefly discusses the specific displacement of the 
commercial farmworkers, who also, in many cases, suffered forced exit.   
    
Voluntary vs. forced exit – implications for collective action  
This dissertation has discussed 'exit' as an action-choice when satisfaction with 
the current situation declines.  Hirschman initially discussed exit as a voluntary choice, 
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one more frequently used in the economic rather than political sphere, but his later 
works (1978, 1986) discussed and defined exit to include the political sphere (1986: p.
77).  Two key points about exit emerged, first exit, is a more direct, and less graduated, 
means of expressing dissatisfaction than that of voice, and second, its effect arises from 
its cumulative, rather than individual deployment (Hirschman 1970: pp. 14-17, 23-24).   
The dynamics between the action-choices of exit and of voice is of critical 
importance for the prospects of reform or stability (Hirschman 1970).  For Hirschman, 
voice serves three distinct roles vis-à-vis exit – as an alternative, as a complement or, as 
a residual choice (1970: pp. 34-37).   Linking to the earlier discussion, these three roles 
of voice vis-à-vis exit would be linked to vertical voice that is, the expression of dissent 
to authorities.  As discussed further in the synthesis section below, Pfaff (2006) 
complements Hirschman's argument, by identifying the role of mass exit as a trigger, or 
source of voice, in his study of exit and voice dynamics of East Germany.  However, 
Pfaff's study is also an example of Hirschman's argument that the effect of exit arises 
from its cumulative implementation (ibid: pp. 23-24).  In Zimbabwe, the scaling-up of 
the land seizures, through forced exit, generated (and continue to generate) effects from 
its cumulative implementation.   
The availability of acceptable alternatives is one of the factors influencing the 
prospects of mobilisation for collective action (Hardin 1982: p. 73), including the 
mobilisation needed to aggregate and amplify voice.  The availability of current and 
future alternatives will also influence an actor's strategic choice to exit.  Hirschman 
argued that the choice of exit will be actioned "...in light of the prospects..." for 
exercising voice (1970: p. 37, italics in the original).  The threat of exit, rather than its 
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immediate deployment, can complement voice, helping to increase its effectiveness – 
for the threat itself may encourage responsiveness to the demands for change on the 
part of the management or the authorities (ibid: p. 83).   
In its capacity to generate responsiveness on the part of other actors, the threat 
of exit will alter strategic choices.  In this regard the threat will serve as a deterrent, i.e. 
"...to persuade an opponent to stop or reverse an action” (George 1994: p. 7).  To 
effectively deter, threats need to be credible. Several factors may affect the credibility 
of a threat to exit, including the degree of interaction between the actors, an important 
consideration in situations of strategic inter-dependency.  If the interaction is a "one-
time" only or one in a series of repeated interactions has implications for both decisions 
and timing of the threat.  Hardin (1982: p. 183) notes that action on the threat may be 
required 'now' in order to sustain credibility, including a credible threat capacity for the 
future.  However, in the case of the threat of exit, this must be qualified – for in some 
cases 'exit' takes the actor 'out of the game', rendering the threat "a one-time only play” 
which cannot be used again in the future.  The credibility of the threat of exit is also 
affected both by its costs and the ease with which it can be implemented (Hirschman 
1970: p. 83).   
The role of voice as a residual of exit is also relevant to the Zimbabwean land 
seizures and occupations.  In this role, it is the denial of the choice of exit, or its 
diminishing prospects, that become the source of voice (1970: p. 34, emphasis added).  
From the perspective of collective action, denying exit to targeted actors may mobilise 
voice, facilitating collective action through its aggregation and expression.  Forcing 
exit will restrict the voices of those targeted, as discussed in chapter three with respect 
!  244
to the media sector and discussed here with reference to the commercial agriculture 
sector.  For rational actors seeking strategic advantage, the intentional creation, or 
alteration of, rules to limit or to force exit is a decision that has profound impacts on 
collective action and on strategic advantage.  Forced exit, imposed by a governing 
regime, may be a rational solution to reduce collective dissent they are facing 
(Lichbach 1995: p. 107).   
Juxtaposed, these two points – the denial of the choice of exit and the forcing of 
exit – highlight a critical factor: that is, whether the affected actor is the one who holds 
the power to decide his own exit or not.  Voluntary exit is a rational response, by an 
actor to increasing dissatisfaction, with exit the action-choice arising from an 
assessment of the altered costs and benefits of giving voice or of remaining loyal.  
Other actors may impose rules that create new (or alter existing) restrictions on this 
action-choice of exit, or may remove barriers to exit, with important consequences for 
the nature and/or depth of dependency between actors.  This chapters and also chapter 
three both reveal the intentional reforms that forced the exit of targeted actors from 
specific economic activities, i.e. journalism, publishing, commercial farming, in 
Zimbabwe.   
Voluntary exit, as an action-choice may take different forms, however Lichbach 
does not discuss the one other type of exit critical to this Zimbabwean case study, i.e. 
forced ‘withdrawal’ or displacement.  Although Lichbach (1995: pp. 105-107), 
advanced Hirschman's original work, he identified only three different types of 
voluntary that are relevant to the dynamics of exit and voice in the context of states.  
These are: withdrawal, secession and emigration.  As an example of withdrawal, 
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Lichbach discusses voluntary internal re-location (e.g. from rural to urban areas, or to 
establish a new community) in order to escape from areas of rural dissent and/or 
conflict.  Secession and emigration are both examples of voluntary exit that alter an 
actor's position relative to other actors in terms of geographic borders.  However, 
forced exit may, a fourth type of exit, may also occur within a state's own borders, in 
other words – a 'forced withdrawal' or displacement. 
Despite the many examples of forced exit within states, this scenario of a 'forced 
internal withdrawal', or displacement, is not discussed by Lichbach. This is a weakness 
in his analysis, particularly given that forced displacement is a solution to collective 
action challenges, as discussed here. Displacement, as defined in this dissertation, is the 
temporary or permanent exit from the local area, community or economic activities.  
Forced exit, or internal displacement, occurred throughout the colonial and Rhodesian 
periods, contributing to, amongst other effects, the unequal distribution of agricultural 
inherited by the ZANU government at independence (SPT 2010: p. 15; Utete 2003: pp. 
10-14).  Decades later these displacements would help to motivate the liberation 
struggle and then, during the period of this study, provide ZANU-PF with a key 
element of their patriotic narrative.      
Forced internal displacements not only occurred under British and Rhodesian 
rule, but the members of the ZANU-PF regime also forced exit.  Hammar (2008) 
identifies several examples from Zimbabwe's post-independence history.  Operation 
Murambatsvina (Tibaijuka 2005; SPT 2005b and 2010) targeting many of Zimbabwe's 
urban areas and populations, as well as the displacement of the commercial 
farmworkers (discussed below) are Zimbabwean examples of forced internal 
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displacement during this period under study. The no-go zones established to restrict the 
movement of MDC supporters, discussed above, also created temporary, targeted, 
displacements, often at local scale (e.g. Anatomy of Terror 2011: constituency annexes; 
HR NGO Forum 2001 and 2005b).    
This chapter argues that, in the context of this political crisis, the reform to 
institutional rules regarding land acquisition, enforced by the mobilisation of land 
occupiers is an example of forcing exit (withdrawal).  Land acquisition had been a 
long-standing commitment, but now, facing their significant Dilemma, and needing 
support, forcing displacement (exit) helped to resolve their immediate collective action 
challenge. Displacement is a common strategy to reduce collective dissent (Lichbach 
1995: p. 106. Forced exit helped to resolve ZANU-PF's collective action challenge in 
several ways: by mobilising ZANU-PF supporters, and support, through visible action 
on the land issue; by reducing collective dissent and by permitting a selective incentive 
to be acquired.  
This section has discussed the different roles of voice vis-à-vis exit, the different 
types of exit, and has noted the important distinction between voluntary versus forced 
exit.  Exit, also interacts with loyalty, and in this regard, barriers to exit and the issues 
of group size, uncertainty and the costs of exit are relevant.  Restrictions on exit from 
the group may affect both the size and composition of the group.  Barriers to exit may 
help the group to maintain its size and its cohesion, despite rising dissatisfaction.  
Barriers to exit are therefore particularly important in situations where specific skills, 
networks and/or resources are required for group success.  Barriers to exit also assist in 
the monitoring of defections from the group, helping to address the challenge of free-
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riding.  Barriers to exit, like barriers to entry, reduce the group's "permeability", i.e. 
"...the ease with which one [can participate]... in the group" (Lichbach 1995: p. 214 
citing Lasswell and Kaplan 1950: p. 35).  
In those situations where the actor is affected by, but does not control the rule-
making process that is altering the group's permeability, the actor may face increased 
uncertainty.  Rules that alter the group's composition and/or its structure may generate 
uncertainty, as discussed with reference to the issues of accreditation of journalists. 
Changes in the group's permeability may also increase the uncertainty of individual 
actors about future institutional alternatives and consequences, the actions of others 
with whom they interact, and their own uncertainty about their future status within the 
group (Knight 1992: pp. 44-45).  These uncertainties were discussed in more detail in 
chapter two, but examples pertinent to this discussion of commercial agriculture exist. 
As the ZANU-PF regime forced exit, the permeability of the rules governing 
membership in both the Commercial Farmers Union, and the GAPZUW representing 
the farmworkers, were also being affected.   
A specific cost of exit, that is, compensation for the land itself, was a central 
issue in the land debate .  The Constitution, at independence, restricted the state's 11
purchase of land to a ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ basis (see next section).  
Compensation was a financial means to incentivise voluntary exit by the commercial 
farmers, but, when paid, was also a formal recognition of the existing property rights of 
individual farmers.  Compensation was also an important financial constraint for the 
 For many in Zimbabwe, including ZANU-PF's leaders, compensation was also discussed as a moral 11
issue, in light of the original colonial expropriations.   Shaw (2003) discusses the components and 
limitations of this view.   Public opinion data in Zimbabwe supports Zimbabweans' own sense of the 
importance of the issue, as discussed below.
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ZANU-PF regime wishing to encourage or force exit.  Other relevant costs of exit 
included the loss of "...life-long associations... [and/or] ...deprivation of 
livelihood..." (Hirschman 1970: p. 96 citing Almond 1954: Chapter 12).  Exit from their 
primary source of livelihood, as well as the disruptions to their community ('life-long 
associations') were the realities and costs facing members of the white-Zimbabwean 
commercial farming community as well as many of the farmworkers.   
As discussed below, institutional reforms were reducing the mobility of 
property rights, as the government altered the rules of the commercial agriculture sector 
to provide itself with new powers and permissions.  Both Hirschman (1978:  pp. 
96-101) and Lichbach (1995: p. 24) discuss more broadly the issue of mobility of 
property rights and the implications for the action-choices of voice and exit.  
Hirschman argues that the mobility of property rights is a key element in increasing the 
prospects for voluntary exit over voice.  Those with more fixed property (e.g. land, 
buildings) are more likely to choose the action-choice of voice over voluntary exit as 
the costs of exit, i.e. the loss of fixed assets, would be more significant.   
In situations of both forced exit, and of low mobility of property rights – such as 
that found in Zimbabwe's commercial agricultural sector – it is rational that this 
preference for the action-choice of voice will apply.  The dynamics of exit and voice 
therefore offer useful explanatory value to understanding the response from commercial 
farmers to the institutional reforms on land acquisition being introduced by the 
members of the regime.  Faced with reduced mobility of their (weakening) property 
rights, and rules that were transitioning their choices from voluntary to forced exit (see 
below) many expressed their action-choice of voice.   
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Finally, the demographics of Zimbabwe's commercial agricultural sector also 
highlight that the comparative size of contesting groups matters in a situation of 
contentious collective action.  As the members of the ZANU-PF regime faced their 
collective action challenge known as the 'State's Dilemma', the demographics of the 
group of commercial farmers (both ethnically and in terms of numbers) were no match 
for the hundreds of thousands of black Zimbabwean voters in the communal areas 
seeking land for resettlement.  Forcing exit from the farms offered strategic partisan 
gain, i.e. political advantage by one political party and its members over another, 
through the mobilisation of political support.       
However, the farmworkers, numbering approximately two million (Hardnack 
2005: p. 174 citing Rutherford 2001 and Sachikonye 2003) were also an important 
demographic group, particularly within ZANU-PF's political base of the Mashonaland 
provinces, where nearly one-half of the commercial farms were located ((Utete 2003: p. 24 
Table 1).  As discussed below, this group posed challenges to the members of the ZANU-PF 
regime.  Their forced exit, also contributed to the easing of the 'State's Dilemma', including by 
reducing the numbers of perceived ‘enemies’ in the rural areas of Zimbabwe and ZANU-PF’s 
political heartland.  
This section of the dissertation has discussed the concepts and typology of 
voluntary versus forced exit, as well as their respective implications for collective 
action (e.g. mobilisation, voice).  It has identified that the critical factor in the 
dynamics of exit and voice, is which actor holds the power to decide 'exit'.  The next 
section of this chapter discusses in more depth the strategic institutional reforms that 
altered the dynamics of exit from one that was voluntary to forced.  
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Forcing exit: Reforming property rights in the commercial farming 
sector   
Historically, the commercial farming sector has been one of Zimbabwe's most 
important economic sectors, supporting food production, foreign exchange earnings via 
exports, significant direct employment as well as the development other related 
industries (UNDP 2008: pp. 126-155).  However, the disparity between conditions in 
the commercial farming sector, with its large land-holdings, and access to productive 
resources, contrasted sharply with the conditions in the communal areas where many 
Zimbabweans lived – areas that were densely-populated and largely situated in the 
poorer quality agro-ecological zones (Sachikonye 2005: p. 32; Matondi 2012: p. x).  
This disparity was particularly noticeable in the ZANU-PF heartland of the 
Mashonaland provinces, where nearly one-half of the large-scale commercial farms 
were located (Utete 2003: p. 24 Table 1).      
Land ownership was an important element of ZANU's liberation struggle 
(Sachikonye 2003a: pp. 228-229; Sachikonye 2005: pp. 31-32; Utete 2003: pp. 12-13).  
Given both the economic and political importance of the white-owned commercial 
farming sector, it was not surprising that specific rules governing the post-
independence interactions between the new government and the sector were negotiated 
as part of the political transition to an independent Zimbabwe.  The Lancaster House 
Agreement stated:   
"When property is wanted for one of these purposes [public benefit or 
"settlement for agricultural purposes"], its acquisition will be lawful 
only on condition that the law provides for the prompt payment of 
adequate compensation and, where the acquisition is contested, that a 
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court order is obtained.  A person whose property is so acquired will 
be guaranteed the right of access to the High Court to determine the 
amount of compensation" (Lancaster 1979: Annex C Article V(1), 
emphasis added).  
These rules governing property rights were, in turn, set out in the 1979 Land 
Acquisition Act and inscribed into Zimbabwe's new Constitution (Matondi 2012: p. 36 
Table 2.1).  At a time of significant political change, these rules offered greater 
economic certainty to actors, including both farmers and investors, and let the new 
Zimbabwean government turn its attention to other priorities and challenges.    
These rules also structured the relationship between the actors, creating 
opportunities for both voluntary exit ('willing buyer, willing seller') as well as the 
action-choice of voice (right to appeal).  These rules established the permissive 
framework under which land acquisition could occur, and set the conditions for the use 
of voice, i.e. the conditions under which appeals of the government's decisions were 
allowed.  The rules also established a specific prohibition, i.e. the new Government of 
Zimbabwe (GOZ) could not compulsorily acquire land for the purposes of resettlement 
without the payment of compensation.  This prohibition restricted forced exit, and as 
Sachikonye (2003b: p. 17) and Utete (2003: p. 15) argued, also limited the possibility 
of a comprehensive approach to land reform.  
Off-setting this economic certainty was the fact that these rules were both 
conditional and time limited.  Land acquisition was conditional upon the availability of 
financial resources (either domestic or through international assistance) (UNDP 2008: 
p. 159), at a time when other socio-economic demands and budgetary pressures in the 
now independent Zimbabwe were considerable.  Second, the protections offered by 
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these rules were of fixed duration.  These constitutional protections would end in 1990 
– that is, ten years after Zimbabwe's independence.  These protections were also 
effectuated indirectly, through a broader limitation on constitutional amendment during 
the first post-independence decade (Sadomba 2008: p. 63 citing Moyo 1995: p. 106).  
However, in 1985, the Acquisition Act revised the rules to narrow the 
permissions associated with the sale and transfer of the farmers’ property rights.  The 
Act provided the GOZ with the 'right of first refusal', a right that was still responsive to 
the voluntary decisions of individual landowners (Moyo 2006: p. 147).  The right of 
first refusal did not include the power of selection, nor the power of initiative.  The 
responsiveness also meant that geographic distribution of land acquired varied.  
Seventy percent of the land offered was in southern Zimbabwe meaning that little 
progress on land acquisition was made in the politically important Mashonaland 
provinces (Moyo 2006: p. 147 note 93).    
For the landowners, the Act obligated them to offer the right of first refusal to 
the GOZ, constraining their action-choice of exit only indirectly, i.e. through the choice 
of purchaser, rather than the decision, or the timing of the sale.  Once offered, a 
Certificate of No Present Interest was issued by the Government if the GOZ did not 
wish to acquire the land (Matondi 2012:  p. 36 Table 2.1).  These certificates supported 
the continuance of these property rights.  These rules remained in effect until 1992, two 
years after the land acquisition provisions of the post-independence Constitution ended.  
Not surprisingly, with the post-independence prohibitions now expired, the 
1992 Land Acquisition Act (Zimbabwe 1992) further altered the institutional rules to 
provide a more permissive framework that would govern the acquisition of land for 
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resettlement.  The Act created a new power for the government, i.e. the legal authority 
to designate, and therefore acquire, specific parcels of land for the purposes of 
resettlement (Zimbabwe 1992).  Designation transferred some of the decision-making 
to the regime, through a veto over the future disposition of the farm or parcel of land 
for a period of up to ten years.  The governing regime now held, for the first time, a 
limited veto on the action-choice of voluntary exit by specific landowners.  The power 
to force exit (displacement), and to select the timing of this exit was now emerging.  
This power was broader than Lancaster's general criterion of 'willing 
buyer' (government) and 'willing seller' (landowner), and the 1985 Acquisition Act's 
responsive option of the 'right of first refusal'.   
The Land Acquisition Act created new powers, including the powers of initiative 
(to designate), of selection (specific designation decisions) and of compulsion 
(compulsory acquisition and mandatory compliance).  These powers, i.e. "...strategies 
that seek to alter the content of decisions by shifting the power of decision-making to 
different people” (Stone 2002: p. 262) restructured the relations between the regime 
and other actors within the sector.  For the members of the ZANU-PF regime, these 
new powers greatly reduced future transaction costs and allowed the regime to alter the 
permeability of the sector.  Together, they increased uncertainty for some actors (e.g. 
commercial farmers) and raised the expectations of others (e.g. rural Zimbabweans).   
To create a power of initiative, in this case the power to designate land under 
the Land Acquisition Act, is a purposeful decision that communicates a strategic 
intention to act.  However, the power of initiative, because of its intentionality, also 
raises stakeholder and political constituency concerns and modifies expectations 
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(Solesbury 1976). The delays in advancing land acquisition and distribution following 
the proclamation of this Act generated frustration among ZANU-PF's key 
constituencies (Utete 2003: p. 15; Sadomba 2008: p. 20; UNDP 2008: pp. 9-10).  The 
power of initiative allows an issue to be addressed through targeted action, and, like 
many rules, is also prospective in nature (Solesbury 1976: p. 383; Knight 1992: pp. 
68-69 citing Searle 1969: p. 42).   
By vesting the powers of initiative and selection with the governing regime, the 
limited veto created by the Land Acquisition Act (Zimbabwe 1992) created greater 
uncertainty and increased costs for other actors, specifically the commercial farmers 
and agricultural landowners.  The power of selection – in this case the power to 
designate a specific parcel of land – increased the dependency of individual landowners 
on the decisions of the governing regime, as Rowe discussed with reference to the 
Rhodesian commercial agriculture sector under sanctions (Rowe 2001: pp. 115-120).   
Zimbabwe's commercial farmers now faced uncertainties about whether, when, and to 
what extent (i.e. in whole or in part), their land may be unilaterally designated.   
The power of compulsion also minimizes transaction costs as it is a power that 
shifts the costs of compliance to other actors.  The costs of monitoring the designation 
process, of challenging in court the decision, i.e. the action-choice of voice, as well as 
the costs of addressing the decision's ramifications (e.g. coordination with others, 
business losses) were transferred to others.  Many farmers reported learning of the 
designation only via announcements in the newspaper (ICG 2004: p. 85).   
The reforms to the Land Acquisition Act removed the earlier institutional 
constraints that had restricted the scale and pace of acquisition.  The 'willing buyer, 
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willing seller' model de facto limited the scale and pace of acquisition, and the 1985 
Acquisition Act, only modified slightly by forcing the 'first right of refusal' to the GOZ.  
However, the Land Acquisition Act’s powers of initiative and selection could be applied 
in aggregates.  Aggregation increases the productivity of the tactics and strategies 
deployed (Lichbach 1995: pp. 51-54), including by minimizing transaction costs.   
In Zimbabwe, the aggregation strategies decided and adopted included 
designating farms where the landowner held ownership of more than one farm or 
establishing maximum sizes for farms and prohibiting the sale of commercial farms 
that exceeded this specific size (Utete 2003: pp. 19-20; Sachikonye 2003b: p. 39).  The 
"Report of the Presidential Land Review Committee on the Implementation of the Fast 
Track Land Reform Programme (2000-2002) (‘The Utete Report’)" (Government of 
Zimbabwe, 2003) states that the Land Acquisition Act was adopted "...[in] a bid to 
speed up the process of land acquisition and resettlement" (Utete 2003: p. 15; Matondi 
2012: p. 35).   
These powers altered the rules governing commercial agricultural property 
rights, and restructured the relations between the ZANU-PF regime and the white-
Zimbabwean dominated commercial agricultural sector.  Designation denied the 
landowner of voluntary action-choice of exit, for the powers of designation made the 
GOZ the decision-maker, including a time-bound veto over the land's future 
disposition.  Designation de facto removed the land from the private property market, 
removing the choices (both financial and in terms of timing) it offered to commercial 
farmers.   
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Rowe's study of the institutional reforms in Rhodesia under UDI, found that the 
increasing government monopoly of property rights (e.g. the Rhodesian regime legislated itself 
as sole buyer and exporter of the tobacco harvest) meant that the commercial farmers became 
increasingly dependent on the governing regime for the maintenance of their property rights, 
and therefore their livelihoods (Rowe 2001: pp. 83-88).  These institutional reforms that 
weakened property rights "...helped to [raise dramatically] the opportunity costs of political 
dissent" (ibid: p. 95),  in other words, the action-choice of voice.  However, the Rhodesian 
reforms did not affect the asset of land itself but rather the agricultural production generated 
from these assets.  In Zimbabwe, the gradual accumulation of powers over property rights by 
the governing regime affected the primary asset, i.e. the right of title to the land itself.  As 
discussed, the denial of the action-choice of voluntary exit had become a residual source 
of voice despite its private costs and uncertain prospects of success.   
Zimbabwe's commercial farmers, facing forced exit from both their businesses 
and their homes, rationally exercised their action-choice of voice.  The Act permitted 
this voice, with its rules regarding the right to appeal the designation decisions.  In 
1997, 1471 farms were designated (out of an estimated 8700 farms), with 1393 
objections received and 510 of these objections upheld (Utete 2003: pp. 15; 24 Table 
1).  Subsequent, intentional reforms to the Act restricted the processes of appeal, and 
therefore also narrowed the opportunities to exercise the action-choice of voice.   
The Land Acquisition Act was introduced in 1992, when the government was 
facing some new uncertainties and some important pressures.  The Act greatly reduced 
the regime's uncertainty regarding the future institutional alternatives and their 
distributional consequences for Zimbabwe's best agricultural lands.  It was a strategic 
action that established new ‘rules of the game’ (North 1990), and rules that were more 
permissive, and furnished new powers.    
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However, while the Act provided this new certainty, the governing regime was, 
under the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) , committed to 12
liberalizing the Zimbabwean economy.  The ESAP's design, with its budgetary 
constraints, did not take into account the need for land acquisition (Moyo 2000a: p. 11), 
but, nevertheless, still had important consequences for the commercial agriculture 
sector.  For example, under ESAP, commercial farmers benefited from labour reforms 
that reduced farm-labour costs and privatised the agricultural marketing boards (ILO/GOZ 
1992: pp. 51-52; IFPRI 1998), as well as new rules governing foreign exchange and export 
earnings (Moyo 2000b: p. 54; Pilossof 2012: p.30).       
Many of these structural economic reforms were enacted at the insistence of the 
international community, and there were divisions within the government over their 
merit (Clapham 1996: p. 163; IMF 1998: Country Profile Zimbabwe).  The increasing 
influence of the international community in domestic economic reforms (Mumvuma 
2006; Brett 2008), may have contributed to the regime’s later frustration about western 
interference and the elements of sovereignty that was part of their patriotic narrative.  
The ESAP and ZIMPREST programmes also reduced the role of the state (IMF 1998).  
This put at risk many of Zimbabwe's gains during the post-independence period, but 
also ZANU-PF's patronage-based system of loyalty/support.   
The Land Acquisition Act and its new powers demonstrated a commitment to 
advancing land acquisition and redistribution.  Sachikonye (2003a: p. 231) argued that 
ZANU-PF’s political security, as evidenced by their significant parliamentary 
majorities and weak political opposition, meant that the members of the regime felt 
 and later its 1996 successor, the 'Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation' 12
programme (ZIMPREST).
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little pressure to act, while Matondi (2012: p. 19 citing Matondi and Moyo 2002) 
argued that ESAP-related budget cuts limited the possibilities of large-scale land 
acquisition.  Given the multi-dimensionality of public policy-making, it is possible that 
both arguments are valid, with ZANU-PF's sense of political security potentially 
reducing the pressure to act, and the international pressures to cut budgets likely 
providing an external justification to explain the limited action.  During the early-to-
mid 1990s, only 17,000 additional families were resettled, far short of the established 
target of 110,000 families (Sachikonye 2005: p. 32; UNDP 2008: pp. 151-153).  Many 
members of the ZANU-PF elite were able to take advantage of these economic 
liberalisations, and perhaps too the sense of political security.  Many obtained leasehold 
access to commercial farmland, benefiting from a desire for black economic 
empowerment within the sector (Sachikonye 2003a: p. 232; Moyo 2006: pp. 145-146).  
The country was also facing a very significant and prolonged drought that 
created, or exacerbated, food insecurity for many rural Zimbabweans.  Rural 
Zimbabweans living in the poorer, communal areas were also struggling with 
increasing population pressures, economic reform and the HIV/AIDS pandemics – each 
of which had an adverse effect on agricultural livelihoods. The economic pressures 
faced by Zimbabweans increased (Mumvuma 2006: pp. 250-252; Meredith 2002: p. 161; 
Saunders 2000: p. 63) and per capita income fell by nine percent during the period 1990-1996 
(IMF 1998: p. 103).   
As discussed, new rules that provide the power of initiative raise expectations 
of action.  In these circumstances of drought and hardship, and the long pent-up 
demand for land, it is not surprising that rural Zimbabweans began to exercise their 
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action-choice of voice, expressing their dissatisfaction and increasing frustration with 
the pace of land resettlement (Sachikonye 2005: p. 32; Moyo 2000b: pp. 146-148).  In 
late 1999, nearly three-quarters (73 percent) of the Zimbabweans surveyed by 
Afrobarometer rated the government's handling of the issue of "...enough land for 
everyone" as either "not very well or not at all well" (Chikwanha-Dzenga et al. 2001: p. 
26 Table 11).  Allegations that many senior ZANU-PF officials were privately 
benefiting from the land acquisition process generated further pressure for action 
(UNDP 2008: p. 152; HRW 2002: p. 7).   
Although the government and international donors did build a consensus for 
land acquisition and resettlement, with an agreed target of 5 million hectares of land, 
this consensus and its recommendations were not implemented, due in part, to a lack of 
significant financial support from donors (Utete 2003: p. 16; UNDP 2008: p. 152).  
Disagreements between the international donor community and the GOZ, regarding 
land purchase financing existed, including as a result of the realities of the state 
facilitated elite access to land, concerns about cronyism and corruption, as well as the 
implications of these actions for inequalities and beneficiaries (Sachikonye 2003a: p. 
232; HRW 2002: p. 9).   
Given the centrality of the land compensation issue, the communicated position 
of President Mugabe in 1997 is important:   
"We are going to take the land and we are not going to pay for the 
soil.  This is our set policy. Our land was never bought and there is no 
way we could buy back the land. However, if Britain wants 
compensation, they should give us money and we will pass it on to 
their children" (UNDP 2008: p. 154 citing The Guardian 15 October 
1997, emphasis added).   
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However, Britain's role as the colonial power at the time of the original 
Rhodesian land expropriations, and their post-independence influence as a major 
international donor to Zimbabwe, made their views important as well.  The new British 
Minister for International Development, Clare Short, replied, in November 1997 to the 
Zimbabwean Minister of Agriculture:  
"I should make it clear that we do not accept that Britain has a 
special responsibility to meet the costs of land purchase in 
Zimbabwe. We are a new government from diverse backgrounds 
without links to former colonial interests.  My own origins are Irish 
and as you know we were colonised not colonisers. We do however 
recognise the very real issues you face over land reform...We would 
be prepared to support a programme of land reform that was part of a 
poverty eradication strategy but not on any other basis" (Utete 2003: 
p. 15 emphasis added). 
These opposing views were emblematic of the polarisation between Britain, the 
'West' and Zimbabwe as the crisis unfolded.  These and other past (e.g. colonial and 
Rhodesian era events) were amplified and reinforced through the ZANU-PF's patriotic 
narrative, particularly through its emphasis on sovereignty, the centrality of land, and 
its resistance to Western interference.   
President Mugabe, at the donors’ conference, also underscored the growing 
frustration of Zimbabweans with the slow pace of land resettlement: "[i]f we delay in 
resolving the land needs of our people they will resettle themselves.  It has happened 
before and it may happen again" (Utete 2003: p. 16).  In the late 1990s, small-scale 
land squatting occurred, as the communal areas suffered from both poverty and 
population pressures (Matondi 2012: p. 20; Sachikonye 2003a: pp. 233-234).  
Landowners sought, and obtained court orders to uphold their property rights, which in 
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turn were often enforced as the police carried out a number of legal evictions (Sadomba 
2008: pp. 97-118; Matondi 2012: p. 20; Utete 2003: p. 15).   
Matondi (2012: p. 32) argues that the failure of land reform during this period 
(1998-2000), was one of several factors, but not “the sole cause” that gave "…rise to 
the [fast-track land reform programme]”.  Local pressures for land redistribution also 
had increased (Moyo 2006: pp. 148-146).  The war veterans became increasingly vocal 
about their impoverished situation, adding to those rural Zimbabweans that were 
already expressing their dissatisfaction, through the action-choice of voice.  The 
Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veteran's Association (ZNLWVA), inaugurated as a 
national organisation in 1992 (Sadomba 2008:  pp. 84-85) increased its pressure on 
members of the regime throughout the 1990s, including on land issues.   
The ZNLWVA's advocacy led to new presidential pledges of material benefits 
(i.e. pensions), enacted through changes to the War Victims Compensation Act 
(Zimbabwe 2001b). The war veterans also continued to advocate for immediate land 
redistribution (Sadomba 2008: p. 20; Moyo 2001: p. 314), and threatened further farm 
occupations if the regime did not include them in the resettlement processes (Sadomba 
2008: pp. 92-93).  They were to be beneficiaries, with President Mugabe pledging 
"...twenty per cent of all land that was to be acquired by the state for resettlement and 
residential purposes" would be allocated to the war veterans (Matondi 2012: p. 26 
citing Sadomba and Andrew 2006: p. 9).    
The financial commitments to the war veterans had significant economic 
(UNDP 2008: p. 10) and important political consequences. Sadomba argues that they 
created tensions with other Zimbabweans and helped to alienate the war veterans from 
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other members of the political opposition.  The elite's abuse and corruption in the 
allocation of these funds also helped to more broadly fuel opposition to ZANU-PF and 
to its economic management (Sadomba 2008: p. 91; ICG 2004: pp. 56-58).   
Different authors furnish different dates for the political alliance between 
members of the ZANU-PF regime and the war veterans, with implications for 
understanding the causal reasons for the alliance.  Chitiyo (2009: p. 3) dates the 
alliance back to 1997, and although he provides no additional detail to justify his 
assertion, the timing coincides with the pensions decision.  This suggests an alliance 
based on the satisfactory resolution of ZNLWVA’s demands for improved material 
benefits, in exchange for support and political loyalty to ZANU-PF.  Alexander et. al. 
(2001: pp. 56-58) discuss that, due to these payments, ZANU-PF mobilised continued 
support from an important nation-wide organisation, i.e. the ZNLWVA.   They also 
note, however, that this political support was not shared by all members (including 
those who left ZNLWVA to form the Liberators' Platform for Peace and Development), 
and many from the Matabeleland region. 
Sadomba (2008: p. 146) dates the alliance to February 18th, 2000, arguing that 
this alliance was a strategic choice by ZANU-PF, to reduce the collective dissent from 
this constituency – in other words to help ease ZANU-PF's collective action problem. 
In his view, the alliance was intentionally made to "...avoid fighting a battle [of 
survival] on two fronts..." i.e. with war veterans and the MDC (Sadomba 2008: p. 92).  
The war veterans were important allies - many had fought for ZANU during the war, 
were members of the party and whose liberation experiences were closely linked to 
ZANU-PF's own patriotic narrative.  With reference to liberation movements more 
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broadly, Clapham (1996: p. 242) argued that their sense of ownership of the state 
creates a "sense of accountability to the [liberation] movement and to the fighters, 
rather than to the population as a whole" as well as a "particular[ly] intense resentment 
at external pressure..." for domestic policy change.  In the years following, as the crisis 
in Zimbabwe unfolded, Clapham's words would be prescient.    
Sadomba's analysis recognises strategic decision-making, but also suggests two 
opponents external to the regime.  However, Moorcraft (2011: p. 142) argues that the 
alliance was to consolidate Mugabe's hold on ZANU-PF itself by reducing attacks from 
within the party, including those who were members of the security services.  Retaining 
the support of the Zimbabwean Defence Forces (ZDF) was critical, and many members 
of the ZDF were also former veterans (Moorcraft 2011: p. 167; Chitiyo 2009: p. 3).  
More generally, Lichbach asserts that a "...disloyal military is a sign of weak 
government resources" (Lichbach 1995: p. 68) that can reinforce collective action 
problems.    
Strategies of cooperation with traditional allies and/or the allocation of selective 
incentives are strategic decisions that both build and communicate strength by 
reinforcing the ruling party's unity.  One of the solutions to resolving collective action 
problems is to "increase the probability of winning", with both the state and 'rebels' 
calculating how to appear strong in order to alter expectations towards future success 
rather than failure (Lichbach 1995: pp. 62-81).  The support from the war veterans 
reinforced the liberation elements of ZANU-PF’s patriotic narrative, adding credibility 
to both its messaging – and to its threats.  This political alliance also helped to 
exacerbate the collective action challenges faced by the MDC, for example, given the 
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role of the war veterans in the political violence that occurred.   Members of the 
ZNLWVA declared their political support for ZANU-PF in the critical June 2000 
elections (HRW 2002: p. 8) and "...vowed never to let the MDC assume power" (HR 
NGO Forum 2001: p. 5).   
This chapter has discussed the development of specific institutional reforms that 
provided the regime with new powers, and the limitations of the ‘willing buyer, willing 
seller’ model.  Both have been discussed with specific reference to the dynamics of the 
action-choices of exit and voice.  The dissatisfaction of many of ZANU-PF’s traditional 
rural supporters, and the war veterans, was confirmed by public opinion data that 
revealed Zimbabweans’ dissatisfaction with the performance of the regime on the 
critical issue of land.  The failure of the international community and the GOZ to reach 
an agreement on the terms and financing of land resettlement has been noted.  
However, another critical element in the reform of property rights in the commercial 
agriculture sector was the constitutional reform process and debates.  These will now 
be discussed.  
Land acquisition and the constitutional debates     
Also in the late 1990s, the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) and its 
allies were building support within Zimbabwe for a new, more democratic constitution 
that amongst other reforms, would reduce the powers of the executive presidency, and 
introduce democratic and electoral reforms (McCandless 2011: pp. 48-49; Saunders 
2000: pp. 92-95).  The NCA was a civic coalition that brought together trade unionists, the 
!  265
Zimbabwe Council of Churches and other civic and human rights organisations (McCandless 
2011: pp. 40-41, 48-49; Dorman 2003).  
The NCA and its advocacy generated new pressures on the regime, and also 
generated new uncertainties, both through the substantive content of the constitutional 
reform debates and the scale of their mobilisation.  These debates, and the NCA's 
constitutional reform process de facto targeted the institutional stability, and its 
distributional advantage, that were sustained by the rules of the current Constitution 
with its powerful Executive Presidency.  Seeing the NCA's efforts as an emerging threat, 
and seeking to reduce the uncertainty associated with constitutional reform, i.e. future 
institutional alternatives and design, a government-led constitutional commission ('the 
Chidyausiku Commission') was created in 1999, to develop its own constitutional proposals for 
the President.  The government-sponsored draft constitution, rather than the people-
driven draft of the NCA would then be subjected to a national referendum vote 
(Dorman 2003: pp. 849-854; Saunders 2000: pp. 96-97).     
Although the Commission’s findings were criticised for not fully respecting the 
views expressed by Zimbabweans during the Commission's hearings, particularly on 
the issues of the executive presidency (Saunders 2000: pp. 99-100; Dorman 2003: pp. 
853-854), there was some public support and trust in the Commission.  Zimbabweans 
were surveyed prior to the constitutional referendum and their opinions on both the 
Commission and the NCA initiative were sought.  Notably, in the Mashonaland Central, East 
and Midlands provinces, those surveyed demonstrated higher degrees of trust for the 
Commission process than that of the NCA initiative (MPOI 2000:  p.16 Table 25).  However, 
overall, the Zimbabweans surveyed indicated that their level of trust in the NCA constitutional 
initiative was higher (43.3%) than that of the Commission (34.9%), with markedly higher 
support for the NCA's initiative in urban areas (ibid).    
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The members of the regime stated that the constitutional reform process would 
address the land issues, fully anticipating that the draft constitution would be adopted in 
the referendum (Matondi 2012: p. 20; Moorcraft 2011: p. 142).  Of note, the 
Commission’s report noted that only 30 percent of Zimbabweans supported acquisition 
without compensation (Shaw 2003: p.  80 citing Commission pp. 33, 149) .  However, 13
the ZNLWVA protested the draft text developed by the Commission, and "...demanded 
that no compensation [for land] be paid.  ZNLWVA's [Harare representative] Douglas 
Mahiya [said], ‘We are saying the price of the land has been paid by the blood of the 
people who died during the war'" (Sadomba 2008: p. 180 citing Daily News 12 January 
2000) and the ZNLWVA threatened to mobilise against the draft text in the referendum, 
i.e. to campaign for a 'No' vote (Sadomba 2008: p. 180).  The NCA had refused to 
become part of the Commission itself, including due to the heavy presence of ZANU-
PF members and allies on the Commission, lobbied against the draft constitutional text 
it produced, and campaigned for a 'No' vote in the referendum (Dorman 2003: pp. 
849-854; Saunders 2000: pp. 98-100).  
Mugabe amended the Commission's draft constitutional text to assign 
responsibility for the compensation of lost property rights solely to Britain (Boone and 
Kriger 2010: p. 181; Meredith 2002: pp. 164-165).  The amendment reflected the 
demands of the war veterans, ZANU-PF's own liberation history and also Mugabe's 
(and ZANU-PF's) long standing commitment to this issue. it also reflected earlier 1997 
public statement, cited above.  The amendment was an incentive to rural voters (Chan 
2003: p. 144), but one which also relieved the government of significant financial 
 As cited, Shaw (2003) states 30 percent of Zimbabweans did not support acquisition without 13
compensation.  Boone and Kriger (2010: p. 180 citing Shaw 2003) state fifteen percent.  
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responsibilities at a time of deepening economic problems. The message to 
Zimbabwe’s commercial farmers (and to Britain) on compensation was clear.   
The defeat of the draft constitution in the February 2000 referendum had 
institutional and political implications.  Amongst other consequences, the referendum 
defeat meant that the existing institutional framework for land acquisition remained in 
effect – with its requirements for compensation, with its right to legal appeal from  
commercial farmers' whose land had been designated, and, with its consequences in 
terms of the regime's political support.   
For the President and other members of the ZANU-PF regime, this defeat came 
just a few months before the June 2000 elections, where ZANU-PF would face, for the 
first time, the MDC (Raftopoulos and Quantin 2001: pp. 40-43).  The referendum 
defeat altered future expectations regarding institutional outcomes, emboldening the 
MDC and its allies.  It also generated greater uncertainty for the members of the 
ZANU-PF regime and its allies, including about the prospects for land and the 
consequences of political reform.   Further the referendum campaign, had allowed the 
MDC (and the broader NCA) to present "alternative political messages" in the rural 
areas, ZANU-PF's traditional heartland of support (Raftopoulos and Quantin 2001: p. 
43, author's own translation).   
Both the NCA referendum campaign, and the MDC (as a party, during its 
campaign), provided opportunities for the democratic expression of the action-choice of 
'voice' by Zimbabweans, including by white Zimbabwean members of the commercial 
farming sector.  The increasing probability of forced exit was a factor that helped to 
initially incentivize voice by this community.  Both the NCA and the MDC "...provided 
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new spaces for the involvement of white [Zimbabweans] in the political arena", while 
the "...land occupations and their direct threat to private property rights certainly 
provided a strong impetus for their involvement” (Pilossof 2013: p. 39 citing Selby 
2006: p. 277).   
The MDC's campaign promised new economic policies, proposals for political 
reform, pledges to reduce corruption and made more moderate proposals for land 
reform (Raftopoulos 2007: p. 125; Raftopoulos and Quantin 2001: p. 43).  It rationally 
attracted support from the white business and commercial farming communities.  
ZANU-PF's campaigned on the slogan 'the land is the economy, the economy is the 
land' (Sachikonye 2003a: p. 233).  This slogan effectively framed the campaign on the 
centrality of the land issue, while framing, through their causal narrative, the need for 
land acquisition as the sine qua non for economic growth and performance.  
Zimbabweans’ economic dissatisfaction was therefore caused by the historical 
inequities of land ownership, than the implementation (or not) of ZANU-PF’s own 
economic actions and policies.  The slogan also aligned with several of the key themes 
of their patriotic narrative, i.e. sovereignty, race and land.   
  
Fast-tracking land reform:  mobilisation for a credible commitment 
The defeat of ZANU-PF's proposed constitution in the February 2000 
referendum meant that the existing institutional framework for land acquisition 
continued, and the draft provisions that would permit compulsory acquisition without 
compensation, had been defeated.  For members of the ZANU-PF regime, and many 
members of the war veterans association, this rejection, by Zimbabweans of the 
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regime’s proposed constitutional reforms, “...[strengthened their] resolve to embark on 
an accelerated land reform programme" (Utete 2003: p. 16; Matondi 2012: p. 19).  With 
the June 2000 elections looming, and with their political uncertainty, the war veterans 
wanted the political commitments made to them about land allocations, 
institutionalised in the Constitution (Marongwe 2003: p. 178).  In other words, facing 
political uncertainty about land acquisition, the veterans' wanted institutional rules that 
would credibly commit future governments (regardless of party) to their promised, 
preferential access to land.   
Taking strategic advantage of ZANU-PF's parliamentary majority, and in 
advance of the June 2000 elections, an amendment to the Zimbabwean Constitution 
was adopted in April 2000  to address the land question.  Compulsory acquisition was 14
now permitted and responsibility for payment for the land was assigned to the UK 
(Boone and Kriger 2010: p. 181).  For some, this amendment provided some political 
"legitimacy to [the] actions" of the members of the ZANU-PF regime in the weeks 
prior to the June 2000 parliamentary elections (Matondi 2012: p. 33 citing Madhuku 
2004).  For others, the amendment was seen as undemocratic and/or in ZANU-PF's 
interests (Sachikonye 2003b: p. 37; Sachikonye 2011a: p. 108; UNDP 2008: p. 154).  In 
2001, Zimbabwe's Supreme Court ruled that this amended Land Acquisition Act (2000) 
was legal (Sachikonye 2003b: p. 40).   
This sixteenth amendment to Zimbabwe's Constitution completed the legal 
transition from 'willing seller' (voluntary exit) to 'compulsory purchase' (forced exit) 
begun under the Lancaster Constitution.   The acquisition process was simplified by 
 This constitutional reform was integrated into the Land Acquisition Act (2000) shortly thereafter.  14
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reducing the transactions associated with the process of designation (Matondi 2012: p. 
34).  The members of the regime had re-written the rules, removing important financial 
and statutory obligations that had constrained land acquisition.  The legal framework 
for the compulsory acquisition of land was now in place, and Zimbabwean-financed 
compensation for the land itself  prohibited.  Mugabe's 1997 statement "...[we] are 15
going to take the land and we are not going to pay for the soil" was now the legal 
reality (UNDP 2008: p. 154, citing The Guardian 15 October 1997).  A more rapid and 
cost-effective means of addressing the demand for land (Matondi 2012: pp. 35, 39) was 
now permitted. 
The power of initiative, created under the rules of the Land Acquisition Act 
(1992), together with the broader power of compulsion, were now deployed to create 
the new fast-track land reform programme ('fast-track'), launched in July 2000.  
Formally defined as "...the process of compulsorily acquiring land for resettlement 
purposes based on legal instruments and a set of administrative 
guidelines….”  (Matondi 2012: p. 18), informally, the programme was characterized by 
jambanja, a Shona language word meaning "...'mayhem' or causing violence to achieve 
a certain objective'" (Matondi 2012: p. xi emphasis added).  In an often mutually 
reinforcing process, the occupations helped advance land acquisition through informal 
processes, and at times, targeted violence, that forced exit, while formal processes of 
compulsory acquisition, helped to legitimate or incentivize the occupations.     
Once launched, the 'fast track' programme's scope and ambition grew, from an 
official target of compulsorily acquiring more than five million hectares of land. to new 
 compensation was still permitted for equipment and improvements made.15
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goals of 11 million hectares and the resettlement of 300,000 people and the 
development of a black-Zimbabwean commercial farming community of 51,000 (Utete 
2003: p. 18; Sachikonye 2005: p. 33).  By April 2002, just after the Presidential 
elections, over 5,000 commercial farms totalling 10 million hectares had been listed for 
acquisition (IRIN 2003b).  The programme officially concluded in late 2002 although 
"Intermittent" land occupations and evictions of commercial farmers continued until 
mid-2005 (Sachikonye 2005: p. 33; Sachikonye 2003a: p. 227).   
In May 2002, new amendments to the Act were adopted, again enabling faster 
evictions and acquisition (i.e. strengthening control over the timing of forced exit), and 
hardening the penalties for non-compliance (Zimbabwe 2002c; IRIN 2003b).  In 2003, 
the scope of compulsory acquisition was broadened, through formal amendment to the 
Act, to include agricultural businesses that operated in the previously-excluded export 
processing zones (ICG 2004: p. 107).    
From April 2000, with the approval of the new constitutional amendment, these 
new reforms, sought to publicly demonstrate to Zimbabweans, a reinforced ZANU-PF 
commitment to this long-standing political goal.  As discussed, permissive reforms to 
the formal rules governing land acquisition clearly communicated an intention to act.  
This author argues that these institutional reforms, and the regime’s support to the 
mobilisation of many of the farm occupations, were both examples of reinforcing their 
political credibility on a key commitment, so as to reduce their collective action 
challenge of the ‘step-good’ of the June 2000 elections.  From the perspective of the 
'State's Dilemma' and the regime's time-bound collective action dilemma, these 
permissive reforms may be explained as a means of increasing the "productivity of 
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tactics" (Lichbach 1995: pp. 51-54) needed to quickly address their collective action 
challenge.    
It was in Zimbabwe's vote-rich, densely-populated communal areas that the 
credibility of the regime's commitment on land redistribution would be judged.  For the 
regime, the challenge of altering expectations, and therefore choices, in this critical 
policy area, was both significant and critical, given the ‘step-good’ of the upcoming 
June 2000 elections.  Analysing the 1999 Afrobarometer survey, as discussed above, 
revealed that nearly three-quarters of Zimbabweans surveyed had negative views of 
ZANU-PF's performance on the land issue.  Twenty years of promising land 
redistribution and missing publicly announced targets (UNDP 2008: pp. 151-153; 
Sachikonye 2011a: pp. 109-112) created a credibility gap for the members of the 
regime, and therefore the challenge of demonstrating their commitment at this critical 
juncture.     
Credibility and commitment can be established through both actions and signals 
of intent, as well as demonstrated through effect.  When commercial farms situated in 
communities and areas where land had not previously been redistributed were publicly 
gazette, this gazetting provided reliable information that communicated intent to other 
actors.   "From 2000 to 2002 the government was clearly on the offensive as it gazetted 
large-scale farms in the national press, ostensibly to demonstrate the seriousness of its 
intention" (Matondi 2012: p. 34, emphasis added).   
Members of the regime and their allies also demonstrated effect, through the 
public and forced exit (evictions) of individual commercial farmers from their farms.  
These evictions were often scaled up and/or coordinated by members of the security 
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and/or intelligence services, working with war veterans and local officials (Alexander 
et al. 2001: p. 52; Alexander and McGregor 2001: p. 511: Chan 2003: p. 150).  The 
wide geographic spread of the occupations, the mobilisation of many, and the rapid 
expansion of acquisition efforts demonstrated visible action and momentum across a 
significant number of rural constituencies.  Over 1600 farms were occupied during 
2000 (COHRE 2001: p. 27; UNDP 2008: p. 154).  When the scale and scope of specific 
situations is altered, driven by "...particular occurrences or events" (e.g. new 
designations, new occupations), the issue will command attention on the public agenda 
(Solesbury 1976). 
Public statements and communications are a means for principals to set out 
expectations for agents (e.g. the war veterans, youth militia), to enable the coordination 
of efforts, to build support, and to communicate future intent to other actors.  They may 
be amplified relatively efficiently, factors that are particularly important in a 
decentralised, time-bound collective action problem such as the State’s Dilemma.  
Despite early statements by the Minister of Home Affairs (February 2000) that the land 
occupiers would be evicted, President Mugabe quickly, and publicly, countered that 
message, encouraging further occupations, in turn generating additional momentum 
(Matondi 2012: p. 20; COHRE 2001: p. 28).   
Signals of support, targeted non-enforcement and reduced penalties (or rewards) 
all encourage mobilisation.  
 "... [the] land occupiers from 2000 onwards gained courage from 
reading the signals of political leaders who directly supported them, 
or simply were indifferent to cases of forcible land takeovers. Where 
previously land occupiers had risked beatings and property 
destruction through forced removals by officials of the courts and the 
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police, now they were left alone and at times even encouraged by 
politicians to stay on the farms" (Matondi 2012: pp. 28-29 emphasis 
added).     
This author’s assertion of the need for ZANU-PF to demonstrate credible 
commitment in advance of the elections is shared by Matondi (2012:p. 21).and 
Marongwe (2003: p. 165), who argued that it became ZANU-PF's "...'official campaigning 
strategy' for wooing voters in the June 2000 parliamentary elections".   Matondi's 
(2012: pp. 78-80) analysis of voting patterns from the February 2000 referendum, and 
the results of the 2000, 2002 and 2005 elections in both Shambva and Mazowe 
districts, confirmed ZANU-PF's vote gains during the fast-track programme period.  
However, in both districts, the MDC made gains in the 29 March 2008 elections, as 
discussed in the synthesis section following this chapter.   
Mobilisation is about the organised efforts to bring about change (Stone 2002: 
p. 217), and the literature on the farm occupations has debated the role of the members 
of ZANU-PF in supporting and organising the occupations.  Chan and Primorac (2004: 
p. 71) argued that in this immediate post-referendum period, the occupations by war 
veterans were an “extemporized project” with support from members and allies of 
ZANU-PF.  Their assertion is also supported by Rutherford (2009: p. 388) in his study 
of the Ufomi area of Zimbabwe.  Sadomba’s (2008: pp. 123-150) more detailed study 
of the war veterans reveals the internal organisational and coordination actions taken by 
groups of war veterans, in specific Zimbabwean districts, particularly during the early 
stages of the occupations.  These actions included mobilising financial, logistical and 
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human resources, including through the use of selective incentives such as payments 
for cell phone use, the provision of food and/or the promise of land allocations.  
A larger role for members of the regime and their allies in the scaling up of 
these occupations is evident.  Scaling up the occupations was strategically 
advantageous to advancing the electoral prospects of ZANU-PF, for the scale-up 
provided evidence of visible action and commitment.  Coordination was needed as the 
occupations involved not only multiple geographic locations but also multiple actors 
including the police, security agencies and the ZNLWVA.  Operation Tsuro, occurred 
during the period of May to July 2000, i.e. in the weeks prior to and immediately after 
the parliamentary elections.   
The details of Operation Tsuro support both the claims of active coordination 
and execution by members of the regime, as well as the participation of, and 
coordination with the war veterans.  Operation Tsuro involved  "... approximately 1,500 
war veterans, 1,000 soldiers of the 5th Brigade, 300 [Central Intelligence Organisation] 
operatives, approximately 200 members of the police, and 5-6,000 ZANU-PF 
volunteers, including ZANU-PF youth members" (Chitiyo 2009: p. 4) with regular 
planning meetings held (Sachnikonye 2011b: p. 35 citing Chitiyo 2003; Chitiyo 2009: 
p. 3).  Although the “…ground troops’ consist[ed] of land-hungry peasants… led by 
war veterans"... the state "acted as the armorer" (Sachikonye 2011b: p. 35; Zimbabwe 
Human Rights NGO Forum 2001: p. 17), highlighting the different resources 
coordinated to advance the occupations.  
The literature also debates whether land redistribution was the primary goal of 
the members of the regime.  In this view, the 'fast track' land reform was simply a 
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"guise" to enable ZANU-PF to seize control of rural areas, establishing bases from 
which violence against farm-workers could be perpetrated (HR NGO Forum and the 
Justice for Agriculture 2007: p. 12; Anatomy of Terror 2011: p. 1).  Cliffe et al. (2011: 
p. 914 citing Alexander 2006; Pilossof 2012: p. 49) discuss that the occupations, and 
their accompanying violence, served to punish the commercial farmers (and their 
farmworkers) who had supported the MDC in the referendum. The targeted political 
violence was a penalty (Sachikonye 2003b: p. 38) for the past expression of the action-
choice of voice, (e.g. during the referendum campaign) and also served as a deterrent 
against future disloyalty (i.e. in the upcoming parliamentary elections).  The message of 
deterrence would be particularly targeted to the farmworkers that represented such an 
important number of votes in rural Zimbabwe, particularly in the Mashonaland 
provinces.    
The Anatomy of Terror report documents the establishment of multiple bases in 
the rural constituencies, although only 17 percent during the 2000 elections, and in the 
2002 elections, 22 percent of the bases identified were located on commercial farms 
(Anatomy of Terror 2011: Appendix H, p. 3 Table 3).  Other facilities and public 
buildings – and, notably in 2002, schools – were of greater importance than the 
commercial farms, as sites of the planning and execution of the campaigns of political 
violence and terror (Anatomy of Terror 2011:  Appendix H, p. 3 Table 3). The Report's 
constituency annexes also describe the various interactions between both ZANU-PF 
and the war veterans and the contributions of each to the occupations, the bases, the 
violence and the terror.  
!  277
This author concurs with Sachikonye that the violence in this period "…had a 
dual role…to seize land from 4,500 white farmers who owned about 11M ha in 2000, 
and to destroy the political base of the MDC amongst farm-workers…” (Sachikonye 
2011b: p. 33 emphasis added; Sachikonye 2003b: p. 38).  This approach links together 
ZANU-PF's patriotic narrative, land reform, and recognizes the centrality of the 
organised political violence (a penalty) to altering the electoral prospects of the MDC.  
For this author, the common denominator was the distributional advantage that arose 
from these intentional penalties. Support was retained or mobilised, their opponents' 
collective action problem was exacerbated, and an important economic asset, and a 
material benefit, had been obtained.    
Zimbabweans’ themselves attributed multiple objectives to the ‘fast-track’ 
programme.  Public opinion data from 2003 confirms that there was public support on 
the importance of the land question to the Zimbabwean people.  A majority of 
Zimbabweans surveyed, agreed (or strongly agreed) that land redistribution would 
address "...a colonial imbalance in the distribution of resources" (Sithole and Ruswa 
2003: p. 21 Figure 22 emphasis in the original) and that "...land reform was, and is, 
necessary" (ibid: p. 16).  Forty percent saw the land resettlement programme as 
empowering for Zimbabweans (ibid: p. 18 Figure 18).  This support aligned with 
ZANU-PF's patriotic narrative which appealed to resolving this historical grievance and 
colonial legacy.  
However, the same public opinion survey revealed Zimbabweans’ support for 
the objective of land redistribution was also mitigated by significant skepticism about 
the 'fast-track' programme's rationale, beneficiaries and its likely results.  A number of 
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the Zimbabweans viewed the ‘fast-track’ programme as a partisan political strategy 
rather than a genuine effort to redistribute land: 30 percent of the survey respondents 
indicated that the "major reason" for the exercise was a "vote winning 
strategy" (Sithole and Ruswa 2003: pp. 67, 17 Table 1) while others felt that “...the 
exercise was just a way to punish the whites for their perceived support of the 
opposition” (ibid: p. 16 emphasis added).  A majority (57.9 percent) of those surveyed 
believed that the programme had "benefited top politicians and their cronies” while 
only 30.7 percent who felt it had benefited “…deserving majority” (ibid: p. 35 Figure 
42).   
This dissertation is focused on the collective action challenge faced by ZANU-
PF.  The issue of land redistribution was an important one – to their key constituencies, 
to the liberation struggle, and to their electoral prospects.  The scaling-up of both the 
land seizures, and the occupations, were mutually reinforcing strategies that helped to 
mobilise political support through the delivery on a critical, stated political goal.  The 
violence that accompanied the process both resulted from intentional actions and the 
allocation of resources (e.g. Operation Tsuro), the communication of the non-
enforcement of formal rules, and served both to administer penalties to their opponents 
and to incentivize the achievement of their partisan goals.  The next section of this 
chapter discusses the issues of rewards and penalties in more depth.         
Rewards and Impunity  
This section of the chapter will now examine the use of land as a reward and 
incentive, and the use of impunity to reward many of those who participated in the 
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'fast-track' programme.  While many Zimbabweans did benefit from the land re-
settlement and acquisition processes, this section focuses on the role of the land 
acquisition and the impunity of the occupations in easing ZANU-PF's collective action 
challenge.  These rewards, and this impunity, helped to ease the regime's collective 
action challenge, for inducements help to alter the choices and decisions of rational 
actors.  By encouraging cooperation, selective incentives may directly contribute to 
mobilisation (Hardin 1982: pp. 17, 15; Lichbach 1995: p. 216) and to loyalty, i.e. a 
deferral of exit.   
Boone and Kriger (2000) discuss the distribution of land as a resource for 
patronage and loyalty in the context of multiparty elections, including with specific 
reference to Zimbabwe and to its mobilising effects.  Shaw also argues that the seized 
commercial farms became a new resource that could be offered as a material benefit 
(Shaw 2003: p. 77), while Sachikonye (2003a: p. 236 emphasis added) acknowledges:  
” This material imperative behind land reform may have been 
initially under-estimated because the political factor had loomed 
larger in the context of the 2000 and 2002 electoral contests. It is, 
however, an imperative which has now become quite significant in 
economic and political terms. The sharing of spoils allows for 'instant 
accumulation' with state backing, and beneficiaries are now more 
likely to be beholden to the ZANU-PF than to an opposition 
movement advocating 'transparency' in the land reform process” 
Sachikonye's acknowledgement speaks to both the element of material interests and 
gain ('sharing of spoils' and 'instant accumulation') that accrued directly, as well as to 
the electoral loyalty that was incentivized by this partisan distribution of a valuable 
resource.    
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The distribution of land as a material benefit to members of the ZANU-PF elite 
and to their supporters was not a new phenomenon, but the scale of the seizures in the 
period under study was unprecedented.  In the mid-1990s, land seizures by the 
Zimbabwean elite had occurred (ICG 2004: pp. 49-50), and documented reports of the 
same  helped to fuel anger over both the corruption and the lack of progress on land 16
redistribution (COHRE 2001: Annex 2 citing M. Dongo, 1999).  Despite this earlier 
public anger, the land seizures were scaled-up under the 'fast-track' programme.  
The re-allocation of farms was a clear incentive and an important material 
reward that helped to re-inforce loyalty amongst both members of the regime, including 
the leadership of the security sector (Matondi 2012: pp. 64, 240-41; Scoones et.al.: pp. 
70-71).  The 2003 Buka report (Government of Zimbabwe), which audited the elite 
land allocations under the 'fast-track' programme detailed the extent to which some had 
benefited from the farm reallocation process, with the ICG (2004: pp. 108-109) 
reporting that over 1000 members of the ZANU-PF elite had received farms.  The 
Anatomy of Terror reports (2011) and Matondi's study (2012) provide greater detail of 
those who benefited within specific districts and constituencies. For example, in the 
constituency of Shamva South, the Anatomy of Terror states that three farms were taken 
by Police Commissioner Chihuri (2011: Shamva South Annex, p. 1), while Matondi 
(2012: pp. 70-71 Tables 3.4 and 3.5) provides a detailed breakdown of beneficiaries, 
including those within different elements of the regime (e.g. security, civil service) for 
Mazowe District.    
 The documenting of these land-grabs was particularly due to the efforts of Margaret Dongo, an 16
independent member of parliament.  A former war veteran and also a former member of ZANU-PF, she 
was "dropped" from the party following her public criticism of ZANU-PF leadership.  She ran as an 
independent candidate, and following a court-ordered re-count, was elected to parliament (Sadomba 
2008: pp. 73, 87-88).  
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The extent of these accumulated benefits was so widespread that President 
Mugabe ordered that "... ruling party officials with multiple farms to relinquish all but 
one within two weeks" (IRIN 2003a, emphasis added), a statement that confirmed the 
partisan right of regime members to acquire land through the land acquisition process.  
In 2007, the Reserve Bank Governor, himself a very senior member of the regime, 
provided official confirmation of the scope of this land patronage system:  
 "...[a]ll cabinet ministers, their deputies, senior officials of the ruling 
ZANU-PF party, and senior officers of the army, police and 
intelligence services were allocated commercial farms that became 
available during the fast-track land reform programme... As the new 
owners of commercial farms, the ruling elite were also accorded 
preferential loans ... low-priced fertiliser and heavily subsidised 
fuel..." (IRIN 2007 emphasis added).   
Beyond these rewards to the ZANU-PF elite, the evidence as to the precise 
extent of land allocation to small-holder beneficiaries who were ZANU-PF supporters 
is less clear .  Many of the land occupiers (e.g. war veterans) were ZANU-PF 17
supporters and also many "...card-carrying members of the ruling party got 
land" (Matondi 2012: p. 75 citing Marongwe 2003, Hammar et al. 2003 and Alexander 
2006).  In November 2002 it was announced that "...soldiers returning from the conflict 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo [would also] get preferential treatment in land 
allocation" (IRIN 2003b; Boone and Kriger 2010: p. 183 citing Sachikonye 2003 and 
Selby 2006).   
In June 2001, one year following the June 2000 parliamentary elections, the 
Rural Land Occupiers (Protection from Eviction) Act  was enacted, with the stated 
 Figures of those resettled include 127,000 families were beneficiaries of the 'fast-track' programme 17
under the small-holder farms model (Utete 2003: p. 24).  
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rationale of "...to protect land occupiers  on land not yet acquired by 18
Government" (Utete 2003: p. 20, emphasis added).  This Act provided de facto land 
rights (possession), i.e. a material benefit, to those individuals who were occupying 
land, "...in anticipation of being resettled", on the date the Act came into effect, and 
who were eligible for resettlement (Zimbabwe 2001a).  Although Moyo (2001: p. 329) 
argues that the Act was an intentional effort to "legalise the process of the occupations", 
the Act clearly provided a significant material benefit to individuals, in advance of the 
legal process of acquisition.  This new institutional rule, also, by providing a legal 
status to the occupiers, reinforced the irreversibility of the occupations – and reduced 
the future uncertainty about institutional alternatives in the economically and 
symbolically important agricultural sector for the members of the regime.  
This material benefit of land was offered via the intentional development of a 
new prohibition, i.e. the denial of the court's jurisdiction in the matter of the land 
occupations.  This Act eliminated the courts from the interactions between the 
governing regime and landowners, and therefore also eliminated, for members of the 
regime, the uncertainty and risk that the courts could (again) rule against them on the 
issue of the farm occupations.  More specifically, the Act prohibited the courts from: 
 "... issu[ing] any order for the recovery of possession from a 
protected occupier of any rural land, or the ejectment therefrom of a 
protected occupier, or the payment of damages by such protected 
occupier in respect of the occupation or trespass of such land..." and 
it suspended any existing orders (Zimbabwe 2001a). 
 It is interesting to see the use of this term.  The Act's definition of a "protected occupier" focuses on 18
the physical presence of the individual rather than how (i.e. with political assistance or not) the 
individual came to be occupying the land.  The inclusion of "protected" in the term, like the intentional 
enactment of the Act itself, however, clearly signals regime support for their occupation. 
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The application of partisan rather than technical land allocation criteria 
provided new opportunities to reward, or purchase, loyalty. As Matondi (2012) and 
Utete (2003) both document, members of the regime at central, sectoral, provincial and 
district levels often coordinated (or at times competed) to identify and/or allocate these 
farmlands.  Sadomba (2008) and Matondi (2012) also both documented the role of the 
war veterans and/or other occupiers in accelerating the pace of land redistribution, 
including, for example, the assignment of specific roles in terms of identifying potential 
land sites and 'pegging' it for surveying and sub-division purposes, work that would 
have been done by public servants.     
As discussed with reference to the material benefit of food aid, existing 
technical committees to allocate land were replaced, challenged and/or marginalised by 
new structures coordinated through the military and security actors within the regime, 
as well as by ministers and governors (Alexander 2003: pp. 104-114; Matondi 2012: 
pp. 57-61).  Munemo (2012: pp. 88, 117-118) argued that the key variable in 
determining the partisan use of food aid programmes was the relative degree of 
political security felt by the ZANU-PF regime.  In times of political insecurity, 
technical criteria were replaced by partisan criteria, and ZANU-PF personnel, rather 
than technocrats, increasingly were engaged in the allocation of the resource.  Altering 
the decision-making fora, and the decision-makers is a means to ensure that loyalty 
considerations, and not just technical criteria, are taken into account.  This author 
suggests that Munemo's argument may be a useful link to Boone and Kriger's (2010: p. 
174) observation that land as a patronage resource has not been fully integrated into the 
analyses of multiparty elections in Africa.  This dissertation's identification of the 
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reform of institutional rules (formal and informal) as an analytical means of assessing 
the allocation of this valuable resource, and the distributional consequences of the 
allocation may also be helpful.  
Beyond land, another material benefit offered by members of the regime was 
the access to employment, as well as the incentive of impunity for the land-related 
violence and 'jambanja'.  In September 2000, the 'war veterans', in a strategic decision 
by the members of the regime, were integrated into the Zimbabwean national army as a 
reserve force, increasing both their power of action and their access to arms (HR NGO 
Forum 2001: pp. 18-19), as well as incentivizing continuing loyalty.  Boone and Kriger 
(2010: p. 180 note 12 citing Guma 2009) state that 29,000 members of the youth militia 
were added to the public service.  Material benefits such as employment help to 
incentivize collective action by "...inducing individuals to join in group 
cooperation..." (Hardin 1982: pp. 17, 15).   
Again, amnesties to individual actors who had engaged in the political violence 
related to the occupations were offered as a reward that protected them from the 
consequences (penalties) of their actions.  In October 2000, President Mugabe grant 
amnesties to those engaged in electoral-related violence (with the exception of cases of 
rape or murder).  Given the partisan profile of the perpetrators of this violence, this 
amnesty was a decision that primarily benefited the war veterans and members of the 
youth militia (HR NGO Forum 2001: p. 18) and others who had been engaged in the 
violence and 'jambanja' associated with the occupations.  
 This section examined the allocation of land as both a reward and incentive for 
loyalty.  The allocation of land to elite and/or loyal members of the regime was 
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confirmed.  Many other beneficiaries, these were often decided through the use of 
partisan rather than technical criteria.   The use of partisan criteria to select actors was 
discussed, highlighting the similarity of these actions to the strategies used in the 
allocation of food aid.  The reform of institutional rules, to regularize the land 
occupations through the Rural Land Occupiers (Protection from Eviction) Act, reduced 
the penalties associated with the illegal occupations ("for land not yet acquired") and 
provided a valuable reward to those that had participated in this visible action.  This 
Act removed, for landowners whose farms were occupied, the action-choice of voice, 
through its explicit removal of the right to appeal through the judicial system.  They 
were now in a situation of forced exit, and their avenues for 'voice' would now be 
outside of the judicial sphere.  
The Farmworkers:  Strategic Displacement and Partisan Gain 
This chapter has discussed the intentional reform of institutional rules to force 
'exit' of the commercial farming community, via the restructuring of property rights and 
the mobilisation of supporters to (often violently) seize the land.  Approximately two 
million people (including both farmworkers and their family members) lived and 
worked on the commercial farms, and were thus affected by the 'fast-track' land reforms 
(Hardnack 2006: p. 174 citing Rutherford 2001; Sachikonye 2003).  Their situation, 
their displacement and the violence that they suffered received far less media coverage 
and attention than that of the white commercial farmers.  Their forced displacement 
may be seen as both a penalty for disloyalty, imposed via targeted political violence, as 
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well as a strategy of voter suppression.  The case of these farmworkers is a significant 
example of internal, forced displacement within Zimbabwe.   
Many of these workers were specifically targeted for eviction, displacement and 
violence.  Like other victims in rural Zimbabwe, many were targeted for their 
expression of voice.   They were perceived to be either supportive of their (white) 
employers, the MDC opposition or both (ICG 2004: pp. 92-94; Hammar 2008: p. 425).    
Others were victims of the political violence that occurred in the context of the 
occupations.  In a 2000 study, it was reported that MDC supporters were the largest 
group of farmworkers displaced or otherwise victims of political violence at 47.2 
percent (HRW 2002: p. 19 citing Cheater 2001: p. 36).  Few benefited from the land 
redistribution – only an estimated 6-8 percent of the recipients were farmworkers 
(Matondi 2012: pp. 67-68; McCandless 2011: p. 159 citing Scoones et al. 2010: p. 54 
and Moyo et al. 2009: p. 32).  During this period, the farmworkers lost both their 
livelihoods (HRW 2002: p. 33; Hardnack 2005) and many also lost access to the social 
services provided through farm schools, clinics etc. (Raftopoulos 2009: p. 216).   
Displacement and its resulting impoverishment have important implications for 
collective action, as discussed earlier in this dissertation.  The forced exit from the 
commercial farming sector included the displacement of hundreds of thousands of 
farmworkers and their family members (Sachikonye 2003a: p. 237).  As with other 
instances of political violence, the occupations and jambanja which occurred displaced 
these farmworkers from their homes.   
However, in a closed environment such as a commercial farm, where private 
lives, homes, livelihoods and relationships are all intertwined (Hardnack 2005), the 
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disruptions of these networks (e.g. family, union structures), via forced exit, is likely to 
particularly, and negatively, affect the prospects for successful collective dissent.  The 
inter-connectivity, in one precise geographic location of these networks, whether a 
commercial farm (or a police camp) means that the loss of their "social system and the 
social networks", will profoundly "...undermine the relational foundation for 
voice" (Pfaff 2006: p. 149).   
Physical displacement, especially on this scale, makes mobilisation by the MDC 
more difficult.  Due to these losses, attention and energy turns to other concerns as 
farmworkers, for example seek new housing or other assets, jobs, health care or 
education.  The MDC had benefited from the earlier mobilisation work undertaken by 
the GAPWUZ trade union (HR NGO Forum and JAG Trust 2007: p. 12; Rutherford 
2009: p. 387-388).  The immediate needs of their members (e.g. severance, housing) 
would occupy GAPWUZ, while the displacement and job losses would pose an 
organisational threat to GAPWUZ itself.    
Forced displacement of these farmworkers may also be seen as a strategy of 
voter suppression.  Facing the time-bound collective action challenge that is electoral 
success in specific rural ridings, displacing significant numbers of eligible voters, is a 
solution that contributes to easing the 'State's Dilemma'.  Voter suppression is a strategy 
to prevent, or discourage, specific groups of voters from voting, in order to affect 
electoral outcomes. It is targeted against actual or perceived opponents.  The size of the 
commercial farmworker community was sufficient to materially negatively impact the electoral 
outcomes in several districts of the ZANU-PF heartland, and thus posed a risk to the regime 
throughout the 2000 and 2002 electoral period (ICG 2004: p. 93 citing ICG correspondence 
April 2003).     
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This Chapter has discussed the strategic reform of rules to reduce the cost of 
exit, specifically the cost of compensation for the land acquired.  However, one of the 
other financial and legal obligations removed, in order to help accelerate land 
acquisition, were the amendments to the 2002 Labour Relations Act (Zimbabwe 
2002d).  These amendments, were enacted within the time-frame of the 'fast-track' 
programme, and shifted the obligations related to the severance payments for the 
commercial farmworkers.  The payment of severance was now the responsibility of the 
former landowners (e.g. a white commercial farmer) rather than to the acquiring 
landowners (Sachikonye 2003b: pp. 46-49; HRW 2002: p. 33).   By reducing financial 
costs, this transfer of these financial obligations also helped to facilitate the rapid 
process of land redistribution. The amendments also generated uncertainty for the 
farmworkers, and/or imposed a financial penalty...    These changes would have had 
important negative economic consequences for the farmworker community, including 
for the estimated 70 percent of farmworkers who lost their employment (HR NGO 
Forum and JAG Trust 2007: p. 29 citing Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe 2003).  
Given the numbers of farmworkers, and therefore their potential voting weight, 
it is not surprising that members of ZANU-PF, at both the physical and rhetorical 
levels, targeted the farmworkers.  Farmworkers were classed as ‘enemies’ under 
ZANU-PF’s patriotic narrative.  “Guilty by association” they were targeted for having 
worked with the white farmers, being part of the trade union movement and/or 
supporting MDC.  Through first displacement, violence and then revised citizenship 
laws, many were disenfranchised (Raftopoulos 2009: p. 217) following the 2000 
elections, easing ZANU-PF’s collective action for the electoral ‘hurdles’ ahead.    
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This Chapter has examined the dynamics of exit and voice within the 
commercial agriculture sector.  Through an analysis of the institutional reforms that 
occurred, the chapter has demonstrated how the choice of voluntary exit was converted 
into the power to force exit.  Institutional reforms and the powers and permissions that 
they furnished were a critical enabler of the 'fast-track' land reform programme.   In 
advance of the June 2000 parliamentary elections, and later the 2002 presidential 
elections, ZANU-PF needed to reduce Zimbabweans' scepticism about their 
commitment to this long-standing political goal.  The land occupations, and the 
acquisition of the commercial farms were actions that helped to demonstrate 
commitment to this goal, including to their core rural constituency.  Scaling up in 
number, geographic scope and frequency, all helped to reinforce their credibility on this 
issue.   
The interactions between these two processes – reforms to the institutional rules 
and the farm occupations – are important, for each helped to enable the other.  The land 
acquired, in part, became an important patronage resource for the senior members of 
the ZANU-PF regime (Boone and Kriger 2010).  Not only did many personally benefit 
from access to land as a reward or incentive, many of ZANU-PF's supporters, including 
members of security services, also benefited.  The literature on the role of war veterans' 
reveals them to be both actors and beneficiaries.  Farmworkers and commercial farmers 
were, as discussed, often targeted and penalized for their expression of voice.  This 
chapter, has highlighted how, in the face of forced exit, voice became the only choice, 
as Hirschman (1970) foresaw in his theory of the dynamics of exit and voice.  
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The chapter also discussed how the 'fast-track' programme was enabled by the 
reduction in the costs of exit.  The assignment, to the UK, of the costs of land 
compensation, greatly reduced the costs of forcing exit, while functionally relieving a 
significant budgetary pressure as well.  The powers to aggregate also helped to 
accelerate the pace of acquisition.  Picking up on the discussion of incentives from the 
previous chapter, the issue of rewards (including impunity) and penalties was also 
considered within this sector.  Examples of the strategic deployment of rewards, 
material benefits and penalties were provided.  These helped to align decisions and 
choices with ZANU-PF's priorities.    
Together, the institutional reforms that transferred control of the exit option, the 
political violence and the occupations, and the acquisition of land, contributed to 
ZANU-PF's much needed mobilisation – helping to resolve the 'State's Dilemma'.   
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Synthesis:  The elections of 29 March 2008 
The preceding three chapters have examined the use of strategic institutional 
reform that altered the dynamics of exit and voice in Zimbabwe during the 2002 to 
2008 period.  This dissertation has demonstrated how the use of voice was suppressed 
through reforms to the rules governing the media sector, and via rules that restricted the 
freedoms of expression, association, assembly and movement; how loyalty to the 
governing regime was reinforced through the use of selective incentives such as 
partisan food aid distribution, impunity and protection from political violence; how exit 
was forced, in the commercial farming sector.  It has demonstrated that institutional 
reform mattered to outcomes, and it has revealed how ZANU-PF's 'patriotic narrative' 
was underpinned by strategic institutional reforms.    
 The dynamics of exit, voice and loyalty held throughout the various rounds of 
elections during the period under discussion as, indeed, the members of the governing 
regime succeeded in retaining political power through electoral victory.  How then to 
explain the results of the March 29th, 2008 elections, with its significant shift to the 
political opposition? Did the dynamics of exit, voice and loyalty change, and if so, did 
institutional reform play a part? 
Before turning to this discussion, a brief overview on the parliamentary and 
presidential election results themselves.  Table 1 summarizes the official national-level 
results for those parliamentary and presidential elections held during the period from 
2000 to 2008.  It is important to note that these are the "official", publicly announced 
results.  Many analysts (e.g. Chan 2011:  pp. 140-146) and indeed the MDC itself 
(MDC 2005b) reported vote-rigging, leading to the conclusion that while the results 
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may be "official" they are also unlikely to be accurate.  Following the lengthy delay in 
announcing the results of the presidential election, a run-off election for the Executive 
Presidency was required. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) had announced 
that neither President Mugabe nor the MDC's Morgan Tsvangirai had obtained the '50 
percent+1' of the votes needed to cross the mandatory 'step' of electoral victory to the 
post of Executive President (Table 1; Moorcraft 2011: p. 151).   
In the parliamentary elections, the members of the ZANU-PF regime faced new 
uncertainties, for they had not only lost their parliamentary majority, but they had lost 
the two-thirds parliamentary majority that had allowed them to both alter the 
constitution and to block proposals for constitutional reform (Masunungure 2009b: p. 
77).  As discussed earlier, they faced two types of uncertainty, the first about the future 
consequences of their present institutional choices, and the second, about the future 
institutional alternatives available (Knight 1992: p. 45).  In the House of Assembly, 
ZANU-PF won only 99 of the 210 seats (47 percent) against the 52 percent of the seats 
won by both factions of the MDC (Table 1; Masunungure 2009b: pp. 76-77).  In the 
Senate, ZANU-PF won only 30 seats, a decline of 13 seats, while the MDC-T faction 
won 24 seats  and the MDC-M faction won 6 seats (Table 1).   19
The breadth of the MDC-T's electoral gains was notable, with implications for 
the legitimacy of ZANU-PF and President Mugabe.  The MDC-T succeeded in all 
provinces, and in both rural and urban areas (Masunungure 2009b: p. 76), although in 
many rural constituencies their margin of victory was slim (ZPP 2008a: pp. 12-14). 
 The Senate was created in 2005.  It provided additional patronage opportunities for ZANU-PF 19
(Raftopoulos 2007: p. 137), and exacerbated divisions within the MDC regarding their strategies to 
respond to the electoral climate (Raftopoulos 2007: pp. 137-139; Masunungure 2009b: p. 63 note 4).  
Morgan Tsvangirai called for the November 2005 Senate elections to be boycotted (Chiroro 2005: p. 8).  
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Although the MDC candidate for the Presidency, Morgan Tsvangirai, had officially 
failed to reach the 'step' result of '50 percent +1' of the votes cast, his result, when 
combined with that of the independent candidate, Simba Makoni  (8.31 percent), 20
formerly of ZANU-PF, meant that the two challengers together had received support 
that exceeded the 50 percent +1 'step' – the first time in Zimbabwe's history that this 
had occurred.   
 The scale of these results was a shock for the ZANU-PF leadership. Their 
earlier assertions of popular support were now negated by the choices of Zimbabweans.  
For the first time since independence, a majority of voters had handed ZANU-PF a 
non-majority result.  They had provided the political opposition with majorities and a 
nation-wide mandate in the parliamentary vote.  Zimbabweans' desire for change in the 
Presidency was also publicly revealed in that over 50 percent of the votes cast went to 
opposition candidates.  These results not only had immediate impacts for their 
legitimacy, but also challenged their self-defined sense of democracy, i.e. the 
achievement of majority rule.   
With a second round run-off election required, the rules for this next 'hurdle' 
were clear: the Electoral Act required that this run-off be held within 21 days.  The 
rules were ignored, and the Minister of Justice announced that the Act had been 
"overly-optimistic" and the run-off was thus scheduled for 90 days after the already 
lengthy 32 days delay in the announcement of the results (Matyszak 2009: pp. 49-53, 
 Makoni was a former Minister of Finance, a senior ZANU-PF official and a former Executive Secretary 20
of SADC. He ran for the Executive Presidency as an independent candidate, campaigning on his 
economic record.    His candidacy reflected tensions within ZANU-PF regarding leadership succession 
(Masunungure 2009b: pp. 66-67), and helped to split the ZANU-PF vote (Raftopoulos 2013: p. 11).  His 
candidacy was supported by the MDC faction led by Arthur Mutambara, who while declining to run for the 
presidency himself, backed Makoni rather than MDC-T candidate, Morgan Tsvangirai (Masunungure 
2009b: p. 67).  
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75). Facing a 'time-bound' collective action challenge, they delayed. The run-off was 
scheduled for 27 June 2008.  The delays were strategic actions that "bought 
time" (Tarisayi 2009: p. 21), allowing the members of the regime to coordinate in order 
to resolve their collective action dilemma.   
The threat was clear:  as one member of the regime remarked of the run-off 
election, "We're giving the people of Zimbabwe another opportunity to mend their 
ways, to vote properly... this is their last chance" (Bratton and Masunungure 2008: p. 
44 citing New York Times 09 May 2008, emphasis added).  As discussed earlier, 
Tsvangirai withdrew from the run-off on 22 June 2008, citing the extraordinary levels 
of "retributive" violence unleashed against his supporters (Tsvangirai 2008b).  The 
results of the June 27th run-off, held despite his withdrawal, were "condemned" by  
SADC, the United Nations Security Council, the European Union amongst other 
international actors.  And they were condemned by many Zimbabweans themselves.  
So what happened, in terms of the dynamics of exit and voice, and what was the role of 
strategic institutional reform, that led to these historic results?   
SADC Engages  
Throughout the crisis, Zimbabwe's neighbours had been muted in their 
criticism, and often silent on the scale of the political violence that was occurring 
(Raftopoulos 2013: p. 6).  As discussed, ZANU-PF's 'patriotic narrative' framed the 
crisis around the shared concerns of liberation, sovereignty, land and identity.  With 
several of the SADC states now governed by former liberation movements, and with 
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long-shared histories of struggle and support these neighbours had been the key 
external allies for the Zimbabwean regime.  Their support, anchored in shared histories 
(and long relationships) built up during their respective liberation struggles, as well as 
the fight against apartheid, created a reluctance to criticize 'friends' (Becker 2013: pp. 
262-263).  Shared norms about sovereignty, concerns about external/Western influence 
on African politics (Clapham 1996; Raftopoulos 2013: p. 6) were complemented by 
more immediate domestic political considerations (e.g. Zimbabwean immigration, land 
ownership).  They also contributed to perceptions, on the part of the MDC, that ZANU-
PF was favoured, particularly by South African President Thabo Mbeki (Raftopoulos 
2013: p. 6; Becker 2013: p. 6). 
Despite strong calls for increased SADC censure of the Zimbabwean 
leadership, Thabo Mbeki's strategy of 'quiet diplomacy' meant that there had been few 
public critiques of the political violence and economic decline that was occurring 
(Bratton 2014: p. 88).  With the Zimbabwean crisis deepening, neighbouring countries 
feeling lt its increasing effects (e.g. increased immigration, adverse economic impacts), 
and international attention again turning to Zimbabwe's situation, SADC leaders, in 
March 2007, announced formal mediation efforts focused on improving the electoral 
climate and processes prior to the 2008 elections (Raftopoulos 2013: p. 9; SPT 2008a: 
p. 8; HR NGO Forum 2008a: p. 4).   
SADC's mediation was an opportunity to add the political weight of the region 
(i.e. ZANU-PF's external allies) to efforts to reform the institutional rules governing 
elections in Zimbabwe (Lichbach 1995: pp. 189-191).  For the members of the ZANU-
PF regime this mediation process, offered the potential opportunity to prolong their 
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hold on power, particularly due to changes in the succession rules for the sitting 
President (SPT 2008a: p. 8).  Through SADC mediation, a constitutional amendment 
(the 18th) was negotiated between ZANU-PF and the two MDC factions.  This 
amendment introduced new rules to address the issue of succession to the presidency in 
situations such as the resignation or death of the incumbent, rules that advantaged 
ZANU-PF (in the near-term) by allowing the new president to be chosen by the 
members of parliament rather than through new general elections (SPT 2008a: p. 10; 
Raftopoulos 2013: pp. 9-10).  Further reforms to the structure of Parliament were made, 
with an expansion of the membership of both the House of Assembly and the Senate 
(Zimbabwe 2007).  The election calendar was also 'harmonized' i.e. the local (e.g. rural 
and city councils), parliamentary (Senate and House of Assembly) and the presidential 
vote would all be held on the same day.     
Finally, the mediation effort also resulted in the 2004 SADC Principles and 
Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (SADC 2004), (adopted by SADC 
member-states, including Zimbabwe), becoming the normative basis for reforming  
Zimbabwe's electoral rules and processes (Badza 2009: p. 152).  Reforms to the 
Electoral Act  reinforced the civil and political rights of Zimbabwean citizens, as well 
as the rights of political parties to freely contest the elections, including through the 
media (Masunungure 2009a: p. 7).  The mediation efforts did not, however, 
successfully conclude negotiations for a new constitution, nor reach agreement on dates 
for the planned election (SPT 2008a: p. 11; Raftopoulos 2013: p.10).  
 Following the March 29th elections, the delays in releasing official results from 
the presidential vote, as well as the rapid escalation in political violence that occurred 
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(Masunungure 2009c; SPT 2008b), led some SADC member states (i.e. Zambia, 
Botswana) to become openly more critical of the ZANU-PF regime (SPT 2008a: pp. 
16-17).    
Voice      
From mid-2007 onwards, several factors combined to create greater pressure to 
express voice and, also to create openings for voice to be expressed (e.g. via reforms to 
the Access to Information and Privacy Act and the Public Order and Security Act).  
This section shall briefly discuss the same.    
By 2007, the economic crisis in Zimbabwe was worsening.  Significant 
numbers of Zimbabweans had already exited Zimbabwe, driven out by the collapsing 
economy, and more were following (see 'exit' below). The vast majority of these 
emigrants were settling in neighbouring SADC states, notably South Africa, Botswana 
and Zambia (IOM 2010: p. 37 citing Kiwanuka and Monson 2009).   
By early 2008, Zimbabwe was also in the midst of hyper-inflation, with prices 
doubling nearly daily (Tarisayi 2009: p. 12 and Table 1 citing Hanke 5 Feb 2009).  
More than 80 percent of the population was living below the poverty line and 
approximately four million people were facing serious food shortages (Tarisayi 2009: 
p. 12 citing ICG May 2008).  Mass emigration, the collapse of basic services, high 
levels of unemployment as well as drought, meant increasing vulnerability for most 
(Tarisayi 2009: pp. 16-20).  Economic and political crises, and the severity of the HIV/
AIDS pandemics, meant that life expectancy had dropped to 42 years (Bratton 2014: p. 
85 citing World Bank 2009).  “When they compared their personal circumstances to 
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those of their parents 10 years previously, Zimbabweans perceived greater declines 
than did residents of any other African country” (Bratton 2014: p. 85).    
These worsening economic conditions would be a source of uncertainty about 
their future, as Pfaff (2006: pp. 27-28) discussed with reference to East Germany.  
Economic concerns would be more central to their daily lives, and therefore also to the 
election campaign.  Zimbabweans were angry about their economy, and contrasted it to 
the wealth that surrounded the members of the ZANU-PF elite, some of which would 
have been received as rewards for loyalty (e.g. preferential access to foreign exchange, 
land) (Bratton and Masunungure 2008: pp. 46-47; Bratton 2014: p. 86).  The President 
announced price cuts, but this worsened the shortages in the months leading to the 
March elections (Tarisayi 2009: p. 16; Bratton 2014: pp. 83-85).   
ZANU-PF's demonstrated weakness in addressing the economic crisis would 
alter the prospects of MDC success, as the crisis was a demonstrated signal of 
weakness to the population (Lichbach 1995: p. 68).  ZANU-PF's patriotic narrative and 
slogans that spoke of the centrality of land to the economy had lost some of their 
power: the land had been re-distributed but the economy was declining. Although many 
had benefited from the land re-distribution, their number was dwarfed by the vast 
majority of the population that was suffering from the economic crisis.  The MDC was 
actively campaigning for a "people-centred economy" and for the rebuilding of 
Zimbabwe's social services (Masunungure 2009b: p. 66). 
The dynamics of voluntary versus forced exit, and of voice, have been 
previously discussed.  However, by 2008, Zimbabwe had lots a significant proportion 
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of its population, including those of working age.  The demographic implications of 
this outward migration for collection action were discussed in chapter two.  The action-
choice of voice, as a residual of exit, was also discussed.  
For many of those who remained in Zimbabwe, voluntary exit was a 
diminishing prospect, as the economic losses mounted and/or as age, illness, or family 
obligations meant that exit was not a viable option.  In this context, increasing, and 
widespread, economic dissatisfaction would become a source of voice (Pfaff 2006: p. 
28 citing Lindenburg 1991; Hirschman 1970: p. 34).  As Pfaff discussed, those 
remaining would be incentivised to speak out in order to avoid further, future losses 
(2006:  p. 145).   
 Also discussed was the importance of institutional arrangements that 
would allow 'voice' to be communicated "...cheaply and effectively" (Hirschman 1970: 
p. 43).  When voters can vote with a sense of personal security and confidence in the 
electoral system, elections are, from the perspective of resolving the 'Rebel's Dilemma' 
a useful coordination mechanism.  The national elections machinery greatly reduces the 
coordination challenges and costs for the opposition, by providing a ready 
infrastructure from which voice could be aggregated.  Lower costs, for example, in 
terms of enhanced personal security, would also encourage participation by other actors 
(Lichbach 1995: p. 39).     
This dissertation has also discussed the 'State's Dilemma' and the very specific 
challenge ZANU-PF faced through their dependency on the choices (votes) of 
Zimbabweans on election day.  The manipulation of the voter's register and ward 
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boundaries (HRW 2005a; Makumbe 2009), may contribute to resolving the 'State's 
Dilemma' through the suppression of 'voice', and therefore of votes.  However, the 
institutional rules of an election, are based on the valid votes cast – and despite all of 
their flaws (Makumbe 2009), the institutional rules of the March 29th election still 
provided the mechanism for the action-choice of 'voice' to be communicated.       
 By March 2008, through the 'hurdles' of the earlier elections, Zimbabweans had 
seen the opposition make gains, and also suffer losses; many had benefited (or not) 
from the inducements offered by ZANU-PF, and many had also suffered the political 
violence and displacement that had also accompanied elections during this period.  
After all of these problems with voting in earlier national-level elections during this 
case-study period, did Zimbabweans see the vote as the institutional mechanism to 
communicate their voice? A public opinion survey, from the first half of 2007, asked 
Zimbabweans about their voting motivations. This study found that 36 percent were 
motivated to vote by "a desire for change" while a further 15 percent were motivated by 
"promises of a better life" (Masunungure et al. 2007: p. 5).  Amongst MDC supporters, 
those motivated by a desire for change rose to 60 percent (only 20 percent for ZANU-
PF supporters) when this data was further analysed based on political party sympathies 
(Masunungure et al. 2007: p. 5 Table 1).  As one Zimbabwean said when asked about 
his voting intentions:  
"'I am going to vote.  My vote may make the difference.  I just hope 
that all the people who registered to vote will go and vote.  We need 
change of leadership in this country.  Life has become 
unbearable'" (Ndapwadza and Muchena 2009: p. 36 citing Zimbabwe 
Independent 29 February - 6 March 2008, emphasis added).    
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This statement by a single Zimbabwe: 'I am going to vote.  My vote may make the 
difference...[to changing] leadership in this country'  is an example of "collective 
voice", i.e. actions where "...the intention of the individual in acting is to contribute to 
the desired effect through that action" (Dowding et. al. 2000: p. 473, emphasis added).  
His statement also speaks to the economic challenges and concerns raised earlier.  
Other public opinion polling in January and February 2008, that is in the weeks 
leading up to the March elections, found high levels of intention to vote on the part of 
Zimbabweans.  Voter turn-out in March 2008 was more than double that of the 2005 
elections (Ndapwadza and Muchena 2009: pp. 30-31 citing Zimbabwe Electoral 
Supervisory Commission).  Zimbabweans' confidence in the March elections grew in 
the final weeks up to the election, with more than 50 percent of those surveyed, in both 
February and March 2008, indicating that they felt that the elections would be 'free and 
fair' and, importantly, over 90 percent of those surveyed believed that their vote would 
be secret (Ndapwadza and Muchena 2009: pp. 31-33).   
If scale of economic decline in Zimbabwe became the source of voice for those 
unable to exit, and voting in the election of March 29th, 2008, the institutional 
mechanism by which this voice could be expressed, other institutional reforms, each of 
limited weight and scope, contributed to reducing the cost of expressing 'voice'.  While 
many civic actors and other analysts have argued that these reforms did not meet the 
threshold that would allow for a 'level playing field' and thus for the elections to be 
genuinely 'free and fair' (HR NGO Forum 2008a; Moyse 2009; Makumbe 2009), the 
reduction in the cost of expressing the action-choice of 'voice' is a related, but separate, 
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benchmark.  Lower costs should, in situations of no exit, encourage participation 
(Hirschman 1970: p. 123; Lichbach 1995: p. 42).  
This dissertation has, in chapter three, also discussed the four freedoms that are 
institutional rules underpinning the expression of the action-choice of 'voice'.  Amongst 
the "small but important" reforms (Raftopoulos 2013: p. 11) made for the March 2008 
elections, were those in the areas of freedom of movement and of association.  Both of 
these freedoms improved prior to the March 29th elections (EISA 2008), although 
specific violations, in significant number, still continued (Chart 1; HR NGO Forum 
2008b and 2008c).  Rural areas that had been former 'no-go' zones, had again become 
accessible to the opposition (Masunungure 2009b: p. 73), facilitating mobilisation by 
the MDC.  
Although overall levels of political violence in late 2007 were higher than those 
reported for the 2005 elections, public opinion polling from January 2008 reported that 
85 percent of those Zimbabweans surveyed had "not witnessed any political violence 
since October 2007" and that, even compared to the pre-electoral period in 2005, those 
surveyed still reported a "reduction in cases of political violence" (Ndapwadza and 
Muchena 2009: p. 33).  "This relative calm, established in the context of the SADC 
mediation, allowed the opposition forces to mobilise in the rural areas in a way that had 
not been possible since the 2000 general election" (SPT 2008a: p. 11 emphasis added).   
Freedom of expression also eased, as evidenced by a decline in the number of 
violations recorded by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum in this area (Chart 1; 
HR NGO Forum 2008d: pp. 16-18 Table 2).  However, significant constraints remained 
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in the media sector, despite SADC's active mediation to ease the rules governing this 
sector.  The results in the media allocations confirm that ZANU-PF was not prepared to 
lose their distributional advantage completely, but it did allow its margin to be reduced. 
The Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe (MMPZ) reported that the two MDC 
factions had some increased access to state-controlled media, allowing greater 
communication of their information to Zimbabweans (MMPZ 2009a: p. 9).   
The accreditation requirements of AIPPA were amended (Zimbabwe 2007c), 
following SADC's mediation, creating easing slightly the prohibitions required to 
practice journalism in Zimbabwe.  Although these amendments created new 
opportunities (on paper) for both local and foreign journalists to communicate 
information to Zimbabweans, in practice, these restrictions continued to be applied and, 
in keeping with ZANU-PF's stated positions, international media continued to be 
denied entry into Zimbabwe (CPJ 2009).   
Moyo (2009: p. 557) argues (in the context of the 2008 presidential run-off) that 
there was a rise in "citizen journalism" that was able to capture local events and 
disseminate information on the same, including in zones where professional journalists 
were unable to travel, contributing to a broader availability of the news.  These 'citizen 
journalists' were also likely to have been active in the March electoral period as well 
(although Moyo does not directly address this), perhaps encouraged and/or enabled by 
the limited expansion of freedoms of expression, assembly and association noted 
above.  Their efforts would have contributed to an increased availability of information, 
although the scale cannot be confirmed.      
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Also pertinent to this discussion about reducing the cost of voice, is the question 
of the political violence that was occurring – and occurring at rates higher than the 
2005 electoral period (Chart 2; HR NGO Forum 2008d: pp. 16-18 Table 2).  Although, 
there was more visible freedoms of movement, assembly and association that allowed 
the MDC to campaign more easily, members and supporters of the political opposition 
were still targeted in this pre-election violence (SPT 2008a: p. 39).  It is, from the 
perspective of the dynamics of voice, that this more open mobilisation efforts by the 
MDC, sent signals to "information-starved" Zimbabweans (MMPZ 2009b: p. 7) that the 
cost of expressing voice (i.e. political violence) was reducing. 
Zimbabweans continued to experience information problems, and as discussed, 
the problems of availability and reliability are important to strategic decision-making.  
The MMPZ (2009b) documented the bias in the media coverage, specifically how little 
of the political violence was actually covered in the media, and relative to the scale of 
what was occurring.  For example, between the period 01 January to 31 March 2008, 
the MMPZ recorded 112 incidents of political violence, of which only 19 percent 
appeared in the official or public press, and only five stories appeared on the ZBC, the 
media outlet with the widest reach in Zimbabwe (MMPZ 2009b: p. 7, emphasis added).   
MMPZ contrasts this very limited coverage with the 2,049 incidents of human 
rights abuses through political violence that were recorded by the Zimbabwe Human 
Rights NGO Forum during this same period (2009b: p. 7 citing HR NGO Forum June 
2008) .  MMPZ asserts that "...the government-controlled media continued to present 21
 Individual incidents may include more than one human rights abuse (e.g. false arrest, torture and 21
assault) and individual media reports may include more than one incident.  There is not therefore a 1:1 
comparison between these two datasets.  Nevertheless the order of magnitude, in terms of the under-
reporting of political violence is clear. 
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the impression that peace prevailed in the country" (MMPZ 2009b: p. 9) and the public 
media "...passively quoted officials calling for a peaceful campaign, or report[ed] the 
police pledging to maintain peace" (MMPZ 2009b: p. 10).  As discussed, these 
differences reflected some of the polarisation that existed between the public and 
private media.   
Economic decline would have exacerbated the information problems faced by 
Zimbabweans.  Given Zimbabwe's impoverishing hyper-inflation, and the high levels 
of the population living in poverty, newspapers and radios would have become 'luxury' 
goods.  Earlier data from 2004 confirmed that media consumption had already dropped 
significantly, with drops of one-third in radio listenership (to 41 percent of the 
population), and a drop of "half" of newspaper readership (to 12 percent) by 2004 
(Bratton, Chikwana and Sithole 2005: p. 101; MMPZ 2009b: p. 40).  The problems of 
incomplete information can cut both ways – they may facilitate solutions to the 'State's 
Dilemma', but perhaps, when combined with new sources of dissatisfaction, and with 
evidence of new openings for voice to be expressed (e.g. fewer 'no-go' zones), it may 
also serve to encourage the mobilisation that helps to overcome the 'Rebel's 
Dilemma' (Lichbach 1995: pp. 95-96).   
Loyalty   
This dissertation defined the action-choice of loyalty as "...[postponing exit] in 
spite of dissatisfaction and qualms" (Hirschman 1970: p. 104).  By 2008, for all but a 
very select few, the "returns to electoral loyalty" were decreasing. Over 80 percent of 
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the population now lived below the poverty line, and approximately four million people 
were facing serious food shortages (Tarisayi 2009: p. 12 citing ICG May 2008).  
Poverty had deepened in rural areas (UNDP 2008: p. 18).  The Zimbabwean population 
was as a whole, poorer than it was in the electoral years of 2000, 2002 or 2005, with 
real average earnings lower than those in the  mid-to-late 1970s during the UDI period 
(ibid).  Nationally, Zimbabwe's GDP had declined at an average rate of 5.9 percent p.a. 
between 2005 and 2007 (UNDP 2008: p. 11 citing Central Statistics Office).  These 
points underscore the weakening of the asset base from which contributions or 
'sacrifice' could be drawn. 
Material benefits and other incentives (e.g. protection from political violence) 
for continued loyalty remained available.  However, their impact, when weighed 
against the hyper-inflation and the magnitude of Zimbabwe's economic crisis, would be 
less significant than in earlier years – although undoubtedly still welcomed by those 
who received them.  The partisan distribution of food aid to ZANU-PF supporters 
continued (ZPP 2008c).  Salary increments were offered as incentives for voter loyalty 
to some of Zimbabwe's remaining public servants (Masunungure 2009b: p. 68; Tarisayi 
2009: p. 20; HR NGO Forum 2008a: p. 9).  For example, Zimbabwe's soldiers received 
significant pay raises in February, the month prior to the elections, with the Zimbabwe 
Human Rights NGO Forum asserting "...these salary increases were clearly intended as 
bribes to try to ensure the loyalty of soldiers to the Mugabe government" (HR NGO 
Forum 2008a: p. 7).  However, with Zimbabwe's shrinking economy and declining 
revenues (UNDP 2008: p. 25), the resources available to help secure electoral loyalty 
were also limited.    
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Senior officials of the police and security forces made public statements of 
loyalty, prior to the March elections that both confirmed their allegiance to ZANU-PF 
and made clear their intentions to disregard a MDC-T election win (Masunungure 
2009b: pp. 65, 70-72).  However, partisan policing decreased somewhat, with the 
Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) officially adopting a policy of "zero tolerance" and 
calling for a "violence-free election" (Masunungure 2009b: p. 71).  In other words, 
signals to respect, rather than to violate the institutional rules governing policing were 
publicly communicated.  Further, despite the public declarations of loyalty by the 
senior officials, there was no "...institutionalised insistence on who [the rank and file 
should] support" (Masunungure 2009b: p. 73), therefore permitting greater 'free-riding' 
or choice by rank and file members, if they so chose.   
The action-choice of loyalty is about 'postponing exit'.  Many had stayed loyal 
to ZANU-PF out of conviction, satisfaction and/or as a result of the inducements 
(incentives and penalties) deployed.  However, recall the earlier polling data, from the 
late 1990s, that had already shown a high level of economic dissatisfaction with the 
performance of the government.  As discussed immediately above, the economic 
situation had seriously worsened in the intervening years.  The 'State's Dilemma' is 
about the challenge of retaining support when the interests of supporters lie elsewhere 
(Lichbach 1995: pp. 265-268).  By 2008, the depth of the economic crisis certainly 
suggests that support for the status quo would be weak.  There simply may not have 
been sufficient, good reasons for Zimbabweans to defer their 'electoral exit' from 
ZANU-PF any longer.   
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Exit  
By early 2008, a very significant percentage of Zimbabweans had left the 
country, although exact numbers are not known, including due to both illegal crossings, 
false declarations of the reasons for entry to neighbouring states and patterns of circular 
migration (Potts 2010: pp. 9-10; IOM 2009: pp. 35-42).  The International Organisation 
for Migration (IOM) estimated 1.5 million Zimbabweans were in South Africa alone 
(IOM 2009: p. 37), against Zimbabwe's 2002 population of 11.6 million (IOM 2009: p. 
24 Table 2 citing Central Statistics Office 2004).   
The regime's strategy of forced exit in the commercial agriculture sector had 
already largely run its course, and the forced displacement of Operation 
Murambatsvina (2005) had occurred, although the consequences for individuals, 
families and communities remained (SPT 2010).  Smaller-scale incidents of forced 
displacement for continued (HR NGO Forum 2008d: pp. 16-18 Table 2).   
While forced displacement was, in the Zimbabwean context, often 
impoverishing, voluntary emigration was a rational response to Zimbabweans' 
increasing dissatisfaction with the public goods offered by the members of the 
governing regime (Herbst 1990: p. 186; Lichbach 1995: p. 106; Pfaff 2006; Hirschman 
1978: pp. 94-95).  Emigration in the early years of the crisis (2002-2005) was often 
motivated by political concerns (Makina 2010: p. 229) and thus, voluntary exit was 
either a means of "conflict avoidance or resolution" for many Zimbabweans and/or a 
clear expression of interest in the capacity of other states (e.g. South Africa) to be an 
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"alternative supplier" of the public goods (Hirschman 1978: pp. 94-95; Pfaff 2006 
particularly chapter 9; Lichbach 1995: p. 106).   
For those who remained, while emigration may have provided some material 
assistance via the transfer of remittances , or the knowledge (hope) that family 22
members were safe, mass emigration also created new threats (or vulnerabilities) (Pfaff 
2006: p.138).  These would cause Zimbabweans to re-examine their options and also 
their choices.  There was an exodus of Zimbabwe's professionals, particularly teachers 
and trained health sector workers.  This exodus significantly contributed to the collapse 
of the basic social services upon which Zimbabweans depended (IOM 2009: pp. 71-72; 
UNDP 2008: p. 110-111, Table 7.5).  The consequences of this mass emigration, from 
these professions, and from the country, were clear to those individual Zimbabweans 
remaining. For many, their interests were directly threatened by the scale of the 
emigration (Pfaff 2006: pp. 138-139).  To provide a sense of the scale, 40,000 teachers 
were estimated to have left the profession after 2007 and most schools did not open in 
early 2008 (Tarisayi 2009: p. 19 citing Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe), 
while health sector staffing vacancies doubled in 2008 (Tarisayi 2009: p. 20).   
By 2008, economic rather than political factors were the primary motiviation 
for the accelerating emigration (Makina 2010: p. 229).  In the early years of this case 
study, ZANU-PF leaders appeared to welcome the voluntary exit: “[w]e would be 
better off with only six million people, with our own people who support the liberation 
 For each Zimbabwean sending home remittances from South Africa, it was estimated that five 22
Zimbabweans depending on these transfers (Crush and Tevera 2010 p. 3).  The exact value of 
remittances in Zimbabwe is unknown (UNDP 2008: p. 112), however Zimbabweans surveyed in 2007 
identified remittances as the "fourth most importance source of livelihood (UNDP 2008: p. 112 citing Mass 
Public Opinion Institute 2007)
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struggle.  We don’t want all these extra people” (HR NGO Forum 2007: p. 6 citing 
ZANU-PF Politburo Secretary D. Mutasa, UK Sunday Times).  Migration, more 
broadly, may help to ease of both political and economic pressures (Hirschman 1986: p. 
93; Lichbach 1995: p. 107). 
However, by 2008 its cumulative effect was becoming clear, and exacerbating 
the economic recovery challenges facing the members of the ZANU-PF regime (UNDP 
2008: p. 111).  Mass emigration may be seen as  'voting with their feet', and as the scale 
increased, it became more visible to others.  As Pfaff discussed with reference to East 
Germany, the mass voluntary emigration, to neighbouring countries, was a signal of 
"...regime vulnerability, [it made] popular grievances manifest, and activate[d] pressure 
for reform" (Pfaff 2006: p. 29).  For those remaining, the increasing pace and scale of 
emigration, may also have signaled that the 'worst is still to come’, triggering 'voice' 
rather than inaction, as the costs of "...silently enduring the continuing deterioration of 
public goods is also high" (Pfaff 2006: p. 28 citing Lindenburg 1991; p. 145).   
With no end in sight to an accelerating economic crisis, nor to the emigration of 
Zimbabweans, voluntary exit may have triggered voice (Pfaff 2006)  – and the message 
of dissatisfaction was delivered to the governing regime on 29 March 2008 at the ballot 
box.  
Summary  
This section of the dissertation brought together the dynamics of exit, voice and 
loyalty in the context of a single day of elections – March 29th, 2008.  These elections 
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were noteworthy, both during the period of this dissertation, and in Zimbabwe's history, 
for the success of the political opposition, the MDC.   
This synthesis section has highlighted several important shifts as compared to 
the earlier 'hurdles' of the elections earlier in this period.  First, the cost of expressing 
'voice' was declining, while the environment for the four freedoms that underpin the 
action-choice of 'voice' had become somewhat more permissive.  Second, for many, the 
'exit' option was closing.  Mass emigration due to economic crisis (Madina 2010: p. 
229) can reveal both a regime's vulnerability and the breadth of economic 
dissatisfaction (Pfaff 2006: pp. 29, 138).  It also created new vulnerabilities for those 
who remained, as key social services collapsed during this period, due to both 
economic conditions and migratory factors.  Third, the benefits of choosing the action-
choice of 'loyalty' were reduced, for many of the effects of the economic collapse 
would affect those loyal to ZANU-PF, especially those who were not in a privileged or 
elite position.     
Institutional reforms played a small role in these shifts.  As discussed, the 
playing field was not 'levelled' but they did create openings for a 'fairer match' –indeed 
the March 29th elections were viewed as the most 'fair' since the political crisis began 
(Masunungure 2009a: p. 6).  For the political opposition, greater freedom of movement, 
assembly and association was permitted, although challenges remained and freedom of 
expression on the public media was still constrained.  Political violence still occurred, 
but as noted, signals that greater 'free-riding' was being permitted in the security sector, 
and the renewed enforcement of formal policing rules was again starting to occur.  
These too were shifts as compared to previous electoral rounds.  
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In an environment of economic collapse, free-riding will likely increase, with 
all of its negative implications for group success.  There is "...no incentive to sacrifice 
any more than he is forced to sacrifice" (Olson 1971: p. 91).  Both the material benefits 
of loyalty (inducements), as well as the enforcement of loyalty weakened, and, as a 
result, the 'State's Dilemma' was exacerbated for members of the regime. 
The profound economic decline for those remaining in Zimbabwe and who had 
not left became a source of voice, i.e. voice as a residual of exit (Hirschman 1970: p. 
34).  Broadly shared and rising economic dissatisfaction created new pressures for 
'voice', and the economic losses being experienced by most Zimbabweans became a 
source of mobilisation for change, for actors are "...far more likely to organise around a 
threatened or actual loss than around a potential gain" (Stone 2002: p. 220).   
The March elections became a mechanism for communicating this voice 
(Hirschman 1970: p. 43), and one which helped to aggregate voice across the entire 
country, easing the coordination challenges faced by the MDC and its supporters.  This 
section has highlighted Zimbabweans' increasing confidence in the electoral process in 
the weeks leading to the election (Ndapwadza and Muchena 2009: pp. 31-33), i.e. in 
their increasing confidence in the "... prospects for the effective use of 
voice" (Hirschman 1970: p. 37). 
The dynamics of exit and voice were altered, particularly due to the economic 
collapse and the mass emigration it generated.  However, institutional reforms played 
an important role in facilitating mobilisation, in lowering the cost of voice, and in 
increasing perceptions that voice could be effective.  Zimbabweans, with their desire 
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for better rewards for themselves and their families, saw the opportunity that the March 
2008 elections presented:  "[e]conomic discontent translated into political discontent 
via the medium of the ballot box..."  (Masunungure 2009b: p. 77).  The members of the 
regime would not make that mistake in the second round run-off vote.  
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Chapter Six:  Conclusion 
This eight-year period of the Zimbabwean history was unique, for ZANU-PF 
faced both unprecedented opposition and the challenge of repeated elections (the 
'hurdle race').    Four national elections, either parliamentary or presidential votes, were 
the 'hurdles' during this 2000-2008 period.  These realities created a very specific 
collective action problem for the members of ZANU-PF – the 'State's 
Dilemma' (Lichbach 1995).  The challenge of retaining support when its supporters' 
interests lay otherwise, the elections process highlighted the dependency of the regime 
on Zimbabweans' choices.  The Zimbabwean literature has not previously explicitly 
focused on this collective action problem, the dynamics of exit and voice, nor on the 
role of institutional reform in easing the same.  This dissertation is therefore a 
contribution to the literature.    
Institutional rules were fiercely contested during this period, as they had been 
under Rhodesian rule and the resulting liberation struggle.  This dissertation has shown 
that institutions also mattered to the outcomes during this period.  They were the 'rules 
of the game' (North 1990: p. 3) that had important distributional consequences (Knight 
1992).     From the late 1990s, both the members of ZANU-PF, the MDC, and their 
respective allies and supporters were engaged in significant contestation over 
institutional reforms, and its distributional consequences.   
The referendum result of February 2000 was an important expression of 
preferences, by many Zimbabweans, for institutional alternatives that could generate 
different political outcomes. The NCA's efforts and their concerns for the democratic 
consequences of the rules of Zimbabwe's Constitution were important, both for their 
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awareness-raising and, their mobilising effects.  The NCA campaigns and the 
referendum had demonstrated Zimbabwean's interest and engagement in issues of 
institutional reform, and had created an opportunity for them to influence the 
institutional reform process.  This mobilisation, awareness-raising, and the referendum 
vote, had implications for the future expectations of many Zimbabweans.  And it  
generated important uncertainty regarding future institutional choices and outcomes for 
the members of the ZANU-PF regime. 
Institutional rules also matter for their contribution to explaining outcomes 
(Shepsle 1989: p. 135, emphasis added).  This dissertation made visible this 
contribution, which has not been systematically assessed in the Zimbabwean literature 
to date.  Strategic institutional reform is not the whole story, but it is part of it.  This 
dissertation has, for example, demonstrated the institutional reforms that underpinned 
the amplification of ZANU-PF's patriotic narrative.  Institutional rules may magnify or 
ease the collective action problems faced by each actor, and this dissertation has 
provided specific examples of how institutional reforms, strategically undertaken by 
the members of the ZANU-PF regime, has eased their own challenge or exacerbated 
the collective action problem of the MDC.  This analysis adds explanatory value to our 
understanding of this unique period.   
This dissertation has also contributed to the literature through its discussion of 
the centrality of these collective action problems to this institutional contestation in 
Zimbabwe.  This dissertation has discussed how specific reforms eased or exacerbated 
the collective actions problems faced by ZANU-PF or the MDC, recognizing that the 
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"...[t]he relative capacity for solving and creating, diminishing and magnifying 
collective action problems decides the outcome of the game" (Lichbach 1995: p. 258).  
Electoral success is a 'step-good' type of collective action problem (Hardin 
1992: pp. 4, 59-61), with its binary nature.  This author has argued that it has also both 
aggregated (across constituencies) characteristics and a time-bound nature, raising the 
hurdle 'higher'.  The 'State's Dilemma' is a specific collective action challenge faced by 
members of a governing regime and it is their challenge of sustaining needed support in 
the face of collective dissent (demands for reform), when the interests of the state's 
supporters may align otherwise (Lichbach 1995: pp. 256-258).  Its opposite is the 
Rebel's Dilemma, faced by the MDC during this period.   
The Rebel's Dilemma is the challenge of the mobilisation of dissent, for 
uncertain public benefits and certain private costs incentivise inaction rather than action 
and participation (Lichbach 1995: pp. 15-16).  Indeed, Lichbach argues that the 'Rebel's 
Dilemma' is "the origin of political repression" as regimes seek to intensify the 
Dilemma faced by their opponents (Lichbach 1994: p. 21).   
This dissertation has examined these Dilemmas through the theoretical lens of 
rational choice institutionalism, collective action theory and the dynamics of exit and 
voice (Hirschman 1970, 1978, 1986).  This approach adds to the diversity of theoretical 
frameworks which are already found within the literature on Zimbabwe.  Rational-
choice institutionalism is a theoretical framework that focuses analytically on decision-
making, rules, collective action challenges, uncertainty, and role of institutions in the 
aggregation and structuring of choices.  Its focus on the role of "...existing institutions 
structure individual and aggregate choice" (Levi, Cook et al. 1990: p. 15) allows for an 
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analysis of how the strategic choices of actors (individually, in organisations or in 
groups), are influenced, and shaped by, institutions themselves.  Specific examples of 
the outputs of institutional reform, for example, narrowed permissions or new 
prohibitions, have been discussed.   
The strategic institutional reforms, and their effects, undertaken during this 
turbulent time in Zimbabwe, have become more visible as a result of the theoretical 
lens of rational choice institutionalism.  This dissertation examines the specific role of 
institutional reform, in two key sectors:  print media and commercial agriculture; and, 
discusses the emergence of informal institutional rules in the area of public security and 
food aid distribution.   This dissertation also demonstrates that strategic institutional 
reform altered the dynamics of exit and voice during this period of profound 
contestation over institutions and the outcomes that they produced in Zimbabwe.   
As Hirschman originally argued (1970), there are three core action-choices 
available to individual (or collective) actors in situations of rising dissatisfaction – to 
exit, to give voice or to remain loyal.  Each of these action-choices were discussed, 
along with the two mechanisms of information and sanctions (i.e. penalties) identified 
by Knight (1992) that help actors to formulate their expectations of other actors.  
Moblisation, inducements (i.e. rewards and penalties), and veto or other powers, are 
amongst the strategies that may contribute to aligning expectations, and therefore 
choices and outcomes.  Lichbach argued that "[t]he state, recognising a dissident's exit/
voice option, uses accommodative and repressive response strategies to control the 
dissident's choice" (Lichbach 1995: p. 24).  Strategic institutional reforms were made to 
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help control the choices of ZANU-PF's political opponents and to retain ZANU-PF's 
political support.     
Chapter two discussed these three action-choices ('voice', 'exit' and 'loyalty'), 
highlighting how they interact with each other, and also discussing some of the key 
analytical developments within the conceptualisation of each action-choice.  'Voice' 
was discussed as 'vertical' (i.e. to authorities), 'horizontal' (i.e. amongst citizens or other 
actors) (Hirschman 1986: p. 82 citing O'Donnell 1986) or 'reformist' (i.e. to improve 
performance and/or responsiveness) (Pfaff 2006: p. 21).  'Exit' was discussed as either 
voluntary or forced.   Situations where the 'exit' option was unavailable, and  the 
different roles of 'voice' vis-à-vis 'exit' were also analysed and discussed, with specific 
reference to Zimbabwe.  The action-choice of 'loyalty' was also examined, both in 
keeping with Hirschman's original conceptualisation of loyalty as the postponement (or 
deferral) of exit (1970: p. 104) as well (in chapter four) refining the concept further, 
through the integration of Dowding et al.'s contribution (2000: pp. 476-478) that 
usefully distinguished between the object of loyalty from the degree of loyalty.  These 
distinctions allowed the questions of government performance versus love of country 
and demographics to be assessed in light of ZANU-PF's challenge of the State's 
Dilemma, and their own construct of loyalty.   
The second part of the dissertation (chapters three through five, plus a synthesis 
section) explored each of these action-choices in more depth, and specifically the role 
of institutional reform (or stability) in manipulating the dynamics of 'exit' and 'voice'.  
Chapter three discussed how the action-choice of voice is the expression of dissent, and 
is thus a sub-set of the larger public debate which occurs.  It analysed the institutional 
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reforms that were strategically introduced by the members of the governing regime to 
limit the private print media, and to restrict the four freedoms most important to 
collective mobilisation, and therefore to 'voice': the freedoms of expression, of 
assembly, of association, and, of movement.   
Chapter four examined the challenge of retaining loyalty, needed in order to 
help solve the 'State's Dilemma'.  The strategic deployment of both selective incentives 
(e.g. food aid, impunity and the protection from political violence) as well as penalties 
(e.g. targeted political violence), were discussed.  Incentives and penalties are both 
important means of aligning choices to achieve preferred outcomes.  The concept of 
free-riding, i.e. benefiting from the provision of a collective good without having 
participated in its production (Olson 1971: p. 91), was discussed.  The members of the 
ZANU-PF regime took specific measures to reduce it (e.g. by increasing the monitoring 
of contributions), for free-riding has important negative consequences on the prospects 
of collective success.  
Chapter five discussed forced 'exit' (displacement) in the commercial 
agriculture sector, and argued that forced exit, via the land seizures, helped to 
demonstrate political commitment, especially to rural Zimbabweans, easing ZANU-
PF's collective action problem.  Reforms transferred the choice of 'exit' from the 
farmers to the 'state', in the process both increasing the use of 'voice' and increasing the 
dependency of the farmers (and their workers) on the choices and decisions of the 
GOZ.  A specific cost of exit, that is, compensation for the land itself, was central to the 
land debate, and decisions to not pay compensation lowered the cost of exit for the 
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ZANU-PF regime. Both the reductions in the cost of 'exit' and the transfer of the 
control of the 'exit option' were fundamental to the acceleration of land acquisition.   
Across chapters three through five of this dissertation, the analysis has drawn 
specific attention to the powers of actor selection, of initiative and compulsion and the 
permissions and prohibitions altered or created through reforms.  The identification of 
these powers and their effects on the dynamics of exit and voice is an advance on both 
Hirschman and Lichbach.  These were the some of the outputs of the intentional 
processes of institutional reform, and they had important effects on outcomes, for by 
altering the dynamics of exit and voice they eased the ZANU-PF's collective action 
challenge.  Despite the turbulence of this period under study, intentional reforms were 
adopted: reforms that helped to suppress voices of dissent, that constrained 
mobilisation by those opposed to the ZANU-PF regime, and that demonstrated 
commitment by forcing the exit of thousands of commercial farmers and farmworkers.   
The prospective nature of rules eased ZANU-PF's coordination challenge for 
their effect would continue to felt at each future 'hurdle' or election.  Once the rules 
were in place, they applied to future cases, easing ZANU-PF's collective action 
challenge.  Examples from the media sector and its prohibitions on content and sectoral 
participation were discussed.  In the security sector, the rules, formal and informal, 
eased ZANU-PF's coordination challenges as they communicated to agents and allies 
how cases (e.g. of protest) should be handled, and engaged actors in their enforcement. 
Rules also provide information to actors about permissions, prohibitions, incentives and 
penalties, affecting decision-making through, for example, the choices they incentivise 
and the deterrence they generate.      
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The strategic management of uncertainty, i.e. the use of intentional reforms to 
reduce uncertainty about outcomes was also discussed throughout the dissertation.  
Uncertainty is an important analytical factor emerging from rational choice 
institutionalism, given its effects on the evaluation of choices, decisions, and also the 
expected actions of other actors.  This dissertation specifically discussed two types of 
uncertainty, the first, about an actor's future status within a group and, the second, the 
uncertainty about institutional alternatives and outcomes.  This dissertation has 
demonstrated how institutional reforms contributed to reducing uncertainty for 
members of the ZANU-PF regime.  For example, new rules in the media sector, that 
prohibited the development of private sector radio, ended the uncertainty that was 
generated by the Supreme Court decision that de-regulated the sector.  The Land 
Acquisition Act (2000) not only mobilised political support in advance of the upcoming 
elections but also reduced the uncertainty about the rules governing land acquisition 
that followed the referendum result.   
The synthesis section, which examined the elections of March 29th, 2008, 
brought these three action-choices together in a discussion about the dynamics of exit, 
voice and loyalty and the contribution of institutional reform to the outcomes.  Whilst 
economic collapse was a very significant factor, this dissertation highlighted its impacts 
on the choice of voluntary 'exit', and the impacts of mass 'exit' on the mobilisation of 
voice.  Incremental institutional reforms that enabled the MDC to more effectively 
campaign and mobilise support were discussed, while the weaker enforcement of 
loyalty within the police was also highlighted.      
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ZANU-PF's political narrative has received a great deal of attention within the 
literature on Zimbabwean crisis.  As Ranger (2004) identified it was a narrowed and 
partisan distillation of Zimbabwe's history, dominated by the key themes of 
sovereignty, liberation, and race.  It was also a sophisticated and powerful political 
framing of ZANU-PF's liberation history deployed in an electorally competitive 
environment.  Chapter three analysed how this 'patriotic narrative' differed from the 
action-choice of voice in its substantive content, source, role and target.   
This 'patriotic narrative' was a non-institutionalist strategy that had important 
mobilising effects for ZANU-PF, for it contributed to the mobilisation of both domestic 
and international support (Tendi 2008).  It also contributed to the de-legitimisation of 
Zimbabwean voices of dissent, including those of the trade union movement, white 
Zimbabweans and the civic supporters of the MDC.  The political use of liberation and 
struggle to help legitimate (or not) demands and access to resources (Kriger 2006), 
provides an important interests-based rationale for the narrative's mobilising success.   
The framing of this patriotic narrative also explicitly evoked the language and 
imagery of war and struggle, through ZANU-PF's development of the concept of the 
Third Chimurenga.  In consequence, this narrative appeared to create a more 
permissive environment for the political violence which occurred.  This is also an 
example of how the 'patriotic narrative' served as a coordination mechanism.  By 
communicating ZANU-PF's expectations, including to its allies and agents, it helped to 
facilitate the coordination of efforts, decisions and choices.  It provided information 
across different geographical points and reduced uncertainty about ZANU-PF's 
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intentions and expectations.  Coordination of expectations is particularly important in a 
decentralised, time-bound collective action problem such as the 'State's Dilemma' faced 
by ZANU-PF during this period.  The coordination role of ZANU-PF's narrative is 
revealed by the use of rational choice institutionalism and collective action theory as 
analytical frameworks.    
The patriotic narrative also focused on land, and the colonial period's legacy of 
inequitable land rights and distribution.  As discussed, this framing was a successful 
one, for Zimbabweans did concur that the land question was an important issue.  Land 
issues were important to two of ZANU-PF's key constituencies, i.e. rural Zimbabweans 
and the war veterans.  Functionally, the land issue also helped to distinguish ZANU-PF 
from the more urban-based MDC.   
ZANU-PF's 'patriotic narrative' had important effects, but it was not deployed 
alone – it was accompanied by institutional reform.  The narrative's effects arose not 
only from its own normative power, but also from the amplification that occurred 
through the state-owned media (print and broadcast sectors) and statements by senior 
members of the regime.  As discussed, and documented by the MMPZ, its dominance 
was also due to the suppression of the voices of dissent.    
As discussed in Chapter three, this dissertation analysed the intentional reforms 
undertaken to restructure the relations within the print media sector.  These selected 
actors, narrowed permissions, increased the noticeability of action and strengthened 
penalties for non-compliance. Undertaken by members of the ZANU-PF regime the 
outcome was to sustain their distributional advantage in the private print media sector.  
Information problems exacerbate the challenge of coordination of both expectations 
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and actions.  Restrictions on the flow, availability and reliability of information are help 
solve collective action problems by "...concentrat[ing] their attacks...on the dissident's 
supplies or input sources" (Lichbach 1995: p. 49 citing Leites and Wolf 1970: p. 
76-78).  For the members of the ZANU-PF regime, the uncertainty that was generated 
by the substantive journalistic content in the private media sector was reduced.     
Institutional reforms also targeted the freedoms that underpin the action-choice 
of 'voice' and its aggregation.  Each of these freedoms – the freedom of speech, of 
association, of assembly and of movement – is an institutional rule, and all are 
guaranteed in Zimbabwe's Constitution.  During the period of this study, these 
freedoms, through their facilitation of mobilisation and aggregation of both 'horizontal' 
and ‘vertical’ voices of dissent, exacerbated the collective action challenge faced by the 
members of ZANU-PF regime.   
The intentional reforms that were expressed in AIPPA and POSA, altered the 
incentives, prohibitions and penalties facing Zimbabweans.  These narrowed what was 
permitted in terms of the practice of journalism and the freedom of expression, and they 
broadened the penalties for non-compliance.  New requirements of licensing and 
accreditation not only encouraged compliance but provided members of the regime 
with opportunities to force 'exit' and increased the dependency of those in media sector 
on the regime's decisions.  Criminal and financial penalties were introduced along the 
entire publishing chain.  The adoption, and later amendment, of these two Acts, were 
the outputs of intentional reform processes.  And they restructured relations to suppress 
dissenting voices, including through either voluntary or forced exit.    
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The 'no-go' zones that were established across many constituencies were 
communicated and enforced as informal rules that de facto created restrictions on the 
freedoms of association and movement.  These restrictions narrowed the permissions 
inherent in the freedom of movement, by limiting its geographic scope, the population 
entitled to enjoy the freedoms (despite constitutional protections for all citizens), and/or 
by limiting the purposes for which freedom of movement was allowed.  So many 'no-
go' zones, in so many districts were the result of strategic decisions taken and 
communicated to ZANU-PF's allies or agents (e.g. war veterans, youth militia 
members).   
This dissertation argued that informal rules differ in three important ways from 
the simple, non-enforcement of formal rules.  First, they communicate new rules that 
specifically structure and/or alter relationships between specific groups of actors (e.g. 
the youth militia and the police).  Second, these informal rules may provide new 
permissions that differ from those provided under the formal rules.  These permissions 
may include new freedoms, roles or entitlements.  Third, the decision-making sphere 
and the scope for creating informal rules is different than that where formal rules, and 
their enforcement, are decided.   
The 'no-go' zones, the impunity offered to ZANU-PF's allies engaged in 
political violence (chapter four), and the partisan distribution selective incentives (e.g. 
food aid purchased with state funds), are all examples of informal rules.  They were 
informal rules emerged through intentional and strategic decisions by members of the 
regime, and were not decided by Parliament, nor effected through formal processes 
(e.g. amendments to the Police Act, gazetting).  These informal rules were discussed, 
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including with reference to their effects on the effectiveness of the MDC's mobilisation, 
and their benefits in terms of easing ZANU-PF's dilemma.  
Chapter four focused on two specific strategies to that ease collective action 
problems: the strategic use of inducements (i.e. incentives and penalties) as well as the 
management of the free-riding problem.  Inducements and reducing free-riding are 
strategies to align choices, an outcome needed for the State's Dilemma to be 
sufficiently resolved for the 'step-good' to be achieved.  One of the research lines of 
enquiry asked 'how did reforms to rules alter the incentives and penalties faced by 
actors' and this chapter examined the regime's use of informal rules to strategically alter 
penalties and incentives in order to retain the electoral loyalty of both their agents ( e.g. 
youth militia) and of Zimbabweans.  
 This discussion complements that in chapter three which discussed strategies of 
actor selection and the exit option.  Compliance was encouraged via a narrowing of 
permissions and the introduction of stronger, tougher penalties.  The reward of 
protection from political violence, either as victims or as perpetrators; the use of 
political violence as a penalty (punishment) for disloyalty, and as a disincentive for 
future disloyalty; the strategic distribution of material benefits (selective incentives), 
particularly the allocation of food aid were all discussed. 
Rational actors, in situations of strategic interdependency, may offer selective 
incentives to encourage specific outcomes.  If so, they will want to reduce free-riding 
via demands for specific demonstrations of loyalty and through strategies to increase 
the visibility, i.e. noticeability, of contributions via monitoring and control measures.  
This dissertation has discussed examples of ZANU-PF's demands and contributions of 
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loyalty, including access to (or denial of) food aid as well as votes in exchange for 
employment or promotion/demotion.  
 Monitoring mechanisms and enforcement measures are also needed to reduce 
free-riding and/or non-compliance with these demands.  Informal rules that target 
enforcement, against 'enemies' or ‘sell-outs' communicated, to members and supporters 
of the ZANU-PF regime, that action to address disloyalty was being taken.  
Enforcement actions that are strategically timed (discussed below) may amplify these 
effects, particularly when the collective action itself is one that is time-bound.  For the 
members of the regime, targeted enforcement helped to address their collective action 
problem through the retention of support, as well as suppression of opposition..   
The action-choice of loyalty differed from genuine support for ZANU-PF, as, 
recalling, the action-choice is the deferral of exit in situations of dissatisfaction or 
dissent.  This definition clearly indicates that the action-choice is with the actor or 
citizen, rather than 'management' or the 'authorities'.  As argued, to remain loyal, in a 
time-bound, collective action situation is a decision by rational actors, one that takes 
into account the costs and benefits of this action-choice and those of the other 
alternatives available.   
This action-choice also differed from ZANU-PF's own views on 'loyalty', 
anchored in their historical achievement of majority rule, and framed by their liberation 
struggle.  ZANU-PF's own constructed view of the liberation struggle and revolution 
would not recognize the distinction between the separation of object and degree of 
loyalty identified by Dowding et. al. (2000: p. 477).  As Southall (2013: p. 70) argues 
there was a "...continuing belief in ZANU-PF that politics in Zimbabwe are essentially 
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an extension of the liberation struggle and consequently that they are the only party 
with the ‘right’ to govern”.  Very broadly, this view conflates democracy with the 
transition to majority rule and loyalty to ZANU-PF and loyalty to the nation (Southall 
2013: p. 68-71).  ZANU-PF's constructed view of loyalty, based on their historic 
achievement and the liberation struggle, appears to discount the potential for other 
factors, e.g. economic aspirations or a desire for change, to provide the basis for 
mobilisation and agency.   
However, this view of loyalty is offset by the undisputable reality of ZANU-
PF's repeated, voluntary decisions to compete in democratic elections, as well as their 
maintenance of rules that permitted the existence of a legal, political opposition.  From 
an institutionalist perspective, ZANU-PF chose to maintain formal rules that permitted 
opposition, and acknowledged the same through its decisions to electorally compete.  
Throughout this period of profound contestation, and the institutional instability it 
generated for the members of the ZANU-PF regime, the MDC (or other parties) were 
not banned (although they were suppressed and targeted through political violence).  
Although many other intentional reforms were also made to suppress the action-choice 
of voice, including the prohibitions and penalties did restrict its mobilisation and 
aggregation, these reforms did not go so far as to extinguish the aggregation of this 
voice through alternative political parties.  
For this author, one of the puzzling questions arising of this 2000-2008 period is 
why ZANU-PF chose to compete in the 'hurdle race' of this period.  Chan (2011: p. 
100) attributes the decisions to hold elections during this period to reputational reasons, 
i.e. to "validate" ZANU-PF’s historical achievements and their vision, while Matyszak 
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(2010: p. 46) states that they were simply opportunities for Zimbabweans to express 
"fealty and obeisance to power". The answer(s) are important to both the larger 
discussions about the characteristics of ZANU-PF as a liberation movement holding 
power, and also to the institutionalisation of democratic governance in Zimbabwe.   
This dissertation identified, in the public opinion polling data, how 
Zimbabweans, at the start of this period, recognized, and valued, many of the 
institutions of liberal democracy (Chikwanha-Dzenga et. al. 2001: p. 10 Table 2).  Over 
70 percent of those surveyed preferred democracy as a mode of governance and 74 
percent rejected a one-party model (ibid: pp. 6-7).  The demographic data presented 
highlighted (Chart 4) that the majority of the population, by 2002, were born, or came 
of age, since independence. For many of these Zimbabweans, the constitutional rules 
were the 'rules of the game'.  This institutionalist analysis has discussed that the 'rules 
of the game' allowed for multiple players, and through the institutional rules of the 
freedoms of expression, association, movement and assembly, the space for civic and 
political opposition to exist.   
This dissertation has also discussed how the 'rules of the game' were then 'tilted' 
by ZANU-PF in their favour through intentional reforms.  ZANU-PF's views on their 
own right to govern arising from the liberation struggle, may provide the motivation (or 
the 'why') for their actions.  Without question they also had public support, but they 
also chose to compete in the processes of democratic governance and its underlying 
principles of constitutionalism.  The decision to participate, whatever the motivation, 
was recognition of the legitimacy of these rules.  This recognition, helped to drive some 
of the contestation during this period.   
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Contribution to the Literature and Areas for Further Research  
The dissertation has identified the reality that the members of the ZANU-PF 
regime faced a very specific collective action problem, the 'State's Dilemma', during 
this unique eight-year period of Zimbabwean history.  It has shown that institutional 
reforms, the outcome of intentional decision-making by the members of the ZANU-PF 
regime, were an important part of this turbulent period.  These reforms were an 
important means to alter exit-voice dynamics, easing the collective action problems 
faced by a regime seeking to retain its hold on power, despite significant domestic 
dissent.   
Of note, the focus on distributional advantage as a driver of either institutional 
reform, or the maintenance of institutional stability (Knight 1992) provided important 
explanatory value in understanding the strategic actions of the members of the ZANU-
PF regime.  The introduction of Hardin's assessment of electoral victory as a 'step-good' 
was also an advance – given that the Zimbabwean crisis was marked by four distinct 
national elections in the eight year period under assessment in this dissertation.  This 
dissertation drew attention to the specific characteristics of the 'step-good' of electoral 
victory, that is, a collective action challenge that has a fixed timeline, and is the 
aggregation of both individual actions (i.e. votes) and localised (i.e. constituency) 
challenges that must be simultaneously achieved through coordinated action.  The 
attention to these characteristics that helped to reveal both the coordination that 
occurred across space and time, and the strategic timing of both key incentives and 
penalties.    
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The dissertation has contributed to an understanding of exit-voice dynamics by 
examining institutional reforms and collective action dynamics within specific sectors 
(e.g. media, commercial agriculture) and within a single developing country.  As such, 
this dissertation opens up new areas for further research, either comparatively across 
other countries facing similar situations of collective dissent, across the other countries 
of Southern Africa led by the former liberation movements.  Comparative studies on 
institutional reforms within a single sector such as the media market may also be of 
value.   
This dissertation has added to the existing research on the Zimbabwean crisis 
through its innovative application of a rational choice institutionalist framework, the 
collective action challenge of the 'State's Dilemma', and Hirschman's action-choices of 
exit, voice and loyalty, to the specific examination of Zimbabwe's political crisis.  The 
Zimbabwean case appears to support Pfaff's (2006) assertion that mass, voluntary exit, 
can become a trigger for voice, and thus also of Hirschman's argument that voice may 
serve as a residual of exit (1970: pp. 34-37).   
The strategic use of institutional reform altered the rules that structure the 
interactions between actors, including in future instances, as rules are prospective.  The 
accompanying sanctions (penalties) for non-compliance, incentivised compliance, as 
rational actors, in an economic environment of increasing impoverishment, so to avoid 
those costs, whether financial (e.g. fines), legal (e.g. imprisonment), or physical (e.g. 
displacement, political violence).  As such, the transaction costs for the regime were 
reduced.  This analysis may be valuable for future researchers examining other 
electoral crises or other sectoral reforms where costs and compliance are important.  
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Across the sectors examined, and the action-choices, discussed, the 
identification of the powers of actor selection are perhaps the most important in terms 
of collective action research more broadly, and exit-voice dynamics in particular.  For it 
is this power, that may increase the dependency of one actor on another, thus 
incentivising compliance or loyalty.  This power of actor selection is also the power – 
as seen in this dissertation – to force exit, i.e. to remove those expressing voice, those 
supporting reform, or wavering in their electoral commitment to ZANU-PF.  The power 
to force exit is one that dramatically restricts the choices available to the actor(s) being 
'exited', while reducing uncertainty faced by the other actors.  Forcing exit may resolve 
challenges relating to group size, may increase the benefits (rewards) arising from 
group membership, and/or facilitate coordination and mobilisation by the removal of 
'dissenters'.  The 'State's' power to select actors, and therefore to force exit, provides it 
with a significant advantage in intensifying the 'Rebel's Dilemma'.  
Additional research arising from this institutionalist discussion, would be to 
assess, whether, and to what extent, the narrative of patriotic history, may have become, 
nearly two decades later, institutionalised.  Both the scope and time-frame, of this study 
are too narrow to assess this question.  However, this future research would offer not 
only new insights into Zimbabwe, but also be of wider theoretical value in terms of 
understanding if, how, and under what conditions, narratives may become institutions.  
An additional area of further research would be to assess, in greater detail, the 
communication of patriotic history as a causal story (Stone 1989; 2002).  This 
assessment, with its focus on the definition of political problems and the consequent 
implications for policy alternatives, would complement other analysts' valuable 
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assessments on the development and effects of patriotic history.  It may perhaps 
contribute additional explanatory value in understanding the challenges of responding 
to it in an electoral context.    
This dissertation has focused on strategic institutional reforms, by members of 
the governing ZANU-PF regime that de facto altered the dynamics of exit and voice in 
Zimbabwe (2000-2008) – to the distributional advantage of the regime.  It has 
contributed to the collective action literature via its focus on the 'State's Dilemma', and 
by its attention to the specific nature of the collective action challenge ('step-good') that 
is an electoral victory.  Because institutions matter' to outcomes, this framework, and 
also the dynamics of exit and voice, discussed in this case study of Zimbabwe's 
political crisis (2000-2008), may be relevant to the study of other countries, in Southern 
Africa or elsewhere.  It may contribute to future studies analysing the governance of 
former liberation movements, including the internalisation (or not) of the elements of 
constitutionalism.    
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Chart 1:   
Zimbabwean Opinions on Freedoms underpinning ‘Voice’  
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